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My  
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## FOREWARD

It gives me great pleasure, indeed, in publishing Dr. Tapasvi S. Nandi's thesis entitled "The Origin and Development of the Theory of Rasa and Dhvani in Sanskrit Poetics".

Dr. Nandi has dealt with the subject in its historical perspective which forms an interesting study in probably one of the most important theories advanced by Sanskrit literary criticism. He has shown how the theory of Vyañjanā-Rasa-Dhvani was ably established by the efforts of such ālamkārikas as Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata. Ānandavardhana's views were by and large found to be acceptable to his followers with rare exceptions, such as Kuntaka, Mahima, Bhoja, Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, etc. The Vaishnavite ālamkārikas such as Rūpa Goswamin tried to give a different colouring.

I am thankful to Dr. Nandi for agreeing to the publication of this research work which was accepted by this University for the award of the Ph.D. degree. I also wish to express our grateful appreciation of the financial assistance given by the University Grants Commission for this publication.

I have no doubt that the students, teachers and others interested in this subject will find this reading a rewarding experience.

Gujarat University  
Ahmedabad-9.  
July 31, 1973.  
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K. G. Parikh  
University Registrar

## PREFACE

The present work actually forms the thesis for Ph.D. prepared under the guidance of Prof. R. C. Parikh of the B. J. Institute of Learning and Research, Ahmedabad. My thanks are due to the Gujarat University authorities for undertaking the publication of this work, which though written first, is actually my third work in a book form, the other two being, 'Sanskrt Nātakano Paricaya', and 'Bhāratīya Sāhityaśāstranī Vicāra Paramparāo', (in Gujarati) both being the publications undertaken by the University Book-Production Board, Gujarat Rajya. A fourth book viz the translation of *Locana* in Gujarati, with introduction and annotations is also in Press, and the Gujarat University has taken up its publication and my fifth work, viz. The *Kāvya prakāśa* (I-VI) with Gunaratna's *Sāradīpikā* is also to be published soon. I am extremely thankful to Dr. Solomon, Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Gujarat University and Dr. J. M. Shukla, Reader in Sanskrit, Gujarat University, for their helpful suggestions. My thanks are also due to Mrs. Harsha Nandi and daughter Chinmayee for being helpful in their own way throughout the course of the publication of this work. I also thank my sister Sragdharaben for preparing the word-index. Shri Ramanand Press also deserves thanks for the speedy work it carried out.

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Navarangpura, Ahmedabad-9.  
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T. S. Nandi

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## INTRODUCTION

One of the great prasthānas of Sanskrit Poetics is what we might call 'Dhvani, particularly rasa-dhvani, prasthāna'. It is therefore natural that the topics of vyañjanā-dhvani and rasa should have been discussed by many modern scholars. However, as far my knowledge goes, no one has discussed in detail, the origin and development of these two topics and their inter-relation in a connected form. It has been my humble attempt to do this work in the present thesis

In Dhvanyāloka, we find the dhvani theory in its fully developed form. At Dhv. I 2 we are told (1) that the 'artha' or sense which is the soul of poetry, is of two kinds viz vācya or expressed and pratiyamāna or implied. It is this pratiyamāna artha which is regarded as the soul of poetry (Dhv. I. 5) (2), though Alhinava would allow this honour to that pratiyamāna sense alone which conveys rasa (3) In Dhv I 7, we are told (4) that this pratiyamāna sense is not understood merely by the knowledge of grammar or logic, but it is known only by those who know the essence of poetry. Thus, Dhv indicates a verbal process in poetry which is only grasped by the aesthetics of poetry. So, what one has to find out in great poetry is his 'vyaṅgyārtha' or the suggested sense, and the word that is capable of shedding light on it. When in a poem, this verbal process of vyañjanā predominantly engages the mind, it is called 'dhvani' or 'dhvanikāvya' by the sūtris or sages. Ānanda says that the soul of poetry is dhvani (kāvyasyātma dhvaniḥ—Dhv. I.1). Here dhvani is a synonym of vyaṅgyārtha. But he also says (Dhv. I. 13) and Mammata follows him, that a poem in which dhvani predominates is called dhvanikāvya (kāvyavīśaḥ sa dhvanīriti sūtibhiḥ kathitaḥ) (Dhv, I. 13). Here dhvani is a characteristic of a poem which is classified by Mammata as uttama-īdamuttamam atīśayinī vyaṅgye vācyaḥ dhvanīrbudhaiḥ

kathitah (K P I) Thus in one sense, dhvani is a characteristic of a poem in which vyangyārtha predominates

From Dhv I 1, we have to infer that Ānandavardhana does not regard himself to be the first to promulgate this theory. As we learn from the introductory portion of the Dhv, this theory was a subject of great controversy amongst the learned critics of Sanskrit poetry. The very first verse informs us that though the wise have ordained that the soul of poetry is dhvani, still, some say that there is nothing like dhvani, while others say that it is something secondary in a poem, and still others maintain that the essence of dhvani is something beyond words (Dhv I 1) (5)

Unfortunately however, we do not find any work earlier than Dhv, which treats of dhvani in this fashion. So, I have attempted in this thesis to find out, if possible, the earlier background of this theory.

The theorists of poetry or writers on poetics in Sanskrit were primarily, as it should be, concerned with the nature and functions of poetry. Poetry, however, is an art which uses human speech as its medium. Therefore, these writers thought it proper to concern themselves with word and whatever it conveys, i.e. the various meanings, particularly the emotive suggestions in contrast with its direct or scientific meaning. In other words, they considered, what is called in modern logic, the scientific and the emotive uses of language (Susane Stebbing Introduction of Logic). This has led to the theory of abhidhā, lakṣaṇa and vyañjana in Sanskrit poetics.

According to Ānand there are three types of dhvani, viz. vastudhvani, alampkaradhvani and rasadhvani. But vastu and alampkāra dhvanis can also take the form of abhidhā. Rasa-dhvani, however, is exclusively conveyed by vyañjana. Thus vyañjana and rasa become intimately correlated. It appears that all the emphasis laid upon vyañjana is mainly for the purpose of rasa-conveyance. In this way these two topics viz

vyāñjanā and rasa become so to say, parts of a single theory. So, investigation (or inquiry) in one topic remains incomplete without an investigation in the other topic. So in the second and third parts of my thesis, I have tried to study the origin and development of the concepts of rasa and the various theories advanced for its conveyance by different theorists (Part II & III)

In the first part of my thesis, I have started with the references of dhvani and vyanjana in the vedic literature including the Upanisads, starting with Rgveda. After that I proceed to Nirukta, Rk-prāśikhya, Astadhyayi of Pāṇini and Mahabhāṣya of Patañjali.

It may be noted that we fail to come across the words 'vyāñjanā, pratiyamāna' as such in the Rv. The word dhvani also does not occur in the Rv. We will see, however, that we do come across different forms of the root √dhvan in Rv and also of the word 'dhvani' in Av. But these occur in the usual sense of 'sound' and do not have the technical sense of dhvani as seen in Sanskrit Poetics.

However, we do come across different forms of the root √añj, and vi+√añj, such as ayyate, ayyase, ayyamanah, vyajyate, vyanjate etc etc. A careful study of the different occurrences of √añj in its various grammatical forms shows that it seems to carry principally the meaning viz (i) 'to anoint' with a view to embellish, the second stage being that of embellishment proper, and (ii) 'to shine'. Its use with the prefix 'vi' is in the sense of 'to shine forth' 'to glitter' etc. The idea seems to be to enhance the glitter of something by the application of some ingredient, the stages being first anointing and then the consequential embellishment and the general meaning of adding zest to a thing, and this adding zest, by means of revealing the hidden meaning of a thing. Moreover, the survey of the occurrences of vi+√añj in the vedas shows two connected meanings, viz to bring out something hidden, by the application or enhancement of something, to brighten, to embellish,

to decorate, to adorn, to display I have similarly studied all such occurrences of  $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}}$ ,  $vi+\sqrt{a\tilde{n}}$ ,  $\sqrt{dhvan}$  and  $dhvani$  in the Nighantu and the Nirukta, Pāṇini and Patañjali.

The Nighantu does not contain  $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}}$  and  $vi+\sqrt{a\tilde{n}}$  in any grammatical form. There are certain occurrences of  $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}}$  in the Nirukta, but this is only by way of explaining the vedic mantras quoted therein, and we fail to come across any new shades of meaning other than those already found in the Vedas. Nor do we find any occurrences of  $\sqrt{dhvan}$  or the word  $dhvani$  in either the Nighantu or the Nirukta. However, at 713, in the Nirukta we have *vyāñjanamatram* in the sense of more indication. 'Vyāñjana here means an indicator. This seems to be the earliest occurrence of 'vyāñjana' in the sense of 'indication'. Similarly, in Ch 1 (Nirukta) Yaska cites the opinion of Gargya who holds that upasargas are not meaningful by themselves but they serve to suggest or indicate the relation of *nāma* and *ākṛtā* with a particular meaning. Says Gargya *na nirabaddhah upasargah arthān nirāhuh nāmā khyatayostu karmopasamyogadyotakāḥ bhavanti*. Thus, it seems, Yaska comes very near to the power of *dyotana* or suggestion. We know that in the *kāvyaśāstra* the word *dyotana* is used as an equivalent of *vyāñjana*. Thus these early occurrences of the  $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}}$  and  $vi+\sqrt{a\tilde{n}}$  and *vyāñjana* foreshadow the later technical use in Sanskrit Poetics.

In the *Rk-pratisakhya* we do not come across anything worthy of note. In Pāṇini also there is no mention of *vyāñjan* or *sphota* or *dhvani* as such. We come across 'vyāñjana' in the technical sense of a consonant. But at Pā II, 1 34-*vyāñjanairupasiṅkte*, the explanation given is *dadhox upasiṅktam dadhikam*. Thus *vyāñjana* is anything that is used to enhance the relish of the main or principal object of eating. We come across the same use of the term *vyāñjana* in the *Nṛtyasāstra*, wherein Bharata cites the analogy of *śālavādīrasa* (Nā Śā Ch VI). This can have an important bearing on the *vyāñjanavāda*

of the *ālaṃkārikas*. In *Patañjali* also, we come across occurrences of different forms of  $\sqrt{a}ṇj$  and  $vi+\sqrt{a}ṇj$  and also of *sphota* and *dhvani*. But the term *dhvani* occurs in the sense of sound only. The word *vyañjanā* by itself is missing even here. At VIII 1.70, in the *Mahābhāṣya* it is observed, 'vyajyate anena iti vyañjanam'. Thus 'vyañjana' is that which reveals or manifests or brings something into light. This sense of *prakāśana* is note worthy, especially from the point of view of the *vyañjanāvada*.

I have also studied the occurrences of  $\sqrt{a}ṇj$  and  $vi+\sqrt{a}ṇj$  in works of early poets such as *Asvaghosa*, *Kalidāsa* and also *Bhāsa*, the supposed author of the thirteen *Trivendrum* plays. Literary criticism follows literature. So, I have tried to note certain important occurrences in these poets, which could have inspired the Sanskrit poetists in the formation of the theory of *vyañjanā* and *dhvani*. For example, *Bu Ca* IV 84 reads : 'upapañnamīdam vākyaṃ sauhārdavyaṇjakam tvayi'. Herein a *vākya* is said to be 'sauhārdavyaṇjaka' i.e. 'suggestive of friendship'. Similarly in *Kalidāsa's Meghaduta* (purva, 29) we have

'saubhāgyam te subhaga virahāvasthaya vyanjayanti'. This is the description of the river *Nirvindhya*. As *Mallinātha* explains, the *nṛyakanṛyikabhāva* is clearly suggested here. Moreover, *Kumārasambhava* VII 91 reads

tan sandhiṣu vyañjitavṛttibhedam  
rasāntaresu pratibaddharāgam etc

This has a clear reference to the concepts of *vyañjanā* and *rasa*. Instances can be multiplied. One fact emerges out of this, and it is that the *ālaṃkārikas* might have found much in this to draw upon.

*Ānandavardhana* and *Mammata* make it clear that the original inspiration for the theory of *vyañjanā* comes from the *Sphota*-doctrine of the grammarians (6). So, I have tried to investigate this relationship. I have based my study on the original works such as the *Mahābhāṣya* of *Patañjali* and the

Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari, etc as well as the exposition of Sphota—in the works of scholars like P. C Chakravarty and Gaurinath Shastri I have tried to draw as many as nine important points to justify the statement of Ānanda and Mammata that the Sphota doctrine is their original source of inspiration for the dhvani-theory (Ch II)

As vyañjanā is one of the sabdavṛttis, and as a general discussion on sabdavṛttis forms an important part, particularly in later Sanskrit Poetics, I have thought it proper to discuss these topics also in detail (Ch III)

In these chs III & IV, I have not only discussed the nature and scope of different sabdavṛttis, but also the recognition of these by different schools of thought such as those represented by the Vaiyākaranas, Mīmāṃsakas, etc (Ch IV)

In these chapters, I have consulted the original works, yet I am particularly indebted to the works of P C Chakravarty and Prof Devasthali. In Ch V, I have tried to study the exact recognition of different sabdavṛttis in the works of early poeticists such as Bhamaha, Dandin, etc. It should be noted, however that in the works of these authors, we do not come across any systematic discussion of the nature and scope of the sabdavṛttis, as is seen in the works of later authors on alampkāra such as Mammata, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha etc. However, we meet with passages which go to show that the authors were familiar with the ideas of functions of word. Bhamaha has discussed the nature of word and has tried to refute the Sphotavāda. Bhamaha's familiarity with the function other than vyañjanā is quite apparent as shown by me in the thesis (Ch V). As to his familiarity with vyañjanā, we may say that vyañjanā does not occupy the same place as abhidhā in his mind, i.e. he does not seem to have known vyañjana as a separate vṛtti. He, however, uses different forms of वृत्/वृत्ति with the later meaning of vyañjanā at different places. As in Bhamaha, so also in Dandin, we do not come across any mention of vyañjanā as such by name. However, we come

across different forms of root *vi+√añj* in the sense of, 'to suggest' We also come across the term '*pratiyate*' meaning 'is implied' We come across clear references to *lakṣanā* or *gaunī*. *Vāmana* very often refers to *bhakti*, *lakṣanā*, or *gaunārtha* and *upacāra*. But he also does not mention *vyañjanā* by name. He seems to touch *vyañjanā* only indirectly

In *Udbhata* there are some direct and indirect references to the different *vṛttis* including '*avagamana*' (*kāvyaśālmkāra*, *Udbhata*) The meaning of '*avagamana*' is very near to *vyañjanā*

In *Rudrata*, we come across direct and indirect references to *abhidhā* and *lakṣanā* and also indirect references to *vyañjanā*. Thus we see that in these early authors from *Bhāmaha* to *Rudrata*, we do find references in their works which go to indicate that the idea of *vyañjanā* was not absent from their minds, though we cannot say that they have clearly visualised it, much less defined it It should be noted however, that the charm that comes out of *vyañjanā* is recognised by these earlier authors in different *śālmkāras* such as *paryāyokta*, *samāsokti*, *aprasūta*, *prasaṁsā*, *dīpaka*, *ākṣepa*, etc.

The exponents of *dhvani* school like *Ānandavardhana*, *Abhinavagupta*, *Ruyyaka* and *Jagannātha* say that the earlier writers such as *Bhāmaha*, *Dandin*, etc though without clearly defining *dhvani*, had subsumed it under various *guṇas* and *śālmkāras* An element of implicit sense can be seen in the treatment of different *guṇas* and *śālmkāras* in the earlier authors, but I have, however, found no explicit recognition of *dhvani* as observed by *Ānanda*, *Abhinava* etc So, my submission is that even if an element of implicit sense is seen in different *śālmkāras* and *guṇas* treated by the early poeticists, and thus even if *vyañjanā* is seen as partly subsumed under this, it should not be taken as a proof that the theory of *vyañjanā* or *dhvani* was clearly recognised by *Bhāmaha*, *Dandin*, etc. (Ch. VI)

After having thus far studied the problem of the origin and development of the concept of vyañjanā-dhvanī, I have attempted a study of the origin and development of the concept of rasa in Part II of my thesis which covers Chs VII-IX. I have already referred to the probability that the importance attached to vyañjanā or dhvanī in Sanskrit poetics is more or less due to its being the sole conveyor of rasa.

I have studied the occurrence of rasa in the vedas and the upanishads and in the Nirukta and the Bṛhaddevatā. I have also studied the occurrences of rasa in the works of both Pāṇini and Patañjali. Then, I have studied the occurrences of the word rasa in different senses in the works of early poets such as Aśvaghoṣa, Bhāsa and Kālidāsa, (Ch VII), and then I have noted the view of Bharata (Ch. VIII). After this, I have studied the approach of the early ālaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, etc. to the problem of rasa (Ch IX). The method of approach is similar to that in case of dhvanī and vyañjanā in Part I.

In the course of my study, I have tried to indicate as many as nine interesting points with reference to the use of the word rasa in various senses in the Rv. We find the word rasa in the vedas, not only as signifying something liquid but we also find the qualities of joy-giving, tastefulness, exhilaration, being the essence of the vedas, etc. attached to rasa. Thus rasa in the vedas becomes an object of relish, a joy-giving essence, etc.

The Nā Śa (Ch I 17) says that the fact of rasa in Nāṭya is derived from the Av. Abhinava tries to explain this in a rather obscure way. But I have tried to explain this in a different way. It should be noted however, that though the word rasa occurs at several places in the Av., we have no clear case of the later meaning of nāṭyarasa or kāvyarasa in it. From another point of view, we may say that several hymns of the Av. taken by themselves are impressive love lyrics, their ritualistic application notwithstanding. The number of such hymns



is about thirty I have tried to suggest that the attempt to correlate nātyarasa or kāvyarasa to Av is not unjustifiable from this point of view

In the upanīśads however, we see that the word rasa occurs also in the sense of essence of the universe and the Taittirīya Up identifies ātman with rasa-raso vai sah In the Chāndogya Up. rasa is a synthetic product of many ingredients In the Nirukta and the Bṛhaddevatā I have not found anything useful for my purpose

Thus, the different ideas associated with the word rasa in the vedas and the upanīśads, have implicit in them the idea of aesthetic taste as well and the term rasa might have been used in the sense of aesthetic taste also as may be seen in the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (Ch VII)

In Ch VII, I have tried to study the occurrence of √ras, or the word rasa in the works of Pāṇini and Patañjali In the dhātupāṭha √ras is seen in the sense of 'make sound', 'liquification', and 'to taste' In Pa V 2 95- 'rasādibhyasca,' the meaning of rasa according to Pāṇini is not clear The Mahābhāṣya seems to suggest that the meaning here is different and illustrates it by using the expression-*'rasiko natah'*, in which the aesthetic sense of rasa is quite clear The Kāśikā here explains that the matup suffix is ordinarily to be used in respect of the qualities grasped by senses, but in case of *'rasiko natah'* or *'rūpini apsarasām'*, etc, the idea is to suggest not merely the rasa or rupa apprehended by sense-organs, but sentiment or emotion and beauty respectively The Tattva-bodhini on the Siddhāntakautmudī makes this all the more clear when it says—*rasikam ityatra tu rasa sabdena bhāvo gṛhyate na tu rasanāgrāhyo gunah* (pp 303, NS Ed '33). From this we have to assume that this aesthetic sense of rasa might have been well established in usage, otherwise Patañjali could not have used the illustration of *'rasiko natah'*

Then, I have studied the occurrences of 'rasa' or √ras in the works of early poets such as Aśvaghoṣa, Bhāsa and

Kaṇḍaśa I have tried to suggest, quoting illustrations, that it is precisely such clear instances as explained in Ch VII, in the works of literary masters that might have been the original source of inspiration for theorists to formulate the rasa theories

Ch VIII clearly explains the views of Bharata as seen in ch 16 of the Nāṭya, dealing with the concepts of lakṣaṇa, guṇa, doṣa, and alaṃkāra. It is stated (vs 113-114) that the guṇas and the alaṃkāras have to be used in poetry may in consonance with the delineation of different rasas. Here, it be noted, rasa is visualised in connection with poetry, in addition to nāṭya.

Ch IX studies the ideas of rasa as seen in the works of early poeticists such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin etc. I have observed that the earlier alaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, etc do not totally ignore the fact of rasa. But they try to incorporate it under alaṃkāra, a source of charm to poetry. Daṇḍin is more elaborate in his treatment than Bhāmaha. Udbhaṭa also seems to be better informed about the concept of rasa and is probably the first to take rasa as svasabdavācya. One point is clear that in all these authors the ultimate 'ālaṃkārya' seems to be 'kāvyā' itself, rasa being only an alaṃkāra, a kāvyāśo bhākaradharmā.

In Vāmana and Rudraṭa, we notice a new trend of incorporating rasa, bhāva etc. under guṇa, the essential or eternal quality of kāvyā (nityadharmā). For Rudraṭa the number of rasas is not just eight or nine. In fact all the bhāvas can be enhanced to the capacity of rasa. Ānandavardhana with his theory of vyañjanā and dhvani has given a new orientation to the entire theme of rasa. Abhinava elaborates this position.

Thus far I have traced the two streams of thought, one pertaining to śabdavṛttis, with particular reference to vyañjanā and dhvani, and the other pertaining to the origin and development of the concept of rasa and other cognate ideas. In the

Dhv. we find these two currents meeting and merging with each other and bringing forth an integrated theory of *rasa* and *dhvani*.

So, in Part III of my thesis, comprising chapters X-XVI I have studied the theory of *rasa* and *dhvani* from the point of view of its development. This includes topics such as *dhvani* and *rasa* in *Ānandavardhana*, 'classification of poetry', 'the *pūrvapakṣa* against *vyāñjanā* in *Ānanda*', 'some anti-*dhvani* theorists', '*dhvani* in *Abhinavagupta*', '*rasa* experience as in *Lollata*, *Śaṅkuka*, etc.' '*rasa* experience as in *Abhinava*,' and 'some other writers on *rasa* such as *Dhanañjaya*, *Dhanika*, *Bhoja*, *Naiyadarpanakāras*, *Mammata*, *Hemacandra*, *Viśvanātha* and *Jagannātha*. Ch. X gives a brief introduction to part III.

'*Rasa* and *Dhvanī* in *Ānanda*' forms the subject of ch XI. This is done in a novel and all-comprising fashion *Ānanda* does not discard the other elements of poetry as *āṅkāra*, *guṇa*, etc., mentioned by early authors such as *Bhāmaha* and the like. Another point worth noting is that we come to understand how the *rasa*-theory which originated with *rūpikas* or with *nāṭya* became generally a topic for all varieties of poetry. We have seen that *Bhāmaha*, *Dandin* and others clearly emphasise the element of *rasa* in the *mahākāvya*s and *kathās*, the two important varieties of *prabandha kāvya*. But *Ānanda* makes the importance of *rasa* more comprehensive or universal in all the varieties of poetry of which *prabandha* is only one. Thus we may say that as far as our knowledge goes, it is in *Ānanda* that we find the element of *rasa* becoming the soul of all poetry, a thing which *Viśvanātha* in his famous utterance viz. *vākyam rasātmakam kāvyaṃ*, makes more explicit. It may be remarked that the concept of *rasa* was extended even to non-literary arts such as painting, sculpture, music and dance. (See *Vīṇudharmottara purāṇa*.)

Then follows the discussion of the three-fold classification of poetry as given by *Ānandavardhana*. He however refrains

from calling it *uttama*, *madhyama* and *avara* or *citra*. In Ch XII I have discussed how Ānanda refutes the *pūrvapakṣa* against *vyājanā* in the Dhv. In doing so, he refutes the *abhāvavādins* first and clearly distinguishes between *vyājanā* and *abhidhā*, *vyājanā* and *tātparya*, *vyājanā* and *lakṣanā* and *vyājanā* and *anumāna*. He also refutes the *Naiyāyikas*.

While starting the exposition of *dhvani* as expounded in Dhv. we raised the question of the earlier writers who did not accept *dhvani* and against whose view Ānanda was trying to establish his theory. We noted that we have not been able to discover specific works or authors who hold views opposed to the *dhvani* theory. Consequently, we relied upon Dhv. and Locana for those views. We do, however, find works posterior to Dhv. which carry on their polemics against the *dhvani* theory. In order to complete the discussion on *dhvani* I have also taken up a critical consideration of these works also (Ch XIII).

Among these works, we come across the AVM of Mukula-bhatta, VJ of Kuntaka, DR of Dhanañjaya with Avaloka, VY V of Mahima Bhatta and Sṛ Pra of Bhoja.

Mukula seems to incorporate implicit sense under *lakṣanā* which is only a part of *abhidhā* for him. For Kuntaka *vakrokti* is *vicitrā abhidhā*. He subsumes implicit sense partly under *abhidhā* and partly under *lakṣanā*. Kuntaka has also given much importance to *rasa*. I have tried to evaluate his position critically. Kuntaka, with his theory of *vakrokti* or a striking mode of speech differing from and transcending the ordinary everyday mode of speaking about a thing, and such that it charms by the skill of the poet, seems to comprehend all the sources of charm in poetry, beginning with *alampkāra* and ending with *dhvani* and *rasa*. For him, even *dyotaka* and *vyānjaka* words, on account of their quality of the ability to give meaning-*arthapratīkāritva*-are termed '*vācaka*' i.e. expressive of meaning, metaphorically. Thus broadly speaking, Kuntaka may be termed an *antarbhāvavādin* and *bhaktivādin* to a certain extent.

In the fourth prakāsa of the DR, the authors touch the problem of *rasānubhūti* or the experience of sentiment in poetry. Dhanika's elaborate commentary brings out their views clearly. They accept the fact of *rasādi* but they fail to accept the proposition that *rasādis* are conveyed by *vyājanā*. They accept *bhāvabhāvaka* relation between *rasādis* and *kāvya*. They are of the opinion that the *vyangya* or suggestion of the *dhvanivādins* can be explained with the help of *tātparya sakti* or purport alone. Visvanātha in his SD tries to refute the *tātparyavādins*. It seems, however, that the controversy lies in name only.

Mahimabhatta has pointed out as many as ten blemishes in the definition of *dhvani* as given by Ānanda. I have tried to evaluate his argument critically and have shown that some faults as pointed out by him are of a formal nature while others may be taken as of a fundamental nature and so bearing upon his theory of *kāvyañumiti*. It may be noted that he has this much justification in his view that the indirect thoughts and feelings arising out of the direct meaning can be psychologically regarded as of an inferential nature. This however, is in no sense a logical *anumāna* or inference and even Mahima laughs at those who want *kāvyañumiti* to be *tarkañumiti* !

As for Bhoja, the author of SK Ā. and Sr. Pra Dr De seems to suggest that he (i.e. Bhoja) does not accept the *dhvani* theory of Ānanda. Dr. Raghvan tries to refute him. He noted that, in the SK Ā. and Sr. Pra there are *alamkāras* and *gunas* which embody *vyājanā*. This however, does not make him a *vyājanāvādīn*, though, as Dr. Raghvan suggests, Bhoja can be taken as an *antarbhāvavādīn*.

A critical review of the opponents of the *dhvani* school shows that they are not opposed to *pratiyamānatā* or implied sense as a source of charm in poetry. The difference, however, arises as to how this implication is grasped. Ānanda regards

this as one of the functions of words, but this function is not, according to him, fulfilled by either *abhidhā* or *lakṣaṇā*. He therefore posits a third function of word viz *vyājanā*. His opponents see no necessity of adding a third function of word because the implied sense can be grasped by the inferential processes of thought, and by meanings yielded through *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*. So for them, to accept *vyājanā* would lead to what is called *gaurava doṣa*. Thus the question resolves itself into the acceptance or non-acceptance of this additional function of word. Modern logicians who discuss the function of language do accept what they call the emotive use of language in addition to its scientific function. The various emotive associations that a word has, become so to say, prominent in poetic language. But if one considers the psychological process of the emotive function, one has to agree that they are of an inferential type. In fact, as Mammata says, those who experience and enjoy *rasa* have to be keen in the inference of *sthāyin*—(*loke pramādaḍibhiḥ sthāyanumāne 'bhyaśapātavavatām* etc' K P IV 28). Thus it is not impossible to reconcile both the opposing views.

In the next chapter (i.e. Ch. XIV), I have considered the views of Abhinavagupta on *dhvani*. Abhinavagupta follows the Dhv in his theories on *dhvani* and *rasa*. His two important works on this subject are a commentary on Dhv known as *Locana* and his commentary on the *Nāṭya Śāstra* of Bharata, known as *Nāṭyavedavivṛti* or *Abhinavabhāratī*. The merit of his work lies in clear elaboration and at times subtle explanation and original insights to a certain extent. He was a great philosopher of the *pratyabhijñā* school.

As *Locana* and the *Abh* are commentaries, much of their content is naturally the same as that of Dhv and *Nāṭya Śāstra*. For the same reason, much of their treatment is bound to be piecemeal. In the discussion of the contents of Dhv and *Nāṭya Śāstra*, I have, as far as possible, confined myself to the works themselves. Here, while considering Abhinava's commentaries, I have noted the points which have been clarified, elaborated and

sometimes improved upon by him. In the treatment of the e points some repetition has been unavoidable though I have tried to avoid it as far as possible. As noted just now, the treatment of the various topics in these commentaries, particularly in Locana, is piece-meal, and so, in order to give a coherent and critical account, I have brought together passages bearing on the same topic and tried to give a connected account (Ch. XIV).

In Ch. XV, I have tried to discuss the views on rasa-experience as explained by Lollata, Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta. The views of the former i.e. Lollata, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, are put forth by me as clearly and precisely on the basis of the presentation of their views by Abhinava. In doing this, I have not only consulted the original sources but I have fully utilised the excellent work of Gnoli, and Dr. K. C. Pandey

Different Scholars have tried to correlate the views of these ācāryas such as Bhaṭṭa Lollata, Śrī Śaṅkuka, etc. with different schools of thought. I have tried to show that excepting Abhinavagupta, nothing definite can be stated with reference to the rest. As nirvighnā saṃvit and camatkāra are central to the concept of rasa in Abhinava's theory I have tried to explain these terms in the light of pratyabhijñā philosophy

In Ch. XVI, I have tried to record the views of some other writers on rasa. This covers the works of Dhanañjaya, and Dhanika, Bhoja and Rāmachandra and Guṇacandra, and also Mammata, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha. I have taken up Dhanañjaya, Dhanika, Bhoja and the authors of ND together because they have something novel, something different from the Kashmirian tradition to record, while Mammata, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha follow the lead of Abhinavagupta. I have tried to put this in a critical way though of course, as for the views of Bhoja, my thanks are due to the excellent work of Dr. Raghvan. Then follows the *re'sume'*.

In the 'resume', I have tried to correlate the conclusions reached in different chapters and present a connected account of the theory of vyañjanā-dhvanī-rasa. I have tried to make clear how Abhinava has incorporated in his theory the views of his opponents. I have also shown how the concept of rasa developed from its form of category of aesthetic experience to the stature of the higher spiritual experiences of the bhaktas.

As mentioned in the beginning of this statement, dhvanī-vyañjanā and rasa are much discussed subjects by modern writers on Sanskrit Poetics. It will be therefore, presumptuous on my part to say that I have discovered something absolutely new. However I humbly submit that the following points worked out in detail in this thesis are, as far as my knowledge goes, new in treatment and interpretation.

(i) The sort of detailed discussion of occurrences of √añj, vi+√añj, √dhvan and dhvanī in the Vedas, Nirukta, Rk Prā, Aṣṭādhyāyī and Mahābhāṣya, and the literary works of early poets such as Aśvaghoṣa, Bhāṣa and Kālidāsa is attempted for the first time and this, (Chs. I) I humbly submit, is one part of my contribution to knowledge.

(ii) I have tried to explain the relationship between the theory of Sphoṭa and the theory of dhvanī, in (Ch. II) by advancing as many as nine important points.

(iii) In Ch. V, I have tried to discuss the recognition of different śabdavṛttis in the works of early ālaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, etc.

(iv) In Ch. VI, I have tried to discuss the recognition of pratiyamāna sense in the works of early poeticists such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, etc.

(v) In Ch. VII, I have tried to point out nine interesting points with reference to 'rasa' as seen in the Vedas. The investigation, so far as I know, is in much greater detail as compared to earlier efforts by different scholars.



(vi) Then, I have tried to study the occurrences of  $\sqrt{\text{ras}}$  and *rasa* in the works of Pāṇini and Patañjali. In the Mahābhāṣya, I feel I have pointed out for the first time, that we come across an expression viz 'rāsiko natah' which clearly suggests that *rasa* in its aesthetic sense was known to Patañjali and must have been in vogue much earlier (Ch VII).

(vii) Then, I have tried to suggest how actual practice in the literary works such as those of Asvaghosa, Bhāsa, etc might have influenced the theorists to formulate their theories of *rasa* (Ch VII)

(viii) In Ch VIII, I have tried to put the views of Bharata in a precise and clear way, and have also suggested that Bharata also thought of *rasa* with reference to poetry-kāvya-as well, and not with reference to nāṭya alone

(ix) In Ch IX, I have attempted an investigation into the treatment of *rasa* by Bhāmaha, Dandin, etc

(x) In Chs X—XII, I have tried to put the ideas on *rasa* and dhvani as found in the Dhv of Anandavardhana. I have tried to present the whole matter in a critical and comprehensive way and have tried to evaluate the arguments for and against vyañjanā critically

(xi) In a similar way, I have tried to present the ideas of some anti dhvani theorists (ch XIII) in a critical and comprehensive way

(xii) Chs XIV presents the views of Abhinava on dhvani in a coherent way. Whatever is found in the form of a piecemeal treatment is taken up by me and arranged in a connected way so as to evolve a distinct pattern

I have also attempted to present as clear and precise an account as possible of the views of Lollata, Saṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta in Ch XV, and tried to see whether these can be correlated to some 'darśana'

(xii) In Ch. XVI, I have tried to present the views of some other important writers on rasa, such as Dhanañjaya, Dhanika Bhoja, Rāmacandra and Gunacandra, Mammata, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha. I have tried to give a critical account of these authors

All this, I humbly claim is my contribution to knowledge.

### Foot-Notes

(1) Dhv I 2

1o'rthah sahrdayasāghyah kāvyātmeti vyavasthītaḥ |  
vācyapratīyamāṇākhyau tasya bhedaubhau stortaḥ ||

(2) Dhv I 5

kāvyāśyātma sa evārthah tathā cādikaveḥ purā |  
krauñcadvandvaviyogottah sokah ślokatvamāgataḥ ||

(3) Locana on Dhv I 5.

tena rasa eva vastutaḥ ātmā, vastvalamkāradvayā tu sarvathā  
rasam prati paryavasyete iti vācyādutkṛṣṭau .. etc

(4) Dhv I. 7-

śabdārthasāsanajñānamānatrenaiva na vedyate |  
vedyate sa tu kāvyārthatatvajñaireva kevalam ||

(5) Dhv. I 1.

kāvyāśyātma dhvanirīti budhairnyah samāmnātapurvaḥ  
tasyābhāvaṃ jagadurapare bhāktamahustamanye |  
kecidvācāṃ sthītamavisaye tattvamūcustadīyaṃ  
tena brūmah sahrdayamanah prītaye tatsvarūpam ||



## PART I

### CHAPTER I

√AÑJ VI+√AÑJ, √DHVAN AND DHVANI IN THE VEDAS  
(Cir 1500, B C )

In this chapter we will try to study the occurrences of √añj, vi+√añj, √dhvan, dhvani etc in the vedas (Cir 1500 B C )

First of all, we will take up Rgveda

**Rv. I 124.8 is—**

svásā svásre jyā'yasyat yonimaraigāpatyasyāh  
praticāksye va |  
vyucchānti rasmī'bhīh sū'yasyañjyankte  
samanagā iva vra'h ||

Sayana explains : añji vyañjikam tejah yadvā,  
añji vyaktam jagat, ŋkte, anakti, prakasayati

i.e. anoints brings into light, displays, causes to appear, reveals, Griffith explains it as 'decke'

**Rv. V. 1.3 :**

yādīm ganāsya rasana'mājigrah sucirankte  
śūcibhirgobhiragnśh |  
a'ddāksinī yuyate vājayāntyuttanāmūrdhivó  
adhayaajjahu'bhīh ||

Sā -ankte=vyanakti, visvam jagat.

=anoints

Griffith- 'is anointed'

Rv. VIII. 29.1 :

babhrureko visuṇah sūnāro yúvāñjyañkte  
hiranyāyam |

Sa-añji, abhivyañjate prakasyate anena ityañji  
abharanam

abhivyañkti-ādhanam kuṇḍalamukutadīkam svaśa-  
rīram. ankte abhivyañjavati

=adorns, causes to appear, brings into light,  
displays, decks; Griffith-'decks'

ankti-

Rv. I. 153.2 :

prástutirvāṃ dha'ma na práyuktiráyāmi  
mitra varuṇā suvrātīh |  
anākti yádṽṃ vidáthesu b́ota sumnāṃ nam  
surirvrṣaṇāvi'yaksan. ||

Sā. - anakti = vyañjayati = manifests, displays,  
brings into light, reveals, Griffith-'decks',

Rv. IV. 6.3 :

yata' sujūrōi' rāti'nī ghṛtāci  
pradaks nīddevatīmuraṇāh |  
údu svárurnavajā' na'krāh pasvó anakti  
sú hitah sumékah ||

Sa.-anakti = gacchati,

yadva sudhitah svasureva  
udu utkr̥ṣṭih pasvah pasūi anakti  
svaruṣā pasumanakti it *et̥* h = anoints

Griffith-'anoints'

Rv. X. 68.2 :

saṃ góbhirañāgirasó náksamāṇo  
 bhāgaivédaryamāṇam nināya |  
 jāne mitró na dámpatī anaktī br'haspate  
 vājáyāśu'ṁprivājū ||  
 Sā.-anakti = saṃgamayati = brings together  
 = unites;

This seems to be an unusual meaning; may be metaphorical; Griffith-'decks';

añjate-Rv. I. 92.1 :

etā' u tyā' uśāsah ketumakrata pūrve árdhe  
 rájaso bhānūmañjate |  
 niṣkṛavānā' ā'yudharīva dhr̥ṣṭāvah prātī  
 gavòrusīryanti mātáraḥ ||

Sā.-bhānum, prakāśam añjate = vyaktikurvanti  
 = displays, causes to appear, brings into  
 light, manifests, reveals,

Griffith-spread ( shining light )

i.e. causes to appear, display, reveal.

Rv I. 151.8 :

yuvā'ṁ yajñāṁ prathamā' góbhirañjata ṛ'tāvānā  
 mánaso ná práyuktiṣu |  
 bháranti vāṁ mánmanā guródṛpyatā mánasā  
 revádāsāthe ||

Sā.-añjate = vyañjayanti yajamānāḥ

=display, cause to appear.

Griffith-'deck';

## Rv. VIII. 72.9 :

pari tridhā'turadhvaram jūrāfretī nāvīyasī ।  
madhva hōtaro añjate ॥

Sa - añjate = madhva añjate itī = anoint

## Rv. IX. 10.3 :

rājāno na prasistibhih Sómāso gobhirañjate ।  
yajāo ra sapta dhātṛ'bhih ॥

Sā - añjate = ajyante = smśrīyanta ityarthah  
= anoint, adorn,

Griffith - 'deck',

## Rv. IX. 102.7 .

samīcine abhi tmanā yāhvī' rī'sya mātārā ।  
tanvāna yajnatranusagyādanjate ॥

Sā - añjate somam mīśrayanti tada svayama-  
bhigacchatī = mix, (i.e. anoint),

Griffith - 'adorn'

## Rv. IX. 86.43 :

añjate vyañjate sāmāñjate kṛatum rihanti  
mādhunābhyañjate ।

sindhoreucchvasé patayantamukśāsm hiraṇyapaṇāh  
pasumasu grbhate ॥

Sā - añjate - (gobhih), anoint,

vyañjate = vividhamañjanti,

sāmāñjate = samyaganjanti,

and mādhunā gavyena abhyañjate = well anoint,

Griffith - 'balm' (i.e. anoint),

añjanti :

## Rv. I. 95.6 :

ubhé bhadré joṣayete na mene gā vo na vas'ra'iva  
una tasyah évaśhī

sā dīkṣāṁ daksīpatirbabbhūvañjanti yām  
daksīnató havīrbhih ॥

Sā.-añjanti = ārdrikurvanti; tarpayanti (i.e.anoint)  
Griffith-'balm'.

Rv. III. 8.1 :

añjānti tvā'madhvaré devayānto vānaspate  
mādhunā dai'vyena |  
yadūrdhvasī'sṭhā drāvīṇebā dhattādyādvā kṣāyo  
mātūrāsya upāsthe ||

Sā.-añjanti=tvayi gṛtaṃ siñcanti ityarthah  
(i.e. they anoint) Griffith-'anoint';

Rv. III. 14.3 :

drāvatāṃ ta uśāsā vājāyanti āgne vā'tasya  
pathyābhīraccha |  
oātsīmañjānti pūrvyāṃ havi'rbbhīrā' vandhūreva  
tasthaturdurōṇé ||

Sā.-añjanti=siñcanti=anoint (and adorn)  
Griffith-'adorn';

Rv. V. 3.2 :

tvāmaryamā' bhavasi yātkaṇi'nāṃ nā'ma  
svadhāvangūhyāṃ bibharṣi |  
añjānti mītrāṃ sūdhitaṃ na gobhīr yāddāmpati  
sāmānasā kṛṇōṣi ||

Sā.-govikāraih kṣīrādibhiḥ añjanti='anoint',  
Griffith-'balm'.

Rv. V. 43.7 :

añjānti yāṃ prathāyānto nā viprā vapā'vantāṃ  
nā'gninā tāpantah |  
pitūrna putrá upāsi preṣ'ha ā' dharmó  
agni'mṛtāyannasādī ||

Sā.-añjanti=anoint;  
Griffith-'deck';

Rv. IX. 109.20 :

añjāntyenam mādhu rasēnendrāya vṛṣṇa i'ndum  
mādāya ।

Sā -añjanti=samyojayanti=(mix, i.e. anoint)  
Griffith-'balm' (=anoint),

añdhve,-Rv. X. 100.10 :

ūrjam gāvo yāvase pi'vo attana ṛta'sya yā'h  
śādane kós'e añdhvé ।  
tanū'revā tinvō astu bhesajāmā sarv'atātīmādītum  
vṛṣmahe ॥

Sā. -añdhve=vyañjayatha=Cause to appear,  
manifest, display;

Griffith-'are balmmed'.

ajmah-Rv. IX. 45.3 :

Griffith-'balm'

angdhi-Rv. X. 156.3 :

ā'gne sthūrām rayim bhara prthūm  
gómantamas'vī'nam ।  
angdhi' kham vartāya paśm ॥

Sā.-angdhi vrstyudakāih śāca=anoint;

or, atmīyah tejobhīh vyañjaya prakāśaya=reveal,

Griffith.-oil, i.e. anoint;

anajyāt.-Rv. X. 31.4 :

nṣtyasakanyatsvāpatīrdāmūna yāsma u devāh  
savitā' jaja'na ।

bhāgo vā góbhiraryamémanjyatsó asmai  
cā'rūs'chayadutā syāt ॥



Sā - anajyāt = vyaktikuryāt

= to cause to appear, reveal, manifest;

Griffith - 'may appear to him'.

**anajan - Rv. III. 19.5 :**

yattvā hótāramanājanmiyédhe niṣādāyanto

yajáthāya deva'h |

sa' tvāṃ no agne'vitēsa bodhyádhi śrávāṃsi

dhehí nantanū'su. ||

Sā - anajan, gr̥tāhutibhiraukṣan = anointed;

Griffith - anoint;

**ānaje - Rv. I. 102.1 :**

ima'm te dhīyaṃ prā bhare mahó mahi'masyá

stotrē dhīśāṇā yátta ānájé |

tāmutsavé ca prasavé ca sāsahimī'ndraṃ

deva'sah śávasāmadanna'nuo. ||

Sā. - ānaje = aktā śāṃsistāsīt = anoint;

and adds : añjū vyaktimrakṣaṇagatiṣu;

**Rv. VIII. 63.1 :**

śá pūrvyó maha'nāṃ venáb r'tubhirānaje |

yasya dvā'rā mánuspitā devéṣu dhīya anájé. ||

Sā - ānaje = āgacchati;

or, prāpa, ānajiḥ prāptikarmā;

**ajyate :**

**Rv. VIII. 20.8 :**

góbhirvānó ajyate sóbharigāṃ ráthe kóse

hiraṇyáye |

góbāndhavaḥ sujātā'sah isé bhujé mahā'nto

nah spārase nú ||

Sa - ayyate, vyajyate, prakatīkriyate, = revealed,  
Griffith - 'bathed'.

Rv. VIII 519 :

yasyāyam viśv ā ryo da sah Sevadhīra arīh |  
tira'scidaryé rusame paviravi tubhyetó ayyate  
rayāh ||

Sā - ayyate = praksiṇyate ( Vālakhilyabhāṣya ),  
Griffith = 'is brought off

at Rv. IX. 32.3 :

Sā - ayyate = śicyate, or smṛdhīkriyate =  
( anointed ),  
Griffith - 'anointed',

Rv. IX 76.2 .

Rv X. 118.3

Sā - ayyate - śicyate - anointed,  
Griffith - 'balms'

Sa - ayyate gobhīh ( = is anointed ),  
Griffith - 'bathed',

Rv. III. 40 6

gīrvanah pahl nah sūtāṇ mādhdordhā'rabhirajyase |  
indra tva dātamidyāsaḥ ||

Sa - ayyase = śicyase = " ( you ) are anointed "  
Griffith - 'art bedewed', ( i.e. anointed ),

Rv IX. 66 9 .

mrjānti tva samagravīṣyō jirā vadhi svāpī |  
rebhó yadajyase vane ||

Sā - ayyase = ākṣaṇ Sīkto bhavati, = anoint  
Griffith - 'deck thee',

also at Rv. IX. 85.5 :

Sa.-ajyase=sikto bhavasi; anointed;

Griffith-'balm'd' with milk;

also at Rv. IX. 78.2 :

, Sā.-ajyase=preryase;

Griffith-'balm'd'.

**aktaḥ, aktā, aktaḥ**, occur at

Rv. IV. 3. 10-Sā.-sikto bhavati; 'sprinkled with oil'-Griffith.

VI. 4. 6-Sā.-saṁśiṣṭaḥ; 'decked'-Griffith;

VI. 5.6,-Sā. saṁsīktaḥ, 'decked with brightness'-Griffith.

IX. 96.22-Sa -sīktaḥ; 'decked'-Griffith;

**aktam-at**,

Rv. II. 3.4-Sā.-ājyena aktam, 'bedewed with'-Griffith;

IV. 27.5,-Sā.-sīktaḥ; 'filled with a shining liquid'-Griffith;

IX. 74.8,-Sā -saṁprīktaḥ; 'shining, milk anointed'-Griffith;

X. 177.1;-Sā.-vyaktaḥ; abhivyaktaḥ; 'adorned with'-Griffith;

**ajyamānaḥ**-occurs at

Rv. IX. 97.35-Sā.-gobhiḥ sicjamānaḥ  
-'is purified'-Griffith;

X. 31.9-Sā.-vyajyamānaḥ, vyaktibhavan  
=caused to appear, revealed, displayed,  
Griffith-'balm'd';

ajyamānā—occurs at,

Rv X, 31.10, Sa 'nisicyamānaretaskā'

añjat, añjan—at

Rv I. 92 5—añjan, añjanti (Sā)=display,  
—'deck'—Griffith.

In the Yajurveda

anaktu—occurs at VI 2,

XXVII. 12;

XXXVII 11,

añjantu—XXIII 8,

anaje—XXXIII. 29,

ānañja—VIII. 30,

ajyate—XXXIII. 82,

aktam—II 16,

añjat—XXIX 1, and 2,

and samañjan—XX. 37,

'anaktu'—Yv. VI 2.

agreṇīrasī svāveśa unnetṛṇametasya vittādadhī  
tvā sthāsyatī devastvā avitā madhvānaktu  
supīpalābhyastvausadhibhyaḥ ।

dyāmagreṇasprksī āntarīksīṃ madhenāprāḥ  
prthivīmuparevāḍṛṇbhīḥ ॥

anaktu=mraksīyatu, (Uvaṭī)=anoint,

Yv. XXVII. 12 :

tīnūnāpādāsuro visvīveda devó devósī deváh ।  
patíó anaktu mádhvī grtēna ॥

anaktu=anoint, (Uvaṭa),

**Yv. XXXVII. 11 :**

yamā'ya tvā makhā'ya' tvā sū'ryasya tvā tāpase ।  
 devástvā savitā' mādhvānaktu ।  
 prthivyā'h saṁspr'saspāhi ।  
 arcírasí śócírasí tapo'sí ॥  
 madhvā anaktu ( Uvāta ), -anoint ,  
 anaktu = liṁpatu ( Mahidhara ).

**añjantu** - occurs at,

**Yv. XXIII. 8 :**

vāsavastvāñjantu gāyatrēpa cchāndasā rudrā'st-  
 vañjantu trās'tubhenac chāndasādityā'stvāñjantu  
 jā'gatena chāndasā bhūbhuvah svārtājñācchā-  
 cīṇyavye gāvya etádānnamatta devā etádānna-  
 maddhi prajāpate ॥  
 añjantu = anoint;  
 = smidham kurvantu = anoint, ( Mahidhara )

**ānaje**, occurs at

Yv. XXXIII. 29 and is Rv. I. 102-1,

**ānañja** - at Yv. VIII. 30 :

purudaśmó vísurūpa índurantārmahin ā'na'ñj dhiraḥ ।  
 ekapadīm dvīpadīm tripadīm catuspadīmastāpadīm  
 bhūvanā'nu prathantām svā'hā ॥  
 ānañj, -añjater vyāktikaraṇārthasyaitadrūpaṁ.  
 vyāktikaroti ( Uvāta ;  
 = brings into light; displays, causes to appear etc. etc

**ajyate** - Yv. XXXIII 82,

It is the same as Rv. VIII. 51-9

**Uvāta** observes : ajyate dhātūnīmanekārthatvāt

añjirdānārthaḥ vikaraṇavyatyayasca anakti dadāti  
 rayiḥ dhanam

aktam—at Yv. II, 16 :

va'subhyastvā rudrēbhyastvā'dityēbhyastvā  
sa'mjānāthaṃ dyāvāpṛthivī mitrā' va'ruṇau tvā  
vṛṣṭyāvatāṃ ।

vyantuva'yo'ktaṃ ri'hāṇā marūtāṃ pṛ'satirgaccha  
vasā' pṛ'sṇirbhūtvā' divaṃ gaccha ta'to no  
vr'ṣṭimā'vaha ।

caḥṣus'pā' agne'si ca'kṣurme pāhi ।

aktam=drutameva ( Uvaṭa );

samañjan—Yv. XX. 37.

narāsa'msaḥ pra'ti sūro mī'mānasta'nūna'pātpra'-  
tiyajā'sya dhā'ma ।

góbhirvapā'vānma'dhunā samañja'n hiraṇyai'-  
schandri yajati pra'cetāḥ ॥

samañjan=anointing; -

añjan—Yv. XXIX 1 and 2;

añjan=vyaktīkurvan (Uvaṭa)=revealing; displaying;

and añjan=samañjan=anointing gr̥tena (Uvaṭa);

In the Sāmaveda we have,

ajyase—I. 195.

añjate—I. 564;

II. 1121; 964; 1755;

vyañjate—I. 564;

samañjate—I. 564;

ajyate—II. 770;

II. 1099,

II. 1609;

añjanīḥ—II. 1080;

II. 1209,

Now,

Sv. I. 195 is Rv. III. 40·6

Sv. I. 564 is Rv. IX. 86·43;

Sv. II. 1121 is Rv. IX. 10·3;

II. 1755 is Rv. I. 92·1;

II. 770 is Rv. IX. 32·3,

Sv. II. 1099 is

saṃ vatsa iva mātṛbhīrindurhinvāno ajyate ।

devāvirmado matibhiḥ pariskrutaḥ ॥

ajyate = 'is sent' Griffith.

The root may be √aj and not √añj

Sv. II. 1609 is Rv. VIII. 51 9

Sv. II. 1080 is;

punāno vāre pavamāno avyaye vrso acakrīdadvane

devānām soma pavamana niskṛtam gobhirañjāno

arṣasi ॥

añjānaḥ = 'blamed with' Griffith,

i.e. anointed;

Now we may examine the occurrence in the Av.

**anakti** - Av. V. 27 2.

devo deveṣu devaḥ pātho anakti madhvā ghr̥tena ।

=anoints (Whitney);

**añjate** - Av. XVIII. 3·18. is Rv. IX. 86·43;

**anajmi** - Av. IV. 14·6.

aja'manajmī pa'yasā ghr̥tena divya'm payasa'm

suparṣa'm bṛha'ntam ।

tēna genīma sukṛta'sya loka'm svā'rārohaṇto abhi

nā'kamuttama'm ॥

anajmī-abhidhārayāmi (Sā.);

=anoint; Whitney;





(ii) 'to shine' Its use with the prefix 'vi' is in the sense of 'to shine forth', 'to glitter' etc The idea seems to be to enhance the glitter of something by the application of some ingredient.\*

vi + √añj :

We come across different forms of the root vi + √añj in the Vedas

We will first take up the Rgveda

We can make a note of the fact that vi + √añj occurs more frequently in what are known as the later mandals of the Rv. We will try to study all these references carefully and will try to find its sense or senses in their various occurrences.

vyañjate :

Rv I. 64 4 :

citraírañjibhírvapuse vyañjate va'ksaḥsu rukā'm  
a'dhi yetire s'ubhé |  
amsesvesam ní mīmṛksur rsta'yah sak'm jajñire  
svadha'yā divó na'raḥ ||

---

\* Grassman, Roth and Bothlingk also have '√añj' in the following senses

- (i) to anoint, to rub the ointment, to embalm, (salben),
- (ii) to emit, (spitzen),
- (iii) to shine, to glitter (glanzend),
- (iv) to shine forth, (erscheinen)
- (v) to decorate (schmücken),
- (iv) to embellish, to attire dress (zürüsten)

vyañjate=vyaktam kurvanti

alamkurvantityarthah (Sā)

i.e. they bring into light, cause to appear,  
display, reveal, decorate and

añjibhiḥ is explained by Sā as rūpabhi—  
vyañjanasamarthaiḥ ābharaṇaiḥ

Griffith explains it as = 'they deck',

añjibhiḥ as 'glittering ornaments'.

Rv. VII 79.2 : is

vyanjate divó antesvaktū'nvis'o na' yuktā' usa'so  
yatante |

sa'm te ga'vasta'ma ā' var'trayanti jyótiryacchanti  
savitéva bāhú ||

Sā explains as, 'vyakīkurvanti'—

i.e. cause to appear, reveal etc

Griffith—'paint' (i.e. anoint),

Rv. IX. 86.43 is the same as seen above (see añjate),

yyañjate=vividhamañjanti (Sā),

and samañjate samyagañjanti,

=anoint, well anoint,

Griffith—'balm' (i.e. anoint),

vyajyate—Rv. X 85 28,

nīlaloḥita'm bhavati kṛtya'saktirvyajyate |

édhante sayā jātā'yah pā'tirbandhēsā bādhyate ||

vyajyate=tyajyate (Sā)

=driven off (Griffith)

The root is  $v_1 + \sqrt{aj}$ , not  $v_1 + \sqrt{añj}$

It should be noted that this is the same as  
Av XIV. 1 26

Whitney observes that the root is  $v_1 + \sqrt{aj}$

Rv. IX. 71.7 is

pa'rā vyakto aruṣo diva'h kavirvṛṣā triprṣṭhó  
 , anavista gā' abhí |  
 saha'sraṇitirya'tiḥ parāya'tī rebhó na pūrvīruṣa'so  
 ví rājati. ||

Sā. ~somaḥ vyaktaḥ vispaṣṭadhārāyuktaḥ yadvā  
 vasatīvaribhirvis'eṣeṇāaktaḥ siktaḥ san.  
 i.e. clearly manifested, displayed or well anointed;  
 Griffith - 'shines';

vyaktam - Rv. X. 14.9;  
 X. 127.7;

Rv. X. 14.9 :

a'peta vīta ví ca sarpatā'to'smā etām pita'ro  
 loka'makran |  
 a'hobhiradbhīraktúbhirvyaktaṁ yamó  
 dadātyavasā'namasmai ||

Sā. explains : vyaktaṁ = saṁgatam;  
 = accompanied with (i.e. adorned with);  
 Griffith - 'adorned with';

Rv. X. 127.7 :

úpa mā pépis'atta'maḥ kṛṣṇa'm vyaktamasthita |  
 ūṣa ũéva yātaya ||

Sā. says : vyaktaṁ vis'eṣeṇa svabhāsā sarvasy-  
 āñjikaṁ spaṣṭirūpaṁ vā i.e. that which well  
 anoints everything with its own light, or  
 that which is clearly manifested;

Griffith (that which) decks, (i.e. adorns);

R. 2.

vyakta :

Rv. VII. 77.3 :

devā'nāṃ cā'kṣuḥ subha'gā va'hantī sveta'm  
na'yantī sudṛ'sīkama'svaṃ ।  
uṣā' adars'ī ras'mibhirvyaktā citrā'maghā  
viśvamanu-pra'bhūtā ॥

Sā. ~ does not wait to explain vyaktā. But it means, 'clearly manifested'.

Griffith - (that which) 'shines apparent' i.e. clearly shines;

Rv. VIII. 56.4; is;

ta'tro a'pi prā'ṇiyata pūta'kratāyai vyaktā ।  
a'svānāmīṇa' yūthyām ॥

There is no Sāyapabhāṣya on this. We get vāḷakhilyasūktabhāṣya which explains it as : vividhaṃ gantā; nānāprades'eṣu pracalan.

Rv. X. 86.5. is,

priyā' taṣṭā'ni me kapiṛ'vyaktā vyadūduṣat ।  
sīro nvasya rāviṣaṃ na' suga'm duṣkṛ'te bhuvaṃ  
viś'vasmādīndra ūttaraḥ ॥

Sā. - explains as vyaktā = vyaktānyājyai,  
viś'eṣeṇāktāni i.e. (well adorned);

Griffith : vyakta = beauteous things (i.e. well adorned);

vyaktāḥ - occurs at Rv. VII. 56-1.

Rv. VII. 56-1; is,

kā' iṃ vyaktā na'raḥ sanīlā rudra'sya ma'ryā  
a'dhā sva'svāḥ ।

Sā.-'kāntiyuktāḥ' i.e. 'beautiful' 'lustrous',  
'radiant';

Griffith - 'radiant';

vyaktam - Rv. X. 85.21;

udīrṣvā'taḥ pā'tvatī hyeṣṣā vis'vā'vasuṃ nā'masā  
girbhīrīle |

anyā'miccha pitṛṣa'dam vyaktām sa'sāte bhāgō  
janū śā ta'sya viddhi. ||

Sā.-explains 'as : vyaktām anūdheti paris'gutām  
vigatāñjanām vā |

i.e. 'clearly manifested', or that whose añjana  
is removed.

Griffith - 'fair' (i.e. beautiful).

vyañjata - occurs at Rv. VIII. 7.25,

Rv. VIII. 7.25. is,

vidyūdhasṭā abhīdyavaḥ śīprāḥ  
śīrṣa'nhiraṇya'yīḥ |  
śubhrā' vyañjata śriyē ||

Sā.-vyañjata vyañjayanti vyaktikurvanti dhā-  
rayanti tyarthāḥ i.e. 'display'; 'bear';

Griffith - 'deck'.

We have seen as many as thirteen occurrences in which we come across different forms of the root vi+√añj in the Rv. These thirteen references from the Rv. bear the general sense of opening up something hidden and bringing it to light, embellishing, decorating, adorning and the like.

Thus, we can say that the root vi+√añj in the Rv. has these two connected meanings (i) revealing and (ii) adorning.

The Yajurveda has,  
vyaktaḥ—at XIX. 87;  
and vyaktaṃ—at XXXV. 1:

Yv. XIX. 87 is;

kumbhó vaniṣṭhúrjanitā' śa'chībhirya'sminna'gre  
yónyāṃ ga'rbho anta'h |  
plas'i'rvyaktaḥ śata'dhāra útso duhé na' kumbhaī'  
svadhā'm pitṛ'bhyaḥ ||

Uvaṭa explains, vyaktaḥ=spāṣṭaḥ i.e. clearly manifested or displayed; Mahidhara has vyaktaḥ=spāṣṭaḥ.

Yv. XXXV. 1. is,

apetó yantu paṇa'yo'sumnā devapīya'vaḥ |  
asya' loka'h sutā'vataḥ dyubhirā'hobhiraktúbhi-  
rvyakta'm yamó dadātvavasā'namasmai. ||

The second half is almost identical with Rv. X. 14.9b and Uvaṭa has vyaktaṃ=spāṣṭikṛtaṃ clearly displayed;=manifested;

Mahidhara explains similarly.

**Sāmaveda has**

vyajjate—Sv. I. 564;  
and vyaktāḥ—Sv. I. 433.

Sv. I. 564 is the same as Rv. IX. 86.43;

Sv. I. 433 is the same as Rv. VII. 56.1;

**Atharvaveda has :**

vyajjate: Av. XVIII 3.18; is the same as Rv. IX. 68.43;

Whitney explains: 'they anoint out' (vi);

vyajjate—Av. XIV. 1.26. is Rv. X. 85.28;

Whitney explains it from root vi + √aj and not vi + √añj.

vyaktaṃ - Av. XVIII. 1.55 is Rv. X. 14.9;

vyaktā - Av. XX 126.5.

Thus, we see that the Av. has here practically everything borrowed from Rv.

The survey of the occurrences of the root vi + √añj in the vedas shows two connected meanings, viz., to bring out something hidden by applying or enhancing something, to brighten, to embellish, to decorate, to adorn.

Thus, putting together the result of our survey, we get :

(1) to deck; to adorn;

as in Rv. I. 64.4; (Sā. & Griffith)

Rv. X. 14.9 ( „ „ )

Av. XVIII. 1.55 ( Whitney ),

(2) to manifest clearly; display, cause to appear

as in Rv. I. 64.4; (Sā.);

Rv. VII. 79.2. (Sā.);

Rv. VII. 77.5. (Sā.);

Rv. IX. 77.7. (Sā.) ( Griffith );

Rv. X. 85.21; (Sā.)

Yv. XIX. 87. ( Uvaṭa and Mahidhara )

Yv. XXXV. 1 ( Uvaṭa and Mahidhara );

Rv. X. 14.9. (Sā.);

Av. XVIII. 1.55 (Sā.)

- (iii) to paint (i.e. to anoint), (Griffith),  
as in Rv. VII. 79 2,
- (iv) to balm (i.e. anoint); (Griffith);  
Rv. IX. 86 43  
Sv. I. 564,
- (v) to anoint  
as in Rv. IX. 86·43 (Sā.)  
Av. XVIII 3 18 (Sā.) and also Whitney;  
Rv. X. 86 5 (Sā.)
- (vi) to shine forth;  
Rv. VII. 77·3. (Griffith)
- (vii) beautiful; (vyaktā); Griffith  
as in Rv. X. 86·5,  
and also 'kāntiyuktaḥ' according to Sā. at  
Rv. VII. 56·1.  
'radiant', Griffith-Rv. VII. 56 1  
and also Sv. I. 433 (Griffith)  
'fair'—Rv. X. 55 21 (Griffith)

We may also note the occurrences of the root  
√dhvan, or the word 'dhvani' in the vedas.

We come across,

adhvanīt—at Rv. VIII. 6 13.

adhvānayat—at Rv. VI. 18·10,

dhvanayīt—at Rv. I. 162 15

and dhvani, dhvanayaḥ at Av. V. 20 7.

Rv. VIII. 6·13. is;

ya'dasya manyūra'dhvānīdvi' vṛtra'm parvaśo ruja'nī  
apaḥ samudra'mairayaḥ ॥



Sā.-stanayitnulakṣaṇaṃ śabdaṃ akarot; Griffith - 'thundered'.

Rv. VI. 18 10 :

agni'rna śuṣkaṃ va'namindra hetī' rakṣo ni'  
dhakṣyaṃsa'nirna' bhīmā'.  
gambhīra'ya rṣya'yā yó rurojā'dhvanayad duritā'  
dambha'yaccha ||

Sā.-yuddhe garjanalakṣaṇaṃ śabdaṃ karoti.

Rv. I. 162.15 :

mā' tvāgni'rdhvanayiddhūma'gandhirmókhā  
.....etc.

Sā.-'to make noise'.

Griffith - 'make thee crackle',

Av. V. 20 7 is,

antareme nabhasī ghoṣo astu pṛthak te dhvanayo  
santu sībham  
= 'let there be noise'; Whitney;

Thus, the root √dhvan and the word dhvani carry the sense of 'to make noise' and 'noise' respectively.

The occurrences of the root vi+√añj in different forms might have proved to be a remote source of inspiration for the theory of vyañjanā in times to come.

- (iii) to paint (i.e. to anoint), (Griffith);  
as in Rv. VII. 79-2;
- (iv) to balm (i.e. anoint) (Griffith),  
Rv. IX. 86-43  
Sv. I. 564;
- (v) to anoint  
as in Rv. IX. 86-43 (Sā.)  
Av. XVIII 3-18 (Sā.) and also Whitney;  
Rv. X. 86-5 (Sā.)
- (vi) to shine forth;  
Rv. VII. 77-3. (Griffith)
- (vii) beautiful; (vyaktā); Griffith  
as in Rv. X. 86-5;  
and also 'kāntiyuktāḥ' according to Sā. at  
Rv. VII. 56-1.  
'radiant', Griffith-Rv. VII. 56-1  
and also Sv. I. 433 (Griffith)  
'fair'—Rv. X. 55-21 (Griffith)

We may also note the occurrences of the root  
√dhvan, or the word 'dhvani' in the vedas.

We come across,  
adhvanīt-at, Rv. VIII. 6-13.  
adhvānayat-at Rv. VI. 18-10,  
dhvanayit-at Rv. I. 162-15  
and dhvani, dhvanayaḥ at Av. V. 20-7.

Rv. VIII. 6-13. is;

ya'dasya manyūra'dhvanīdvī' vṛtra'm parvaśo ruja'nī  
apa'ḥ samudra'mairaya( ॥

This is a very important occurrence. 'vyanjana' here means 'an indicator' This seems to be the earliest occurrence of 'vyañjana' in the sense of 'indication' In a similar sense, we find another root viz. √dyut In Ch I. Yaska cites the opinion of Gārgya who holds that upasargas are not meaningful by themselves but they serve to suggest or indicate the relation of nama and akhyata, with a particular meaning Says Gargaya na nirbaddhāḥ upasargāḥ arthan nirāhuḥ nāmākhyā tayostu karmopasaṃyogadyotakāḥ bhavanti.

Thus, it seems, Yāska comes very near to the power of 'dyotana' or 'suggestion' of words, though, he does not mention it by name We know that in the Kavyasāstra, the word 'dyotana' is used as an equivalent of 'vyañjanā' 'Vyañjana' in the sense of 'indication' in Yāska as noted above is also an important occurrence of vi + √añj. We do not come across the occurrence of √dhvan or dhvani in either Nighantu or the Nirukta.

√añj and vi + √añj in Rkprātis'ākhya, Astādhyāyī of Pāṇini (Cir. 300 B.C.) and the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (Cir. 150 B.C.)

Rk. Prā :

In the RK. Pra, it should be noted at the outset, that we do not come across words such as vyañjanā, dhvani etc. The word vyañjana, in the technical sense of a 'consonant' occurs at several places (4)

Astādhyāyī of Pāṇini (Cir 300 B.C.).

In Pāṇini, we get 'vyañjana' at II 1.34, IV iv. 26, and II. iv 12 (5) In the last two occurrences,

√añj and vi + √añj in the Nighantu and the Nirukta  
(Cir 700 B C - 300 B C )

The Nighantu .

The Nighantu has no word like 'vyanjana' nor any other from the roots √añj and vi + √añj

The Nirukta . (Cir 700 B C - 500 B C )

In Nirukta, however, we have come across certain occurrences of √añj in different forms, wherein it seems to carry the sence of 'to anoint' (1)

We have P. P of vi + √añj in 'vyaktavācah' at 11 29 in the sense of 'distinct speech' - (vi + √añj = to manifest clearly) (2)

At 7 13 we come across the word 'vyañjanamatram' in the sense of 'mere indication' (3)  
This reads as below

.. athotā karmabhirṣirdevataḥ stauti vrtraha  
purandara itī, tanyapī eke samamananti bhūyapī  
tu samāmnānat vyañjanamatram tu tat tasyabhidha  
nasya bhavati yathā brāhmaṇaya bubhukṣṭaya  
odanap dehi, snataya anulepanap, pīpasate  
panīyap itī

(Moreover, a seer praises deities with regard to their activities, as (Indra) the Vrtra-slayer, or the City-destroyer, and so on Some make a list of these also but they are too numerous to be collected together in a list These epithets are mere indications of (a particular aspect of the proper) appellations, just as 'give food to a Brahmana who is hungry, or unguents to one who has taken a bath, or water to one who is thirsty' (3)

cussing this particular illustration, the author says that here also, a particular action (kriyā ' which has 'mandra ' for its kāraka is suggested by the upasarga viz. 'āñ'. Thus we get 'vyajyate' in the sense of 'suggestion.'

We find 'vyajyante' at I. 3.1. 19-20; the author  
258

says that without 'kriyā' action, the kālās such as bhūta, vartamāna etc. are not suggested. vi+√añj occurs in the sense of 'suggestion'—(athāvā nāntareṇa kriyām bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānāḥ kālāḥ vyajyante-) (and a.s.o, astyādibhis/cāpi bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānāḥ kālāḥ vyajyante) (I. 3.1. 19 20)  
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Again, at III. 1.67. 14/57—

tiṅgabhihitena bhāvena kālāpurusopagrahā abhi-  
vyajyante kṛdabhihitena punarṇa vyajyante.

We have 'vyajyante' in the same sense. The author says that the meaning of 'bhāva' or 'action' is suggested by both tin and kṛdanta. But there is some difference in these two. Whatever is suggested by kṛdanta is in the form of a 'dravya', while by tin, kāla, puruṣa, and upagraha (parasmai, and ātmane) are suggested.

Moreover, at VIII. 2.48 23/23, we have  
408

añjerasañjanam añjanam ca prakāśanam tatbā añjervy-  
añjanam vyañjanam ca prakāśanam—the context is that when √añj is in the sense of prakāśana, we do not change 'ta' into 'na' in case of a P.P.P. Thus, we get √añj in the sense of 'prakāśana'.

it is seen in the sense of a consonant. At II. i. 34, we have : 'vyañjanairupasikte'. It is explained as : dadhnā upasiktaṃ dādhikaṃ'. Anything that is used to enhance the relish of a principal object of eating is called a vyañjana, e.g. curd, in the case of rice.

Thus, vyañjana is that which serves to enhance the relish. We come across the same use of the term vyañjana in the Nāṣā wherein Bharata cites the analogy of sādavādirasa (Ch. VI). This can have an important bearing on the vyañjanāvāda of the ālaṃkārikas, wherein, vibhāva, anubhāva, etc. cause to enhance the sthāyin to the capacity of rasa.

It should also be noted that Pāṇini does not mention 'dhvani', nor does he refer to sphaṭavāda. He mentions one Sphaṭāyana without referring to the theory of sphaṭa (VI. i. 121). We also come across the word 'vyakta' meaning 'distinct', 'clear', in the sūtra I 3.48 (6).

**The Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (Cir. 150 B.C.) :**

In the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, we come across many occurrences of different forms of the roots añj and vi + √añj and also of words such as vyañjana, Sphaṭa, etc. (7). Some of the important occurrences are as below :

We find 'vyajyante' at Pā. Su. VIII. 1.70. line 15, page 381; ihāpi tarhi mandrasādhanā kriyāṅgā vyajyate. The context is that in the illustration, "mandrairindra' haribhīryābī mayirūromabhiḥ; the word 'mandra' being not an indicative of 'gati' 'or' action, does not get an anudātta svara. While dis-

cussing this particular illustration, the author says that here also, a particular action (kriyā ' which has 'mandra' for its kāraka is suggested by the upasarga viz. 'ān'. Thus we get 'vyajyate' in the sense of 'suggestion.' ,

We find 'vyajyante' at I 3 1. 19-20, the author  
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says that without 'kriyā' action, the kālās such as bhūta, vartamana etc. are not suggested. vi + √añj occurs in the sense of 'suggestion'—(athavā nāntareṇa kriyām bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānāḥ kālāḥ vyajyante-) (and also, astyādibhiḥcāpi bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānāḥ kālāḥ vyajyante) (I 3-1. 19 20)  
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Again, at III. 1-67. 14/57-

tīṅgabhiḥitena bhāvena kālāpurusopagrahā abhivyajyante krdabhiḥitena punarṇa vyajyante.

We have 'vyajyante' in the same sense The author says that the meaning of 'bhava' or 'action' is suggested by both tīṅ and krdanta But there is some difference in these two. Whatever is suggested by krdanta is in the form of a 'dravya', while by tīṅ, kala, purusa, and upagraha ( parsmai, and ātmane ) are suggested.

Moreover, at VIII 2-48 23/23, we have  
408

añjerasañjanam añjanam ca prakāśanam tīṅhā añjervyañjanam vyañjanam ca prakāśanam—the context is that when √añj is in the sense of prakāśana, we do not change 'ta' into 'na' in case of a P.P.P Thus, we get √añj in the sense of 'prakāśana'—,

Later on he says that  $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}c}$  is also seen in the same sense 'aṅcitah gacchati' means 'prakāśayati ātmānam iti gamyate'. In our popular usage aṅcitah gacchati means 'being alert he goes-samāhito bhūtvā gacchati'. The author here uses terms such as 'iti gamyate'. This brings us very near to the vyañjanāvāda.

Thus we see that  $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$ ,  $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}c}$  and  $vi + \sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$  are all used in the sense of prakāśana, i.e. manifestation, or revealing or bringing something into light, or displaying something etc ... 'vyañjana' occurs in its technical sense of a consonant. At VIII. 2.48  $\frac{24}{408}$  however, we get it in the sense of prakāśana,

as noted above. Thus  $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$  and  $vi + \sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$  seem to occur in the same senses as in the earlier literature.  $Vi + \sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$  in the sense of suggestion is also noted as at Mahābhāṣya VIII 170 15/381, or Mahābhāṣya I. 3 1.  $\frac{19}{258}$  etc. as noted above.

**Different forms of  $vi + \sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$ , dhvani etc.  
as seen in earlier poets.**

- (i) Bhāṣa. (Cir. 300 A.D.)
- (ii) Aśvaghoṣa. (Cir. 100 A.D.)
- (iii) Kālidāsa. (Cir. 400 A.D.).

We have traced the earlier occurrences of the words connected with vyañjana in the vedic literature. Now let us take note of these words in earlier classical literature e.g. the plays of Bhāṣa and works of Aśvaghoṣa and Kālidāsa.



That criticism follows literature does not require proof. That practice precedes theory and in turn is guided by theory is well proved in the story of literature, science, fine arts, etc. So, before we come to Bharata and Bhāmaha, let us take note of the usage of vyañjanā, rasa, etc., in earlier classical literature. The date of the plays attributed to Bhāsa is still a matter of controversy. Bhāsa, however, is placed earlier than Kālidāsa by scholars like Keith and others. I shall therefore, take him first for the sake of convenience of the treatment of the subject.

**Bhāsa :** ( Cir. 300 A.D ).

In the thirteen plays ascribed to Bhāsa, we come across words like vyaktam, vyakti, suvyaktam, vyaktikṛtam etc., in the sense of 'clearly manifested.' We also come across sūcayati, sūcayitavyah, sūcayanti etc., in the sense of 'suggesting or indicating' (8). Some of the more interesting occurrences are as below :

In the second act of Avimāraka the prince is sitting all alone, lost in the thoughts of Kuraṅgi. Meanwhile, two maid servants of Kuraṅgi came there with some message. The dialogue proceeds as follows :

Dhātṛī-ārya ! kiṃ cintyate ?

Avimārakaḥ-Bhavaṭi, śāstraṃ cintyate

Dhā - kiṃ nāmaitad ramaṇiyam śāstraṃ vivikte  
cintyate ?

Avi.- Bhavaṭi ! yogasāstraṃ cintyate !

Dha - (sasmitam) pratigrhitam mangalavacanam !  
yogasāstrameva bhavatu !

Avi (ātmagatam) ko nu khalu vākyarthah '  
anyadapyabhilāśavasādanyathā samkalpa  
yāmī ! (prakāsam) kimabhipretam bhavatyāh !

Dha - yogamicchantyavāgate svah ! anumata  
arjuna yoga iti nanu nisthitam kāryamas  
mākam rājakule vivikta avakase ! tatrāpi  
ko pi jano'dhikatarām yogam cintayannasti !  
tena saha tatraivaryeṇa susthu yogavi  
dhānam cintyatamiti !

The passage leaves no doubt that the author is not only fairly conversant with the 'abhipreta artha' or the implied sense, but also seems to be conversant with the verbal function called *vyāñjana*.

In the Carudatta act II we come across the following dialogue

Gaṇika - samvāhaka āryah ! sukhmāra kala  
śikṣitāryeṇa !

Samvāhakah - kaletī śikṣitā !  
ājivikedānim samvrtta !

Gaṇikā - nirvedasucakamiva vacanamaryasya !  
tatastatah !

Thus a sentence becomes 'sūcaka' or suggestive of a bhāva called nirveda

Again in the act III we have,-

Brahmanī ha dhik ! (niskrānta)

Vidūśakāheśā vacā duḥkham rakṣitvas'rubhiḥ  
sucayitva gata ! bhoh ! idam !

Here also, 'asru' or tears, an anubhāva, become suggestive of the feeling of grief.

Again, In the act I, we have Gaṇikā—(prāvāraṇam gr̥hitvā sahaṣam)—anudāsinaṁ yauvanamasya paṭavāsagandhaḥ sūcayati !

The fragrance is said to reveal that his yauvana is 'anudāsina' (not indifferent to the joys of life).

In the Pratimānāṭaka, act V we have,

Rāmaḥ.....aye imāni khalu pratyagrā-bhīṣiktāni vṛkṣamūlāni adūragatāṁ maithilīm sūcay-anti ! tathā hi.....etc. (Act. V.)

Here, one fact viz. that Sītā has not moved much farther, is suggested by yet another fact viz. the roots of trees that are recently sprinkled. But herein, we can read even the process of reasoning on the part of the hero. The word 'dhvani' occurs in the usual sense of 'sound' only.

**As'vaghōṣa :** (Cir. 100 A.D.)

Now we turn to Aśvaghōṣa (9). We come across 'vyañjana' in the sense of 'embellishment' 'adoration' etc., as in Śaundarananda XVIII. 11—viz,

maitrīstanīm vyañjanacārusāsnām

saddharmadugdhām pratibhānaṣṛṅgām !

tavāsmi gām sādhu nīpiya tṛptaḥ

tṛṣeva gāmuttamavātsavarṇaḥ !

Here, the word vyañjana, it may be noted is in the sense of alaṃkāra.

Again, at Bu Ca XVI 73, we have vyañjana in the same sense

sarvakleśabhīviddhānām kleśasālyasamuddharah |  
sarvalakṣaṣasampannāḥ sarvavyañjanamaṇḍitah ||

vi + √añj in the sense of 'to manifest clearly' or 'to suggest' occurs at Bu. Ca IV 84

upapannamidaṃ vākyaṃ sauhardavyañjakam

tvayi |

atra ca tī anumesyami yatra ma dusthu manyase ||

Herein, a vākya is said to be 'sauhardavyañjaka' i.e. suggestive of friendship. The sentence, i.e. a group of words, suggests the bhāva of 'sauhārda'. It may be noted that this passage is specially interesting and useful from the point of view of our inquiry

The occurrence of vyañjana meaning ornament in the verses quoted above is also of some importance for our investigation. We know that in Vāmana the word alaṃkāra has two senses, (i) that of saundarya, and (ii) that of a figure of speech. It is not unlikely that the word vyañjana had also a sense similar to alaṃkāra i.e., beauty or beautifying agent and also the sense of suggestion. The first sense of alaṃkāra seems to have gone out of usage but the second sense seems to have prevailed in Sanskrit Poetics

We come across some occurrences of 'dhvani' in the sense of 'sound' only. This cannot have any reference to the theory of dhvani of the writers of poetics

**Kālidāsa** (Cir. 400 A.D.) :

In Kaldāsa, we come across vi+√añj in its different grammatical forms (10). All the occurrences of vi+√añj, in the Kumāra, except at II. 11, are in the sense of 'to manifest', 'to display' 'to bring into light' etc. At II. 11, we have 'vyakta' and 'vyaktetara' having the philosophical connotation of 'the manifest' and 'the unmanifest'. Kumāra. VII. 91 is more interesting. It runs as below :

tau sandhisu vyaññitavrttibhedam  
rasāntaresu pratibaddharāgam ।  
apas'yatāmapsarasām muhūrtam  
prayogamādyam lalitāṅgabhāram ॥

Here, we have 'vyañjita' in the sense of manifested, revealed. There is also the mentioning of pañcasandhi, vṛtti, and rasa. This suggests an advanced stage of the science of dramatury.

In the Megha. 12 (pūrva), we have 'snehavyaktiḥ', i.e., the manifestation of love. Megha. 29 (pūrva) is very interesting. It reads as

venībhūtapratanusalilā' savatītasya sindhuh  
pāṇduccchayā tataruhatarubhramś'ibhirjīrṇa  
saubhagyam te subhaga vīrahāvasthayā  
vyañjayanti

kārs'yaṃ yena tyajati vidbinā sa  
tvayaivopapādyah ||

That the nāyakanāyikābhāva is suggested here is clear. Mallinātha explains it fully. 'Vyañjayantī' is explained as 'prakāśayantī' i.e. 'suggesting'. The river Nīrvindhya is said to suggest, by her R. 3.

condition in separation, the good fortune of the cloud, the lover. This may have an important bearing on the formation of the theory of vyañjana of the writers on poetics, wherein something else is suggested with the help of something else.

In the Raghu also very often we have  $vi + \sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$  in the sense of 'to manifest' Raghu XIII 12 and XIV. 26 are more interesting They read as below

XIII 12—

velanilaya prārta bhujanga vahormivisphūr  
jathunirvis'eṣāh |

suryāms'usamparkasamrddharagairvyajyanta  
ete mañibhih phagasthaih ||

vyajyante=unniyante (Mallinatha)— i e are suggested, and XIV 26 is—

athādhibhasnigdhavilocanena mukhena sitā  
s'arapāḍureṇa |

ānandayitri pariṣeturāsīdanaksaravy  
añjitaḍhadena ||

anaksaravyañjita is explained by Mallinātha as  
avāgvyapārṇam yathā bhavati tatha vyanjitaṁ

In Malavika, Vikrama, and Abhi Sa, in the occurrences,  $vi + \sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$  carries the sense of 'to manifest'

Thus, we have seen that in Bhāsa, Asvaghosa and Kālidāsa, we come across certain occurrences of  $vi + \sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$  in the sense of 'to suggest', that might have paved the way to the formation of the theory of vyañjanā at the hands of the writers on poetics

*Foot notes :*

- (1) añjate occurs at Nirukta 12.7 and is the same as Rv. I. 92.1.

añjan, at 3.20; ( i.e. Rv. I. 92.5. );

añjanti at 8.18; ( i.e. Rv. III 8.1 );

and also, ankte vyakte vyaktatare ( Ch. I ); akṣipī kasmāt, añkteḥ, etc.- in the sense of ' clearly manifested ' . and also, anakti at 8.10;

Yāska explains ' uṣāsānaktā;

He says : uṣā vyākhyātā. nakteti rātrīnāma. anakti bhūtānyavas'yāyena. apī vā naktā avyaktavarṇā tayoreṣā bhavati.

anakti = anoints,

avyaktavarṇā = not of distinct colour ( i.e. having no clearly manifested colour ).

' vi + √añj ' is seen in the sense of manifestation;

- (2) vyaktavācaḥ at 11.29 is :

devīm vācam ajanayanta devāḥ tām sarvarūpāḥ pas'avo vayanṭi,

vyaktavācas'cāvyaktavācaḥ ca

- (3) Translation ~ Sarup p.p 120

Nirukta (7.13)-

iti imā devatā anukrāntāḥ-sūktabhājaḥ havirbhājaḥ, ṛgbhājas'ca bhūyistāḥ kas'cinnipātabhājaḥ, atha uta abhidhānaiḥ samyujya havis'codayati indrāya vrtraghne indrāya amhomuce iti. tānyapi eke samāmananti, bhūyāmsi tu samāmnānāt yattu samvijñānabhūtam syāt prādhānyastuti tat samāmane atha uta karmabhīḥ ṛsiḥ devatāḥ stanti vrtrahā purandaraḥ iti. tānyapi eke samāmananti, bhūyāmsi tu samāmnānāt. vyañjanamātram tu tat tasyābhidhānasya bhavati yathā brāhmaṇāya bubhuksītāya odanam dehi, snātāya anulepanam. pipāsate pānīyam iti.

( Nirukt = 7.13 )

(4) RK Prā. has,

‘vyañjana’ at XVIII (patala) 32 (sūtra), 42, 43,

vyanjanam’-I 5, 22,

II 8

VI 14,

‘vyanjanasya’-XIV 15,

‘vyanjanāt’-XIV 47,

XVIII 44,

‘vyanjanānam’-XIV 16

‘vyañjanani’-I 6 23,

IV 1,

XVIII 33,

‘vyañjane’-VII 1,

‘vyañjanena’-III 17,

‘vyañjanesu’-VIII 48

‘vyanjanasamgamam’-XVIII 40

‘vyanjanasannipatah’-I 37,

‘vyañjanodayam’-VII 33,

‘vy ñjanodayāt’-VI 46,

(5) Paṇini (astadhyayī)

II iv 12,-

IV iv 26,-

(6) ‘vyaktavāc-I 3 48-vyaktavācām samuccāraṇa-

‘vyaktivācānah -I 2 51 ,-

sphotāyānah-VI 1 123-avañ sphotāyanasya

(7) In the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali we have  
 vyañyante - at Pr Sū I 3 48 line 7-8-8-8/page 283  
 abhivyañyeta at V 3 55 17/415,  
 vñjana at VIII 21 48 23-23/408  
 vyañjana at pratyāhara sūtra 23 26/26  
 and at I 13 3/11/13/15/22/25



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( Nirukt = 7.13 )

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‘vyañjana’ at XVIII (paṭala) 32 (sūtra); 42; 43;

‘vyañjanam’-I. 5; 22;

II. 8;

VI 14;

‘vyañjanasya’-XIV. 15;

‘vyañjanāt’-XIV. 47,

XVIII. 44;

‘vyañjanānām’-XIV. 16.

‘vyañjanāni’-I. 6.23;

IV. 1;

XVIII. 33;

‘vyañjane’-VII. 1;

‘vyañjanena’-III. 17;

‘vyañjanesu’-VIII. 48,

‘vyañjanaśamgamam’-XVIII. 40;

‘vyañjanasannipātaḥ’-I. 37;

‘vyañjanodayam’-VII. 33;

‘vyañjanodayāt’-VI. 46;

(5) Pāṇini (astādhyāyī)

II. iv. 12;-

IV. iv. 26;-

(6) ‘vyaktavāc’-I. 3.48-vyaktavācām samuccāraṇe-

‘vyaktivācanaḥ’-I. 2.51 ,-

sphotāyanaḥ-VI 1. 123-avaṇ sphotāyanasya.

(7) In the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali we have ;

vyañjante - at Pā Sū. I. 3 48 line 7-8-8-8/page 283.

abhivyañjeta : at V. 3.55.17/415,

añjana : at VIII. 21 48.23-23/408.

vyañjana : at pratyāhāra sūtra 23 26/26

and at I 13 3/11/13/15/22/25;

I. 1.3. 21/48;

I. 1.50. 19/123

I. 1.51. 16-19/128;

I. 1.73. 18-21-21/189;

I. 2 30 15/18/19/19/21/23/24/30,  
206

206

II. 1.34 35 19/386

III, 2 109 4/117;

VI. 1.2.  $\frac{1/2/4/5/7}{7}$

7

VI. 1.3 14/8.

VI. 1.131-17/19.

VI 1 223 19/20/21/23,  
119

119

VI 1 223 6/9/9/15;  
1 20

120

VI 4.16-3/185.

VIL. 1 73 19/265.

VIII 2 4-4/389

VIII. 2 48.  $\frac{24/24}{408}, \frac{2}{409}$

408

409

vyañjanādyartha : at VII 2 115  $\frac{7/8}{314.}$

314.

vyañjanānta at I. 1 29 10 :  
91

91

II. 4 43  $\frac{2}{2}$   
485

485

IV. 1 1, 18/21/21  
191

191

$$\text{VI. } 1\ 223 \frac{17}{119} : \frac{8/11/20/21}{120} :$$

119

120

1

VI. 4 56.  $\frac{23}{203}$  :

203

VIII 2.82    23 :  
              415

415

The references are to Dr. Keilhorn's Ed

(8) In the Svapnaśāradattam we have the following :  
 'sarpavyakti'—at Svapna V.

'vyaktam'—at Svapna V. 7

'vyaktam'—at Svapna VI. 14

In the Pratijñāyugandharāyaṇa we have 'vyaktam'  
 Ātmahite ksaman (Act I) Introduction.

and also, Yaugendha.—vyaktikṛtam asāmarthyam etc  
 and, 'vyaktam' balam. etc

and also 'vyaktam'—(Act II 1),

Kāncukīyaḥ—'suvyaktam'—(Act II),

rājā—'vyaktam'—(Act II),

Yau—vyaktam bharatarohako etc (Act IV)

The Avimāṛaka has,

Kauṇjayaṇaḥ—vyaktahumamurtiḥ etc ) Act. I)

Avimāṛakaḥ—vyaktam svayam viṇām vādayati—(Act III)

The Cārudatte has:—

Nayakaḥ sarvathā suvyaktam gitam (Act III) and  
 also,

Sajjalakaḥ dipaprabhavyaktikṛtam dṛśyate—(Act III)

The Pratimānāṭaka has,

Rāmaḥ suvyaktam prabhavāmīti etc (I 11) and  
 also

Bharataḥ—bahumānavyākṣiptena manasa suvyaktam  
 nāvadbharitam etc (Act III).

The Abhisekanāṭaka has,

Angadaḥ vyakta mutsryya deham etc. (II 25), and  
 also

Rāvanaḥ vyaktamindrajitā etc (V 10), and also

Rāmaḥ vyaktam daivagatim etc (VI 34)

The Dūtavākya has—

Duryodhanaḥ—suvyaktam prāpta eva keśavaḥ and  
 also,

Sudars'anaḥ ...avyaktādiracintyātmā etc

The Dūtaghatotkaca has—

Durtarastraḥ-suvyaktam nihatam etc I. 26 and  
also,-suvyaktam dhanuḥ etc I 28

The Pañcarātra has

Bhīṣmaḥ-<sup>1</sup> suvyaktam bahus'alinaḥ<sup>2</sup> etc. I 50, and  
also

Bīhannalā Yena suvyaktakāraṇa II 65

The Madhyama has,

Bhīmaḥ suvyaktam rākṣasījo etc I 26

The Urubhanga has,

trītiyaḥ vyaktīkṛtā dinakarograkaraḥ =etc I 121  
and also

As'vatthāma vyaktam nirjita eva etc I 58 d

The Bālacarita has vasudevaḥ vyaktam ghoṣasamipe  
etc

- (9) The Saundarananda has vi+√añj at II 38, XIII 41,  
and XVIII 11,

The Bu Ca has vi+√añj at,

IV 58, IV 84, IX 64, XII 18, XII 22 XII 40, XVI  
73, and XVI 130, and 'dhvani at IV 51, V 80, VIII  
72,

Bu Ca, IX 64, XII 18 XII 22, and XII 40, have  
'vyakta' and 'avyakta' having a philosophical con-  
notation of 'the manifest' and 'the unmanifest' Sau  
II 38 and XIII 41 have vi+√añj in the sense of 'to  
indicate', 'to manifest clearly'

Bu Ca XVI 130 has vi+√añj in the sense of 'to the  
letter' as opposed to 'artha' or 'spirit'

- (10) In Kālidasa we have, vi+√añj at

Kumāra -II 11, V 62, VI 23, VI 51, VII 91, VIII,  
37, VIII 71, and IX 6,

Megha -Vs 12, 29 55 (pūrva) ,  
and 21 (uttara)

Raghu -I 10, IV 68, V. 16, VI 12, VII 58, XI 41,  
XIII 12, XIV 26, XVI 23, XVII 40, XIX 30 XIX.  
41 , vi+√anj occurs in the sense of 'to manifest '

Mālavikā Somewhere after I 9, II 10, and IV 1,

Vikramo Somewhere after III 7, and V 7,

Abhi Śāku Somewhere in act V

and at VII 8, VII 17,

√dhvan or 'dhvani' occurs at  
vs

Rtu - 10 ( Pravṛddharṇanam )

15 ( , , )

and 21 ( , , )

kumara -I 56,

VIII 24,

VIII 71,

XI 36 38,

XIV 27, 39, 45

Megha -Vs 42, 56 (pūrva)-

Vs 3, 36 (uttara)

Raghu -II 72,

IV 73

VI 56,

VII 41.

and XVI 13,

## CHAPTER II

### **'Dvani in the Grammarians and certain parallelisms between Sphotavāda and the theory of dhvani'.**

We may say, on the authority of Ānandavardhana (middle of the 9th cen A.D. De, Sk P p. 101, Ed '60), that the concept of dhvani was not unknown to the early poeticists such as Bhamaha (last quarter of the 7th cen. A.D. to the middle of the 8th cen. A.D. De p. 49-50), Dandin, (1st half of the 8th cen A.D. De p. 67) etc. Ānandavardhana observes that Bhamaha and others subsumed dhvani under various heads such as alamkāra, guṇa, etc. I am going to examine this position in Ch VI, but one point is clear that in Bhamaha, Dandin, etc. dhvani has not emerged as the soul of poetry.

Ānandavardhana and his followers clearly mention that they have derived inspiration for the dhvanivāda from the Sphotavāda of the grammarians. We may therefore examine the Sphotavāda of the Vaiyākaraṇas and also their concept of Sphota and dhvani. We will also consider as to how far the writers on poetics are exactly indebted to the Vaiyākaraṇas in upholding their theory of dhvani and vyañjanā.

The grammarians are held in very high esteem by the poeticists. They, for their concept of dhvani

in poetry, turn to the Vaiyakaranas whom they quote with great respect. Ānandavardhana in his Dhv. says 'The expression,' is designated by the learned', brings out the fact that this designation was first devised by the learned and that it had not gained currency in a haphazard fashion. The foremost among the learned are grammarians because grammar lies at the root of all studies. They indeed refer to articulate sound units by the term dhvani or 'suggester'. In the same way, since the element of suggestion was common (to both), not only the word and its meaning, but its essential verbal power and also that which is usually referred to by the term poetry, was given the same designation, viz Dhvani by other learned men, whose insight into the fundamental truth about poetry was profound and who were the followers of the principle laid down by the grammarians" (1)

(Translation Krishnamoorthy)

Mammata (middle of the 11th cen and beginning of the 12th cen A D - De, p 146) also in his K. P. speaks to the same effect when he says

"This (i.e. poetry) is the best when the suggested sense eclipses the expressed sense, it is styled Dhvani by the learned" And also—"Idam, i.e. Poetry. The learned grammarians gave the style of Dhvani to the word, in as much as it is suggestive of the suggested thing, viz Sphota (The Revealer)" (2)

He adds, "Hence, others also following their view (gave the name of Dhvani) to the pair of



word and sense such as are capable of suggesting a sense other than the direct sense" (3).

Now, one thing that emerges very clearly out of this is that the term dhvani was first used in a peculiar sense by the grammarians and the poeticists, borrowing it whole sale, applied it to the domain of poetry in their own way.

### Patañjali :

In order to get a clear idea of the concept of dhvani in the grammarians, we will turn to Patañjali first.

In the Paspasāhnika we come across the following discussion (4) . "when one says 'gauh' what is Sabda ? Is it the object which has the dewlap, tail, hump, hoof, horns, etc ? "No", he says, "it is called dravya' . "Is it then its gesture, movement, or winking ?" "No", he says "it is called kriya or action " "Is it then the whiteness, blueness, brownness, or greyness ? No, it is called 'guna' Is it than the sum total of the qualities like "sattā" which ever exists even when the individuals are broken or destroyed ?" "No", he says, "it is called āhrti".

Then what is S'abda ? (5) . "S'abda is that on the manifestation of which, the correct knowledge of the object which has dewlap, tail, hump, hoof, horns, etc., is produced, or the sound which has a decisive meaning is said to be 'S'abda' in the world .. Hence, dhvani is S'abda".

When a word like 'gauh' is pronounced the following concepts appear in the mind of the hearer; the individuality cow, her action, her qualities genus cow, the shape of the cow, and also the word made up of 'g' au' and 'visarga'. The hearer wants to make out the exact connotation. Individually cow, her qualities, etc., are seen by the eyes and the word 'gauh' is heard by the ear. So, it is absurd to take this for the exact connotation. But since the relation of Śabda and artha guṇa and guṇī, and kṛiyā and kṛiyatva is that of identity according to the grammarians as there is a rule tadabhinnaḥbhinnasya tadabhinnaṭvam, it is quite natural to think so. The Māhabhāṣyakāra says that the श्रुति, गुण, etc. are not the true connotations of the Śabda, but the true connotation is Sphota—that, which when manifested, enables the hearer to have a clear knowledge of the object 'cow'.

The Sanskrit grammarians hold that the Śabda is not the sound units that we hear but it is manifested in the mind after the whole word is pronounced. It may be noted that according to Sanskrit grammarians, Śabda is of four phases viz para prajanti madhyamā and vaikharī. Śabda Brahman when manifested at the muladhāri or the sacral plexus is called para vāk, when manifested at the naval it is prajanti at the heart madhyama and vaikharī is that phase which is manifested out of the vocal organs as the articulated sound (6)

In the ninth śloka, Patañjali discusses the tīparasūtra (pa. 1.1.70). There are two points to

√añj, vi + √añj, √dhvan and ..

be examined (i). Is 'tatkālasya' a correct expression or not? And (ii).—Is this sūtra an apūrvavidhi or a niyamavidhi? While discussing the latter point the author talks about Sphoṭa and dhvani (7):

At the end of some technical discussion (8), it is stated—

evam tarhi Sphoṭaḥ, śabdaḥ dhvaniḥ Śabdaguṇaḥ.—  
'If so, Sphoṭa is the Śabda and dhvani is the Śabdaguṇa'.

Katham? how?

bheryāghātavat—Like the beater of a drum.  
tadyathā bheryāghāto bherīmāhatya kaściddviṃśati  
padāni gacchati, kaścit triṃśat, kaścit catvāriṃśat.

"This may be illustrated as follows—

One beater of the drum goes twenty steps at the time when the sound by beating the drum lasts, another thirty steps, and another forty steps. Beating is the same. The increase is due to the sound production by beating'.

It is observed,

"dhvaniḥ Sphoṭasca śabdānām, dhvanistu khalu  
laksayet |

alpo mahāṃśca, keśāṃcit ubhayaṃ  
tatsvabhāvataḥ ||

With reference to śabdas there are dhvani and Sphoṭa. Of them dhvani alone is cognisable to the sense of hearing. It is short, it is long, and it is by nature both (long and short) at the hands of some.

śabda, he makes his position very clear by suggesting that no question of order such as priority and posteriority and that of plurality can be logically raised in relation to Sphota which is essentially one and eternal. It is sound, he observes, that passes through successive stages in case of articulation and appears to be either long or short in proportion to the exertion required for the utterance of a word. So, it is particularly due to varying modulations of voice, as caused by vocal apparatus, that 'ka' sound seems to be different from 'kha' sound and the like. But Sphota remains unaffected. Thus the Sun, a fixed body, seems to be quivering when reflected in an agitated pool of water (11)

Order and difference pertaining to sound are falsely attributed to Sphota. The dual aspects of śabda as observed already imply that śabda has the potency of expressing itself as well as its meaning that is associated with it by inseparable connection (12)

The grammarians maintain that there are two different aspects of words, viz, kārya or the popular form and nitya or the permanent form. The former is usually produced by the exercise of the vocal apparatus and serves to give a reflection of internal consciousness, and the latter is what represents the ultimate germ of speech. Sphota is to be identified with this latter aspect of speech.

The three views regarding the cognition of sound and Sphota are (1) Sound when produced is heard by the auditory organs and becomes the

positive instrument whereby Sphota is comprehended. (ii) After having assumed the material form through the medium of sound, Sphota is capable of being heard, and (iii) sound acts upon the organ concerned and serves to manifest Sphota

Bhartrhari supports the third view. Sound serves as an outer garment of Sphota. Though incomprehensible and inconceivable in itself, Sphota reveals its existence through the medium of sound.

Sound and Sphota are intimately related. As to how sound and Sphota, that are related to each other as the indicative and the indicated, are to be comprehended, Bhartrhari refers to four different views. Some hold that Sphota is recognised as identical with sound, just as crystal looks red when in contact with a japa kusuma (13). Others say that sound (though not cognisable by itself) is indicative of Sphota. Still others maintain that the exact nature of Sphota is too subtle to be determined and it is sound only that comes under comprehension and finally according to some, Sphota is really manifested but is indistinct and unintelligible on account of distance from where it is evolved.

While referring to the intellectual process involved in the comprehension of śabda, Bhartrhari holds that the cognition of śabda practically follows from the last sound together with the impression made by the preceding ones. We may try to understand this, 'varnoccāraprakriyā' or the process of the pronouncing of sound units.

There are three opinions as to the nature of a word, (i) the word is not eternal, i.e., it is *anitya*. The words are created and destroyed. They have a *jāti* or a class in keeping with other objects. This view is held by the Nyaya Vaiśeṣika systems. (ii) *Varṇas* or sound units are *nitya* or permanent and are the cause of *śabda*. These letters have a relation with meaning and this relation is called *śakti*. This view is held by the Mīmāṃsa, Vedānta, Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools. (iii) Third is the opinion of *Sphoṭavāda* or the *akhaṇḍatavāda* of the grammarians. The grammarians believe in the identity and indivisibility of the letters. On account of the contact of air and the like, the *varṇas* or sound units are manifested as different. These manifested letters are known as '*nāda*'. They suggest the *Sphoṭa* which is gathered by *antimabuddhi* i.e., final cognition. As suggested above, Patañjali has already made this thing clear, when he talks of the four forms of *vaś* such as *para*, *paśyanti* etc. These are the four stages through which *Sphoṭa* (*nāda-bindu*) receives manifestation. Both *parā* and *paśyanti* are too subtle and delicate to be comprehended by the sense organ. *Parā* resides in the *mūlādhara* or the sacral plexus in the form of a motionless *bindu* (14).

*Paśyanti* comes up to the naval region pushed up by the internal wind. Of the four forms, it is *madhyamā* that indicates *Sphoṭa*. All these are more or less mysterious in nature. *Vaikhari* is the popular form and it is what is uttered by the vocal organ and is capable of being heard by others. It is again

held that *nāda* is simultaneously produced by *madhyamā* and *vaikharī* but there is a lot of difference between the two (15). The *nāda*, produced by the *madhyamā* is slightly cognised by us either at the time of counting *japa*, or when the ears are shut up (16). This *nāda*, manifested by *madhyamā* is what we precisely know by the name of *Sphoṭa*. It stands for Brahman and is eternal, one, without division, etc. According to this view, it is one and the same indivisible *Sphoṭa* that is represented by *varṇa*, *pada* and *vākya*, in the same way as one and the same face appears to be long and round when seen through stone, sword, and looking glass, or as a piece of stone taking reflection from red or blue flowers seems to be either red or blue (17). The difference between 'ka' and 'ga' is not on account of the diversity of *Sphoṭa*, but points to the peculiarities of sound that serves to manifest *Sphoṭa* (18). The unity and indivisibility of *Sphoṭa* are brought about by its comparison with the sky and consciousness, which though one and not admitting of fractions, are said to have such attributive difference as *ghaṭākāśā*, *maṭhākāśa*, and *jīva*, *īśvara*, etc. respectively. Thus those who take *pada* and *vākya* to be similarly indivisible units say as follows : just as letters are devoid of parts, so too no letters are comprehended in *padas* (19).

Strictly speaking, it is not admissible to take words separately by splitting up a sentence. To those who advocate the divisibility of both *pada* and *vākya*, it is the last letter that indicates *Sphoṭa*, and each

preceding letter serves to make for a cognition of the intended sense (20).

Taking into consideration the difference between madhyamā and vaikharī sound can be divided into two viz original or eternal (i.e. inexhaustible) and artificial (derived) or momentary (21) The natural sound only, which is generated by madhyamā, suggests Sphota. The unnatural (aprakṛta dhvani) sound is so termed because it rises from prākṛta dhvani and undergoes an amount of modification in the form of long and short sound Sphota which is essentially one and beyond any modification is not in the least effected by the quick utterance of sound which practically refers to vaikṛta dhvani. Another point that should be noted down is that it is Sphota alone, as is evident from its derivative meaning that is really associated with the expressiveness of sound (sphutatyarthōsmāditi Sphotah) [For the sake of convenience alone we regard word as having meaning. A closer examination of both the internal and external facts will show that Sphota alone is finally the significant element of speech. Moreover, Bhartṛhari holds that Sphota is practically one and the same but it is only the indicator of Sphota viz Sound that differs (22)

How is Sphota manifested ?

The answer is that it is practically from the last letter that the cognition of the entire word is derived together with the impressions produced by preceding letters (23) And, it is evidently an intellectual



operation which enables us to retain recollection of the entire structure of a word, even when we hear the last letter alone. 'Manifested by sound', implies that Sphota, though permanent, is not always comprehensible, but comes under our cognition only when the vocal organs are engaged in operation for its manifestation

Thus Sphota is regarded as 'antimabuddhigrāhya'. There is a rule that śabda, buddhi and karma are dvikṣaṇasthāyī (i.e. they continue to stay for two moments) They come into existence in the first moment, exist in the second and die out in the third. For example, we may take the word 'ghata'. There are four letters in it viz., 'gh' 'a' 'ṭ' and 'a'. First 'gh' is created. It continues to stay in the second moment. In this very moment 'a' is created. In the third moment 'gh' is destroyed but 'a' continues to exist and 'ṭ' comes into existence. Now when 'ṭ' continues in the next moment, the last 'a' comes into existence. In the sixth moment the last 'a' also disappears. Now, for those who regard letters to be eternal, 'utpatti' means 'abhivyakti'. So the whole word ghatī, the varṇasamghāta—or the collection of letters never comes into existence at one and the same moment. Then how is the meaning gathered? The answer is that though the varṇa sound unit is destroyed, it gives rise to some saṃskāra or impression. This saṃskāra or impression stays on and is united with the next letter. Thus the assemblage of saṃskāras unites with the last 'a' and we get the word 'ghatī'. This happens in case of yajñadikārya

(or sacrificial ritē) which gives rise to the fruit in form of heaven (svarga). Sphota is also 'antimavarni-grāhya' in this very sense.

The gist of the above is that eternal and indivisible sphota is manifested in the form of letters through dhvani or sound.

So, dhvani is two fold Prākṛta or natural and vaiṛta or unnatural as already observed. The prākṛta-dhvanī is qualified by the qualities such as 'katva', 'hrasvatva', 'adyudattatva', etc. Even though Sphota is self-manifested it is as though obstructed by the accumulated vayasamyoga or, contact with air. By removing this obstruction, the prākṛtadhvanī manifests Sphota. This manifested Sphota is different from the dhvanī and so Sphota is said to be one, eternal, all-pervading and manifested by different dhvanis and it gives meaning when it becomes antyabuddhigrāhya - i.e., when gathered at the last moment. This prakṛtadhvanī is the same as varṇasound-units and Sphota is never manifested unless through them. Vaiṛta dhvanī has a different function. It creates vṛttibheda e.g., dṛṭvāmbitādī in the letters gathered by prākṛta dhvanī. Thus even if there is vaiṛtadhvanībheda we have no prākṛta-dhvanībheda. So we get uniformity in form i.e., eka-rūpita of ākāra and the like.

Thus, the term dhvanī is used in three different ways :

- (1) Dhvanī is used for 'śabdīya śabda' of the Naiyāyikas. On the basis of this, the ālambārikas call vyāṅgyārtha to be dhvanī,

the sādharmaḃa being pratīyamānatva or utpadyatva

- (ii) According to Vaiyākaraṇas, Sphota is vyaṅgya-suggested, and prākṛtadhvanī is the vyaṅjaka or suggester. Dhvanī is thus vyaṅjaka. On the basis of this, the ālamkārikas call the 'vyaṅjaka sabdārthau' to be dhvanī, and
- (iii) the vaikṛtadhvanīs make for the vṛttibheda. Hence, vyaṅjanāvyāpāra is termed as dhvanī

So, for the grammarians the relation between Sphota and dhvanī is that of vyaṅgya vyaṅjaka.

We have also noted that the grammarians use dhvanī to mean (i) nāḃamatra or sound only, and (ii) śabda or word. So ghaṭa the dhvanī which is just sound-nāḃamatra-by itself has no relation with the object ghaṭa-ṛ pot which is seen, touched, etc (sparśaksama). The sound ghaṭa is something quite different from the object ghaṭa which can be seen touched, etc. Still, it should be noted very carefully that the sound ghaṭa indicates something which it is not viz the object ghaṭa. This idea of one thing indicating something else which it is not, becomes, so to say, the distinguishing characteristic of dhvanī. So, in all cases of expression where one thing expresses something which it is not, it is, so to say, taken as a case of dhvanī. It is this mode of expression, both to be found in ordinary conversation as well as in literature, that in saṅskṛit tradition is studied as a particular linguistic mode of expression. Therefore, dhvanī is that which suggests something other than

itself, and which is known to be separate from itself, and by this common point of suggestion (*vyāṅjakatvasamyāt*) the *vyāpara*-process-is also called *dhvani*. According to the *vyañjanas* the world is *artharūpa* i.e., of the form of *artha* or meaning, and is derived from *Sphoṭa*, the *SabdaBrahma*. In the like fashion, we derive the *ghatartha* from the word *ghata*.

This *dhvani* is identified with word in our day to day affairs. So *kāvya* is also termed as *dhvanikāvya*. Every sound is suggestive of the *SabdaBrahma*, which is *Sphoṭarūpa*. The *artha* of this *SabdaBrahma* is world. Thus, *Sabda*, through *Sphoṭa*, suggests an object. The whole process is as follows: *dhvani-sabda-SabdaBrahma*-i.e., *Sphoṭa* and *vivartita artha*. Here we may note that even in the process of gathering the conventional meaning from the word, an element of suggestion or *vyāñjanā* is involved. *Vyāñjanā* is that process by which something not manifested becomes manifested. *Dhvani* or *Sabda* first suggests *Sphoṭa* and as *Sphoṭa* is eternally connected with the meaning, we derive meaning from *dhvani*. Moreover, it may be noted that *vyāñjanā* is that process of manifestation through which something already existing is manifested. *Vyāñjanā* does not create new objects.

### **Sphotavāda and Vyāñjanāvāda**

We will be able to make a note of certain marked parallelisms between the *Sphotavāda* of the grammarians on the one hand and the *vyāñjanavāda* on the other. The points of comparison are as below

- (1) As observed earlier, for the grammarians, *dhvaṇi* is explained as 'dhvanatīti dhvaṇih'. *Dhvaṇi* is so termed because it sounds or rings or reverberates *Sphoṭa*, i.e. suggests it. The word *ghata*, for example, is used for the object-*artha-ghata*, which is seen, touched etc. This idea of one thing indicating something else which it is not, becomes, so to say, the distinguishing characteristic of *dhvaṇi*. So all cases of expression, where one thing expresses something which it is not, becomes, so to say, the distinguishing characteristic of *dhvaṇi*. The writers on poetics extend this connotation of the word *dhvaṇi*. Taking the quality of 'dhvaṇitva' into consideration, they include all that was related to this in *dhvaṇi*. Thus, *guṇa*, *alaṃkāra*, *rīti*, *vṛtti*, *pada*, *padamsa*, *varṇa*, *vākyārtha*, all these become *vyañjaka*, suggestive of the *vyangya*.
- (2) In the philosophy of the grammarians the sound 'ghata' for example, does not give the meaning directly. It does so through *Sphoṭa* which in its turn is suggested by the sound *ghata*. Thus what we ordinarily call meaning is arrived at by an indirect process. For the *ālaṃkārikas* also, the process of *vyangyārthagrahaṇa* is not direct but indirect. We arrive at the suggested sense either through *abhīdha* or through *lakṣaṇā*.

- (iii) The grammarians believe in *vākyasphota*. They do not accept the separate existence of *padas* i.e., individual words, and much less of letters or *varṇas*. But common experience of ordinary people misleads many to believe that the meaning is derived from individual words or *padas* and thus through letters or *varṇas*. The *Mīmāṃsakas* accept this position. It seems, however, that here ordinary people, and so also the *Mīmāṃsakas*, do not seem to pierce the veil of delusion and mistake the nature of condition for the nature of the contents. The nature of condition is the multiplicity of letters, the nature of contents is the unity of word, the *vākyasphota*.

Similar is the case with some *ālaṃkārikas*, *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇa* form the nature of condition and *vyañjanā* or *dhvani* is the nature of the contents. Those who fail to distinguish between ends and means, seem to confuse *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇa* with *vyañjanā*.

- (iv) To put it otherwise, for the grammarians the letters may be taken just as what we may call the object of knowledge i.e., *jñānasya viṣayah*, while the word-whole is *jñānasya phalam*-the result or the fruit of knowledge. For the *ālaṃkārikas* also, *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇa* are *jñānasya viṣayah*, while *vyañjanā* may be taken as *jñānasya phalam*. These two are not to be confused.

- (v) The grammarians believe in *vākyasphoṭa*. So they avoid the contingency faced by the *padavādin* viz., that of recognising parts even of letters or *varṇas*. Similarly, those *ā'ampkārikas* who want to arrive at *vyāṅgyārtha* with the help of *lakṣaṇā*, will have to go for a second *lakṣaṇā*, and a third and a fourth *lakṣaṇā* *ad infinitum*, involving further and further *prayojanas*.
- (vi) *Sphoṭa* is a distinct entity by itself, not to be identified with *dhvani* i.e., the sound of a word. The *vyāṅgyārtha* is also a separate entity, not to be confused with *abhidheyārtha* or *lakṣyārtha*.
- (vii) For the grammarians, there is a *krama*, a sequence, in the process of gathering meaning from a word. From word to *Sphoṭa* and from *Sphoṭa* to meaning—this is the sequence. In the same way, with the *ālaṃkārikas* also, there is a sequence, perceptible or imperceptible, between *vācyārtha* and *vyāṅgyārtha*.
- (viii) It is non-discrimination that makes for the acceptance of letters for the word-whole. In the same way, it is non-discrimination that results in our recognising *vyāñjanā* as either *abhidhā* or *bhakti*.
- (ix) For the *vaiyākaraṇas*, there is a gradual and clearer revelation of the *Sphoṭa*. Each sound-unit reveals the whole of *Sphoṭa* and

not a portion of it. The revelation gets clearer and clearer by each succeeding sound-unit. The Sphota revelation is a gradual process and the mind acquires progressively greater and greater aptitude for receiving further glimpses. With the utterance of the last sound unit the process comes to a close. By itself, there is neither qualitative nor quantitative difference in the word essence, but there may be difference in its grasping by the mind. Thus the degrees of difference are purely subjective and not objective.

For the *śloka* also, the gathering of *vyaṅgyārtha* is a gradual revelation in the sense that it comes only after the *abhidhārtha* or the *lakṣyārtha* as the case may be.

The writers on *śloka*, for their concept of *vyaṅjanā* are also partly indebted to other *darsanas* such as the *sāṃkhya*, *vedānta*, and *śaiva darsanas*. *Vyaṅjana* for the poeticists manifests that which is not yet manifested i.e. it brings into light that which already exists but is not presented before us. The analogy cited is *ghataprādīpānyaya* (Dhv III) i.e., the analogy of the lamp and the jar.



*Foot notes :*

- (1) Dhvanyāloka I सूरिमि कथित इति विद्वदुपहर्षमुक्तिं न तु यथाकथञ्चित् प्रवृत्तेति प्रतिपादयते । प्रथमे हि विद्वांसो वैयाकरणा, व्याकरणमूलत्वात् सर्वविद्यानाम् । ते च तेषु श्रूयमाणेषु वर्णेषु ध्वनिरिति व्याहरन्ति । तथैवान्यैस्तन्मतानुसारिमि सूरिमि काव्यतत्त्वार्थदर्शिमि वाच्यवाचकसंमिश्र शब्दात्मा काव्यमिति व्युपदेश्यते व्यञ्जकत्वस्यात् ध्वनिरित्युक्त ।
- (2) Mammata K P “इदमुत्तममतिशियनि व्यङ्ग्ये वाच्यादुध्वनिर्वुधै कथित ।” and also ‘इदमिति काव्यम्, वुधै वैयाकरणे प्रधानभूतस्फोटरूपव्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकस्य शब्दस्य ध्वनिरिति व्यवहार कृत ।”
- (3) K P “अतस्तन्मतानुसारिभिरन्यैरपि व्यङ्ग्यभावितवाच्यव्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जन—समस्य शब्दार्थयुगलस्य ।”
- (4) “अथ गौरित्यत्र क शब्द ? किं यत् तत्सास्नादिलाङ्गूलककुदखुर-विषाण्यर्थरूप स शब्द ? नेत्याह, द्रव्य नाम तत् । .. .... तस्मात् ध्वनि शब्द ।”
- (5) “कस्तर्हि शब्द ? येनोच्चरितेन सास्नालाङ्गूलककुदखुरविषाणिनां संप्रत्ययो भवति स शब्द , अथवा प्रतीतपदार्थको लोके ध्वनि शब्द इत्युच्यते । तद्यथा शब्दं कुरु, मा शब्द काष्ठी, शब्दकार्थय माणवक , इति ध्वनिं कुर्वन्नेवमुच्यते । तस्मात् ध्वनि शब्द ।
- (6) The Mahābhāṣya reads as follows

चत्वारि वाक् परिमिता पदानि तानि विदुर्ब्राह्मणा ये मनीषिण ।  
गुहा त्रीणि निहिता नेद्वयन्ति तुरीय वाचो मनुष्या वदन्ति ॥

MB II 1

The Vākyapadiya ( V P ) also reads

वैखर्या मध्यमायाश्च पश्यन्त्याश्चेतद्भुतम् ।

अनेकतोर्यमेदायास्त्वया वाच परं पदम् ॥ I 144

According to Nāges'abharṭa, the definition  
येनोच्चरितेन सास्नालाङ्गूलककुदखुरविषाणिनां संप्रत्ययो जायते स शब्द

applies to the Madhyamā Vāk, and the definition, प्रतीतपदार्थको ध्वनि शब्द applies to the Vaikharī Vāk

- (7) The whole discussion proceeds as follows किं पुनरिदं नियमार्थमाहोस्वित् प्रापकम् ? कथं च नियमार्थं स्यात् ? कथं वा प्रापकम् ? यद्यत्र अण्ग्रहणमनुवर्तते ततो नियमार्थम् । अथ निवृत्तं तत् प्रापकम् । तपरस्तकालस्येति नियमार्थमिति चेत् दीर्घग्रहणे स्वरभिन्नग्रहणम् ।

तपरस्तकालस्येति नियमार्थमिति चेत् दीर्घग्रहणे स्वरभिन्नानां ग्रहणं न प्राप्नोति ।

- (8) केधाम् ? उदात्तानुदात्तस्वरितानुनासिकानाम् । अस्तु तर्हि प्रापकम् ? Let it then be an apūrvavidhī ? प्रापकमिति चेत् ह्रस्वग्रहणे दीर्घप्लुतयोस्तु प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः ।

विप्रतिषेधातिरिक्तम् । It is decided by the dictum विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम् । अण् सर्वान् ग्रह्णाति इत्येतदस्तु तपरस्तकालस्य इति वा । तपरस्तकालस्य इत्येतदभवति विप्रतिषेधेन । अण् सर्वान् ग्रह्णाति इत्यस्य अवकाश इत्स्वा अतपरा अण् । तपरस्तकालस्य अवकाश दीर्घास्तपरा ।

ह्रस्वेषु तपरेषु उभयं प्राप्नोति, तपरस्तकालस्य इत्येतद् भवति विप्रतिषेधेन ।

यद्येवम् द्रुतायां तपस्करणे मध्यमविलम्बितयोरुपसख्यानं कालमेदात् ।

द्रुतायां तपस्करणे मध्यमविलम्बितयो उपसख्यानं कर्तव्यम् तथा मध्यमायां द्रुतविलम्बितयो तथा विगन्धितायां द्रुतमध्यमयो ।

किं पुनः कारणं न सिध्यति ?

ये हि द्रुतायां वृत्तौ वर्णास्त्रिभागाधिकास्ते मध्यमायाम् । ये च मध्यमायां वर्णा त्रिभागाधिकास्ते विलम्बितायाम् ।

सिद्धत्वं स्थिता वर्णा यत्तु क्षिराचिरवचनाद् वृत्तयः विशिष्यन्ते ।

यत्तैव कश्चित् आश्वभिधायी भवति—आशु वर्णान् अभिषत्ते, कश्चिच्चिरेण, कश्चिच्चिरतरेण । तथा—तमेवाप्यानं कश्चिदाशु गच्छति, कश्चिच्चिरेण गच्छति, कश्चिच्चिरतरेण गच्छति । रथिक आशु गच्छति, आश्विकश्चिरेण, पदातिश्चिरतरेण ।

विषम उपन्यास । अधिकरणमात्राध्वा व्रजति-क्रियाया । तत्रायुक्त  
यदधिनरणस्य वृद्धिहासौ स्याताम् ।

(9) The Mahābhāṣya reads the following Rk to this effect

चत्वारि वाक् परिमिता पदानि तानि विदु ब्राह्मणा ये मनीषिण ।  
गुहा त्रीणि निहिता नेङ्गयन्ति तुरीय वाचो मनुष्या वदन्ति ॥

(10) Says Abhinavagupta—"अस्माभिरपि प्रसिद्धेभ्य शब्दव्यापारेभ्य  
अभिधातात्पर्यलक्षणारूपेभ्य अतिरिक्तो व्यापारो ध्वनिरित्युक्त । एव  
चतुष्कमपि ध्वनि । तद्योगाच्च समस्तमपि काव्य ध्वनि । तेन व्यतिरेका  
व्यतिरेकव्यपदेशोऽपि न न युक्त । वान्यवाचकममिथ इति । वान्यवाचक-  
सहित समिथ इति मध्यमपदलोपी समास । गामश्च पुरुष पशुम्  
इतिषत्समुच्चयोऽत्र चकारेण विनापि । तेन वान्योऽपि ध्वनि , वाचनोऽपि  
शब्दो ध्वनि , द्वयोरपि व्यञ्जकत्व ध्वनतीति कृत्वा । समिथ्यते विभावानु-  
भावसचलनयेति व्यङ्ग्योऽपि ध्वनि ध्वन्यत इति कृत्वा । शब्दन शब्द  
शब्दव्यापार । न चासावभिधादिरूप अपि त्वात्मभूत सोऽपि ध्वनन  
ध्वनि । काव्यमिति व्यपदेश्य च योऽर्थो सोऽपि ध्वनि । उक्तप्रकार-  
ध्वनिचतुष्टयमयत्वात् । अत एव साधारणहेतुमाह-व्यञ्जकत्वसाम्यात्  
इति । व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभाव सवेषु पदेषु सामान्यरूप साधारण इत्यर्थ ।  
( Locana, on Dhv I 13 )

(11) प्रतिबिम्बं यथान्यत्र स्थित तोयक्रियावशात् ।

तत्प्रवृत्तिमिवान्वेति स धर्म स्तोत्रनादयो V P I 49

(12) ग्राह्यत्व ग्राहकत्व च द्वे शक्तौ तेजसो यथा ।

तथैव सर्वशब्दाना एते पृथगवस्थिते ॥ .. V P I 55

(13) यथा जवाकुसुमरूपानुपक्रमेव स्फटिकादीना ग्रहण तथा ध्वनिरूपानुपक्रमे  
एव स्फोटस्तद्विभागेनोपलभ्यते इति केषाचिन्मतम् etc  
( पुण्यराज under V P I 82 )

(14) परावाङ्मूलचक्रस्था पश्यन्ती नाभिस्थिता ।

हृदिस्था मध्यमा ज्ञेया वैखरी कण्ठदेशगा ॥

(15) युगपदेन मध्यमावैखरीभ्या नाद उत्पद्यते—(मञ्जूषा )

- (16) मध्यमा नादस्य कर्णपिचाने जपादौ च सूक्ष्मतरवायुव्यङ्ग्या—मञ्जूषा ।
- (17) यथा च मुखे मणिकृपाणदर्शणव्यञ्जकोपाधिरशात् दैर्घ्यवर्तुलत्वादिभान तद्वत् ।
- (18) व्यञ्जकध्वनिगतं कथयगत्वादिक स्फोटे भासते ।
- (19) पदे न वर्णं विशन्ते वर्णेष्वयथा इव ।  
वाक्यात् पदानामानन्त्यं प्रवेक्ष्यो न कश्चन ॥ ...V.P.I. 77.
- (20) पदवाक्ययोस्तु सत्तण्डित्वरक्षेऽन्तिममर्गव्यङ्ग्य स्फोट एक एव । पूर्णपूर्वं  
वर्णस्तु तात्पर्येणाहक । —(मञ्जूषा)
- (21) ध्वनिस्तु द्विविधः । प्राकृतो वैकृतश्च ।  
स्फोटस्य ग्रहणे हेतु प्राकृतो ध्वनिरिष्यते ।  
वृत्तिभेदे निमित्तत्वं वैकृतं प्रतिपद्यते । (V.P.I 77)
- (22) स्फोटे व्यञ्जकध्वनिगतकत्वादिभानात् ककारो बुद्ध हृत्सौपाधिको  
भेदव्यवहारः । (मञ्जूषा)
- (32) पूर्वपूर्वध्वन्युत्पादिताभिव्यक्तिजनितसंस्कारपरम्परापरिणकोन्त्यनुद्धिनिप्राप्त  
इत्यर्थः । वैयट ।

## CHAPTER III

### **S'abdavṛttis; the nature and scope of Abhidhā**

#### **S'abdārthavṛttis :**

According to the sanskrit writers of poetics, words possess three distinct śaktis or functions, called, (i) the abhidhā śakti, (ii) the lakṣaṇa śakti, and (iii) the vyañjanā śakti. The terms vṛtti and vyāpāra are also used as synonyms for the term śakti. Thus, by the abhidhavṛtti or the power of expression, the word is supposed to give the conventional meaning or the samketitārtha, by the lakṣaṇāvṛtti it gives lakṣyārtha, or the secondary sense, based upon certain conditions, and by the vyañjanāvṛtti, the word gives the vyangyārtha or the suggested sense. Accordingly, the word is said to be vācakā, lakṣaka and vyañjaka, and the sense is said to be vācya, lakṣya and vyangya respectively. We also come across the mention of a fourth vṛtti called the tātparya vṛtti, but as it is connected with the sentence i.e., the correlated meaning of all the words in a given sentence, and not with words taken individually, the alamkārikas generally do not choose to include it under the functions of a word.

As regards the nature of these śabdavyāpāras, there is a lot of difference of opinion among thinkers of different schools. The grammarians and the

philosophers (= dārsanikas) and even some of the ālamkarikas do not recognise the function called the vyañjanāvyaपारा. Even the earlier authors on alamkara such as Bhāmaha, Dandin and Vamana etc., almost failed to recognise or even mention vyañjana as a separate vṛtti in kāvyā. The tāṭhikās (i.e. logicians) and the Mimāṃsākas and some of the later ālamkarikas also (e.g. Mahima and Bhoja) did not accept it (2). There are also others who distinguish between gaunī and laksanā. We will try to consider the nature of the different vṛttis separately and discuss the difference of opinion with reference to the same.

### Abhidhā .

We begin with abhidhā or the function of denotation or expression. Abhidhā is that function by which the word gives the conventional-samketita or the primary meaning. The word here becomes vacaka and the sense is termed as vācyārtha (3). Thus, for example the word 'gauh' by abhidhāvyaपारा means, 'śasnādīmat-paśuvīśesah' or, an entity having a dew lap, horns, etc. This conventional or the samketita artha is gathered directly and hence is called the mukhyārtha or the principal meaning and the word is known as mukhya and the abhidhā-sakti is also called mukhya sakti, or the mukhyavyāपारा.

As to the nature of samketagrahana or gathering of convention, there is a considerable difference of opinion. This samketa has been classified in different ways. The Nuyāyikas classify samketa as 'pāribhāṣika',

'naimittika' and 'aupādhika' When we fix up a name for calling somebody, say, e.g., a father calls his son Devadatta, or when we fix up a technical term to refer to a particular meaning in science, e.g., say, dhvani, guṇa, etc., in the ālamkāraśāstra, it is termed as 'pāribhāsika-samketa'. Naimittika is that which refers to jāti, e.g., asva, manusya etc., and aupādhika is that which refers to the upādhis or attributes. For the Naiyāyika, upādhi or attribute means that jāti in which so many apara-jātis reside e.g. paśu consists of asva, go etc (4)

For Bhartṛhari, samketa is two fold viz ājānika (or natural) and ādhunika (or man made). By ājānika is meant the same as naimittika of the Naiyāyikas. Thus ājānika is nitya. Ādhunika-samketa is of the form of yadākadā' (i.e. kādāritka) and the Sāstra-kārs make its use (5)

### Classification of Abhidhā

Abhidhā is said to be three fold viz (i) rudhī, (ii) yoga and (iii) yogarudhī. These are again known as (i) kevala-samudāya-śakti, (ii) kevalavayava-sakti and (iii) samudayavayavasakti-samkara (6). Rudhī is said to be there where the word as a whole samudaya-conveys the meaning. Here, we gather the meaning with the help of akhaṇḍasakti of the word (7). Here rudhī is formed because the meaning of the components of the word is not at all comprehended separately, or, even if the meaning of the word is gathered separately, it is ultimately not recognised. Again, when meaning of the components

of a word becomes important, in order to get the full sense of the word as a whole, it becomes the case of *yogātmaka abhidhā* (8) *Yogarūdhī* is said to be in cases where *avayavasakti* and *samudayasakti* are both required (9) In the case of 'pankaja', the etymological meaning is 'that which is born in mud' This can be applicable to anything born of mud, other than lotus also. The *Naiyāyikas* do not accept either *rūdhī* or *yoga* in this case *Appayya Dīksita* holds that it is better to accept *yogarūdhī* here (10).

At times it happens that there are more than one conventional meanings attached to one and the same word. Here, *abhidhārtha* is decided with the help of various factors such as context and others *Bhartrhari* has mentioned all these factors (11) *Viśaṇanātha* also gives a fuller explanation (12)

Thus, we have seen that *abhidhā* deals with the directly expressed sense of a word.

### **Tatparya Vṛtti :**

Now, we may consider the *tatparya vṛtti* *Abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā* are the functions of a word, i.e. words taken separately. The meaning of the sentence whole is conveyed neither by *abhidhā*, nor by *lakṣaṇā*, but by a separate power of the sentence called *Tatparya*. The meaning of the sentence is thus termed as *tatparyārtha* The *tātparyasakti* is that power which assimilates the sense gathered by *abhidhā* and gives a new sense (*abhinavartha*) which is not just an assimilation of *vāc्यārtha* (i.e. not *yogamātra*), but



is something unique (apadārthōpi vākyarthah) The Dhvanivādins call it tātparyavṛtti. In this view of the Dhvanivādins we can easily read the influence of the abhihitānvayavāda of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. It may be noted that even though Kumārila recognises a separate function for vākyārtha, as something different from abhidhā, we do not get the clear mentioning of tātparyavṛtti in the works on Mīmāṃsā till we come to Mīmāṃsā-kūṣṭubha of Khṇḍadeva (13th or 14th Cen. A.D.)

### **Vākya, its import .**

While treating the nature of this tātparyavṛtti, we will at the outset, consider the nature of a sentence or vākya and its import

Expression of thoughts is the sole purpose of the use of language. Ideas, again, are completely and best expressed through the medium of sentences as such and not by means of individual words. Thus, a sentence is rightly called the unit of significant speech. An idea becomes definite only when it is capable of being expressed in the usual form of a sentence. Thought, in language, will therefore mean that a man does not think in isolated words but in choerent combination of words, in order to give consistency and relevancy to his very mode of thinking. The Naiyāyikas have drawn our attention to this important linguistic fact, when they deal with the nature of logical propositions. A logical proposition, as we know, is, to all appearance, a sentence—a combination of words connected together by mutual

relation. Jagadīśa says that the so called verbal cognition (śābdabodha) is derivable only from a sentence, i.e. to say, when a number of significant words (sāsthaka), having expectancy (ākāṅkṣa) and compatibility (yogyata) with one another, are related so as to constitute a sentence in the logical sense of the term (13) Thus, a logical proposition is an idea or judgement expressed in the form of a sentence. It should be carefully noted, however, that the meaning of a sentence, which follows from a sentence as a whole, should be distinguished from that of its constituent parts Jagadīśa notes that śābdabodha is not materially the same as śābdārtha or the meaning of isolated words The meaning of the sentence is something more than the mere sum total of the significations of component parts. (vilakṣaṇo bodhah-S' S'. Pra.)

**Vākya, Definition :** Before dealing with the import of a sentence, we will try to understand the definition of a sentence. Thus, Patañjali says that action (ākhyata), with the help of all or each of the following viz avyaya or indeclinable, kāraka, and viśeṣana or adjective, makes for a sentence (14). A kriyāviśeṣana or an adverb is also included herein (15) Just action, aided by viśeṣana alone, can also make for a vākya- (ākhyātam savīśeṣam). At times a sentence is of the nature of an action alone-ekātmī (mbh. II. 11). The grammarians hold that the pada-pādamsa aspect of a vākya is ultimately illusory, and they accept the sentence whole and give us the concept of vākyasphota. (16).

For the Naiyāyikas, a sentence is a collection of words having expectancy (17). Viśvanātha says that a sentence is a collection of words having compatibility, expectancy and juxta-position or, proximity (18).

In the vedas we come across only consolidated sentences, i.e. sentences which are supposed to have been originally undivided into parts. The Tāttirīya Samhitā supports this—*Vag vai paracyavyakṛta*—The grammatical method of analysis is a later development in the history of language. This view is strengthened by the definition of Samhitā or emphonic combination of letters as we find in the Rk Pratisākhya—*Padaprakṛtiḥ Samhitā*. It is said that the Samhitā or the close combination of letters as 'agnimīle' is what represents the original form and the practice of breaking it up, i.e. into *agni* and *īle*, shows only a grammatical process followed in a much later period. The dictum '*padaprakṛtiḥ samhitā*' gave rise to a great controversy. The *padavadins* (= *Mīmāṃsakas*) and the *vākyaavadins* (= *Vaiyākaranas*) have constructed it in different ways. The *padavadins* take *padas* as real and significant, and the sentence for them is only a combination of such *padas* (inflected words). They explain the compound '*padaprakṛtiḥ*' in such a way so as to prove the priority or originality (*pṛakṛitva*) of the *padas* (*padāni prakṛitīryasyah*). The *Vākyaavadins* take the sentence, or better say *vākya-sphota*, to be the only significant unit of speech. They simply reject the notion of the precedence or priority of the *padas* in

preference to that of a sentence and thus explain the compound padaprakṛtiḥ as padānam yā prakṛtiḥ seyam padaprakṛtiḥ. It is difficult to say which of the two explanations is more acceptable (19). Durgācārya has some relevant notes on this. It is emphatically stated that the Mantras, revealed as they were through the holy seers of antiquity, manifested themselves in the compact form of the saṁhita or combination, and not in that of isolated words. The teacher makes the student acquainted first with the Vedas in their Saṁhita form before he is allowed to proceed in his study on a grammatical line. Again, at the time of performing Vedic rites, the priest cites the Mantras in their consolidated form.

### Grammarians :

The grammarians attach much importance to vākya-sphota as the really significant element of speech. Thus, Sphotavadins are the same as vākya-vadins. The author of the Śabdakaustubha says that of the eight varieties of Sphota, only vākya-sphota is accepted to be real and significant (20). Thus, to the Sphotavadin the sentence is an indivisible unit (akhaṇḍa) and the analytical method of grammar that breaks up a sentence into parts is but an artificial device used for the understanding of unintelligent people (21).

Punyarāja also holds that this view is shared even by Pāṇini and Patañjali (22). So, "padanyasatyam vakyameva satyamityarthah"—notes Punyarāja on

## Vakyārtha .

As to the nature of the vakyārtha, we come across different views (see, Dr Kāpildeva Dwivedi in his arthaviṇāṇa or darśana, where he has quoted from Jayanta Bhatta — This is quoted by Bholasankar Vyāsa ), as below

- (i) The sense of a sentence is jñāna
- (ii) As kṛiyā (action ) is the most important element in a sentence the vakyārtha is kṛiyā,
- (iii) The vākyaārtha is phala (result, fruit) as we perform any action with a view to some phala
- (iv) The vakyārtha is Puruṣa (Īśvara ), for the result of action ( phala of kṛiyā ) is for Him
- (v) The vākyaārtha is bhavanā i.e the vāpāra or activity of the karta or agent with reference to some desired object, such as svarga or, heaven
- (vi) The vakyārtha is sambhāvana or vidhi
- (vii) The vākyaārtha is niyoga or preraṇā
- (viii) The vākyaārtha is udyoga.
- (ix) The vakyārtha is pratibha,

The Naiyāyikas hold phala to be the vākyaārtha while the Vaiyākaraṇīs believe it to be pratibha or intuition. The view of the dhvanivāda is not gathered clearly but as the ālamkārikas follow Vaiyākaraṇīs in general, we may hold them to do the same here also

So, according to the *Vaiyākaraṇas*, the meaning expressed by a sentence is *pratibha* or intuition which is innate or ingrained in us all (30) This *pratibha* is inborn and not postnatal, neither a sense-born acquisition nor a result from common experience. It is termed as *samskara* or *bhāvana*, finally seated in our mind and linked together with the continuous currents of knowledge flowing from previous stages of existence. Thus, it is termed as *purvavaśanā* also. The *Vaiyākaraṇa* has to take recourse to the theory of previous existence in order to explain the concept of *pratibha*.

So, what a sentence really signifies is the sense abiding in intelligence (*bauddhārthasya vacyatvam*). Words may have different meanings as taken individually, but when grouped together in a sentence, we have a single sense that is different from the *padārthas* or the meanings of isolated words. This kind of a sense derived from the whole is called *pratibha* i.e. intuition (31). According to intuition, says *Paṇyārāja*, the *padārthas*, unreal in themselves, help in the manifestation of *pratibhā* (32). According to *Bhaṭṭarhari*, the first thing that *pratibhā* achieves is to bring about an association of the meaning which seems to be otherwise unconnected (*asamvṛsta*). It is the objective (*viśaya*) that is directly conveyed by a sentence (33). This *pratibha* is directly manifested by the use of words or by the ever blossoming intellect which originates from the experience or memory of bygone lives (34). *Pratibha* is the source of all popular usages, and serves as the most reliable

it is one that retains in itself the action usually denoted by a verbal root (56). We find certain sentences in which some words seem to be so predominant by their very nature as to denote the entire meaning by themselves without the help of others. The meaning of the sentence *gāyako gāyati* can be gathered by the single word 'gāyakah' the verbal form 'gāyati' being unnecessary. Only in such cases a single inflected word is found to stand for the whole sentence, even independently of the verbal form. But, so far as the grammatical conception of the sentence is concerned, one cannot just do away with 'vyāpāra' i.e. action. We can easily notice here that a sentence, whether consisting of a single word (i.e. either a *nāma* or an *akhyata*), or a combination of words must be, as a rule indicative of some action, either expressed directly or understood. To the Indian grammarian a sentence without a verb is an impossibility.

The Naiyāyikas, however, do not share this view of the grammarians. Jagadīśa maintains that a sentence is a combination of mutually expectant and consistent words, but he does not put much emphasis on the inclusion of a verb. It is not necessary that the verb should be mentioned explicitly, specially when (*kriyā*) action is easily understood from the context. So, Jagadīśa rejects the notion of the grammarians that there can be no sentence without a verb (57). He bases his contention on popular usage. 'Kuto bhavān?', is a combination of words having no verbal form and yet forming a sentence.

So, it is not correct to say that a sentence without a verb is practically incomprehensible. For, the grammarian, herein, a verb, viz. āgacchatī ' is implied and without it neither the sense is complete nor is the proper kāraka, ( i.e. apādāna ) determinable

We have noticed that Bhartrhari has referred to as many as eight different views on the constitution of a sentence. These views, generally speaking, fall under two distinct categories, viz akhandapaksa, and khandapaksa. The Sphotavādīs who take the sentence to be an indivisible unit, support the former viz akhandapaksa, Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas, who take the sentence to be a combination of words, are in favour of the latter, viz khandapaksa.

We have seen that to the Sphotavādī, Sphoṭa represents the real word ( the eternal word ), sound being only a quality of it (58). Sphoṭa is two fold viz external and internal (59). The external Sphoṭa admits of further division into class and individual (60). Those who support the indivisibility of a sentence, are likely to take a sentence as forming either a class (jātisphoṭa) pertaining to a combination (samghātavartinī), or an individual (vyaktisphoṭa), that is to say that a sentence is one without any parts (ekōnavayavaḥ), or an intellectual assimilation (buddhyanusamphrtiḥ) (61). These three definitions according to the Sphotavādīn are duly noticed and explained by Bhartrhari. According to Sphotavāda, a sentence that is expressive of sense is one and not dissolvable into parts (62). It represents either vyaktisphoṭa or jātisphoṭa i.e., an individual or a



class in so far as the outward manifestation of Sphota is concerned. The formal difference seen in these various types of sentences is said to be simply due to upādhi viz. the operation of vocal organs employed in the production of sound and so on (63). Sphota has its internal aspect or vital side and in that it is not at all verbal but purely intellectual. The intellectual assimilation as showing the internal form of a sentence means that a sentence, so far as it is related to the internal world of thought, remains essentially intellectual in its origin before it is materialised into audible sound—It is Nāda or sound says Bhartrhari, that turns such intellectually assimilated ideas into concrete expression of a sentence (64).

For the khandapakṣa, a sentence is either an action, a kind of order or succession, a collection of words the first inflected word, i.e. pada or inflected words i.e. padas having mutual expectancy with one another. We have earlier seen these views. For those who regard the sentence as a 'krama', the word 'krama' is used in the following way. Though usually the word 'krama' implies a property of time as 'paurvāparya' (65)—i.e. priority and posteriority, its particular use in grammar is explained by Bhartrhari and Puṣṭavarāja as below. Every inflected word in a sentence has got some special significance as that of karmatva, kartṛtva, etc., which come to our notice in a successive or well marked order together with similar meanings (viśeṣa) conveyed by other words (66). For example, if we want to bring out the sense of a

sentence like, 'devadatto grāmam gacchatī', in a strictly grammatical method, we are apt to express it in the following way the act of moving which has 'devadatta' as its agent and the village as its object. Here, the idea of 'karmatva' which adds a special feature to the meaning obtained severally from each inflected word, is called 'vīśeṣa' that becomes comprehensible in a fixed or definite order-(67) This definite order is regarded as the main factor of a sentence. Again, it is stated that there can be no sentence made up of words alone, if it happens to be devoid of such an order (68) Thus, a sentence is intrinsically a particular order in which words are combined together in such a way as to express the intended sense (69)

These definitions of a sentence that are acceptable to the *khaṇḍa pakṣa*, can be classified into two classes on the basis provided by the two well known schools of the *Mīmāṃsā* system, viz *Bhātṭa* (i.e. of *Kumārila*) and *guru* (i.e. of *Prabhākara*) *Kumārila* and his followers uphold the '*abhihitānavayavāda*' as against the '*anvītabhidhānavāda*' of *Prabhākara* and his supporters. According to *Kumārila*, therefore, a sentence should be explained either as a combination of words (*saṃghata*) or as an order (*krama*) and according to *Prabhākara*, it is a verbal form (*ākhyāta*), or the first inflected word (*adyam padam*) or inflected words possessing mutual expectancy (*sarvapadam sākhaṅsam*) that make for a sentence (70)

These two views, then, refer to the meaning expressed by a sentence. There is a great difference

of opinion as to the meaning or the significance of a sentence. For the Sphotavādin it is *pratibhā* (71). To one who defines *vaḥya* as a verbal form, it is action ('*kriyā*') that forms the meaning of a sentence (72). For the *abhihitānvayavāda* it is association (*samsarga*) (73). 'Samsarga'—'association' is used here in its literal sense. It means that a sentence acquires some special feature, or import (*tātparyārtha*) when it conveys the intended sense (74). It means that when the meanings of different words in a sentence are correlated with one another, there arises *invariably some additional significance, distinct from those of the constituents*. Thus, the sense that evolves out of such *anvaya* or correlation of meaning is something more than a mere sum-total of them (75). Jagadīśa calls it—*vilakṣṇobodhah*' or special significance that results from the correlation of meanings. For the *anvitābhidhānavādin*, on the other hand, the meaning of a sentence is for all purposes the same as is signified by its component parts (76). Thus the import or the *tātparyārtha* of the *anvitābhidhānavādin* is nothing more than the meaning given by individual words themselves (77).

As to what forms the '*nimitta*' of the *vaḥyārtha* there prevail different views. Vācaspati Miśra in his *Tāttvabindu* refers to these views and establishes the Bhatta view as the *Siddhānta*. We will try to see the different views in the light of *Tāttvabindu*, as follows

- (i) According to the Spotavadi grammarians the nimitta for the vākyārtha is akhaṇḍa vakya, the padavarṇavibhāga being only the result of Avidyā (78)
- (ii) According to some Mimāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas the nimitta for the vākyārtha is the knowledge of that last letter which is accompanied by the saṃskāras or impression of the experience of the meaning of the preceding padas (79)
- (iii) Or, according to some other Mimāṃsakas, it is that varnamala or series of letters that is reflected in the mirror of memory, accompanied by the experience or anubhava bhāvanā of tattad padapadartha (=those words and letters) (80)
- (iv) Or vākyārtha is just the expressed meaning (abhidheyārtha) of the words correlated with other words on account of expectancy compatibility and juxtaposition. Thus anvitapadas or correlated words make for the expression of vākyārtha. This is according to Prabhākara (81)
- (v) The padārtha, which is accompanied by ākāṅkṣa yogyatā and sannidhi and expressed by the words used, makes for the vākyārtha. Thus first of all the padas give padārtas and then with the help of ākāṅkṣa yogyatā etc, they give vākyārtha. This is the abhihitānvaya-vāda of Kumārila. Vācaspati Miśra also accepts this view. \* On this

abhihitānvayanvāda is based the idea of  
tātparvavrtti (82)

Now, the first view is taken up for consideration. The Sphotavādin holds that if it be held that the varṇas in the vyasta form make for the vākyārtha, then the other letters become redundant (83). If it is held that samastavarṇas make for the vākyārtha, then again, there are two alternate possibilities viz. (a) do you consider this correlation (samuha) as genuine (vāstavika) or artificial-(aupādhika)? (84) The idea is that whether the varṇas-letters are naturally (vastutaḥ) (genuinely) correlated to one-another or not. We have the experience that they are correlated and thus as they are thus accompanied by the experience of the bearer, they become related. But as varṇas are nitya and vibhu, they cannot be correlated to one another and as we have the experience of these letters gathered at different times, the experience also cannot be correlated (85).

The Sphotavādi also refutes the view of those who held the view that pūrva purva saṃskārayukta antimavarṇa makes for the vākyārtha. The Sphotavādi asks as to what do the varṇavādins mean by the word 'saṃskāra', or 'impression'. It is either the smṛtibīja or something like the purification of rice etc., by chaffing etc (86). Certainly, the second alternative is not meant here. So here, the saṃskāra stands for smṛtibīja. But smṛti itself being just a vāsanā or impression, which is of the form of power of the soul, the vākyāarthapratīti thus becomes the result not of the saṃskāras but of the power

of the soul. Again, the Sphotavādī says that even though we have identical letters in words such as *nadī*, *dīna*, *sāra*, *rasā* etc., we have different meanings. So, letters in their *akhandā* form only, make for sense. Thus, *akhandavākya* should be accepted by the *varṇavādi* (87). The Sphotavādī cites the illustration of the word 'gauḥ' and says that the experience of the word *gauḥ* suggests that there is *ekata*-oneness- and *akhaṇḍata*-wholeness- in this word. For, if we take the different letters to be the objects of our experience it runs contrary to our day to day experience (88). If it is argued by the *varṇavādin* that just as the individual soldiers make for the army, or just as individual trees make for the forest, similarly different *varṇas* make for a *pada* and thus *pada* is *upādhika*, to this we ask as to what is meant by this 'upādhī?' 'Upādhī' or attribute can be two-fold, viz. (1) *ekajñānavisayatā*, or becoming the object of one and the same experience or, (2) *ekābhīdhehyapratyayāhetutā*-i.e., becoming the cause of the experience of one and the same *bhava* (*ekābhīdheya*). Now, if by the *upādhī* is meant (1), then we will have to accept the *padajñāna* even before *varṇajñāna* which goes against the *varṇavādi*, and if by *upādhī* is meant (2), then, there is *staretarāśrayidosāh*. As *arthabhinnatā* or difference in meaning-is the cause of the distinction between one *pada* and another, and as *padabhinnatā* is gathered with the help of *arthabhinnata*, the fault of *staretarāśrayidosāh* arises. Thus, the *vākyārtha* should be connected only with the *akhaṇḍa* *sphota*. This is the view of

the Sphotavādin, which forms the *prima facie* view in the Tattvabindu.

After explaining the first view held by the Sphotavādin in detail Vācaspati goes on refuting it. Vācaspati argues in the following way. Do the Sphotavādins establish their view on the foundation of our (1) normal experience, or (2) on the difference of senses of *pada* and *vākya*? (89) If the first alternative is accepted, then again two alternatives prop up therein according as (a) you accept *vākya* to be *avayavi* i.e., having *avayavas* or parts in form of *padas* or (b) you do not accept any *avayavas* or parts with reference to the *vākya*ārtha. Now (a) cannot be accepted as *pada* is held to be 'vibhu' or all-pervasive even by the objector, and in that case it is not possible to dream of an *avayavi vākya* which is 'vibhutara' or more pervasive. The very notion of 'vibhutara' is illogical (90). Again, the Naiyāyikas take *śabda* to be the quality of *ākāśa* and quality or *guṇa* is *avibhājya*—i.e., incapable of division, and it cannot be the *samavāyikā* of anything else, it being always 'dravya' itself. Thus, *padas* cannot be the *aṅgas* or factors of the *vākya*ārtha (91). Now, if you accept the second alternative i.e. (b), viz. that there is no *avayava* in a *vākya*, then it follows that the sentence as a whole makes for the sense and neither the *varṇa*, nor the *pada* is important and therefore *varṇa* or *pada* has no independent existence in a language. Well, it is true that only the sentence exists in a language, and that this *akhaṇḍaspoṭa* is manifested by *dhvani*, but

all this is putting aside the reality and is like the face reflected in a jewel, sword, or a mirror. Again, we ask that if the first dhvani reveals the sense, what would be the use of other dhvanis. Again, your antimadhvani also fails to reveal the Sphota fully. So, this Sphota and akhaṇḍavākya is a wrongly postulated hypothesis. The final dhvani reveals the sense only if it is aided by the impression of the preceding dhvanis. So they cannot be held as useless. Just as a jeweller gives his opinion about a particular stone after looking at it repeatedly, in the same way, the hearer decides the vākyārtha, with the help of the final dhvani aided by the impression of the preceding dhvanis. It is because of this that we, the padavādins, accept the last letter, aided by the impression of the preceding letters to be the cause of vākyārtha (92)

The varnavādin refutes the theory of Sphota, for according to him, for vākyarthagrahana, or gathering of the sentence-sense, there is no necessity to postulate the hypothesis of Sphoṭa. The varṇas themselves, used in the pada, make for arthapratiti or apprehension of meaning. When they are in a particular order (say, sarah), they give a particular meaning, and when they are in a different order (say, rasah) they give a different meaning. Thus, the pada gives a particular meaning with the help of krama-sequence-, nyūnātirikṭatva, swara, vākya, śruti smṛti, etc. If different letters of the same pada are pronounced by different people, we do not get the meaning. If I say, for example, 'sa' and you say 'rah', we do not get the idea of 'sarah'.



Thus, it is necessary that a pada should be pronounced by one and the same man, at one and the same time. Thus, eka-kartṛtva is an important factor in arthānubhava and is the jñāpakahetu of it. So the vākyaārthajñāna is the result of varṇasamūha and it is no use postulating the hypothesis of an anavayava vākya (93).

It may be noted that Maṇḍanmīśra in his Sphoṭasiddhi finally establishes the Sphoṭavāda in an admirable way after refuting the views of Kumārila and his supporters. We need not go into those details here.

Vācaspati then considers the second view held by some Mīmāṃsakas and some Naiyāyikas. This view is slightly better according to him than the first one, as there is no postulation of any adṛṣṭa like Sphoṭa herein. This view takes letters and words to be the cause of vākyaarthapratīti. We get some trace of this view in the Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana. According to Vātsyāyana, when letters are spoken, the hearer listens to them. These letters are not correlated in form of words-padas-, and therefore the hearer first of all correlates them and through the agency of words (padavyavasāyena) and with the help of memory, he correlates different words also and gathers thereby the vākyaārtha (94).

So, according to this view, we do not hear any sentence fully at a given moment. The speaker speaks letters one by one. As the letters perish immediately (āśuvinaśitva) and in a moment (kṣaṇikatva), every first letter disappears when the next one is uttered.

Thus, when the whole sentence is completed, the listener hears only the last letter at that moment. But he undoubtedly gathers the whole sentence. The solution to this situation is that even though the preceding letter or letters die out the moment they are uttered, they leave behind them their impression in the minds of the listeners. With the hearing of the last letter this impression comes up in form of memory and produces the vākyārthadhī (95)

The abhīhitānvayavādin (i.e. the Siddhāntin) refutes the above view as below : Is it so that the last syllable explains the vākyārtha after causing the memory of the correlation of the meaning of itself and the vākyārtha ? Then, we say that when the mental impression exhibits its strength viz., the remembering of padārthas, the padapratyakṣa, etc., at this moment, the cause viz. impression, does not exist. At the same time, when a listener remembers the correlation of pada and padārtha, he cannot clarify the position of the final syllable of a pada or vākya. So, the hearing of the last letter accompanied by the memory of the preceding etc., cannot make for the vākyadhī (96).

The third view is supposed to be held by some other Mīmāṃsikas. According to the commentator of the Tattavabindu, this view is not held by any particular ācārya, but both this and the preceding one are just placed as *prima facie* views by Vācaspati Miśra (97). According to some this view is held by the earlier Mīmāṃsaka Upavarṣa, who is older than

Sabara (98) So, according to Upavarsa 'gauh' is constituted of g, a, u, and visarga

These varṇavādins hold that we gather the meaning of a word or a sentence in the same way in which it is used by the elderly people. Now, these elderly people, in their regular affairs, do not use single letters or words, but use sentences to convey meaning. But a sentence cannot be without parts (anavayava). So, the sentence is just the correlation of letters (varṇasamūha) left in memory. This varṇamālā or dhvanimālā is the cause and vakyārthadhīh is the effect. The knowledge of pada-padartha is held to be instrumental only (nimittamātra) while the vakyārthadhīh follows genuinely from the varṇamālā or a group of letters or phonemes or syllables (99). The Bhatta Mīmāṃsakas do not accept this view. They find two faults with this, viz, those of 'gauravadosa' and 'viśayābhavadosa' (100). They explain it in the following way, suppose, they say, we take the following eight sentences—viz 'arbhaka, gāmanaya, arbhaka, gāṃ badhana, śīso, gamānaya, śīso, gāṃ badhana, bala, gāmanaya, bala, gam badhana, dimbha gamanaya, dimbha, gaṃ badhana'—Now, in these eight sentences we can see only seven different words viz gam, ānaya, badhāna, arbhaka, śīso, bāla, and dimbha. According to the varṇavādin (i.e. the 3rd view), we will have to accept separate power of each of the eight sentences. Thus, we will have to accept eight śaktis in respect of these eight sentences. If we accept the view of the pada-ādins, we will have to accept only seven śaktis with reference

to seven words. Thus we have to go for unnecessary acceptance of additional śaktis if we accept the varṇavāda. Thus, it becomes redundant on account of kalpanā-gaurava (101). Another fault that is seen in this view is that of viśiyābhāva. The varṇamālā in a vākya can cause vākyaārthadhīḥ only when there is first padārthadhīḥ. Padārthajñāna is a must before vākyaārthajñāna. It is only when the padārthas are correlated that the vākyaārtha flashes upon our mind. Thus, padārthajñāna is necessary before their correlation (anvaya). In this case, how can we take varṇamālā as the cause of vākyaārthadhīḥ? Again, when we listen to a sentence, we cannot remember the syllables of even five or six words in a sentence, then what to talk of a long sentence full of many words? (102). Thus, this (viz. the third view) cannot be accepted.

The fourth view is the one held by Prabhākara and his followers who are known as anvitābhīdhānavādins. For them, the words used in a sentence, on account of expectancy, compatibility and proximity, are first correlated and then they yield the vākyaārtha, through the power called abhīdhā (103). The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas or the abhīhitānvayavādins object to this view. Their objections are as below - when the anvitābhīdhānavādī says that the abhīdhā power of a word is able to convey its meaning as well as correlation (anvaya), is it so that the vākyaārtha is gathered through all the padārthas together or not? If they (=anvitābhīdhānavādins) hold that all the words together do not convey the vākyaārtha, then for them only the first word-pada-will convey the vākyaārtha.

So, the use of other padas becomes redundant, as the *vivaksa* (intention) of the speaker will be conveyed by just one word alone<sup>1</sup> (104) Or, if it be said that other words also convey *vākyārtha*, then in the sentence, *hariḥ gam badhnāti*, wherein we get three words, the meaning of the action 'badhnāti' will not become clear until it is connected with 'hariḥ' the agent and 'gam' the object. The same is the case with the other words. Thus, there arises the contingency of *itaretaraśraya* (The illustration cited by Vācaspati Miśra is *ukhayām pacet*) (105).

The fifth view is held by *abhihitānvayavādins* or by *Kumarila* and his followers. According to them, the padas first convey their meaning separately, and then after getting correlated, they convey the *vākyārtha*.

*Vacaspati Miśra* in his *Tattvabindu* refutes *Prabhākara's* *anvītabhidhānavāda* and establishes the *abhihitānvayavāda* as the *Siddhānta*. The *abhihitānvayavādin* says that unless a contrary evidence arises, usually, for any effect, we consider the immediately preceding factor as the cause of it (106). Whenever there is *vākyārthajñāna* it is preceded by *padārthajñāna* *smṛti*, which should be then recognised as its cause. Again, this *padārthasmarana* alone is not sufficient for bringing about the sentence-sense, but their correlation is also important. Thus the *smaraṇa* of the *padārthas* in the mind, qualified by *ākāṅkṣā*, and *sannidhi*, makes for the *vākyārthadhīh* (107). Again the *abhihitānvayavādin* holds that the mental impression (*manovāsana*) by itself does not create the *smṛti* or memory of the objects of experience that

were known or unknown earlier. It just makes for the remembrance of the padārthas of a given padasamūha qualified by ākanksā, योग्यता etc. Thus, padarthasmṛti goes with (i.e. is sahakṛtā) ākanksādi and thus only (i.e. ākanksādi trayasahakṛta) makes for the knowledge of the vākyārtha.

As for the argument that if padarthajñāna is caused by smṛti which is different from padas, then, in that case, it will not be capable of causing knowledge of the vākyārtha; for, in case if it is held to be capable of this, then we will have to accept this as the seventh pramāṇa over and above the six, held by the Mīmamsadarsana. Or the śābdapramāṇa will have to be included in this novel pramāṇa, and this is not noticed by Śābara and others, who have not accepted padārtha as a separate pramāṇa because they have already mentioned āgamapramāṇa which could have been only a sub-variety of the new padārtha pramāṇa (108), and also that if āgamapramāṇa is a sub-variety of padārtha, then, padārtha should be mentioned along with the other five pramāṇas, and this means casting aspersions on the scholarship-vidvattā-and omniscience-sarvajñatva-of Bhagavān Bhasyakāra. Moreover, if we take padārthajñāna as the nimitta of vākyārthajñāna then, we will have to accept either three vūttis or two, such as (i) the first śakti that helps the pada to give its individual meaning, and (ii) the second that causes its memory, and (iii), the third that correlates, or at least the two that give padarthajñāna and vākyārthajñāna R. 7.

respectively while in the view of the anvitābhīdhana-vāda only one śakti is required and thus there is no kalpanāgaurava—or the contingency of imagining many vṛttis (109)(110) Vācaspati gives the following reply

The abhīhitānvayavādī holds that only one śakti as mentioned by the Prabhākaras can not be connected with the anvaya or correlation. For thus, as anvaya or correlation is just one and identical with reference to different padas, we will have to accept the position in which all the padas stand for one another as synonyms<sup>1</sup> (111). The abhīhitānvayavādī again asks the following question to the anvitābhīdhana-vādī. Is it so that a pada by its śakti conveys only the meaning as such (padarthasarūpa) and not the correlation (anvaya) also which makes for the vākyaṛthadhīh? Or is it so that it conveys both its meaning and the correlation, both of which help to bring about the vākyaṛthadhīh? The knowledge of the correlation of one padārtha with another padārtha is born of some other pada either known (spasta) or unknown (aspasta), and not by the padas themselves. Those who are learned in the vedas also hold this view and according to them, kṛiya or action, by abhīdhā cannot convey the karta or agent (112). Thus, the abhīhitānvayavādī accepts another śakti, different from abhīdhā, and it is termed as lakṣaṇaśakti. For them in laukika and vaidic sentences, the vākyaṛthadhīh is caused by lakṣaṇa. Vācaspatimīśra clarifies the stages which the śrota-listener-has to pass through while going from vākyaśravaṇa to

vākyarthajñāna. It is as follows— An individual listens to the sentences, spoken by the elderly people and thereby becomes conscious of activity (pravṛtti), inactivity (nivṛtti), joy or sorrow (haṣṭa, soka) etc. Thus, he records this sentence as the cause of pravṛtti, nivṛtti etc. As the elderly person goes on using one word (pada) after another, he gathers *newer and newer meanings* (anupajāta) and this new (or anupajāta) meaning dawns upon the mind only after listening to some particular words (viśeṣa pada) even though the words already pronounced are very well there. Thus the child takes them to be the cause of it (i.e. knowledge). This knowledge is only with reference to the padārtha alone and as such it cannot make for the pravṛtti, nivṛtti, etc. But when the whole sentence sense is gathered then only it causes pravṛtti, nivṛtti etc. This viśiṣṭa artha or, particular meaning, goes with the whole sentence. The vṛddhavyavahara results into this. The words used in the vṛddhavyavahara have this conveying of the viśiṣṭārtha as its object, but by abhidhā they convey only the padārtha alone. Thus, as in the case of laukika vākyas, so also in the case of vaidika vākyas the words convey the sentence-sense through lakṣaṇā alone (113).

It becomes quite clear that for the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas the grasping of the meaning of the sentence, the vākyārthagrahaṇa, is achieved with the help of lakṣana. Kumārila himself notes in his vārtika that vākyārtho lakṣyamāno hi sarvatraiveti na sṭhitiḥ.

Pārthasarathī Miśra in his Nyāyaratnamālā refutes the anvītābhidhānavāda and establishes that



even though in a single sentence, we get many padas, still, with the help of ākāṅksādī we gather the correlation between different padas (114) Neither the sentence, nor the words by themselves make for the vakyārthadhī First of all, from the padasvarūpa we get padārtha through abhidha and then vakyārtha becomes lakṣita i.e. indicated (115) In a sentence there are many words, but when there is vakyārthadhī, all the padarthas are united just as all types of pigeons get together for picking up grains (116).

Vācaspatī has made it quite clear that the power that correlates the word senses in a sentence is quite different from abhidha and it is lakṣaṇa But this lakṣaṇa is different from lakṣaṇa of the ālamkārikas and thus we come across at least four vṛttis, viz, abhidhā, lakṣaṇa, gūṇa and padārthānvayaśakti In order to avoid the gaurava of recognising so many vṛttis the padārthānvaya śakti is also termed as lakṣaṇa (117) This lakṣaṇa or padārthānvayaśakti is different from lakṣaṇa of the ālamkārikas and probably because of this others might have named it differently as tatparya śakti,

### Ālamkārikas

As seen above, some of the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas later on, called it tatparya vṛtti in order to distinguish it from lakṣaṇa as such Probably, the Mīmāṃsakas in Kasmīra, followed this tradition which was mentioned by even Abhinava and Maṃmaṭa Moreover Abhinava and Maṃmaṭa have identified gauṇī and lakṣaṇa of the Mīmāṃsakas Thus, for them, tatparya becomes the third vṛtti and vyarjana is therefore

termed as the *Turīyā Vṛtti* (118). Abhinava and Mammata also accept this view of the *abhīhitānvayavāda*. It becomes clear when we read *ityanta-granthena upapadītasya abhinavaguptacaryasammata-paksasya bahuvacanam s'ri mammaṭācāryapādāḥ svasammātatvamuktamīti tīkākāraḥ sarvaḥ uktamītidik* (Bālabodhinī pp. 27).

But later on, certain *dhvanīvadins* rejected this *tātparyavṛtti*, and *Vidyānātha*, the author of *Pratāparudhīya*, includes *tātparyavṛtti* in *vyāñjanavṛtti* and mentions the *tātparyārtha* as identical with the *vyangyārtha*. The view *viz-soyam īṣoriva dīrghadīrghataro abhīdhā vyāparaḥ* etc. (supposedly mentioned by *Bhaṭṭa Lollata*) considers *tātparyavṛtti* as just a part of *abhīdhavṛtti*. *Mahima* gathers the *tātparyārtha* with the help of *anumāna* or inference. He does not recognise *tātparyavṛtti* in gathering the sense of 'nisedha' or negation, from the sentence, *viśam bhak sayā, macāsyā grhe bhūnikthah*. For him, the *nisedhārtha* does not fall in the province of *sābdabodha*, but is gathered by the process of *anumāna*, where the *vacyārtha* becomes the *hetu*. Thus, here we have an instance of *ārthī prakriyā* and not *sabdi prakriyā* (119).

### **Lakṣaṇā :**

After considering the nature of *abhīdhā* and *tātparyā* we may consider *lakṣaṇā* or the power of indication, or that function of a word which gives us the secondary meaning. The word that gives the secondary sense is called *lākṣaṇika*, the sense, *lakṣyārtha*, and the function, *lakṣaṇa*. That words

are at times used in a sense other than the primary was recognised by pioneer grammarians such as Patañjali who admitted a *gaunī vṛtti* besides *mukhyā vṛtti*. He has explained the conditions that necessitate the recognition of *lakṣaṇa* as a process of transference of one's attribute to another. The various illustrations of *lakṣaṇa* cited by him under the rule Pa. 4-1-148, are as below *mā caḥ hasanti, gaṅgāyām ghosaḥ, yastih praveśaya* etc. These are so clear and typical that they have been often used by others. The *Mīmāṃsakas* and *Naiyāyikas* and all the other schools of thought recognise *lakṣaṇa*. Though this *vṛtti* was generally called *lakṣana* other names also were current viz *gaunī vṛttih, bhāktih* or *upacāra*. Usually when there is a *lakṣaṇika* or, secondary use of words, we see commentators saying *gauṇōyam śabdaprayogaḥ, bhāktah va* or, *upacāroyam* etc., though of course herein we come across different shades of meaning. We will consider this in detail later on.

*Lakṣaṇā*, then, is a secondary function. As *Mammata* says, the power really belongs to *vāc्यārtha*, though, for all practical purposes, it is supposed to belong to *vacaka śabda* (120). Thus, if *gaṅgāyām ghosaḥ* is taken as an instance of *lakṣaṇā*, the *lakṣyārtha* of *gaṅgā tata* is, really speaking conveyed by the *vāc्यārtha* viz *gaṅgāpravāha*, and not by the word 'gaṅgā'. The idea is that the power of the *śabda* 'gaṅgā' becomes exhausted in expressing *gaṅgāpravāha*. Now, where lies the possibility of the word, which has become powerless after giving the *abhidhārtha*, conveying the *lakṣyārtha* viz. *gaṅgātata*?

Thus, when we say that lakṣaṇā is the power of a word, we are slightly inexact and attribute to the word, a function that belongs to its sense.

### Conditions of Lakṣaṇā :

Lakṣaṇā presupposes three conditions. (121).  
 (i) The vācyārtha must be inapplicable (i.e. mukhyārthabādhā) (ii) The lakṣyārtha must be such as is connected with the vācyārtha-(mukhyārthayoga, or tadyoga), and (iii) The lakṣaṇā must have been resorted to either (a) in keeping with usage or rūḍhi, or (b) with a definite purpose (prāyojana).

The vācyārtha becomes inapplicable or bādhita because of its coming into conflict with the pramāṇas (122). In gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ, the mukhyārtha viz. gaṅgāpravāha is bādhita, say, by pratyakṣa pramāṇa and again fails to comply with the second requirement of a vākya viz. 'yogyatā'. In determining whether a sense is bādhita or not, we take note of the tātparya or purport of the words. Thus, when we say that in gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ the mukhyārtha of gaṅgā is bādhita, it is the purport or tenor of the sentence that makes us say so. Otherwise, one could have said that the mukhyārtha of ghoṣa (and not gaṅgā) is bādhita and that lakṣaṇā applies to ghoṣa and not gaṅgā.

Now, the lakṣyārtha must be such as bears some sort of connection—may be even of vaiparītya or contrariety—with the vācyārtha. If this condition is not fulfilled, every sense could be the lakṣyārtha. The connection may be any one of the five enumerated


by Bhartrmītra and others

abhidheyena sambandhat sādṛāyāt samavāyāt hi  
vaiparityāt kriyayogāllakṣaṇā pañcadhā mata || (123)

Canons of interpretation in Sanskrit, are, on ground of 'gaurava dosa' against the secondary use of words, where the primary use would give the same idea (124) Lakṣaṇa which is a secondary function, requires justification Lakṣaṇā is justified on the score of prayojana or rudhī Gangādate ghosāḥ will fail to convey the sense-prayojana-of the preponderance of śaītya and pāvanatva or coolness and purity, that is conveyed by 'gangā im ghosāḥ', which, therefore, is justified The example of lakṣaṇa based on rudhī is 'karmāṇi kuśalāḥ' according to Mammata Viśvanatha disagrees (125) Hemacandra does not accept rudhīmūlā lakṣaṇā at all (126) It might have been that all instances of lakṣaṇa must have been prayojanamūla in the beginning The first gentleman who transferred 'kuśala' to the realms other than that of darbhagrahana did so on the basis of upacāra (i.e. transfer due to similarity) But constant use has totally overshadowed the prayojana element in it Māṇikyacandra very critically brings out this view point when he says nirudhā itī bhras opacāraprāptayaḥ Kumārila also recognised this fact, and even went to the length of saying that even rūdhīlakṣaṇās may to-day be employed as prayojanalakṣaṇās under certain circumstances (127) We have seen that 'tadyogaḥ' is one of the requirements for lakṣaṇā This tadyoga may be śamīpya sambandha, angangībhava sambandha,

tatkarmya, sādṛśya, svāmibhṛtya sambandha, tādārthya etc. Based on these sambandhas or relations, laksana is divided into gauṇī i.e., based on sādṛśya sambandha and śuddhā i.e. based on sādṛśyetara sambandha. We will consider the classification of laksanā later on. It may be noted here that according to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, and certain ālamkārikas such as Hemacandra, gauṇī vṛtti is recognised as distinct from and independent of laksanā. Thus, a word has, in view of the latter, four vṛttis viz abhidha, gauṇī, laksana and vyañjana. Vidyānātha, in his Prataparudriya refutes the view of the Prābhākaras and observes that gauṇī cannot be a separate function of a word. If at all, it can only be a subdivision of laksanā, as in both there is mukhy ārthabaddha and tadyoga. If gauṇī be accepted as a separate function of a word, he observes, then we would have to accept several functions based on several relations (128). The Naiyayikas also hold a similar view (129).

**Classification of laksanā:** Mammata seems to classify laksanā in the following way—



Thus, gauṇī lakṣaṇa is that which is based on sādṛśya sambandha, and s'uddha is one which is sadṛśyetara-sambandhamulā (i.e. the relations of kāryakāraṇa, tadarthya, tātparmya, etc.) Suddha is again four fold as shown above, while gauṇī is two fold.

It should be noted however, that these divisions and subdivisions pertain to prajñānavṛtti lakṣaṇā alone and not rudhīmula. Māṇikyacandra suggests that rudhī lakṣaṇa is so well established that we cannot penetrate into its nature (130). Thus, it is of the type of abhidhā (131). The S. D. gives a more detailed classification.

Upādānalakṣaṇā is also known as ajahatsvārtha or ajahallakṣaṇa. Its definition is, according to Mammata, svasiddhaye paraksepah. It is a subdivision of śuddha. The example is kuntāḥ pravṛṣanti. The vāc्यārtha of kuntāḥ cannot be logically constructed with 'pravṛṣanti'. So, there is mukhyā rthabādhā and we derive the idea of 'kuntin' or 'kuntadhāriṇī'. In this instance, the vāc्यārtha is completely comprehended in the lakṣyārtha. The idea of 'kuntāḥ' is completely included in that of 'kuntadhāriṇī'. So, it is called upādāna lakṣaṇā or ajahat-svārthā.

Lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā is defined as 'parārtham svasamarpanam'. It is also termed as jahallakṣaṇā. This is another sub-division of s'uddhā. In this particular variety, the vāc्यārtha surrenders its meaning and yields place to the lakṣyārtha. In gangāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ, the word gangayāṁ surrenders its vāc्यārtha

*Śabdavyūṭtis, the nature --*

viz gangāpravāha and makes room for the lakṣyārtha viz gangatāta This variety is called lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇa because gangā here serves as the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) both of the vācyārtha and the lakṣyārtha The sampradāyaprakāśinī explains lakṣanā as lakṣaṇam upalakṣyaṁ Maṇikyachandra and others explain the word lakṣanā as lakṣaṇena tatadījñāpanena According to Nāgesvarī it is lakṣinena svārthasamarpaṇena upalakṣita This svārthasamarpaṇa is total and not partial (132)

These two viz upādāna and lakṣaṇa are the varieties of sūddha only, and not of gaunī While dealing with upādāna lakṣanā Mammata takes care to refute the views of two different schools The first view refuted is that of Maṇḍana Miśra according to Udyota or that of Mukula bhaṭṭa, according to Maṇikyachandra According to this view the jātivācaka śabdāś like gauḥ conveys vyakti by upādāna lakṣaṇā Abhidhā is exhausted in giving the sense of gotva and therefore govyakti is indicated by the word gauḥ, through the process of upādāna lakṣaṇā For Mammata it is not so According to him govyakti is gathered by avinabhavamūla ākṣepa, i.e. by invariable implication Lakṣanā is not possible for want of either prayojana or rudhī Govyakti is here ākṣepagrāhya, i.e. gathered by implication

The second view refuted is probably the one held by the Mīmāṃsikas According to this view, rātribhojana in case of Devadattī who is stout and yet does not take his food by day, is a matter of lakṣyārtha. Again, rātribhojana includes the idea of



divā-abhojana Therefore, it is the case of upādāna lakṣaṇa But, not so, according to Mammata, who holds that this is a case of arthāpatti which should be accepted here as it involves a lesser amount of gaurava than lakṣaṇā We have seen above that s'uddha is so called as it has no reference to upacāra, gauṇī on the other hand is based on upacāra Upacāra is based on resemblance (133).

Sāropā and sadhyavasānā are two sub divisions common to both suddhā and gauṇī Both sāropā and sadhyavasānā involve āropa, to a smaller or greater extent In saropa, the āropa is associated with a consciousness of distinction between the object superimposed and that superimposed upon and in sādhyavasānā, the āropa is carried to such an extent that all consciousness of distinctness between the two objects is lost owing to the latter being merged into the former Again, if the instances involve the idea of sādṛśya, they become the sub divisions of gauṇī and if they involve the relations of sādṛśyetaśasambandha they become the sub varieties of s'uddhā. Thus gaurāhikā and gaurevāyam are instances of gauṇī sāropā and gauṇī sadhyavasānā, while āyurghṛtam and āyurevedam are instances of sāropā suddhā and sadhyavasānā s'uddhā In short, we have a lesser degree of āropa in saropā than in sādhyavasānā where it is termed as adhyavasāna (134) It may be noted, that when based on sādṛśya, sāropā becomes the basis of rupakālakṣārah and sādhyavasānā, that of atīśayokti

Mammata and Viśvanātha give three different views as to the functioning of laksanā in the instance-gaurvāhikah. They are as below : (i) According to the first view, gauh in gaurvāhikah indicates gogata-jadyamāndyadīgunas. As these are found to be common to vāhika also, the word gauh expresses vāhikārtha. (ii) The second view says that gauh indicates vāhikagatajadyamāndyadīgunas (not gogata gunas as in the first view). These gunas or qualities through avinābhavasambandha suggest vāhika vyakti. (iii) The third view is that gauh indicates vāhika himself as being the substratum of jadyamandyādī common to both. The third view is accepted by Mammata. We do not know exactly as to who held the first two views. The third is held by the Mimamsakas as is clear from a citation from Kumarila in support. In Kumarila's Tantravartika (8th cen. A.D.) which constitutes the commentary on the last three padas of the 1st adhyaya and also the 2nd and 3rd adhyayas of the Sabarbhāṣya, we read the following mānantaraviruddhe tu mukhyārthasya parigrahe abhidheya-vinābhutapratītir laksanocyate । lakṣyamāṇaiguṇair-yogat vrtteristā tu gaunata ॥ As to the second view, Māṇikyacandra notes that it is very close to that of Mukula (135).

Mammata also mentions certain sādṛś'yetara-sambandhas such as karyakāranabhava, tadarthya, svasvāmibhava, avayavavayavibhāva, tatkarṁya, etc. Māṇikyacandra adds māna e.g. adhakam as'nāti, dhārana (=holding) e.g. tuladhṛtam candanam tulā; ādhipatya (=leadership) as in pumanayam gotram

(= This person is family) sthāna as in māñcah krosanti etc. The sambandhas are numerous (136)

As to the classification of laksanā, authors on the ālambārasāstra differ. We have seen Mammata's view. Jagannatha's view is almost similar. Viśvanātha gives as many as eighty varieties of laksanā. The Vṛttivartikakara (Appayya Dīkṣita) gives a seven fold division of prayojanavati laksanā (137). It may be noted that Mammata also admits the gūḍhatva and agūḍhatva of the prayojana.

### Laksanā, not accepted \*

There are certain ālambārikas who do not accept laksanā as a separate vṛtti at all. e.g. Mūlābhata, Mahābhata and Kuntaka accept only abhidhā. They do not accept laksanā as a śabdavyāpāra. Bhāṭṭa Mūla suggests this when at the end of Abhidhāvṛttimūlīkā he says ityetaḍabhidhāvṛttam daśadhātva vivēcitam. He includes the varieties of laksanā under his ten fold scheme of abhidhā. According to him, he treats of lakṣanā only because for him the dhvani of vyākṛjanīvidins is not different from laksanā (138). We will consider Mūla's views in the chapter on dhvanivirodha (Ch. XXIV). For Mahima also, the word has only one śakti and that is abhidhā (139). For Mahima, lakṣyārtha becomes anumāna or inferred through vāc्यārtha which serves as a hetu. According to him, in gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ when we derive the meaning of people staying on the Ganges, it is anumitigamya or derived through inference. Similarly, in gauravahika, there is no lakṣavyāpāra, but we have anumāna or inference

of the similarity of *vāhikā* and *gauh*, on the strength of the superimposition of *gotvā* on *vāhikā*. If it is otherwise, who will superimpose a thing on something totally different (140)

Next comes *Kuntika*. *Kuntaka* does not clearly negate *lakṣaṇā* at any place. But when he describes *vakrokti* as '*vicitrā abhidha*' we get a glimpse of his approach (141). The *Mīmāṃsakas* and the *Nyāyikas* accept *lakṣaṇa* as a separate *vṛtti*.

From the above discussion it is clear that *lakṣaṇa* is a derived function of language. The primary sense of a word used in several contexts gets modified or transferred by these. An attempt has been made by *Sanskrit* writers to note down as many such contexts as possible, for example, the relation of similarity which gives the varieties of *gaunī*, the relations of nearness, causality, ownership, possession, *tātkarmya* etc.—which are responsible for the derived meanings of words. As we have seen, writers like *Mukula Bhatta* do not consider it necessary to consider *lakṣaṇa* because, they think that it is derived from *abhidha* conditioned by contexts. But the grammarians, *Mīmāṃsakas* and logicians recognise *lakṣaṇa* as a separate function because it is necessary for them, for logical clarity, to distinguish the different meanings conveyed by a word in different contexts.

### **Vyañjanāvṛtti**

We now consider the nature of what is termed as *vyañjanāvṛtti*. As noticed already, it is recognised to be the *turiyāvṛtti*, the first three being *abhidhā*,

tatparya and laksana. We have also seen that the tatparya vṛtti is called a sabdavṛtti only through upacāra i.e. metaphorically, and the gaunī of the Mīmāṃsakas is included in laksanā, though certain writers on alamkāra, such as Hemacandra mention it as a separate vṛtti.

The Dhvanyāloka says that in poetry there is something which is beyond the expressed sense and it is this that is the true essence of poetry (142). We will see later on in due course, that some modern European writers also have underlined two uses of language, viz the scientific and the emotive and that the latter one has a special role in poetry.

For the realisation of this implied or the pratiyamāna or vyaṅgyārtha i.e., the suggested sense, the writers on alamkāra have established a separate vṛtti or function of a word, and it is termed as the vyañjanavṛtti which is not identical with either abhidha or laksanā. With the help of vyañjanā, a word, subordinating itself and its meaning, suggests the vyaṅgyārtha which is more important and is termed as 'dhvani' in a poem (143). Just as an object, already existing beforehand, is manifested by light, in the same way this pratiyamānārtha becomes manifested with the help of vyañjanā. The pratibhā of the reader also plays a major role in gathering this vyaṅgyārtha, observes Hemacandra (144). The vacyārtha or lakṣyārtha, is only an instrument, a nimitta, in the realisation of vyaṅgyārtha. The stock example is — 'gangayāṃ ghosah' — wherein the idea of coolness and purity is gathered through a separate power called vyañjanā.

Mammaṣa in his k. p. II. 9 days :

Yasya pratitimādhātum lakṣaṇā samupāśyate ।  
phale śābdukagamyētra vyañjanānnāparā kriyā ॥

and adds:—prayojanapratipipādayiṣaya yatra lakṣaṇayā śābdaprayogaḥ tatra nānyatastatpratipattirapī tu tasmādeva śābdāt. na cātra vyañjanā<sup>1</sup>ṛtenyo vyāparaḥ i.e. with reference to this fruit, for conveying the apprehension of which indication is resorted to, (and) which is understood from the (indicative) word alone, (there is) no other function than suggestion . . where (as in a sentence) a word is used with indication with the desire of conveying the motive, there the apprehension of that motive does not arise from anything else, but from that word alone. And there (i.e. with reference to the motive) there is no other function except vyañjanā.

Mammaṣa brings in the topic of vyañjanā while concluding the topic of lakṣaṇā. He says that lakṣaṇā again can be three-fold, viz (one) based on rūḍhi and the other two varieties based on prayojana which may be gūḍha i.e. concealed or agūḍha i.e. not-concealed. To convey this prayojana, the vyāpāra or the function resorted to, is always vyañjanā. It is not abhidhā in the absence of convention or samaya, and it is not lakṣaṇā in the absence of further prayojana (II. 10). Again, the vyñgyārtha is not identical with the lakṣyārtha because, the latter one is not the primary sense or the mukhyārtha, nor is there any incompatibility i.e. bādha, nor any connexion with the fruit (yogaḥ phalena na), nor any motive herein (na prayojanametasmin), nor does the word

fail in conveying the motive (na ca s'abdah skhalad-gaṭh). (K. P. II. 11.) Mammaṭa adds the following explanation: As the word Gaṅgā indicates the sense viz. the bank, because it is incomplete with the present context in its primary sense of the stream, like that if it were incompatible with the present context in its indicated sense of the bank also, then it would further indicate the motive. And the bank is not the primary sense of the word Gaṅgā. Also here there is no incompatibility. And there is no connection of the bank, which is the indicated sense of the word Ganga, with properties like coolness, holiness etc., which are to be further indicated by that motive which is supposed to be indicated. Moreover the word Gaṅgā is not unable to convey the motive, as it is to convey the sense of the bank, in the absence of the three conditions (145). Mammaṭa adds that in this there would be anavasthā, the absence of finality which would cause the destruction of the very root (mūlakṣayakārinī anavasthā. K. P. II. 129) If this prayojana is to be indicated, it would be indicated by yet another motive, and that second motive also will be indicated by a third one, and so on. Thus, want of finality or regressus ad infinitum, causing the non-apprehension of the matter in hand, i.e. the first motive, would result. Mammaṭa also rejects the case of the indicated sense being accompanied with or qualified by the motive. The object of knowledge is different from knowledge, and the fruit of knowledge is also different from it. The object of direct perception is a blue thing and the like. But the fruit is knownness or

self consciousness. Thus, with reference to a qualified object, indication is not possible. But properties or qualities such as holiness and the like are realised as residing in the bank and are apprehended by a function other than expression, purport or indication. And this function is designated by terms such as *vyañjana*, *dhvanana*, *dyotana* etc., and it should be necessarily admitted as having an independent existence (146)

### **Classification :**

Mammata has classified *vyanjana* into *lakṣaṇāmūlā* or that based on *lakṣaṇa* and *abhīdhamūlā* or that based on *abhīdhā*. The *lakṣaṇāmūlā* is illustrated as in 'Gangayam ghosaḥ'. The *abhīdhamūlā* occurs when the function of expression of a word having more than one primary sense, is restricted to one sense by means of conjunction and the like, and the process which produces the apprehension of a sense that is not expressed is suggestion (147). Conjunction (or *samyogaḥ*) disjunction (or *viprayogaḥ*), association (or *sāhacarya*), antagonism (or *virodhita*), motive (or *arthah*), context (or *prakaraṇa*), special mark (or *liṅgaṃ*), proximity of another word, (i.e. *s'abdasyanyasya sannīdhiḥ*), capability (i.e. *sāmarthyam*), propriety (or *aucitya*), place (or *deśaḥ*), time (or *kalāḥ*), gender (*vyaktiḥ*), accent (*svara*) and etc. are the causes of recollection i.e. apprehension of a particular meaning, when there is no decision or determination regarding the meaning of a word. Mammata also gives proper illustrations for all these cases. He concludes that, when though the power



and Mahima Bhatta do not accept this variety at all. There are others who reject the whole of *sābdi vyañjanā* which, according to them falls within the scope of *s'lesa*. Still others accept *abhidhāmūlā s'abdi* only in certain cases. He holds that in the particular illustration viz. *asāvudaya mārūdhah kāntimān raktamaṇḍalah*, the earlier authors recognise a case for *abhidhāmūlā s'abdi vyañjanā* (152). But for him, it is a case of pure *s'lesa*, as both the meanings are gathered by *abhidha* (153). Appayya Dikṣita does not accept *s'abdas'aktimūlā vyañjanā*, but he does accept *s'abdas'aktimūlā dhvani* on the grounds that herein its charm is dependent on the use of certain words only (154). Viśvanātha observes that Mahima's view viz. that in the particular illustration viz. *durgālanghita vighrahe* etc., there is no presence of any *aprākaraṇikārtha* i.e. non-contextual meaning whatsoever, is only *gajanimilitā* on his part (155). Jagannātha has his own view. He holds that both in case of *nanārtbhaka s'abdas'aktimūlā dhvani* and in case of *s'lesa kāvya*, there cannot be any obstruction in gathering both the meanings (i.e. *prākaraṇika* i.e. contextual and *aprākaraṇika* i.e. non-contextual) simultaneously. It is no use saying that while in *s'lesa* there is *tātparyajñāna* with reference to both the senses, while it is not so in case of *vyañjana*. Jagannātha is of the opinion that in *s'abdas'aktimūlā dhvani* both the meanings are equally *vācya* or expressed and that both are gathered through *abhidha*. It is therefore not wise to accept *vyañjanā* for gathering the other sense-*aparārthapratīti* (156). Thus he does not seem to agree with the *dhvanivadins* in general.

in case of the s'abdaśāktimūladhvani. But at places he agrees He believes that in case of words having multiple sense, when rūḍha or yaugika words are used, even the aprākaraṇikārtha is vācya. But when it is a case of yogarūḍha or yaugikarūḍha padas having a multiple sense, according to Jagannātha, the non-contextual sense is gathered through vyañjana (157). The illustration cited is-abalānām s'riyam hṛtvā....etc. Here, in respect of the first meaning in term of lightening and the cloud, there is rūḍhaśabda. But in respect of the second meaning, there is either rūḍhi or yoga. Again the second meaning is not avayavalabhya only, as in the case of yaugika words. This is, therefore, a proper instance of vyañjanā. Thus says he,

yogārūḍhasya s'abdasya yoge rūḍhyā nīyantrite ।

dhiyam yogaspr's'othasya yā sūte vyañjanaiva sā ॥

i.e. when yogaśakti in case of yogarūḍha sabdas becomes restricted by the rūḍhiśakti, (according to the dictum-rūḍhiryogādbalīyasī-) the yogārtha is derived through vyañjanā alone.

### Modern Views :

Modern European thinking as to the function of language in poetry bears some striking resemblance. We may look into it in the light of Susan Stebbing (Introduction to Logic), and I. A. Richards (Meaning of Meaning, Principles of literary criticism) and other authors.

Language conveys both information and emotion. When the emotional element is subdued or suppressed

as far as possible we have the informative function of language. When, however, the main function is to convey emotion and use information even for the purpose of evoking emotion as in rhetoric and poetry we call it the emotive function of language. The first is termed the scientific use of language, and the other, the emotive use of language.

Thus, one important function of language is to communicate information. For science, this is the only function, and for this, it evolves a terminology i.e. a set of technical terms which aim at precision, i.e. uniqueness of reference. A scientific statement is, qua scientific, precise. The aim of the scientist is to use his verbal symbol so as to achieve uniqueness of reference and thus to use language, in order to communicate information that is exact and precise.

However, we see in our day to day life, that very often statements are made not merely to communicate information, but to arouse in the hearer a certain state of mind. Literary critics, everywhere, have realised that the poet uses language not mainly to express statements that are true or false, but to express what is neither true nor false. Thus, when e.g. Shelley says

. . . Life, like a dome of many coloured glass  
stains the white radiance of eternity

Untill death tramples it to fragments "

he is neither talking non sense, nor making an assertion that must be accepted or rejected as true or false. The question of truth or falsity does not arise at all

The poet is using language for an entirely different purpose from the scientist who says, "The Specific heat of air at constant pressure is  $O\ 2734$ " To distinguish between these two uses of language, Mr I. A. Richards has suggested the convenient terminology viz—"the scientific use of language", and "the emotive use of language" (*Principles of literary criticism* Ch XXXIV and also *Meaning of Meaning*, pp 226-9, 255-60, 271-5). When language is used simply in order to refer to a referend, its use is scientific. When it is used in order to arouse an emotional attitude in the hearer, to influence him in any way other than giving him information, then its use is emotive. The most unmistakable examples of the emotive use of language can be found in literature, just because it is not the main function of literature to instruct. Owen Barfield in his, 'Poetic Diction A Study in Meaning,' pp. 13, 14, says "When words are selected and arranged in such a way that their meaning either arouses, or is obviously intended to arouse æsthetic imagination, the result may be described as poetic diction. He adds, ". . . the same sounds and signs may easily be vehicles of poetry at this place and not in that, at this time and not at that, to this person and not to the other". The scientist uses words so as to eliminate this variation of response. It may be noted that what is called logical connection has little relevance to the emotive use of language. Whereas, it is the condition of success in scientific language\*.

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\* Susan Stabing Introduction to Logic

Foot notes .

- (1) प्रतीयमान पुनरन्यदेव वस्तवस्ति वाणीषु महाकविनाम् ।  
यत्तद्वैमल्यव्यतिरिक्त विभाति लावण्यमिवाङ्गनाम् ॥ ध्वन्या I 4
- (2) The तर्कदीपिका says व्यञ्जना तु शक्तिर्लक्षणान्तभूता शब्दशक्तिमूला  
अर्थशक्तिमूला त्वनुमानादिना अन्यथा सिद्धा ।
- (3) साक्षात्सङ्केतित योऽर्थमभिपद्यते स वाचकः । K P II and also तत्र  
सङ्केतितार्थस्य बोधनादभिप्रायमाभिधा । S D II
- (4) यत्रार्थे यन्नामाधुनिकसङ्केतवत् तदेव पारिभाषिकम्, यथा पित्रादिभिः  
पुत्रादौ सङ्केतितम् यैत्रादि यथा वा शास्त्रकृदिम् सिध्यभावादौ  
पक्षतादि । जातिवाच्यताशक्तिमन्नाम नैमित्तिकम्, यथा मौ गव्यादि,  
यदुपाध्यवच्छिन्नशक्तिमन्नाम तदौपाधिकम्, यथा काशपञ्चादि-श श प्र
- (5) आज्ञानिकश्चाधुनिक सङ्केतो द्विविधो मतः । नित्य आज्ञानिकस्तत्र या  
शक्तिरिति गीयते । कादाचित्कस्त्वाधुनिकः शास्त्रचारादिभिः कृतः । V P
- (6) सेयमभिधा त्रिविधा, केवलसमुदायशक्तिः केवलावयवशक्तिः समुदायावयव  
शक्तिसकरश्चेति । R G pp 141
- (7) अखण्डशक्तिमान्नैकाग्रप्रतिपादकत्वं रुढिः । - वृत्तिवार्तिक (अप्यवशीक्षित)
- (8) अवयवशक्तिमानसापेक्षं पदस्यैकार्यप्रतिपादकत्वं योगः । - ibid
- (9) अवयवसमुदायोभयशक्तिसापेक्षमेकार्यप्रतिपादकत्वं योगरुढिः । - ibid
- (10) नैयायिकास्तु - पञ्चजादिशब्दरूपैकपदोपादानरूपयान्तररङ्गप्रत्यासत्त्या नाभि-  
कमलकुमुदान्वयात्प्रागेव पञ्चजनिकर्तृत्ववैशिष्ट्येनोपस्थितस्य पदमस्य पदमाध-  
यत्वेनोपस्थितस्य पञ्चजनिकर्तृत्वस्य च नाभिकमलकुमुदायान्वये नाकाङ्क्षा,  
न च विशिष्टस्य तदन्वयविषयिणी शान्दधी, इति तदन्वयार्थः स्वतन्त्र  
पञ्चपञ्चजनिकर्तृत्वोपस्थितये पञ्चजादिपदस्य लक्षणैवाभ्युपगता न तु  
रुढिर्योगो वा । - वृत्तिवार्तिक अप्यवशीक्षित-pp 5
- (11) सयोगो विप्रयोगश्च साहचर्यं विरोधिता । अर्थः प्रकरणलिङ्गशब्दस्या  
न्यस्य सत्तिधिः । सामर्थ्यमौचित्यं देशकालो व्यक्तिस्वरस्य ।  
शब्दार्थस्यानवच्छेदे विरोपस्मृतिहेतवः ॥ हेमचन्द्र adds आदिप्रहणानां  
अभिनयापदेशानि देशसङ्केहिनाकारा गृह्यन्ते । काव्यानुशासन 123. pp 65.

- (12) सशङ्खचक्रो हरि इति शङ्खचक्रयोगेन हरिशब्दो विष्णुमेवामिषत्ते ।  
 अशङ्खचक्रो हरि इति तद्वियोगेन तमेव । भीमार्जुनौ इत्यर्जुन पार्थ ।  
 कर्णार्जुनौ इति कर्ण सूतपुत्र । स्थाणु वन्दे इति स्थाणु शिव । सव जानाति  
 देव इति देवो भवान् । कुपितो मकरध्वज इति मकरध्वज काम । देव  
 पुरारि इति पुरारि शिव । मधुनामत्त पिक इति मधुर्वसन्त । पातु वो  
 दयितामुख इति मुख सामुरयम् । विभाति गगने चन्द्र इति चन्द्र शशी ।  
 निशि चित्रभानु इति चित्रभानुर्वह्नि । भाति रथाङ्ग नपुसकव्यक्त्या रथाङ्ग  
 चक्रम् । स्वरस्तु वेद एव विशेषप्रतीतिकृत् न काव्ये इति तस्य विषय  
 नोदाहृतम् । S D
- (13) वाक्यभावमवाप्तस्य सार्थकस्यावबोधत ।  
 सपद्यते शाब्दबोधो न तन्मानस्य बोधत ॥ श श प्र ३२
- (14) आख्यात (साव्ययकारकविशेषण) वाक्यम् । महाभा II 11
- (15) सक्रिया विशेषण च । mbh II 11
- (16) तदस्मान्मन्यामहे पदान्यसत्यानि एकमभिन्नस्वभावक वाक्यम् । तद्वुध  
 बोधनाय पदविभाग कल्पित इति । वा प टीका पुण्यराज ।
- (17) मिथ साकाङ्क्षशब्दस्य व्यूहो वाक्य चतुर्विधम् । श श प्र १३
- (18) वाक्य स्यादयोग्यताकाङ्क्षासत्तियुक्त पदोच्चय ॥ विश्वनाथ सा द I
- (19) दुर्गाचार्य on निरुक्त I 17 says सहिताया प्रकृतित्व ज्याय ।  
 मन्त्रो ह्यविभाज्यमान पूर्वं ऋषेर्मन्त्रदश सहितयैवामिव्यज्यते न पदै ।  
 अतश्च सहितामेव पूर्वमप्यायत्यनुष्ठाना ब्राह्मणा अधीयते चाध्येतार ।  
 अपि च याज्ञे कर्मणि सहितयैव विनियुज्यन्ते मन्त्रा न पदै ॥
- (20) यद्यपीहाष्टौ पक्षा उक्तास्तथापि वाक्यस्फोटपक्षे तात्पर्य ग्रन्थकृताम्-  
 शब्दकौस्तुभ ।
- (21) VP I : 240 says उपाया शिक्षमाणाना बालानामपलापना ।  
 असत्ये वर्तन्ति स्थित्वा तत सत्य समीहते ॥  
 and पुण्यराज on VP II 57 तस्मान्मन्यामहे पदान्यसत्यानि,  
 एकमभिन्नस्वभावक वाक्यम् । तद्वुधबोधनाय पदविभाग कल्पित ।

- (22) एवं सूत्रकारस्य भाष्यकारस्य चाखण्डपक्षोऽभिरुचित । पुण्यराज on VP II 37
- (23) उपाधिमेदेनैव शब्दस्य मेदप्रतिभासो न स्वतो नित्यवात्-पुण्यराज on VP II 22 and also अभिज्ञयत्वमध्यासरूपत्वमागतं शब्द । पुण्यराज VP II 129.
- (24) असत्ये वर्तमानि स्थित्वा तत सत्य समीहते । VP II 240
- (25) पदे न वर्णा विद्यन्ते वर्णेष्वयवा इव ।  
वाक्यात् पदानामयन्त प्रविवेको न कश्चन ॥ VP I 173
- (26) यथा पदे विभज्यन्ते प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादय ।  
अपोद्धारस्तथा वाक्ये पदानामुपवर्ण्यते ॥ VP II 10
- (27) वाक्यार्थस्यापि तथैव निर्विभागत्वं प्रतिपादयितुमाह ॥ पुण्यराज
- (28) शब्दस्य न विभागोऽस्ति कुतोऽर्थस्य भविष्यति ।  
विभागे प्रक्रियामेदमविद्वान् प्रतिपद्यते ॥ VP II 13
- (29) ब्राह्मणार्थो यथा नास्ति कश्चिद्ब्राह्मणकम्बले ।  
देवदत्तादयो वाक्ये तथैवस्युरनर्थका ॥ VP II 14
- (30) तत्राखण्डपक्षे प्रतिभा वाक्याथ । पुण्यराज on VP II 1
- (31) विच्छेदग्रहणेऽर्थानां प्रतिभाऽऽद्यैव जायते ।  
वाक्यार्थे इति तामाहुः पदार्थैरुपपादितम् ॥ V.P II 145
- (32) पदैरसत्यैरेवोपाधिभूतरूपपादितामभिव्यक्त्यामिति ।-पुण्यराज on VP 145.
- (33) उपश्लेषमिवाधार्ता सा करोत्यविचारिता ।  
सर्वरूपमिवापक्षा विद्ययत्वेन वर्तते । VP II 147
- (34) साक्षाच्छब्देन अनित्यं भावनानुगमेन वा ।  
इति क्वण्यतायाः सा न कश्चिदतिवर्तते ॥ VP II 148
- (35) प्रमाणत्वेन तां लोके सर्वं समनुपश्यति ॥ VP II 149
- (36) समारम्भा प्रतीयन्ते तिरध्वामपि तादृशात् । VP II 149

- (37) जन्मान्तराभ्यासहेतुकेयम् । पुण्यराज ।
- (38) स्वरवृत्ति विकुरुते मधौ पुस्कोकिलस्य क० ।  
जत्वादय कुत्रायादिकरणे केन शिक्षिता । II 151.  
आहारप्रत्यभिद्वेषप्लवनादिक्रियासु क ।  
जात्यन्वयप्रसिद्धासु प्रयोक्ता मृगपक्षिणाम् ॥ II. 152.
- (39) प्रतिभायाश्च शब्द एव मूलमित्याह । पुण्यराज  
and also, भावनानुगतादेतदागमादेव जायते ।  
आसत्तिविप्रकर्षाभ्यामागमस्तु विशिष्यते ॥ V.P. II 53.
- (40) स्वभावचरणाभ्यासयोगादष्टापपादिता ।  
विशिष्टोपहिता चेति प्रतिभा षड्विधा विदु ॥ V.P. II 54.
- (41) अयमर्थोऽर्थान्तरसाक्षात् इति व्यवहारात् । लघुमञ्जुषा pp 497
- (42) The S D II says योग्यता पदार्थानां परस्परसम्बन्धे बाधामात्र ।  
पदोच्चयस्यैतदभावेऽपि वाक्यत्वे बहिना सिञ्चति इत्याद्यपि वाक्य  
स्यात् । आकाङ्क्षा प्रतीतिपर्यवसानविरह । स च श्रोतुर्ज्ञानसारूप ।  
निराकाङ्क्षस्य वाक्यत्वे गौरव पुरुषो हस्ती इत्यादीनामपि वाक्यत्व  
स्यात् । आसत्ति बुध्यविच्छेद । बुद्धिविच्छेदेऽपि वाक्यत्वे इदानीमुच्च  
रितस्य देवदत्तशब्दस्य दिनान्तरोच्चारितेन गच्छतीति पदेन सङ्गति स्यात् ।  
अत्राकाङ्क्षायोग्यतयोरान्तरार्थधर्मत्वेऽपि पदोच्चयधर्मत्वमुपचारात् ।
- (43) सुप्तिहन्तचयो नैवमतिव्याप्तादिदोषत । श श प्र 13
- (44) घट वृत्ति कर्मत्व
- (45) अर्थैकत्वादेक वाक्य साक्षात् चेद् विभागे स्यात् । मी.सू. II 146  
and also एकार्थ पदसमूह वाक्य । शा.भा.मी.सू. II 146
- (46) साक्षात्वावयव भेदे परानाकाङ्क्षशब्दवत् ।  
कर्मप्रधानं गुणवदेकार्यं वाक्यमिष्यते ॥ V.P. II 4
- (47) भेद संसर्गो वा वाक्यार्थ इति यदुच्यते । . एकप्रयोजनत्वादुपपन्नम् ।  
शा. भा. on Mī Sū II 1 45
- (48) तस्मात्तेभ्य प्रतीयेताधितयात् प्रयोगस्य-मी. सू. II, 1. 4. and also  
अपूर्वस्याख्यातपदप्रतिपाद्यत्वम् शा.भा. and also भाषशब्दा एवापूर्वस्य  
चोदका । शा भा.



- (49) आख्यातशब्दः सङ्घातो जातिः सङ्घातवर्तिनी ।  
 एकोऽनवयवः शब्दः कमो बुध्यनुगृह्णति ॥  
 पदमायः पृथक् सवः पदः साक्षाक्षमित्यपि ।  
 वाक्यं प्रति मतिर्भिन्ना बहुधा न्यायवादिनाम् ॥ VP II 1
- (50) आख्यातशब्दो वाक्यमिति ।  
 आख्यातशब्दे नियतः साधनः यत्र गम्यते ।  
 तदप्येकः समाप्तार्थः वाक्यमित्यभिधीयते ॥ VP II 327
- (51) आख्यातशब्दो वाक्यमिति पक्षे क्रिया वाक्यार्थः । पुण्यराजः on VP II 1
- (52) आख्यातः साव्ययकारकविशेषणः वाक्यम्-वार्तिकः 9 on वा 21 1
- (53) अपरः आह । आख्यातः सविशेषणमिति एव सर्वाणि श्रेयानि क्रिया-विशेषणानि mbh on Vartika 9
- (54) यथानेकमपि कान्तं तिष्ठतस्य विशेषकम् ।  
 तथा तिष्ठन्तः मन्त्राहुः तिष्ठन्तस्य विशेषकम् ॥ VP II 6
- (55) नास्त्यत्र वाक्यभेदः, मन्त्रनीत्येतत् प्राधान्येनैकः क्रियापदमत्र स्थितमन्यानि क्रियातराणि तद्विशेषणान्येव-पुण्यराजः, and also बहुष्वपि तिष्ठन्तेषु सावाकक्षेष्वेकवाक्यता । VP II 450
- (56) वाक्यं तदपि मन्यन्ते यत् पदं चरितक्रियम् । VP II 326
- (57) क्रियारहितं न वाक्यं अस्तीति श्रुत्वा प्रवादो निर्युक्तत्वादधर्मादेयः ।  
 शः शः प्र on वा 13
- (58) स्तोत्रः शब्दः, ध्वनिः शब्दगुणः इति । पुण्यराजः VP II 1
- (59) स्तोत्रश्च द्विविधः । बाधः आभ्यन्तरश्च । पुण्यराजः VP II 1
- (60) बाधोऽपि जातिव्यक्तिभेदेन द्विविधः ।
- (61) तत्राखण्ड्यपक्षे जातिः सङ्घातवर्तिनी, एकोऽनवयवः शब्दो बुध्यनुगृह्णतिरिति त्रीणि लक्षणानि (पुण्यराजः on VP II 1)
- (62) एव निरशमेव वाक्यं वाचकमित्येव युक्तम् । पुण्यराजः on VP II 12
- (63) नस्तु प्रतिभाम् सोऽसावुपाधिकृत एवेत्यर्थः पुण्यराजः on VP II 19

- (64) यदन्त शब्दतत्त्व तु नादरेक प्रकाशित ।  
तदाहुरपरे शब्द तस्य वाक्य तथैकता ॥ V P II 30
- (65) क्रमो हि धर्म कालस्य तेन वाक्य न विद्यते । V P II 51
- (66) सन्त एव विशेषा ये पदार्थेषु व्यवस्थिता ।  
ते क्रमादनुगम्यन्ते न वाक्यमभिधायकम् ॥ V P II 50
- (67) क्रमेत्वमित्यादयो विशेषा सन्त एव पदेभ्य क्रमेण प्रतीतेभ्योऽवगम्यन्त  
इति क्रम एव वाक्यम् । पुण्यराज on V P II 50
- (68) क्रमव्यतिरेकेण शब्दात्मक न वाक्यमभिधायकमस्तीत्युच्यते ।
- (69) क्रम एव वाक्यमिति पदक्रमो वाक्यमुक्तम् । पुण्यराज on V P II 52
- (70) अप्रापि सङ्घात क्रम इत्यभिहितान्वयपक्षे लक्षणद्वयम् पुण्यराज on  
V P II 1 and आख्यातशब्द पदमात्र पृथक् संवपद साकार्क्ष  
मित्यन्विताभिधानपक्षे लक्षणत्रयमिति विभाग ।
- (71) तत्र सङ्घपक्षे त्रिविधे लक्षणेऽपि प्रतिभा वाक्यार्थः । पुण्यराज V P II 1
- (72) आख्यातशब्दो वाक्यमिति अस्मिन् पक्षे क्रिया वाक्यार्थः । पुण्यराज  
on V P II 1
- (73) सङ्घातपक्षे क्रमपक्षे च सप्तर्गो वाक्यार्थः । पुण्यराज on V P II 1
- (74) पदानां परस्पराश्रये पदार्थवशादाधिक्य सप्तर्ग स वाक्यार्थः । पुण्यराज  
V P II 41 and also  
सम्बन्धे सति यत्त्वन्वयाधिक्यमुपजायते ।  
वाक्यार्थमेव त आहुरनेकपदसम्प्रयम् ॥ V P II 42
- (75) पदानां समन्वये तात्पर्यार्थो विशेषवपुरपदार्थोऽपि वाक्यार्थः समुल्लसती  
त्यभिहितान्वयवादिनाम् मतम् । K P II 7
- (76) पदार्थ एव वाक्यार्थः । पुण्यराज  
and also वाच्य एव वाक्यार्थः इत्यन्विताभिधानवादिन K P II 7
- (77) पूर्वमेते यो वाक्यार्थः स वाच्यान्तगत एवेत्यर्थः ।
- (78) अनवगतमेव वाक्यमनाद्यविशेषदर्शितालीकपदविभागस्य निमित्तमिति  
केचित् । तत्त्वबिन्दु PP 6
- (79) पारमार्थिकपूर्वपूर्वपदपदार्थानुभवात्प्रतिपक्षकारसहितमन्त्यवर्गविज्ञानमित्येके ।  
तत्त्वबिन्दु PP 6

- (80) प्रत्येकवर्णपदपदार्थानुभवमावितमावनानिचयलब्धत्रन्मस्मृतिदर्पणरूढा वर्ण  
माटेयये । PP 7 ibid
- (81) पदान्येवाकक्षिप्तयोग्यतासन्निहितपदार्थान्तरान्वितस्वार्थाभिधायिनीत्यपरे ।  
PP 7-ibid
- (82) पदैरेव समभिव्याहारवद्विरभिहिता\* स्वार्था आकाङ्क्षायोग्यताऽऽसत्तिसप्रो-  
चीना वाक्यायचीहेतव इत्याचार्या. । PP 8-ibid

(82 a) We have seen above the view of the Sphota  
vadins as explained by Bhartṛhari. We will try to see how  
Vacaspati Miśra tries to refute the above-mentioned view  
of the grammarians

In the beginning we will see the arguments put  
forward by the Sphotavadin, which is the pūrvapakṣa here.  
For him akhaṇḍa Sphota is the nimitta for the vākyārtha.  
When we take Sphota to be akhaṇḍa śabda we can not  
take the pada-vākyady vibhāga which we come across on  
the ordinary plane (vyavaharika-or empirical plane) to  
be 'akhaṇḍa śabda'. The varṇavādins hold varṇas letters  
to be nimitta of vākyārtha. But the Sphotavādins may  
put the following question before the varṇavadin

- (83) सा न तावत्प्रत्येकम्, अनुपलभविरोधात्, वणान्तरोच्चारणतथ्य-  
प्रसङ्गात् तद्वर्णान्दु PP 25
- (84) नापि मिलिता, तथा भाषाभावात् । तथा हि वास्तवी वा समूह एतेषा  
माधोयते ? अनुभवोपाधिको वा ? ibid
- (85) तत्र सर्वेषामेव वर्णानां नित्यतया विभुतया च वास्तवी सगतिरिति  
प्रमगिनी केषाञ्चदेव पदवाक्यमाव नोपपादयितुमर्ह'त । अनुभूयमाना  
नवनवानुभवानुसारिणी तत्पदयिग पर्यायकनी न समूहभाग्भावात् । न  
खल्वेकदेशकालानवाच्छन्ता समूहवन्तो भवन्ति भावा अतिप्रसङ्गात् ।  
PP 25 ibid
- (86) को नु खल्वय सस्कोरोऽभिमत आनुष्मत् ? किं स्मृतिवीज, अन्यो वा  
प्रोक्षणादभ्य इव प्रोक्ष्यादे । PP.25 ibid

- (87) तस्मात् स्वसिद्धान्तव्यामोहमपहाय अभ्युपेयतामनुसहारबुद्धेरेकपदवाक्य-  
गोचरता । PP.35. *ibid.*
- (88) गौतम्येक इदं पदमित्येकपदावभासिनी धोरस्ति लौकिकपरीक्षकाणाम् ।  
PP 49. *ibid.*
- (89) स खल्वयमेको वाक्यात्मा वाक्यार्थधीहेतुः अनुभवादवा व्यवस्थाप्यते अर्थ-  
धीमेदाद् वा अन्यथा अनुपपद्यमानात् । PP.9. *ibid.*
- (90) न तावत्पूर्वः कल्पः । अवयवव्यूहपरिमाणत्वादवयवानाम् । परममहतां च  
घर्णानां तदनुपपत्तेः । PP.9. *ibid.*
- (91) गगनगुणत्वे च अद्रव्यतया समवायिकारणत्वाभावेनावयवामावाभावा ।  
PP.10
- (92) पूर्वपूर्वाभिव्यक्तिरङ्गस्कारसचित्रोत्तरोत्तराभिव्यक्तिक्रमेण त्वन्यो ध्वनिः  
स्फुटतरं विशिष्टस्फोटविज्ञानमाधत्ते इति न वैयर्थ्य । द्वितीयादिध्वनीनाम् ।  
नापि पूर्वेषां तदभावे तदभिव्यक्तिजनितरङ्गाभावेनान्यस्य ध्वनेरसहाय-  
तया व्यवस्यवभासवाक्यधीहेतुभावाभावात् । PP.20 *ibid*
- (93) तसिद्ध्यमेतदर्थोपत्तरनुमानस्य वा निवृत्तिस्तदेकगोचरपदवाक्यावसाधनीति  
स्थित नानवयवमेकं वाक्यं वाक्यार्थस्य संप्रकर्मिता—तत्त्वबिन्दु—PP 76
- (94) वाक्यस्थलेषु त्वत्तु यणेषूपचरत्सु तावच्छ्रवणं भवति श्रुतं यणमेकमनेन  
वा पदभावेन न प्रतिगन्धते प्रतिसन्धाय पदं व्यवस्यति पदव्यवसायेन  
स्मृत्या पदार्थं प्रतिपद्यते पदसमूहप्रतिसंधानाच्च वाक्यं व्यवस्यति  
सम्बद्धां पदार्थान्गृहीत्वा वाक्यार्थं प्रतिपद्यते । न्यायगूढं वात्स्यायन-  
भाष्य, III.2.62.
- (95) स खल्वयमन्यो घर्गः पूर्वपूर्वघर्गपदपदार्थविज्ञानजनितवासनानिचयसंवि-  
धनजेन्द्रियमभिगनजन्यमहणस्मरणरूपसदसद्रूपनिर्भासप्रत्ययपरिवर्तपदवा-  
क्यार्थधीहेतुरूपेयते ॥ तत्त्वबिन्दु —PP.77.
- (96) न अन्यघर्गभ्रुतिः स्मृता नीता वाक्यार्थबोधिनी, PP.76 *ibid.*
- (97) एतत्तु मतद्वय संभावनामात्रेणोपन्यस्तं इति केचित् । तत्त्वबिन्दु टीका  
तत्त्वविभावना । PP.7.
- (98) यर्णा एव तु शब्दा इति भगवानुपपत्तेः—मीमांसाभाष्य 1.1.5 and also  
गौरित्यम् क शब्दः ? गकारोकारविसर्जनीया इति भगवानुपपत्तेः । योग-  
मुक्ता, प ॥ 1.17.

(99) वृद्धप्रयोगाधीनाधारणो हि शब्दार्थसम्बन्धः । न च पदमात्रं व्यवहाराद्यं प्रयुज्यन्ते वृद्धाः, किन्तु वाक्यमेव, तच्चानवयव न्ययेधीति स्मृतिसमाख्या वर्णमाला परिशिष्यते । सा च नैमित्तिकं वाक्यार्थबोधमाधत्त । पारमार्थिकस्तु पदतदर्थबाधो निमित्तमानणावतिष्ठते वर्णमालैव वाक्याग्रहीहेतु इति । तत्त्वविन्दु-PP.83,84

(100) गौरवाद्धिषयाभावात्तदुभेरेव भावतः ।

वाक्यार्थविधयमाधत्ते स्मृतिस्था नाक्षरावलि । तत्त्वविन्दु-PP 84

(101) इत्यष्टानां वाक्यानां अष्टौ शक्यं कल्पनीयास्तवेति कल्पनागौरवम् । पदवादिनस्तु सप्तानां सप्तैव शक्यं इति कल्पनालपयन् । शुक्लमिति पदप्रक्षेपणं पदवादिनोऽष्टानां पदना अष्टौ शक्यं इति । तत्र तु षोडशापरा इति मद्गौरवमायत्तम् । pp 84 85 ibid

(102) आप च त्रिचतुरपञ्चपदवाक्यवर्तिनीपदार्थप्रत्ययव्यवहितापि केशेन वयं माला स्मर्येतापि तदभ्यधिकपदवति तु वाक्ये सातिदुष्करा । P 89 ibid

(103) पदान्याकाङ्क्षिनासम्प्रयोगवान्तरसगतान् । pp 89 ibid  
स्वार्थानभिधन्तीह वाक्यं वाक्यार्थमाचरम् ॥

(104) तत्रानभिहितस्वार्थान्तरान्वितस्वार्थान्ध्याने पदादेकरमादेवोच्चरित्वा द्ववक्षा प्रतीते वैयर्थ्यमितरेषाम् । pp 93. ibid.

(105) Anvitābhīdhanavādī may argue as follows. If we do not accept the anvitābhīdhanavāda, then, in that case, we will have to postulate two abhīdhaśaktis, viz the one that conveys the sense of individual words and the other that conveys the sense of the whole sentence, after correlating the word-sense. Again says he, there is no fault in our view. Even though every word in a sentence with abhīdhā power, conveys the correlated meaning, still, the sense of the sentence is not gathered just by the first word alone. So, it should be held that a word, by abhīdha, conveys its own meaning and correlation and not the meanings of other words. The anvitābhīdhānavādin again put the following question to the abhīdhānavādin viz that when we get some knowledge from the words, what

type of knowledge is it ? The Śāstra speaks of four types of knowledge viz *pramāṇa samśaya viparyaya* and *smṛta*. Now, *arthapratīti* can not be taken as a *pramāṇa*, because *pramāṇa* occurs only with reference to that which is already existent. *Padārtha* cannot be supposed to be existent before *padaśravaṇa*. Nor can we take *padārthajñāna* as either *samśaya* or *viparyaya* (= *mithyajñāna*). As there is no fifth type of *jñāna* we should take *padārthajñāna* as *smṛta* only. Thus a *pada* depends on *samskāra* or *bodha* and they make for the *smṛti* in form of *padārthajñāna*.

विधान्तरावगमात् स्मृतिलक्षणयोगतः ।

अभ्यासातिशयात् रूपस्मृतेर्नान्योन्यसम्यग् ॥ pp 100 तत्त्वविन्दु and also न च पचमी विद्या समस्तीति स्मृति परिशिष्यते । pp 100 ibid

The *kyāprākāśa* of *Mammāṭa* also throws light on the *anvayabhidhānavāda*. *Mammāṭa* discusses this theory in the second *ullāsa* and then elaborately in the fifth *ullāsa*. Accordingly to *Prabhakara* then the *vācvartha* is itself the *vākyaartha*.

वाच्यार्थ एव वाक्यार्थ इत्यन्विताभिधानवादिनः । K P

The words in a sentence first express the *samānya* *artha* and then the *viśiṣṭa* *artha*. These two are two aspects of the same sense. This *viśiṣṭa* *artha* is nothing else than the *vāc* *artha* itself.

(106) एव तावदीर्त्ताको न्यायो यदसति बलवद्वाचकोपनिपाते सहकारिणि कार्ये च श्रयामन्ना हि कारणम् । सति तदभावभाषिते तथा चापस्मृति पदत् । - तत्त्वविन्दु pp 111

(107) तःपूर्वमेव (मानसीनां) स्वर्यस्मृतीनामाकाङ्क्षायोग्यतामस्तिमहकारिणीना कारणत्वं वाच्यार्थप्रत्ययः प्रपञ्चस्याम् ॥ pp 112 ibid

(108) ननुक्तं न मानांतरानुभूतानामप्यस्या वाक्यार्थधीप्रसवसान्ध्यं उपलब्धम्, उपलब्धे वा सप्तमप्रमाणप्रसंगः, आगमस्य वा तत्रैव अन्तर्भावः । तदेव प्रवृत्तादिभिः सह दुःसह्यतयोपन्यसनीयम्, न त्वागमस्तद्भेदः । - तत्त्वविन्दु pp 120

(109) न हि प्रमाणानुधिष्ठितविति प्रयुक्ते, प्रयुक्ते प्राप्तरात्राविति वसिष्ठानुधिष्ठितविति वा सौकिंशः । pp. 121, ibid.

- (111) तथा च तिष्ठ शक्तयः द्वे वा । पदानां हि तावदर्थरूपमभिधानस्याः शक्तिस्तदर्थरूपाणां अन्योन्यान्वयशक्तिः, तदाधानशक्तिश्चापरा पदानां मेवेति । स्मारकत्वपक्षे त्वेव शक्तिद्वयम् । अन्विताभिधानपक्षे तु पदानां मेकैव शक्तिः तत् कल्पनालाघवात् एतदेव न्याय्यम् । pp. 133 *ibid*
- (111) तन्मात्रविषये तस्याविशेषात् सर्वशब्दानां पर्यायताप्रसङ्गः । pp. 123 *ibid*.
- (112) अनन्यालभ्यः शब्दार्थ इति त्रैविध्यवृद्ध्या । अत एव आख्यातादौ कर्माभिधायिता नाद्रिश्यन्ते । pp 131 *ibid*.
- (113) तथा हि वृद्धप्रयुक्तवाक्यध्वनिसमन्तरं प्रवृत्तिर्निवृत्तिर्द्वयोक्तमयसम्प्रतिपत्ते व्युत्पन्नस्य व्युत्पिस्तद्वहेतुध्वन्यमनुमीयते । तस्य सांख्ये अप्यनेकेषु अनुपपन्नस्य पदवातध्वनिसमन्तरं संभवत् तद्वहेतुभावमवधारयति । न चैव प्रत्यय पदार्थमात्रगोचरं प्रवृत्त्यादिभ्यः कल्प्यत इति विजिघृष्टार्थगोचरोऽभ्युपेयते, तद्विशिष्टापरता अवसिता वृद्धध्वन्यवहारे पदानाम् तस्मात् लोकानुसारेण वैदिकस्यापि पदसदमस्य विशिष्टार्थरूपप्रयुक्तस्य अवशिष्टार्थाभिधानमात्रेण लक्षणया विशिष्टार्थगमकत्वम् ॥ pp 153 *ibid*
- (114) सन्निध्यपेक्षयोर्मयत्वेरूपलक्षणलाभन ।  
अनन्त्येध्वन्वितानां स्यात् सबवप्रह्ननं मन ॥ व्याख्यानमाला, वाक्यार्थप्रकरण pp 78
- (115) तस्मान्न वाक्यं न पदानि साक्षात् वाक्यार्थबुद्धिं जनयन्ति किन्तु ।  
पदस्वरूपमभिहितैः पदार्थैः सलस्यतऽसाविते सिद्धमेतत् ॥ pp 79 *ibid*
- (116) वृद्धा युवान् । शशवः कपोताः खले यथाऽमी रूपावर्तन्ते ।  
तथैव सर्वे युगपन्वयार्थाः परस्परैरान्वयिनो भवन्ति ॥
- (117) एव च न चेदियं पदवृत्तिर्लक्षणा लभ्यमन्वेति भवन्तु तर्हि चतुर्थी दृष्टव्यात् ।  
अस्तु वा लक्षण एव ॥ तत्त्वचिन्दु pp 157
- (118) S D 53) स तात्पर्याख्या वृत्तिनाहुः पदार्थान्वयबोधने ।  
तात्पर्यार्थं तदर्थं च वाक्यं तद्बोधकं परे ॥ II 2  
and also अभिधाया एकैकपदार्थबोधनविरताद्वाक्यार्थरूपस्य पदार्थान्वयस्य बोधिका तात्पर्यं नाम वृत्तिः । तदर्थश्च तात्पर्यार्थः । तद्बोधकं च वाक्यमियमभिहितावयवादिनां मतम् । S D  
and also आकांक्षायोग्यतासन्निधिवशाद् वक्ष्यमाणस्वरूपार्णममवयवतात्पर्यार्थो विशेषवपुरपदार्थोऽपि वाक्यार्थः समुपलसनीत्यभिहितान्धवादिनां मतम् । K P II
- (119) विषयभागादपि प्रामेयदृष्टद्वयभेदस्य दाहकत्वम् ।  
धाव्यादौऽनुमितिं प्रकरणवस्तुस्वरूपदा ॥

विषयलक्षणमनुमनुते न हि कश्चिदकाण्ड एव सुहृदि सुधीः ।

तेनात्रार्थान्तरयतिरार्थी तात्पर्यशक्तिसाः न पुनः ॥ व्यक्तिविवेक-I 67,68 pp. 122.

- (120) मुख्येन अमुख्य. अर्थ.लक्ष्यते स आरोपितः शब्दव्यापारः सान्तरार्थ-निष्ठो लक्षणा । K P. also प्रवीण—शक्यव्यवहितलक्ष्यार्थविषयत्वान्छब्द आरोपत एव स व्यापार वस्तुतः अर्थनिष्ठ एवेत्यर्थः । तदेतदुक्तम् सान्तरार्थनिष्ठ इति । also उद्योत-सान्तरार्थनिष्ठ इति साक्षादर्थनिष्ठः सांतरा परंपरया शब्दनिष्ठ इत्यर्थः । also साहित्यचूडामणि-अन्तरं व्यवधाने तत्प्रहितः सान्तरं तत्रार्थं निष्ठं तात्पर्यं यस्य ।
- (121) मुख्यायवाधे तथोगे रुदितोऽथ प्रयोजनात् ।  
अन्योऽर्थो लक्ष्यने यथा लक्षणाऽऽरोपिता क्रिया ॥ K.P. II
- (122) See माणिक्यचन्द्र-मुख्यायस्य अनुपपत्तेरनुप्रयोगाच्च प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेन वाधे साहित्यचूडामणि also observes वाधः प्रमाणपराहृतत्वम् ।
- (123) माणिक्यचन्द्र gives the following illustrations (i) अभिधेयेन सवध, गङ्गायां घोष (ii) सादृश्य-गौर्यादीक गौरेवायम् । (iii) समवाय-साहचर्यम्-कुन्ताःप्रविशन्ति; (iv) वैपरीत्य-भद्रमुख. meaning अभद्रमुख (v) क्रियायोग-मइति समरे शत्रुघ्नस्त्वम् (शत्रुघ्न a proper name is used with reference to a slayer of enemies )
- (124) तन्त्रवार्तिक notes : अगत्या लक्षणावृत्तमभिध्यातुमर्हति ।
- (125) केचन कर्मणि कुशलः इतिरूढावुदाहरन्ति । तेषामयमभिप्रायः कुशलात्तातीति व्युत्पत्तिलभ्य कुशमाहिरूपो मुख्योऽर्थः प्रकृतेऽसम्भवन्विवेचकत्वादिसा धर्म्यसंबन्धिन दक्षरूपं अर्थं बोधयन्ति । तदन्ये न मन्यन्ते । कुशमाहिरूपार्थस्य व्युत्पत्तिलभ्यत्वेऽपि दक्षरूपस्यैव मुख्याधत्वात् । अन्यदहं शब्दानां व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तमन्यच्च प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । व्युत्पत्तिलभ्यस्य मुख्यार्थत्वे गौः शेते इत्यत्रापि लक्षणा स्यात् । गमेर्दो इति गमघातोर्बोप्रत्ययेन व्युत्पादितस्य शाश्वतस्य शयनकालेऽपि प्रयोगात् । S D
- (126) कुशल-द्विरेक द्विकादयस्तु साक्षरसंकेतितविषयत्वान्मुख्या एवेति न रुदि-लक्ष्यस्य अर्थस्य हेतुत्वेनास्माभिरुक्ता । ( काव्यानुशासन ) I
- (127) Kumārila-निरूढा लक्षणाः काश्चिन्मामर्थादिभिधानवत् ।  
क्रियन्ते साम्प्रतं काश्चित् काश्चिन्नैव त्यक्तितः ॥
- (128) -गौणवृत्तिर्लक्षणाता भिन्ना इति प्रभाकराः । तदयुक्तम् । तस्याः लक्ष-  
णार्था अन्तर्भावात् । -प्रतापहरीय ।



- (129) शङ्खिलभण्ड्या अतिरिक्तं न गौणी वृत्तिरिति मीमांसका । सा च तदतिरिक्ता नति न्यायिका आहु । -प्रतापस्त्रीय ।
- (130) माणिक्यचन्द्र notes स्मृतिस्तु या रक्षणा सा लोके प्राचुर्यं गतेति न तस्या नयत्वम् ।
- (131) अ भधाव्यापारतुल्यैराभाकिते भाव ।
- (132) मा णिक्यचन्द्र यत्र शब्द सवधा स्वमर्थं त्यजन्त्य रक्षयति तत्र रक्षणेन तदादिजायमान रक्षणा ।
- (133) -उपचारो हि नाम अत्यन्तविशकलितयो पदार्थयो सादृश्यातिशय महिम्ना भेदप्रतीतिस्थगनमात्रम् । S D

सुषामागर explains as - उपचारश्च सादृश्यसम्बन्धन प्रवृत्ति । सादृश्यातिशयम ह्मना भिन्नयोर्भेदप्रतीतिस्थगन वा ।

सम्प्रदायप्रकाशिनी says गौर्वाहीक इत्यादिबन् मेदेन प्रतीनयोरेक्यारो पणमुपचार ।

- (134) सम्प्रदायप्रकाशिनी explains अ दसान निश्चयज्ञानम् । तदिह अत स्मिन्तदेवे यथासरूपम् । माणिक्यचन्द्र says ननु पूर्वस्या (ie सारोपाया), अपि अभेदोऽस्ति रूपकस्याभेदात्मकत्वात्, सत्यं, तत्र आसन्नानामात्रणाभेद इह तु अत्यासन्नतया ।

- (135) -S D explains अत्र केचिदाहुः शासहचारिणो गुणा जाड्यमायादयो रक्ष्यन्ते । ते च गोशब्दस्य बाहीकार्थोभधान निर्मितोभयन्ति । तदनुचम् । गोशब्दस्यागृहीतसङ्केत बाहीकार्थमभिधातुमसामर्थ्यात् गोशब्दार्थमात्र बोधनाच्च । अभिधाया विरतत्वात् विरतायाश्च पुनइत्यानाभावात् ।

अन्ये पुनर्गोशब्देन बाहीकार्थो नाभिधीयते किं तु स्वार्थसहचारिगुण साक्षात्त्वेन बाहाकार्थगता गुणा एव रक्ष्यन्ते । तदप्यन्ये न मन्यन्ते । तत्र गोशब्दाद्बाहीकार्थो प्रतीयते, न वा । आद्यऽपि गोशब्दादेव वा । रक्षिताद्वा गुणा दविनाभावद्वारा । तत्र न प्रथम । बाहीकार्थस्यासङ्केतितत्वात् । न द्वितीय । भविनाभावलभ्यस्याथस्य शाब्देऽन्वये प्रवेशायभवात् । शाब्दी व्याकाशा शब्दनैव प्रप्यते । न द्वितीय । यदि हि गोशब्दान् बाहीकार्थो न प्रनीयेन तदास्य बाहीकशब्दस्य च सामानाधिकरण्य असंगत स्यात् ।

तस्मादेव गोशब्दो मृत्यया वृत्त्या बाहीकशब्देन सहान्वयमलभमानो अज्ञादिमाधर्म्यमन्त्राद्बाहीकार्थं सञ्जयति । बाहीकस्याऽस्तत्वातिशयबोधन प्रयोजनम् । इय च गुणयोगाद् गौणीतुच्यते ।

- (136) माणिक्यचन्द्र says सहचरण स्थान तादृभ्ये वृत्त मान-धारण ह्यसौष्य-योगमाधन आधिपत्येभ्यो मय वर राज सवतु चन्दन गङ्गा-शकट-अन्न पुरुषेषु अतद्भ वेऽपि तदुपचार ।

- (137) जहल्लक्षणा, अजहल्लक्षणा, जहदजहल्लक्षणा, सारोपा, साध्यवसाना, शुद्धा and गौणी । इत्येव सप्तविधा फललक्षणा ।
- (138) लक्षणामार्गवगाहित्वं तु ध्वने सहृदये नूतनतयोरवर्णितस्य विद्यत इति दिशसु मूलयितुमिदमत्रोक्तम् ( अभिधावृत्तिमातृका ) ।
- (139) शब्दस्यैवाभिधाशक्तिरर्थस्यैव लङ्गता । - व्यक्तिविवेक ।
- (140) गोतवारापेण चाहीके तत्साम्यमनुमीयते ।  
कोट्यतस्मिन्नतुल्यत्वे तत्त्व व्यपदिशेदुपध ॥ व्य विवेक I. 46.
- (141) - चक्रोक्ति प्रसिद्धाभिधानव्यतिरेकिणी विचित्रैवाभिधा । चक्रोक्तिजीवित pp 21.
- (142) ध्वन्यालोक I. 5 प्रनीयमान पुनरन्यदेव वस्तुवस्ति घाणीषु महाकवीना ।  
यत्तद्विभक्तावयवातिरिक्त विभाति लावण्यमिवाङ्गनामु ॥
- (143) ध्वन्यालोक I. 13 यत्रार्थ शब्दो वा तमयमुपवर्जनीकृतस्वार्थौ  
व्यङ्क्त काव्यविशेष स ध्वनिरिति सूरभि कथित ।
- (144) हेमचन्द्र explains तच्छब्दं युपजनिता र्थावगमपरिजितप्रतिपत्प्रतिभा-  
सदायार्थद्योतनशक्तिव्यञ्जकत्वम् । का शा I
- (145) KP II. 11- लक्ष्यं न मुख्यं नाप्यत्र बाधो योग फलेन नो ।  
न प्रयोजनमेतस्मिन्, न च शब्द स्वलङ्गतिः ॥  
यथा गङ्गाशब्दः सोतसि सबाध इति तत्र लक्ष्यनि, तद्वद् यदि तत्रेऽपि  
सबाध स्यात्, तदा प्रयोजनं लक्ष्ये । न च तत्र मुख्योऽर्थः । नाऽप्यत्र बाधः ।  
न च गङ्गाशब्दोऽस्य तत्रस्य पावनवाद्यैर्लक्षणीयैः सम्बन्धः । नापि प्रयोजने लक्ष्ये  
किञ्चित् प्रयोजनम् । नापि गङ्गाशब्दस्तद्वत्प्रयोजनं प्रतिपादयितुमसमर्थः ।
- (146) प्रयोजनं न सहितं लक्षणीयं न गुह्यत । K P II 12  
कुत इत्याह,  
ज्ञानस्य विषयो ह्यन्य फलमयदुदाहृतम् ।  
प्रयत्नादेर्नीला विषय फलं तु प्रकृता सवित्तिर्वा ।  
विशिष्टे लक्षणा नैवम् ।  
निगदेनैव व्याख्यातम् ।  
विशया स्तुस्तु लक्षिते ।  
तदादौ ये विनेया पावनवादयस्ते चाभिधानात्पर्यङ्गणाम्यो व्यापारान्तरेण  
गम्यः । तच्च व्यञ्जनध्वननद्योतनादिशब्दवाच्यमवश्यमेवित्यम् ।
- (147) अनेकाधस्य शब्दस्य याचकत्वे नियन्त्रिते ।  
मयोगाद्यैर्वाच्यायधीकृद्वापृतिरञ्जनम् ॥ K P II 14
- (148) तस्मादभिधानात्पर्यलक्षणव्यतिरिक्त चतुर्थोऽसौ व्यापारो ध्वननद्योतन  
व्यञ्जनप्रयापनावगमनासोदरव्यपदेशनिरूपितोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । लोचन 14
- (149) शब्दप्रमाणवेद्योऽर्थो व्यनक्त्यर्थांतरं यत् ।  
अर्थस्य व्यञ्जकत्वे तन् शब्दस्य सहकारिता ॥ K P III. 3

(150) S.D. 11. वक्तृशेषव्यक्त कृतानां अन्यसंज्ञितवाच्ययोः ।

प्रत्यावदेशकालानां हेतोश्चेष्टादिकस्य च ॥

Says प्रतीति—अर्थव्यञ्जकताया वक्तृवैशिष्ट्यादीनामावश्यक्य-  
मात्रम् । न तु शब्दव्यञ्जनायां सर्वधानुपयोगः । अत एव श्यालकादिप्रयुक्तात्,  
सुरभिमाणं भवान् भुङ्क्ते इत्यादितो द्वितीयादलीलार्थप्रतीतिः । न तु गुर्वादि-  
प्रयुक्तात् । अस्ति शब्दव्यञ्जना कश्चित् तन्माहात्म्येन विनापि इत्यन्यदेतत् ।

(151) S.D. II —अनेकार्थस्य शब्दस्य वाचकत्वे नियन्त्रिते ।

एकत्राथेऽन्यधीहेतुव्यञ्जना साभिधाधया ॥

(152) —अत्र प्राञ्च-तत्र शब्दशक्तिमूलो व्यञ्जनाव्यापारः एव शरणम् ।  
गत्यन्तराभावात् । वृत्तिवार्तिक — pp. 9.

(153) वयं तु ब्रूमः — अभावुदयमारुहः न्यादौ प्राकरणिके अर्थे प्राकरणिक-  
वदप्राकरणिकेऽपि राजकरमण्डलादिशब्दानां परस्परान्वययोग्यनृपतितद्प्राह-  
धनदेशादिवाचकानां समभिव्याहाररूपमभिधानियामक्रमस्तीत्यर्थद्वयस्यापि  
प्राकरणिकत्वं इव प्राकरणिकाप्राकरणिकरूपत्वे अप्युभयत्राभिधेय व्यापारः,  
यथोक्तमभिव्याहारस्यापि शब्दान्तरसन्निधिरूपत्वेन प्रकरणवदभिधानिया-  
मवत्त्वात् । pp. 10 वृत्तिवार्तिक ।

(154) ननु एव प्रस्तुतार्थपर्यालोचनालभ्ययोरेव वस्तुत्वलङ्कारयोर्व्यक्त्युपगमे तत्र  
अर्थशक्तिमूत्रैव व्यक्तिसंवेदिति पृथगर्थशक्तिमूलत्वनेः शब्दशक्तिमूलो न  
स्यात्, इति चेद्, मैवम् । तथात्वेऽपि प्रस्तुताप्रस्तुतोभयसाधारणशब्द-  
सापेक्षतया प्रस्तुतमात्रपरपर्यायशब्दान्त (र) परिवृत्त्यसहिष्णुत्वेन ततस्तस्य  
पृथग् व्यवस्थितेः । वृत्तिवार्तिक. pp. 15

(155) दुर्गांश्चैव-इत्यादौ च द्वितीयाथो नास्तेव इति यदुक्तं महिमभट्टेन,  
तदनुभवसिद्धमवलपतो गत्रनिमीलितैव । S.D.V. ।

(156) इत्थं च नानाधेय्येऽपि तात्पर्याधियः कारणताया शिथिलीभवन्त्यां अता-  
त्पर्याधि विषयशब्दबुद्धिसंज्ञादनाय व्यक्तिस्वीकारः अनुचित एव, शक्यैव  
बोधद्वयापत्तेः । R.G. pp. 141.

(157) एवमपि योगदूरेऽपि रूढज्ञानेन योगापरहरणस्य सकलतन्त्रसिद्धयारूढ-  
नधिकरणस्य योगार्थलिङ्गितस्य अर्थान्तरस्य व्यविन विना प्रतीतिः  
दुरुपपादा । R.G. 144.

## CHAPTER IV

### S'ABDAVṚTTIS AS SEEN IN THE DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT SUCH AS THOSE REPRESENTED BY THE VAIYĀKARANAS, THE MIMĀMSAKAS ETC

We may now study the S'abдавṛttis as known to or recognized by the different schools of thought such as those represented by the grammarians, Mīmāṃsakas etc. First, we will take up the views of the grammarians. In the Mbh of Patañjali, we find mainly the discussion of the mukhya and gauna artha; i.e. the discussion of the primary and the secondary sense. In the discussion of mukhyārtha or the primary sense, we come across terms such as abhidhāna and the like. In the discussion on gaunārtha, we find ideas which later on seem to crystallise into gaunī and lakṣaṇā vṛtti.

#### Vaiyākaranas

In the Mbh, we come across terms such as gauna, mukhya, abhidhātum, abhidhānavat, abhidhānārtha, abhidhāya, abhidhiyamāna, abhidheya, etc etc (1). But, we do not meet with either any precise mention of, or any definition as such of abhidhā, gaunī, lakṣaṇā, or vyañjana. Nevertheless Patañjali mentions two types of meanings viz. mukhya or the primary sense, and gaunā or the secondary sense.

While discussing the type of secondary meaning, he mentions at least four different circumstances under which the secondary function takes place (2). Thus, tatsthya or the relation of location, taddharmya or the relation of substance and quality or function, sāmīpya or proximity, and sāhacarya or being together, are mentioned under pā IV 1 48. Thus we find that Patañjali mentions abhidhāna and the like, which pave

R 9-b

the way for *abhidhāvṛtti*. *Abhidhā* is thus seen under the name of *abhidhāna* or *mukhyārtha* in the *Mbh*, and the material for the later *vṛttis* of *gaunī* and *lakṣanā* is also seen herein. The material for the *gaunī* lies in the *sādharmya* relation as noted above, while that for *lakṣanā*, in other relations such as *tāsthya*, *samīpya* etc. which lead to the secondary sense. No strict line of demarcation is laid between *gaunī* and *lakṣanā*. When we come to a later grammarian of repute viz. *Bhartṛhari*, we find material which is the source of the later theory of *vyañjana*. In the *Mbh* itself, nothing more definite about *vyañjana* than what we have already noticed earlier is to be seen.

*Bhartṛhari*, the author of *V P* has divided *s'abdārtha* into *gauna* and *mukhya*, and has shown two-fold *upacāra* (or imposition) with reference to *s'abda* and *artha*. Those who take one word as capable of expressing several meanings, e.g. the word 'go' for both 'go-vyakti' and 'vāhika', have their theory based on the assumption of restricted or accidental meanings (4). A word does not express more than one meaning at a time—*yaugapadyamatikramya paryaye vyavasthate*—*V P*. The other meanings that are not *mukhyārtha*, are to be comprehended by either context (or *prakaraṇa*) or connexion with some other words (i.e. *yogat s'abdāntareṇa vā*) (5). *Bhartṛhari* holds that the word 'go' which denotes 'govyakti' is also applied to 'vāhika' on account of his *sādharmya* with 'go' (6). He observes that it is through usage that the meaning of a word becomes *gauna* and *mukhya*—*prasiddhibhedāt gaunatvam mukhyatvam copapadyate*—*V P*.

As explained by *Punyaṣaṅga* on *V P* II. 256, the *artha* is two-fold viz. *svarūpa* and *bāhya*. *Svarūpa* is that which is naturally fixed by its very form such as 'govā' of the word 'go'. The *bāhya* is that which is indicated by *upacāra* e.g. when *vāhika* is said to be 'go' (7). Thus far, *Bhartṛhari* gives the basis for *abhidhā* and *gaunī* or *lakṣanā*, almost on the lines of the *Mbh*.

Over and above this, Bhartṛhari discusses the problem of determination of the sense of a given word which has convention with reference to more than one sense, i.e. a word having multiple senses. Thus, he takes up the problem of a word having more meanings than one, all of which are mukhyārthas. In his view, the particular meaning out of several is determined by factors such as context, time, place, etc. In this connection, he gives the following verses

vakyāt prakaraṇādarthādaucityāddes'akalatah |  
s'abdārthah pravibhajyante na rupādeva kevalāt ||  
V P II 316

samyogo viprayogas'ca sāhacaryam virodhitā |  
arthah prakaranam lingam sabdasvānyasya sannidhih |  
samarthyamaucitī des'ah kālo vyaktih svarādayah |  
śabdārthasyānavacchede vis esasmṛtihetavah ||  
V P II 317 318 (8)

Here, we may ask as to what it is that fixes the particular meaning of the word and debar other multiple senses which it has by convention and usage? To Bhartṛhari this question does not seem to have occurred. For him, samsarga or conjunction and the like, link the word to one mukhyārtha or the primary sense. But to later thinkers on this subject, it appears necessary to postulate an additional sabdavṛtti, over and above abhidhā and gaunī, and lakṣanā. In this, we may see the inspiration for the vyañjanavṛtti. This is corroborated by the fact that writers like Mammata, Viśvanātha and others mention these very verses (i.e. V P II 317, 318) as authority for their theory of abhidhāmūlā vyañjanā.

Among the later grammarians, Nageśa (18th cen. A.D.) was the first to recommend the case of vyañjanā. He apparently follows the ālapkṛtikas and repeats the same arguments

Nageśa holds that in certain cases, after mukhyārtha or mukhyārthabādhā, as the case may be, is gathered, a further

meaning is to be seen. This artha is either prasiddha, i.e. known, or aprasiddha i.e. unknown, and is either related to the mukhyārtha or is unrelated to it. This sort of meaning is flashed upon the mind through vyañjanāsakti (9). Thus, Nagesa holds vyañjanā to be abhidhāmūla and laksanāmūla. This vyañjanā rests on s'abda, artha, pada, padaikadesa, varṇa, racanā, cēṣṭādī. When a woman casts a glance of her eye with reference to somebody, her desire is thereby suggested. This apprehension is supported by experience—*anubhavasiddha*. So, even in cēṣṭā, vyañjanā can be seen (10). Vyañjakatva lies both in padas and arthādī. That vyañjanā, wherein arthādī are suggested, rests on vaktṛbodhavyādhivaisṛīyāñjana, or the knowledge of the particular speaker, hearer etc. The pratibhā or the genius of the hearer acts as a *sahakārī kāraṇa* (11). In the absence of pratibhā, there is absence of the apprehension of the suggested sense. By pratibhā is meant the *navanavonmēṣa*'ālini buddhi. This *navanavonmēṣa* is due to *pūrvajanmasamskāras* or the impression of the past birth. So, for Nagesa, pratibhā is that factor which accompanied by *prakaraṇāñjana* in form of the speaker, hearer etc, makes for the apprehension of the suggested sense (12).

This vyañjanā is held to be connected even with the previous life (13). In case of *gato'stamarakāḥ*, when we desire different meanings the mukhyārtha is never contradicted (*bādhita*). So, the other meaning is not gathered through *laksanā*. So vyañjanā is not to be included in *laksanā* (14). The *nipātas* and *upasargas* also are suggestors as are the *padas*. The *Sphota* is always *vyangya* or suggested and is described as such in the works on grammar. Bhartṛhari also takes *Sphota* to be *vyangya*. Thus, Nagesa considers vyañjanā to be useful even for the grammarians *vaiyākaraṇāṇāṃ mapi etatsvīkārah* *nyas yakah*.

### Mīmāṃsakas

Now we will consider the views of the Mīmāṃsakas. Jaimini and S'abara hold that the language of the Sūtras must,

as far as possible be understood to convey the same sense as is conveyed by it in common parlance Jaimini says this expressly in *Mi Sū* 1 3 30 When it is said *prayogacodanābbavā-darthaikatvamavibhagāt*, 'avibhagāt' means that no difference is seen between language of the scriptures and that of common parlance Thus, both words and sentences in the veda are in no way different from those in the popular usage (*Mi Sū* 1 2 32-*avis'itsastu vākyārthah*) (15) However, the cases of veda and loka are not absolutely parallel The *vaidika vākya* is *apauruṣeya* i.e. not of human origin and always true, *laukika vākya* is *pauruṣeya* i.e. of human origin and therefore at times it may not be free from errors because of its human agency A further important point of distinction is that in the case of a *laukika vākya*, the *abhipraya* or some *dṛṣṭa artha* or intension of the particular speaker is more important than the *s'abda* Thus, *sabda* becomes only a means of conveying the *artha* or *abhipraya* or intention (16) Therefore, in a *laukika vākya*, *sabda* in its *vācyārtha* is not strictly honoured Sometimes, the *vācyārtha* is given up in favour of some *lakṣyārtha* which suits the *abhipraya* of the speaker in a much better way (17) In a *laukika vākya*, at times such devices as *adhyāhāra* or implication and *viparīṇāma* or transference are also restored to (18) In the *vaidika vākya*, nothing else but *s'abda* is *pramāṇa* (19) *Sabara* therefore very often refers to the general rule that *lakṣanā* is not admissible in a *vidhi-vākya*, while it has scope elsewhere (20) Thus, the *Mīmāṃsakas* mention both *mukhya* and *gauna arthas* They seem to accept *mukhya vṛtti* and *gaunī* or *lakṣanā* We will try to see if there is any distinction drawn between *gaunī* and *lakṣanā*.

*Jaimini* and *S'abara* discuss the two senses viz. *mukhya* and *gauna* under *Mi Sū* III 2 1-2, *S'abara* holds that '*mukhya*' is so termed because it is perceived from the word and is as it were the face of the word While, that sense which is known from the primary signification on the strength of some connection is termed as *jaghanya*, it being also termed as *gauna* as



it is connected with some *guna* (21) Thus, the *Mīmāṃsakas* seem to hold at least two *s'abdavṛttis* viz. *mukhyā* and *gaunī*. They hold that a word, when seen to have two or more meanings, one is its *mukhyārtha* while the rest are all gathered by the 'secondary power through the relation such as *sādṛśya*, and the like. The word *barhiḥ* means grass primarily, but is applied to sanctified grass only secondarily through *sādṛśya*. The word *parvan*, in the same way, primarily means 'samudaya' but through *samudāya-sambandha* it also secondarily means *kāla* (22). Words such as *mātā*, having more than one primary sense are in fact two words and not one (23). It should be noted that *S'abara* seems to suggest that in case of a *gaunārtha*, it is only a meaning that is somehow or other connected with the primary sense that is indicated and not any other sense at random. The *s'abdārtha-sambandha* is *nitya* and therefore it is inadmissible to apply any word to anything which it has no power to signify (24). It is also noted that at times, we come across words that convey two meanings e.g. *kus'ala*, *praviṇa* etc. In such cases, one meaning is derived through etymology and is termed the *yaugikārtha* and the other one is based on usage and is termed as *rūḍhārtha*. On account of *prasiddhi* i.e. because of its being more current, the *rūḍhārtha* is taken as the *mukhyārtha* in such cases. The *Mīmāṃsakas* seem to hold that *lakṣaṇā* is resorted to only as a means to avoid *gnātibhāgya*, when the primary sense is found to be unsuitable to the context. This again is only as the last resort (25). The *Mīmāṃsakas* hold that the most important principle to be borne in mind is that between the two functions of a word viz. *śruti* (or *abhidha*) and *lakṣaṇā*, the former is stronger than the latter (26). *S'rutyasambhava* or *mukhyārtha-bādha* is the first pre requisite of *lakṣaṇā*. On *Mṛ. Sū. VIII.3.34* *S'abara* lays down that though the direct sense of a word is found unsuitable to the context, the *vācārtha* cannot be entirely abandoned. Thus, even the *lakṣyārtha* is bound to be *s'abdārtha*. It cannot be *as'abdārtha* (27). Thus, the condition of 'adyoga', or connection comes in. This is explained again under

kinds of lakṣaṇā There seems to be no reference to vyākṣaṇā as such

### Naiyayikas

We have seen in our discussion of *samketa* that Gotama recognises what is specified as *abhidhā* later on. For him, the *padārthas* or the meanings of the word consist in *vyakti* or individual, *ākṛti* or form, and *jāti* or class. These are the aspects of reality expressed by a word. The acceptance of *abhidhā* by Gotama and other Naiyayikas is clearly indicated in our discussion on *samketa*. As to what is expressed by a word is shown in *Nyāyasastra* II 2 65—*vyaktyakṛtijāyastupadārthah*. This means that in the opinion of Gotama, a word expresses individuality, form and class. Now let us see his views regarding *lakṣaṇā*.

We come adross some discussion as to the nature of secondary usage or *upacāra* at *Nyāyasastra* II 2 64—*sahacaranasthānatadartthyavṛttamanadharana-sāṃsipyasādhanaadhipatyebhyo brāhmaṇamañcakataraṅgaśaktucandanagaṅgāsātakānnapuruseṣvata-dbhāve pī tadupacārah* (31-A). Thus Gotama holds that secondary usage or *upacāra* operates on the strength of ten relations such as *sahacarana* (or going together), *sthāna* (or place) etc. The Vātsyāya *bhāṣya* cites illustrations to the point. Thus, 'yastikāṃ bhojaya' or feed the stick, means the *brāhmaṇa* with a stick is to be fed. This explains the relation of *sahacarana* (or going together). *Sthāna* or location is illustrated in 'mañcāḥ krosanti', *tadartthya* or the relation of purpose is illustrated when straw meant for preparing a mat is itself called a mat. *Vṛtta* or behaviour is the relation as seen in, 'this king is Yama or Kubera'. He is so called because he behaves like Yama or Kubera. *Māna* or measure is illustrated when grains are said to be of a particular measure. *Dhāraṇa* or the relation of weighing is illustrated when sandal wood held in balance is called 'tulācandana'. The relation of *sāṃsipyā* or proximity seen as in, 'gaṅgāyām gāvah' or cattle are grazing in the Ganges, Thus the place near the river is called by the name of river on

the strength of *sāṃpya* or proximity 'Yoga' or combination is yet another relation. Thus a black piece of cloth is called black because it is united with black colour. *Sādhana* or means is illustrated when food is said to be *prāṇa* or life. Actually, food is the *sādhana* or means or life. *Ādhipatyā* or being the head is illustrated when a man who is the head of a family is said to be family or house himself (*ayam puruṣaḥ kuḷam, ayam gotraṃ* etc.)

Elsewhere also in the *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya* we come across numerous references to *bhakti* and *bhākta artha*. But we do not come across any reference to *vyañjana*. Word is not accepted to be *ṛṣṭya* and *abhivyaṅgya* or manifested. 'Vyaṅgya' is seen only in the sense of 'manifested' and not 'suggested'.

We now turn to the new school of *Naiyāyikas* as represented by Gaṅgeś'a (1700 A D), Gaḍadhara (1700 A D), Jagadīs'a (1700 A D) etc. Gaḍadhara, Jagadīs'a and Mathurānātha (1700 A D) are the authors of *Saktivāda*, *S'abdas'aktiprakāś'ikā* and *Vyutpattivāda* respectively wherein they have dealt with the topic of *s'abda*, *sabdartha* and *s'abdavṛttis*.

In the *S'abdas'aktiprakāś'ikā* (S' S' Pra) words are classified as below

- (i) words with conventional meanings assigned to them (or *rudha*),
- (ii) words with secondary signification (or *lakṣaka*),
- (iii) words having both primary or conventional and derivative meanings (i.e. *yogarudha*)

and (iv) words, possessing derivative or *yaugika artha* alone.

*S'abdas'aktiprakāś'ikā* 16 reads

(*rudham ca lakṣakam caiva yogarudham ca yaugikam |  
taccaturdhā parairūdhayaugikam, manyate'dhikam ||*)

The word 'gaṅgāyām' in the illustration 'gaṅgāyām ghosah' forms an example of *lakṣaṇā*. Pañkaja is a *yogarudha* word defined as—

yannāma svāyavavṛttīlabhyārthena samam svārthasyān-vayabodhakṛt tannāma yogarudham, yathā pañkajakṛtsnasarpā-dharmadī-S'. S' Pra 26 i.e. they are those which combine in themselves twofold signification—conventional as well as derivative. The *yaugika* words are those such as *kāraṇa*, *pācaka* etc., that cannot the same meanings as are gathered by their component parts in which they may be grammatically analysed.

Gaḍādhara in his *S'aktīvāda*, discusses the problem of *s'aktigraha*. By '*s'akti*' he means the *mukhya vṛtti* called *abhidhā*. He discusses at length the topic of *sāṅketagrahakatva* of this *mukhyāvṛtti*. At places, he touches *lakṣaṇā* also, which is connected with *abhidhā*. In the beginning of his work, he recognises two functions viz. *sāṅketa* and *lakṣaṇā* with reference to *padārtha*—*sāṅketa lakṣaṇā ca arthe padāvṛttih* (*S'aktīvāda*). He does not go for any further relation. He has neither mentioned nor rejected *vyāñjanā* as a *vṛtti*, but his commentators try to interpret him in such a way as to make him refute *vyāñjanā*. Thus, Kṛṣṇabhāṭṭa observes that *vyāñjanā* need not be recognised as distinct from *lakṣaṇā* and so also *gaunī*. Both *gaunī* and *vyāñjanā* can be included in *lakṣaṇā* (32). Another commentator of his, Mādhava, tries to refute *vyāñjanāvāda*. The *vyāñjanāvādin* figures as an objector here. The objection is that, the *s'aktivibhāga* of Gaḍādhara is not correct, for *vyāñjanā* is a separate *vṛtti*. When it is said by the heroine that, *gaccha gacchasi cet kanta*, etc., the meaning, viz., that 'if you will go, I will die', is gathered through *vyāñjanā* alone, in the absence of which we fail to gather this sense (33). The *Siddhānti* (i.e. *Naiyāyika*) does not agree with this. If *vyāñjanā* is recognised as a separate *vṛtti*, it must have some definite form. If at all it has any definite form, it is the form of *vācya*. When there is the apprehension of the suggested sense, it is always due to *abhidhāñāna*.

Thus even in vyañjanā, we cannot proceed without the vācyārtha, which is its cause. Thus, vyañjanā is not a separate vṛtti other than abhidhā.

The vyañjanānvādin accepts something like a s'abdvyañjanā, e.g. *vayasthā nāgarāsaṅgādaṅgāṇām hanuḥ vedanām*. From this sentence, two senses viz. (i) a young woman, in company of a young man, removes the torment of the limbs of the body, and (ii) *Haritaki* with *Sunthi* removes physical pain, are derived. For the supporter of vyañjanā, it is a case of *abhidhāmulā vyañjanā*. But for the *Naiyāyikas*, the other sense is also gathered through *abhidhā* and it is futile to go for an *abhidhāmulā vyañjanā* with reference to the *pratiyamānārtha* (35). Others (i.e. the vyañjanānvādins, the *purvapakṣa*), hold that the fact of *pratiyamānārtha* can be gathered in poetry, only through vyañjanā, and therefore its acceptance is inevitable (36). For the *Naiyāyikas*, this implied sense is gathered not by any *vṛttiviseṣa*, but by the faculty of mind. Thus, *vyaṅgyārtha* is just a mental apprehension (*mānasa bodhamātra*),—*manasaiva vāḍṣ'abodhasvikārat* (*Mādhavi*).

*Jagadīś'a*, in his *s'abdas'aktiprakāśikā*, *kārikā* 24, refers to the illustration viz. *mukham vīkṣitasmitam* etc., whereby suggestiveness has been established by *Mammata* and others. He discusses at length the problem of the recognition of vyañjanā. He holds that there is no justification to recognise something like suggestiveness, so far as the direct or indirect meaning of a work is concerned (37).

The so called *vyaṅgyārtha* i.e. *s'āitya* and *pāvanatva*, or *saurabha* (i.e. the smiling face is as fragrant as flowers) is derived by the usual mental apprehension, the special beauty of erotic sentiment (*camatkara*) also being a matter of mental apprehension (*mānasabodha*).

Thus we have seen that language is used both in the scientific mode and also in the emotive mode. Scientific usage becomes the source of our *abhidhā* and the emotive use accounts for *lakṣanā* and *vyañjanā*.

We have thus tried to study the concept of s'abdavyūttis in different dars'anas in the historical perspective. The grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas, as seen above, were concerned more with the scientific use of language and therefore they mention only abhidhā and lakṣaṇā (and also guṇavāda in case of the latter). The Naiyāyikas also, for the same reason, see no need of recognising vyañjanā. The grammarians, however as observed by us, enunciate the doctrine of Sphota. They also provide us with clues regarding the development of vyañjanā. Coming to the ālankārikas, Ānandavardhana and his followers clearly define the three vūttis viz abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā. In the discussion of dhvani, they take the grammarians as their authority and we have tried to show above that their claim is not unfounded.

#### Foot Notes

Patañjali has a 'gauna' and 'mukhya' as below

at 1.1.15 एव तर्हि गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये कार्यसंप्रयय इति ।

1.4.108 - गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये संप्रययो भवति । तद्यथा गौरनुबन्ध्य भजोऽग्नीधोमीय इति न वाहीकोऽनुबध्यते ।

8.3.82 - अग्ने स्तु स्तोमसोमा । गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये संप्रतिपत्ति तद्यथा गौरनुबन्ध्यो etc

अभिधातुम् occurs at 2.3.1 - करोतेऽस्त्ययमान कृतोऽनवयवेन सर्वं कर्माभिधत्त कृत्शब्दात्पुनस्त्ययमानया द्वितीयया य कटस्थ कर्म तच्छब्दमभिधातुम् न हि कर्मविशेषः ।

अभिधीयमान occurs at 2.2.24 25/421,

सामान्याभिधाने हि विशेषानाभिधानम् । 4

सामान्ये ह्यभिधीयमाने विशेषोऽनभिहितो भवति । तत्रावश्य विशेषार्थिना विशेषोऽनुप्रयोज्यत्वम् । etc अथवा विभक्त्यर्थोऽभिधीयते एतच्चात्र युक्तं यद्विभक्त्यर्थोऽभिधीयते तत्र हि सर्ववद्वात् पद वर्ततेऽस्येति । etc

अभिधावत् at 1.1.58 1.3/153

. अनङ्वाहमुदाहारि या त्य हरसि शिरसा कुम्भ भगिनि साचीनमभिधावन्तम-द्राक्षीरिति । तस्य यद्येष्टमभिसवधो भवति । उदाहारि भगिनि या त्य कुम्भ हरसि शिरसानङ्वाह साचीनमभिधावन्तमद्राक्षीरिति ।

अभिधानतः—at 1.3.1. 6/258;

प्रथमभावग्रहणं च । ११ ॥

प्रथमभावग्रहणं च कर्तव्यम् । प्रथम यो भावमाहेति । कुतः पुनः प्राथम्यं किं शब्दतः आहोस्विदर्थतः । किं चातः । यदि शब्दतः सनादीनां धातुसंज्ञा न प्राप्नोति । पुत्रीयति वस्त्रीयति इति । अथार्थतः सिद्धा सनादीनां धातुसंज्ञा स एव तु दोषो भाववचने तदर्थप्रत्ययप्रतिषेध इति । एवं तर्हि नैवार्थतो नापि शब्दतः किं तर्हि । अभिधानतः । सुमध्यमेऽभिधाने यः प्रथम भावमाह ।

6 3 46 .....प्रधानतो वा यतो वृत्तिः ॥८॥

अथवा गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये कार्यसंप्रत्यय तद्यथा गौरनुबन्धोऽजोमीषोमीय इति न बाह्योऽनुबध्यते ।

अभिधानलक्षण—3 3 19. 7/146 :

अकर्तरि च कारके सज्ञायाम् । (3 3 19)

.... 'अतिप्रसङ्ग' इति चेदभिधानलक्षणत्वात्प्रत्ययस्य सिद्धम् ॥ ३ ॥

अतिप्रसङ्गात् इति चेत्तन्न । किं कारणम् । अभिधानलक्षणत्वात्प्रत्ययस्य सिद्धम् । अभिधानलक्षणा कृतद्धितसमासा । अनभिधानान्नमिध्यन्ति ।

अभिधानवत् and अभिधेयवत् at 1 2 51 15/227 .

लुपि युक्तवद्व्यक्तिवचने । 1 2 51 .....

अन्यत्राभिधेयव्यक्तिवचनभावाल्लुपियुक्तवदनुदेश ॥ १ ॥

अन्यत्राभिधेयवत्लिङ्गवचनानि भवन्ति । ववान्यत्र । लुकि । लवण सूप । लवणा यवागू । लवण शाकमिति । अन्यत्राभिधेयवद्व्यक्तिवचनानि भवन्ति । लुकि । इहनाप्यभिधेयवत्लिङ्गवचनानि प्राप्नुवन्ति । इध्यन्ते चाभिधानवास्तुरिति तच्चान्तरेण यत्न न सिध्यतीति लुपि युक्तवदनुदेश । एवमर्थमिदमुच्यते । अस्ति प्रयोजनमेतत् । किं तर्हीति .. . etc

अभिधानार्थ—2.1 51. 13/395,

तद्धितार्थोत्तरपदसमाहारे च । 2.1 51. 13/395

..... अभिधानार्थं तु । ७।

अभिधानार्थं तु समाहारग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् । समाहारेणाभिधानं तथा स्यात् तद्धितार्थेन माभूदिति । ... etc.

अभिधाय—5 3 74 4 6/424

कुत्सिते । 5374 इह कुत्सितक अनुकम्पितक इति स्वशब्देनोक्तत्वात्  
तत्स्यार्थस्य प्रत्ययो न प्राप्नोति । नैष दोषः । कुत्सितस्यानुकम्पायां भविष्यत्यनु-  
कम्पितस्य कुत्सायाम् । अथवा ।

स्वार्थमभिधाय शब्दो निरपेक्षो द्रव्यमाह समवेतम् ।  
समवेतस्य च वचने लिङ्ग वचनं विभक्तिं च ॥  
अभिधाय तान्विशेषानपेक्षमाणस्य कृत्स्नमात्मानम् ।  
प्रियकुत्सनादिषु पुनः प्रवर्ततेऽसौ विमलतन्त्र ॥ etc  
अभिधान-1 169 1/178,

अणुद्विषवर्णस्य चाप्रत्ययः । 1.169

अभिधानात्प्रत्ययः सवर्णान्नं ग्रहीष्यति । यान्हि प्रत्ययः सवर्णग्रहणेन  
गृहीयान्न तैरर्थस्याभिधानं स्यात् । अनभिधानान्नं भविष्यति । etc  
1 260 6/231 -कल्गुनीप्रेष्ठपदानां च नक्षत्रे । 1 260 ।

पङ्गुनीसमीपगतं चन्द्रमसि पङ्गुनीशब्दो वर्तते । बहवस्तेऽर्थास्तत्र युक्तं  
बहुवचनम् । यदा तयोरेवाभिधानं तदा द्विवचनं भविष्यति ।

1 264  $\frac{18\ 21}{233}$  सरूपाणामेकशेष एकविभक्तौ । 1 264

प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेशान्नैकेनानेकस्याभिधानम् ॥१॥ प्रत्यर्थं शब्दा अभिनिविशन्ते ।  
किमिदं प्रत्यर्थमिति । अर्थमर्थं प्रति प्रत्यर्थम् । प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेशादेतस्मात्कारणा-  
न्नैकेन शब्देनानेकस्यार्थस्याभिधानं प्राप्नोति । तत्र को दोषः । ..etc  
also 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 22/241

... ननु चोक्तं प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेशान्नैकेनानेकस्याभिधानमिति । यदि चैकेन  
शब्देनानेकस्यार्थस्याभिधानं स्यान्न प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेशः कृतः स्यात् ।

प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेशादेकेनानेकस्याभिधानमिति चेत्तदपि प्रत्यर्थमेव ॥३०॥ प्रत्यर्थं  
शब्दनिवेशादेकेनानेकस्याभिधानादप्रत्यर्थमिति चेदेवमुच्यते । यदप्येकेनानेकस्याभिधानं  
भवति तदपि प्रत्यर्थमेव । यावतामभिधानं तावता प्रयोगो न्याय्यः । यावतामर्था-  
नामभिधानं न भवति तावता शब्दानां प्रयोग इत्येव पक्षो न्याय्यः ।

यावतामभिधानं तावता प्रयोगो न्याय्य इति चेदेकपक्षेनैकस्याभिधानम् ॥३१॥

यावतामभिधानं तावता प्रयोगो न्याय्य इति चेदेवमुच्यते । एषोऽपि न्याय्यः  
एव यदा एकेनानेकस्याभिधानं भवति । यदि तर्ह्येकेनानेकस्याभिधानं भवति  
प्लक्ष्म्यप्रोक्षौ एकेनोक्तत्वादपरस्य प्रयोगोऽनुरूपः । . etc



also 1.2.3.5. 79/242..... एकैनोक्तत्वादपरस्य प्रयोगोऽनुपपन्न इति चेदनुक्तः प्लक्षेण न्यग्रोधार्थ इति कृत्वा न्यग्रोधसदः प्रयुज्यते । कथमनुक्तौ यावतेदानीमेवोक्तमेकेनाप्यनेकस्याभिधानं भवतीति । सरूपाणामेकेप्यनेकस्याभिधानं भवति न विरूपाणाम् । किं पुनः कारणं सरूपाणामेकेनाप्यनेकस्याभिधानं भवति न पुनर्विरूपाणाम् ।

अभिधानं पुनः स्वाभाविकम् ॥३३॥

स्वाभाविकमभिधानम् ।

उभयदर्शनाच्च ॥३८॥

उभयं सत्यपि दृश्यते । विरूपाणामप्येकेनानेकस्याभिधानं भवति । तद्यथा । द्वाधाक्षामा । द्वाधा चिदस्मै पृथिवी नमेते इति । विरूपाणां किञ्च नामैकेनानेकस्याभिधानं स्यात्किं पुनः सरूपाणाम् ।

also at 1 3 1 6/258 : मूवादयो धातवः । 1 3 1 . ..

.. प्रथमभावग्रहणं च ॥११॥...etc & see above, अभिधानतः ..

again at, 1.4 51 8/335 कथितेऽभिहिते त्वविधिस्त्वमितिर्गुणकर्मणि लादिविधिः सपरे ।

कथिते लादिभिरभिहिते त्वविधिरेव भवति । किमिदं त्वविधिरिति । ..etc.

again, 2 1 1 7/363-सख्याविशेषो व्यवहाराभिधानमुपसर्जनविशेषणं च योगः ।

अथैतस्मिन्नेकार्थीभावकृते विक्षेपे किं स्वाभाविकं शब्दैरर्थाभिधानमाहोस्विद्वाचनिकम् । .....etc

again, 3.1 7 18/12 धातोः कर्मणः समानकर्तृकादिच्छाया वा । 3 1 7

अनभिधानाद्वा ॥५॥

अथवानभिधानात्सुबन्तादुत्पत्तिर्न भविष्यति । न हि सुबन्तादुत्पद्यमानेन सनेच्छाया अभिधानं स्यात् । अनभिधानात्तत्र उत्पत्तिर्न भविष्यति ।...etc

again 2 1.36-<sup>2</sup>/<sub>389</sub> अर्थं शब्दो यं पुल्लिङ्गं लत्तत्पदार्थप्रदानश्च तत्पुरुषस्तेन

पुल्लिङ्गस्यैव समासस्याभिधानं स्यात्, स्त्रीनपुंसकलिङ्गस्य न स्यात् ।...etc.

2 1.51. 13/395 तद्विधत्तार्थोत्तरपदसमाहारे च । 2 1.51 ..see अभिधानार्थं above, 2.1 69 24/403 . कर्मधारयप्रकृतिभिर्मत्वर्थविशेषाभिधानं यथा स्यात् ।...etc

2 1 67  $\frac{10\ 10\ 15}{404}$

एवमपि यद्यत्र कदाचिर्कर्मधारयो भवति कर्मधारयप्रकृति-  
भिर्मन्वर्थीयैरभिधानं प्राप्नोति । सर्वेद्यायमेवमर्थो यन्न कर्मधारयप्रकृतिभिर्मन्वर्थीयैर-  
भिधानं मा भूदिति । ..etc .....तत्र कर्मधारयप्रकृतिभिर्मन्वर्थीयैरभिधानमस्तु  
बहुव्रीहिणेति बहुव्रीहिणा भविष्यति स्फुटत्वात् ।...etc

2 2 24 18/421 पदार्थाभिधाने नुप्रयोगानुपपत्तिरभिहितत्वात् ॥४॥ पदार्थ-  
स्याभिधाने -नुप्रयोगस्यानुपपत्तिः । विश्वगुर्देवदत्त इति । किं कारणम् अभिहित-  
त्वात् । विश्वगुस्तद्वेदानाभिहितं सोऽर्थ इति कृत्वा नुप्रयोगो न प्राप्नोति ।

2 2 24 13,15/424 न चानभिधानादसमानाधिकरणेषु सङ्गभावः ॥१६॥

अभिधानात् । तच्च वाच्यमनभिधानमाश्रयितव्यम् । कियमाणेऽपि वै परि-  
गणने यत्राभिधानं नास्ति न भवति तत्र बहुव्रीहिः । तद्यथा पच भुक्नवन्तो  
ऽस्येति ।

अथैतस्मिन्सत्यनभिधाने यदि वृत्तिपरिगणनं क्रियते वर्तिपरिगणनमपि कर्तव्यम् ।  
तत्कथं कर्तव्यम् ।.. .etc

2 2 29 23/432 प्लक्षस्य न्यघ्राघत्वान्यप्रोक्षस्य प्लक्षत्वात्स्वशब्देनाभिधानं  
भविष्यति ।

again at, 2 2 29 25/433. . अभिधानं स्वाभाविकम् ॥१५॥

स्वाभाविकमभिधानम् .....etc

and 2 3 1 12, 13/442-न चान्यतरेणानभिधानात् ॥८॥

न वैष दोषः । किं कारणम् । अन्यतरेणानभिधानात् । अन्यतरेणान-  
भिधानम् । सदिप्रत्ययेनाभिधानमस्तिप्रत्ययेनानभिधानम् । यतोऽनभिधानं तदाश्रया  
सप्तमी भविष्यति । कुतो तु स्वत्वेतत्प्रत्ययमिधाने चानभिधाने चानभिहिताश्रया  
सप्तमी भविष्यति न पुनरभिहिताश्रयः प्रतिषेध इति ।

अनभिहिते हि विधानम् ॥९॥

अनभिहिते हि सप्तमी विधीयते । नाभिहिते प्रतिषेधः ।.....किं पुनः  
द्रव्य साधनं आहोस्विद्गुणः । किं चातः । यदि द्रव्य साधनं नैतदन्यद् भवत्य-  
भिहितात् । अथ हि गुणः साधनं भवत्येतदन्यदभिहितात् । ..etc

- 2 3 5 14/445 कालाप्यनोरत्यन्तसंयोगे । 2 3 5,

. ...लालिभिरभिधानं यथा स्यात् ।... etc

3 1,7 18/12 see above

3 1.7. 13/13 11/15-अकर्मणो ह्यसमानकर्तृकाद्भानभिधानम् ॥७॥ इच्छा-  
यामभिधेयायां सन्विधीयते न चाकर्मणोऽसमानकर्तृकादोत्पद्यमानेन सनेच्छाया  
अभिधान स्यात् । अनभिधानात्तत उत्पत्तिन भविष्यति ।

.....सर्वस्य वा चेतनावत्त्वात् ॥१५॥ ...एवमपि इष्यते ग्रामो गन्तुमिति  
परसाधन उत्पद्यमानेन तेन ग्रामस्याभिधानं न प्राप्नोति ।

3.1.22 9-11/29-एकाज्जलदिप्रहणे च । २।.....यत्रैकाचो ह्लादिश्चोत्प-  
द्यमानेन यद्ध्यस्याभिधानं न भवति न भवति तत्रोत्पत्तिः । etc....यत्र चानेकाचो  
ह्लादेर्षोत्पद्यमानेन यद्ध्यस्याभिधानं भवति भवति तत्रोत्पत्तिः । ....etc

3.1.26 22/31 इह ताहि पाचयत्योदनं देयदत्तो यद्दत्तोनेत्युभयो. कर्तोल्लेना-  
भिधानं प्राप्नोति । प्रत्ययार्थविशेषणे पुन. सति न दोषः । प्रधानकर्तरि ह्लादयो  
भवन्तीति प्रधानकर्ता लेनाभिधीयते यश्चात्राप्रधान सिद्धा तत्र कर्तरीत्येव  
तृतीया । ....etc.

3 1 67  $\frac{1-1-3-9}{58}$  किमुच्यते कृताभिहित इति न लेनाप्यभिधानं भवति ।  
अथाप्य लेनाभिधान आधयितुम् । ....यदि च लेनाप्यभिधानं स्यान्नेद पक्षान्तरं  
स्यात् । .. तस्मान्नैतच्छ्रय वक्तु लेनाप्यभिधानं भवतीति । भवति चेदाभिहिते  
विकरणाभाव इत्येव । .... etc

again at, 3 4 26 13-18/174 .. ननु च भुजिप्रत्ययेनानभिहितः  
कर्तेति कृत्वा अनभिहिताश्रयो विधिर्मविष्यति तृतीया । यदि सत्यभिधाने चान-  
भिधाने च कुत्रचिदनभिधानमिति कृत्वानभिहिताश्रयो विधिर्मविष्यति तृतीया  
यवाग्वां द्वितीया प्राप्नोति । किं कारणम् । णमुलानभिहितं कर्मेति । . ...  
etc ..etc pp 175...यदि सत्यभिधाने चानभिधाने त कुतश्चिदनभिधानमिति  
कृत्वानभिहिताश्रयो विधिर्मविष्यति तृतीया यदुक्तमोदने द्वितीया प्राप्नोतीति स  
इह दोषो न जायते । ...

4 1 48 6/218- सिद्ध तु स्त्रिया. पुंशब्देनाभिधानात् । २।

सिद्धमेतत् । कथम् । स्त्रिया. पुंशब्देनाभिधानात् । स्त्री पुंशब्देनाकारान्तेनाभि-  
धीयते ।

4 1 91.  $\frac{14-15}{246}$  अपन्याभिधाने स्त्रीपुलिङ्गस्याप्रसिद्धनपुसकत्वात् । १।

अस्याभिधाने स्त्रीपुल्लिङ्गस्याप्रसिद्धिः । किं कारणम् । नपुंसकलिङ्गत्वात् । अपत्यं नपुंसकलिङ्गं तेन नपुंसकलिङ्गस्यैवाभिधाने स्यात्स्त्रीपुल्लिङ्गस्य न स्यात् । ननु चेदं पुरस्तादेव चोदितं परिहृतं च । उत्पत्तिस्तत्र चोद्यत इह पुनस्त्यग्नेनाभिधानं चोद्यते ।

4 1 93 5/248 उत्सादयितरि चापत्यपुषते स्त्रिया युवत्या अभिधानं न प्राप्नोति ।

14/249-एवमपि स्त्रिया युवत्या अभिधानं न प्राप्नोति ।

25/250-क्रियमाणेऽपि हि सज्ञाकारिग्रहणे यत्र नात्यादिभ्य उत्पद्यमानेन प्रत्ययेनार्थस्याभिधानं भवति भवति तत्रोत्पत्तिः ।...etc

4 2 1 5/271 रक्तादीनामर्थ्याभिधाने प्रत्ययविधानादुपाध्यायार्थव्ययम् । १।

रक्तादीनामर्थ्याभिधाने प्रत्ययविधानादुपाधिग्रहणमनर्थकम् । न ह्यं रागादुत्पद्यमानेन प्रत्ययेनार्थस्याभिधानं स्यात् । अनभिधानान्तत उत्पत्तिर्न भविष्यति ।

4 3 25 13/307 कस्मान्न भवति तत्रास्ते तत्र शेते इति । अभिधानात् । तच्च चावश्यमनभिधानमाश्रयितव्यम् । क्रियमाणेष्वपि स्वार्थनिर्देशेषु यत्र जातादिषुत्पद्यमानेन प्रत्ययेनार्थस्याभिधानं न भवति तत्र प्रत्ययोत्पत्तिः ।

also at 4 3 155 3-6/325, 4 4 76 14/333, 5 1 59 24/355 and 8 1 4 4/365 in the same sense

(2) Pā IV 1 48 is पुयोगादाख्यायाम् ।

सिद्धं नु ह्यन्या पुशब्देनाभिधानात् ॥३॥ अथवा पुनरस्तु तस्यैव मृत्युनेनाभिसंबन्धेन । ननु चोक्तं पुयोगादाख्याया तद्विषयल्लङ्घनमिति । नैष दोषः । नावश्यमयमेवाभिसंबन्धो भवति तस्यैवमिति । अयमप्यभिसंबन्धोऽस्ति सोऽयमिति । कथं पुनरतस्मिन् स इत्येतद् भवति । चतुर्भिः प्रकारैरतस्मिन् स इत्येवद् भवति । तात्स्यात् तादृधर्म्यात्सामोप्यात्साहचर्यादिति । तात्स्यात् तावत् । मया हसन्ति । गिरिर्दृश्यते । तादृधर्म्यात् । अर्हि यान्तं ब्रह्मदत्त इत्याह । ब्रह्मदत्तं यानि कार्याणि जट्टियपि तानि क्रियन्त इत्यनो जनी ब्रह्मदत्त इत्युच्यते । तत्सामोप्यात् । गङ्गाया घोषः । कूपे गर्गकुम्भः । तत्साहचर्यात् । पुनतान्प्रवेशय । यष्टीं प्रवेशयेति ।

(3) The न्यायकोश observes शक्तिरक्षणभ्यामतिरिक्तैव गौणी वृत्तिरिति नीमांसकाः । सा च तदतिरिक्ता नैति नैयायिका आहुः । (न्यायसिद्धा-तमञ्जरीप्रकाशः)

(4) एकमाहुरनेकार्थं शब्दमन्ये परोक्षकाः । निमित्तमेदादेकस्य सार्वाभ्यं तस्य भिद्यते । V.P. II 252 also Punyarāja says तत्रैकशब्ददर्शने शब्दोपचारः प्रसिद्धप्रसिद्धिनिमित्तकः ।

(5) अर्थप्रकरणाभ्यां वा योगाच्छद्धान्तरेण वा । V.P.

(6) यथा सास्नादिमान् विण्डो गौशब्देनाभिधीयते ।

तथा स एव गौशब्दो वाहीकेऽपि व्यवस्थितः ॥

(7) पुनरराज says : अर्थः शब्दस्य द्विविधः स्वरूपं वाक्यार्थः । तत्र निमित्ता-  
ज्जाख्यादेर्गोत्व वाहीकेऽप्यनुपज्यते, शब्दस्तु गोत्वमेवाभिधत्त इति वाक्यार्थोपचारः ।

(8) Punyarāja holds that verses 317, 318 give someone else's views Mammata and others quote them as representing Bhartṛhari's views.

(9) मुख्यार्थसंबन्धासम्बद्ध साधारणमुख्यार्थबाधप्रहादिप्रयोज्यप्रसिद्धार्थविषयक-  
धीजनकत्व व्यञ्जना ।

(10) अनया कटाक्षेणामिलापो व्यञ्जितः इति सर्वजनप्रसिद्धेस्तस्या चेष्टा-  
वृत्तित्वस्य अपि आवश्यकत्वाच्च ।

(11) अनया चार्थबोधे जननीये वक्तृबोद्धव्यवाच्यादिवैशिष्ट्यज्ञान प्रतिभा च  
सहकारि तद्धीजनकज्ञानजनकमेव वा ।

(12) वक्तृजादिवैशिष्ट्यसहकारेण तज्जनिका बुद्धि प्रतिभा इति फलिताम् ।

(13) एव च शक्तिरेतज्जन्मगृहीतैवार्थबोधिका, व्यञ्जना तु जन्मान्तर  
गृहीतापि, इत्यपि शक्यतेः अस्या भेदकम् ।

(14) एव गतोऽस्तमर्कः इत्यादेः शिष्येण सन्ध्याबन्धनादेः कर्तव्यत्वाभि-  
प्रायेण गुरु प्रति प्रयुक्ताद्वक्तृतात्पर्याभावेऽपि प्रतिवेद्यादीनामभिसरणीयकमादि  
बोधस्य वाच्यार्थप्रतीतिपूर्वकस्य वाच्यार्थबाधज्ञानेऽजायमानस्य लक्षणया उपपाद-  
यितुमशक्यत्वाच्च ।

(15) M.S 1.2 32 अविशिष्टस्तु वाक्यार्थः । and also, अविशिष्टस्तु  
लोके प्रयुज्यमानानां वेदे च पदानामर्थः । स यथैव लोके विवक्षितस्तथैव  
वेदेऽपि भवितुमर्हति । (S B on 1.2 32 pp.150)

(16) MS XI.1.26 लोके कमार्थलक्षणम् । and also SB. on it-  
यच्च लोकवदिति, लोके कमार्थप्रधानम् । कार्यवशात् सकृदप्युक्तो सकृदाहरति,

असकृदप्युक्त सकृदाहरति नाहरति वा । अथैह शब्दलक्षण कर्मणि यथा शब्दार्थे प्रवृत्ति । तस्माल्लोकवदित्यद्वयान्त । pp 2114 and also see MS XI 1, 62 अर्थाल्लोके विधित प्रतिप्रधान स्यात् । and also SB on it- अर्थाल्लोके प्रदोषस्य सकृदसकृन्दा क्रिया । यदि सकृत्कृतं सर्वं प्रकाशयति, सकृत् क्रियते, अथ न प्रकाशयति, ततोऽनकृत् । तददवाप्त्य प्रत्यक्षसामर्थ्यम् । अथैह विधिन उपकारोऽनुपकारो वा गम्यते, न प्रत्यक्षेण । SB pp 2129 and also शब्दलक्षण कर्मणि शब्दाभिहितं गम्यते, न लोकाभिप्राय । (SB on X 5 57 pp 1968) लोके कर्मार्थलक्षणं भवति, न शब्दलक्षणं यथाऽर्थस्तथा क्रियते, न यथा शक । वेदे तु शब्दमेवार्थाऽवगम्यते । तथैवानुष्ठेयमिति । SB on VI 8 27 pp 1516 and also शब्दप्रमाणका वयम् । यच्छब्द आह तदस्माकं प्रमाणम् । । लोके तु कार्यं दृष्ट्वा चोदितमद्योदितमप्यनुष्ठीयत एव । (SB on III 2 36 pp 793) and also लोके कर्मार्थलक्षण, शब्दलक्षणं पुनर्वेदे । SB on III 1 17 pp 726) and also लोके अर्थलक्षणं सत्यवहारे । येन येनार्थं समुष्टेन उपकारोऽनुकृतो वा स समुज्येतैव । इह तु वेदे शब्दलक्षण । SB on III 1 16 pp 725 etc

(17) यथा लोके प्रस्थभुग्देवदत्त इत्युच्यते । यद्यपि सूत्राकादिभिरधिक प्रस्थो भवति, तथापि भुजौ प्रस्थौ निर्विदग्धे व्यञ्जनान्मोदनार्थानि । SB on X 8 29 pp 2079

(18) लौकिकेषु तु वाक्येष्वेव गम्यते । तानि हि विज्ञातेऽर्थे प्रयुज्यमाना न्यप्याहार्यपणानि गौणानि विपरिणतव्यवहितार्थानि च प्रयुज्यते । तस्मात्तस्मादस्याद्वयनावगम्येक्ष्वप्यर्थेषु भवति तत्स्वरूपो मिथ्याप्रत्यय । यथा मृगतृष्णादिषु । SB on IV 3 2 pp 1247

(19) See 16 above and also • न शब्दप्रमाणकाणामन्तरेण शब्दं मवातिर्याप्या । (SB on VI 1 3 pp 1353) शब्दलक्षणे च कर्मणि शब्दो न प्रमाणम् । (SB on X 5 44 pp 1962)

(20) नन्वनुवादेऽपि लक्षणा । अनुवादपक्षे लक्षणाया दोष । SB I 4 22 pp 364 अनुवादे हि लक्षणा न्याय्या न विधी (SB on IV 4 91 pp 1278) मङ्गयुषशब्दश्चानुवादपदो न्याय्यो न विधीक्षे । गौणो हि स आयुषशब्दः यागादिषु । (SB on IV 1 8 pp 1201)

(21) क पुनर्मुख्य को वा गौण इति । उच्यते । य शब्दादेवावगम्यते, स प्रथमोऽर्थो मुख्यः । मुखमिव भवतीति मुख्य इत्युच्यते । यस्तु सल्ल

प्रनीतादर्थात् केनचित्संबन्धेन गम्यते, स पश्चाद् भावाज्जनमिव भवतीति जघन्य । गुणसम्बन्धाच्च गौण इति ।

(22) नायमुभयत्र पर्वशब्दो वर्तते । यदि कारवचनस्तत्संबन्धात्समुदाये गम्यते । यदि वा समुदायवचनस्तत्संबन्धात्काले । अन्यतरवचनो नोभयवचन । तत्र समुदायवचने कल्प्यमाने प्रकरणमनुगृहीत भवति । अपि च पृणाते पर्वशब्द पृणोति-व दाने प्रसिद्ध । दानानि च समुदाया । तस्मात् समुदाया भोज्या । एव शब्दावयवप्रसिद्धिरनुगृहीता भवति । S B on IX 2 53, pp 1739)

(23) अनेकम्याप्येक शब्दो भवति वाचक । तद्यथा मातेति मातरमपि वदति मातरमपि । माता च परम देवता समा च पुत्रेष्वित्येतरूपबद्धमानो जननीवचनोऽवगम्यते । माता सम क्षिप्र-चेत्येभिरनुवच्यमानो धान्यस्य मातुर्वाचक । (S B on X 14 pp 1810)

(24) शब्दे उच्यते नत्र तावन्मुख्या प्रतिपत्ति । शब्दे कार्यस्यासम-वादर्थे कार्यं विज्ञायते । यथा गामानयेति । इह तु शब्द इव कार्यं संभवति, नार्थः । अतोऽत्र शब्द विज्ञास्याम । पूर्वस्मादेष वाद पापीयान् । कस्मात् । औत्पत्तिकत्वात् । औत्पत्तिको हि नामिनाम्नो संबन्ध । यो हि शब्दो यस्मिन्नर्थं औत्पत्तिकेन संबन्धेन प्रसिद्धो न ततोऽन्य प्रत्यावयितुं शक्नोति । न हि गोशब्देनाश्वोऽभिधातुं शक्यते । SB on शब्दमात्रमिति चेन्नोत्पत्तिकत्वात् । MI SI VIII 2 4-5 pp 1542

(25) यदाञ्जस्येन शब्दार्थो नावकल्पते तदा लक्षणायापि कल्प्यमान साधुर्भवति । यथा अग्नौ तिष्ठति, अवरे तिष्ठति अग्निसमीपे तिष्ठत्यवटसमीपे तिष्ठतीति भवति सव्यवहार । लक्षणादि लौकिक्येव (S B on pp 488) श्रुत्यसमवे लक्षणायापि व्यवहारो भवति । यथाग्नौ तिष्ठत्यवटे तिष्ठतीति । (S B on pp 1485) and also श्रुत्यसमवे लक्षणापि न्याय्यैव । S B on pp 1280 असति श्रुत्यर्थे लक्षणायां ग्राह्य । S B pp. 1551, again, मुख्याभावे गौणो गृह्यते (S B 1437 pp) संभवति श्रुत्यर्थे लक्षणायां ग्राह्य । S, B pp 1560 and also भवति लक्षणायापि शब्दार्थे (S B pp 1230) अगतिश्चैषा यल्लक्षणापरिग्रह । S B on pp 1545, again, त्रित्वं हि चतुष्टयादीनि साहचर्याच्छक्नोति लक्षयितुम् । लक्षणा त्वाधिरा भवति । किं क्रियताम् । अगत्याधीयते । सत्या गतौ नाश्रयितव्या । S B pp 2021

(26) श्रुतिबलक्षणाया ज्यायसी । S B pp 134, श्रुतिरक्षणाविषये श्रुति ज्यायसी । S B pp, 324 श्रुतिरक्षणाविषये च श्रुतिर्न्याय्या न रक्षणा । S B pp 565 1244 1262, श्रुतिरक्षणाविषये च श्रुतिर्न्याय्या । S B on pp 1210 1222, again श्रुतिश्च रक्षणाया गरीयसी S B pp 1260 श्रुतिश्च रक्षणाया बलीयसी S B pp 1278; श्रुतिरक्षणायोश्च श्रुतिर्न्याय्या । S B pp 1556, and also श्रुतिश्च रक्षणा नो न्याय्या । S B, pp, 2243,

(27) स्वार्थे वर्तमान सादृश्य गमयति । स्वार्थं जहत् कथं गमयेत् (S B on VIII 3 34) and also, न च रक्षणाया प्रयोगे शब्दार्थ परिच्छिद्यते । यत्कारण स्वार्थे वर्तमानोऽर्थान्तरं रक्षयति । स्वार्थं जहन्नेव रक्षयेत् । S B on VIII 3 34

(28) कथं नु स्वार्थाभिधानेन प्रत्ययव्यवस्थेति चेत् । अर्थसंबन्धात् । सिंह इति निश्चिति प्रमत्तकारिता तत्र प्रायेणेति प्रसन्नकारीति गम्यते । अर्थं प्रत्यक्षसामर्थ्यात् । यो हि मन्यते प्रमत्तकारीति गम्यते । अर्थप्रत्ययसामर्थ्यात् । यो हि मन्यते प्रमत्तकारिण प्रत्याययेयमिति कथं यदि सिंहशब्दमुच्चारयति सिद्धत्यस्याभिप्रेतम् । सिंहार्थं प्रतीतं संबन्धादितरमर्थं प्रत्याययति । एव स्वार्थाभिधाने तद्गुणसंबन्धं प्रतीयते । S B on I 4 22 pp 357-360

(29) गुणसयोगाद्यदगौणमिदमभिधानं भविष्यति । भवति हि गुणादप्यभिधानम् । यथा सिंहो देवदत्तः, भूमिमाणवक इति ।

(30) गुणवादस्तु । गौण एष वादो भवति यत्संबन्धिनि स्तोत्रव्ये संबन्ध-तरं स्तुयते । S B pp 213

(31) (S B on I 11 pp 187) गुणवादस्तु स्यात् । यथा स्तेनो प्रच्छन्नरूप एव च मन इति गौण शब्दः । Thus *stenap manah* is *gunavada*-and also, स्यात्, प्रायात् । MSu I 2 11.

(32) एव च गौणीव्यञ्जनयोः पृथग्श्रुतिव्यञ्जनस्य, तयो रक्षणाया मतर्भावसम्भवात् ।

(33) एतद्विभाजनमुपपन्नम्, व्यञ्जनाया अतिरिक्तवृत्तत्वात्

(34) व्यञ्जनावृत्त्यन्यशब्दत्वेऽप्यस्य कार्यतावच्छेदककोटौ गौरवात् । माधवो, शक्तिवादटीका.



(35) तादृशबोधे तात्पर्यज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वैव शक्त्यैव तादृशबोधसंभवे अभिषा  
मूलव्यञ्जनास्वीकारानुपपत्तेः । pp. 2. Ibid.

(36) न च व्यञ्जनावृत्तिरवानुपगमे तत्र तत्र तादृशबोधस्य अनुभवसिद्धस्य  
अनुपत्तिरित्यगत्या वृत्तिवमज्जीकार्यमिति वाच्यम् ।

(37) यथाकथञ्चिदुपनयवशेन मनसैव विशिष्टधीसम्भवात् । मानोरधिक-  
सुखप्रमेदपर्यवसित चमत्कारं सत्यपि शब्दस्यैव मानसस्यापि बोधविशेषस्य हेतु-  
तायाः सुबन्तत्वात् । व्यञ्जनाख्यपदार्थान्तरस्य स्वरूपसत्ताया अन्वयेषुदौ तद्-  
हेतुत्वस्य च प्रमाणविरहेणासत्त्वाच्चेति संक्षेपः । शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका. का. 24

## CHAPTER V

### S'ABDAVRTTIS—as in the earlier ālaṃkārikas

Bhāmaha	( Last quarter of the 7th Cen A D -Middle of the 8th Cen A D -De (S P.) P. 49-50, Ed '60
Dandin	( First half of the 8th Cen De ibid, p. 67.
Vāmana	( Middle of the 8th and Middle of the 9th Cen. A D. i e. about 800 A D -De ibid, p. 80
Udbhata	( End of the 8th Cen. A D. and beginning of the 9th Cen A D.-De ibid, p. 73
and Rudrata	( Middle of the 9th Cen A.D De ibid, p 85.

### Sabdavrttis in earlier writers on Poetics

It should be noted at the outset that the earlier writers on poetics such as Bhāmaha, Dandin, etc., do not discuss the problem of S'abdavrttis theoretically like later writers such as Mammata. So, we cannot expect any definite mention of this subject in their works. However, we meet with passages which go to show that the authors were familiar with the ideas of the functions of a word.

#### Bhāmaha

We begin with Bhāmaha. In Bhāmaha, we come across some direct or indirect references to abhidhā as below. In the verse 19 which reads as,

“s'abdas'chando'bhidhānārthā, itibhās'rayāḥ kathāḥ

loko yuktā kalās'cetī mantavyā kavyagaurhyamī”...-he obviously seems to enumerate the different branches of learning which a poet-aspirant should study. They are s'abda or grammar,

chandas or metrics, abhidhāna or lexicography, itihāsa or traditions etc. Thus, abhidhāna is here used in the sense of lexicon. However, Abhinava quotes from Udbhata's vivaraṇa of Bhāmaha as follows

sabdas'chandobhidhānārthāḥ iti abhidhānasya s'abdabhedam  
vyākhyātum bhāttodbhāto babhāse-s'abdānāmaphidhānam abhi-  
dhāvyapārah, mukhyo gunavyūttis'ca

If this interpretation of Udbhata is correct, we may say that Bhāmaha here refers to abhidhā vr̥tti by 'abhidhānam'. We have seen that earlier writers use the term abhidhāna to refer to abhidhā. But this interpretation of Udbhata seems doubtful, if we strictly adhere to the context which purports to enumerate the several branches of learning as noted above.

However, in the following passages we will find that Bhāmaha is familiar with the theory of abhidhā.

At III. 21, and III. 25, we come across the mention of the word 'abhidhā', but in both the cases, it means 'mere expressing' or 'naming' and not abhidhāvyapāra. But, while discussing the fault called 'avācaka' at I. 41, Bhāmaha says that—  
saksādarūḍham vācyerthe nābidhānam pratiyate. The line means that an expression which is not conventionally related to the direct meaning is not understood. Here, the terms viz 'vācya artha' and 'saksādarūḍham' show his familiarity with abhidhā.

The following discussion shows that Bhāmaha knows very well the theories of Sphota and apoha which are mentioned by later writers in connexion with abhidhā. Bhāmaha, of course, does not accept the theories of Sphota and apoha in this connexion.

In the sixth pariccheda Bhāmaha discusses the nature and scope of sabda. He also tries to strike some definition. In the

related to artha which is of the nature of reality, through a relation which is eternal or non-eternal

Finally, at VI 20 he concludes that it is difficult to define precisely as to what a word is because it becomes manifold on account of the difference in letters which again are manifold on account of their parts

(VI 20—varnabhedādidam bhinnam varnāhsvams'avikalpatah |  
ke sabdāh kīñca tadvyamityaho vartma dustaram ||

He then proceeds to classify words into a fourfold scheme based on dravya or object, kriyā or action, jāti or class and guna or quality (VI 21)

From the above discussion it follows that Bhāmaha has some definite views as to the nature and scope of word (VL 13 14) and his views seem to be very near to those of the Mīmāṃsakas. It may be noted that from the above discussion, it follows that Bhāmaha seems to be quite familiar with abhidhā

As to Bhāmaha's familiarity with functions of words other than the direct one, particularly vyañjanā, we may say that vyañjanā does not occupy the same place as abhidhā, in his mind, i.e. he does not seem to have known vyañjanā as a separate vṛtti. He, however, uses different forms of  $\sqrt{\text{vy}} + \sqrt{\text{an}}$  with the later meaning of vyañjanā at different places. We will consider these usages

At I 73, we come across the word 'vyajyate' as in,

hi śabdenāpi hetvarthaprathanāduktasiddhaye |  
ayamarthantaranyāsaḥ sutaram vyajyate yathā ||

—by the word 'hi' the idea of supporter and the supported or the samarthyasamarthakabhāva is suggested

At I. 79, sāmāsokti is defined as,

yatrokte gamyate nyo'rthah tatsamānavis'esanaḥ |  
sa sāmāsoktiruddistā samkṣiptārthatayā yathā ||

Herein, we have a reference to another sense to be gathered by implication

At III 9 paryāyokta is illustrated and explained Bhamaha says that Kṛṣṇa's reply to S'isupāla's invitation for dinner is meant to serve the purpose of avoiding the possibility of taking poison-rasadanavṛttaye This is also only implied At III 11 udātta is only illustrated as,

udātātāṃ saktimān rāmo guruvakyānurodhakah |  
vihayopavanaṃ rājyam yathā vanamupagamat ||

Here the idea of Rāma's virtue is only implied III 21 defines apahnūtī which also carries the same touch as seen above. (It is defined kiñcidantargatopamā)

At V 58, we come across the term 'vyajyete' as in

~'yatra dr̥ṣṭāntamātreṇa vyajyete sādhyasādhane |  
tamāhuh s'uddhadṛ̥ṣṭāntam tanmātraviskrteryathā ||

Herein, says Bhamaha, the sādhyā and sādhanā are just suggested by the illustration This according to Bhamaha makes for 'dr̥ṣṭānta' which differs from upamā At V 60 also, we have 'vyajyeran' to the same effect

V 60 reads

kathamekapadenaiva vyajyerannasya te guṇāḥ |  
iti prayujjate santah kecīdvistārabhiravaḥ ||

In V 59 Bhamaha has given an illustration of pure dr̥ṣṭānta wherein a king is said to be Bharata, Dilīpa, Aila, Pradyumna and Naravahana, thereby implying the qualities of those monarchs in that king In V 60 says Bhamaha that in order to avoid unnecessary details, people resort to one word as in V. 59 illustrated above Thus herein, we see a clear reference to the power of suggestion where the qualities of Bharata, Dilīpa etc are suggested by their naming

In his discussion of various ālamkāras, we see that he takes for granted vyaṅgyārtha or implied sense, e.g. in aprast-utaprasaṃsṭ, dīpaka, vyājastuti, nīdars'ana etc This point is

further elaborated in a separate chapter called 'Pratīyamānārtha' in the earlier alamkāras'

### Dandin

In the Kāvyaḍars'a of Dandin we come across the following direct or indirect references to the different sabdavṛttis. There is no reference to abhidhā as such.

We come across some references to gaunavṛtti or lakṣaṇā as follows :

At L 95 Dandin says that words such as nisthyūta, udeṣṭa, vānta etc. are said to have been used in a charming way only when they are found in the secondary sense. Says he

nisthyūtodṛṣṭavāntāḍi gaunavṛttivyapāś'rayam |  
atisundaramaryatra gramakaksām vigṛhate ||

At IL 254, he says

femī prajozamārgesu gaunavṛttivyapāś'rayaḥ |  
atyantasundaraḥ drṣṭāstadudahrtayo yathā ||

He says that at times in 'hetu alamkāra' the cause is said to be residing at a place far from that of the effect, or, the effect is described as occurring simultaneously with its cause, or the hetu is said to operate after the effect takes place. These are actually instances where gaunavṛtti functions.

At II 100 samānarūpa prahelikā is defined as  
samānarūpa gaunārtharopitairgrathitā padaiḥ |  
parusā lakṣaṇāstīti anātravyutpāditas'rūṭiḥ ||

Thus, the texture of samānarūpa prahelikā is woven with gaunārtharopita padas, i.e. words having a secondary sense.

As in Bhāmaha, so also in Dandin we do not come across any mentioning of vyāṇāṇā as such by name. However, we come across different forms of the root, *vi+√āṇ* in sense of 'to suggest'. We also meet with the term 'pratīyate' in the sense of 'to

implied'. Thus, Dandin seems to know a lot also of what is called implied sense or *pratyamaṇa artha*

At I 76 Dandin defines the *guna* called *udārata* as  
*utkarṣaṇaṁ guṇaḥ kaścit yasminnukte pratiyate |*  
*tadudārābhavayāṁ tena saṁāthaḥ kāvyapaddhatih ||*

Thus *udārata* occurs in that sentence, wherein after the expressed meaning is gathered—*yasminnukte*—there is an implication of some high quality. This is an indirect reference to *vyāñjana*,

At II 14, *upamā* is described as—  
*yathākathāñcit sādṛś'yam*  
*yatirodbhutam pratiyate |*  
*upama nāma sa tasyah*  
*prapañco yaṁ pradars'yate ||*

Thus in *upamā*, there is an experience of similarity either by *abhidhā*, or *lakṣaṇā* or *vyāñjana*

At II 16 *vastūpamā* is said to be *pratiyaṁānaikadharmā*. In *prativastūpamā* also (II 46) there is '*sāmyapratīti*' in an implied way. We will see later on that so many varieties of *upamā* have similarity implied in them. At II 65 Dandin says that words such as *spardhate*, *jayati*, *dvesti*, etc. are *sādṛśyasucakāḥ* or suggestive of similarity. At III 136 *anujñā ākṣepa* is said to occur where through apparent *anujñā* or acceptance something else is implied. Says he

*ityanujñā mukhenaiva kṛtasyakṣipyate gatih |*  
*maranam sūcayantyaiva sonujñākṣepa ucyate ||*

Thus there is some element of suggestion involved in this. So also, in *āsīrvacanākṣepa*' (II 142) the *Nāyikā* suggests her own helplessness (*svāvasthāṁ sūcayantīā*)

At II 180 *vyatireka* is defined as, *sabdopātte pratiye*  
*vā sādṛś'ye vastunordvayoḥ |*  
*tatra yadbhedakathanam vyatirekaḥ sa kathyate ||*

Thus vyatireka has some touch of an implied similarity II 189 mentions vyatireka which has pratiyamānasādṛśya

At II 234 Dandin holds utpreksā to be suggested by words such as manye, s'anke, dhruvam etc says he

manye s anke dhruvaṃ prāyo nūnamjtyevamādibhīḥ |  
utpreksā vyajyate s'abdarivas'abdo'pī tādrśah ||

Thus it seems that Dandin considers utpreksā to be implied only

At II 303 udatta is explained Dandin says that in the two illustrations (at II 301 and II 302) āsayamāhatmya and abhyudayagaurava, are respectively suggested-suvyañjita

{purvatras'ayamahatmyamatrabhyudayagauravam |  
suvyañjitamiti proktamudattadvayamapyadah ||

At II 350 nidars'anā is said to contain suggestion  
yadi candrāmsubbhīḥ sprstā dhvāntarāṇi parabhavam |  
sadyo rājaviruddhānām sūcayanti durantatām ||

Thus there is an indirect reference to vyañjanā

We will see in greater detail later on that as in Bhāmaba, so also in Dandin we can read a lot of pratiyamāna element in the different alakmāras such as dipaka, samāsokti, aprastutaprasāṃsā, vyājastuti etc.

### Vamana

Vāmana, in his Kāvyaśamkārāsūtravṛtti very often refers to 'bhaktīlakṣaṇā' or 'gaunārtha' and upacāra But he also, does not mention vyañjanā He, however, seems to touch vyañjanā only indirectly

At I : I, he say that the word 'kāvyā' here stands for word and sense embellished by guṇa and alamkāra But, by 'bhaktī', i.e through secondary usage, it is taken with reference to s'abdarthamātra or 'word and sense' alone

(kāvyas'abdoyam guṇālamkāra-saṃskṛtayoh sabdarthayoh  
vartate |  
bhaktiḥ tu s'abdarthamātravacanō'tra gṛhyate ||)



On I : 1 Vāmana says that the word 'arocakī' and 'satṛṇ-  
abhyavaharī' are metaphorically used (arocakīsatṛṇābhyavaharī-  
s'abdau gauṇārthau) Vāmana holds that in vaidarbhī the  
presence of all the arthagunas makes for the charm (tasya-  
marthagunasampadāsvādya bhavati) Now this totality of  
arthagunas by themselves, as it resides in the diction called  
vaidarbhī itself is known by the name of vaidarbhī I : 22  
says sa'pi vaidarbhī tatsithyāt

Vāmana then adds sapriyamarthagunasampad vaidarbhitukṛt  
tatsithyādityupacāratah vyavahāraṁ dars'ayati Thus, it is used  
secondarily

At II : 12 Vāmana considers the fault called 'neyartha' He  
holds that when some meaning which is not heard of in the  
particular sentence is somehow inferred, it makes for the fault  
of 'neyartha' The term viz 'pañktivihangamanāmabhrt' for  
'Dasaratha' is an instance in point By 'pañkti' is meant 'ten'  
by 'vihangamanāma' is meant 'cakravāka' Ratha or chariot  
is one that bears the name of 'cakravāka' on itself Thus 'pañkti  
and 'vihangamanāmabhrt' means 'Dasaratha' This makes for  
the fault of neyartha Then, it is argued that if you find neyartha  
in such illustrations then the word 'rathāṅganama' for cakra-  
vāka, used by all poets, also will be an illustration of neyartha  
To this, Vāmana says na tesūṃ nirudhalakṣanatvāt Such  
words as 'rathāṅganama' for Cakravāka are instances of nirudha-  
lakṣanā i.e. what later alamkārikas call lakṣana based on rudhī  
or convention

II : 14, Vāmana says that whatever has an obscene sense  
as the other sense is asl's'ila and it is a dosa (asabhyārtan-  
taramasabhyasmṛtibetus' caśīlam) But, he adds at II : 15 that  
secondary usage does not fall under this He says, na gupta-lakṣit  
asamvṛtānt At II : 17, he defines lakṣita as lakṣanīk'asabhyam  
lakṣitam' i.e. if the obscene sense is gathered secondarily, it is  
called 'lakṣitam' and it does not make for the fault of as'ila'

Under IV. iii 7, Vāmana notes that gaunārtha, lākṣanikārtha can also become an alamkāra. He says—yathā ca gaunasy-alamkāratvaṃ tathā lākṣanikasyāpiti dars'ayitumāha—and he quotes sūtra IV. iii, 8 sādṛśyāllakṣaṇa vakroktiḥ. He says : bahūni hi nibandhanāni lākṣanāyām tatra sādṛś'yāllakṣaṇa vakroktirasaviti. Thus he knows a variety of lākṣanās but chooses only one based on similarity as the germ for vakrokti. 'The illustration cited is 'janmabhūmiḥ'. Vāmana says : tadevāsabhyarthāntaram lākṣanikenāsabhyenarthanānvitam padam lakṣitam yathā janmabhūmiḥ iti. Vāmana adds that here this word viz-janmabhūmiḥ means the female organ only secondarily and not by the power of expression-taddhī lākṣanāyā guhyartham na svas'aktiā iti.

He quotes an illustration in which 'unmīlana' and 'nimīlana' i.e. opening and closing, which are the qualities of eye are superimposed on kamala and kairava, through similarity, and secondarily mean the blossoming and fading of the respective flowers ('sādṛśyāt vikāśasamkocau lakṣayataḥ'). He cites some more illustrations to the same effect and adds : ityevamādisu lākṣanārtho nirūpyate iti lākṣaṇyāmeva jhauṭi arthapratipattiksamatvaṃ rahasyamācakṣata iti. The secret of lākṣanā lies in an immediate gathering of the sense. He says that lākṣanā based on something else than similarity does not make for vakrokti—sādṛśyanibandhanā tu lākṣanā na vakroktiḥ.

In at IV. iii 9, he defines utprekṣā, the source of charm is adhyavasāna which is neither adhyāropa as in case of rūpaka, nor lākṣanā as in case of vakrokti. Says he na punaradhyāropo lākṣaṇa vā.

At v. i 15, he discusses the topic of words that can or cannot be used in poetry i.e. those that are prayojya or aprayojya. He says : (v. i 15) — lākṣaṇās'abdhāśca, and adds : lākṣaṇās'abdhāś'ca atiprayuktāḥ prayoktavyāḥ. yathā dvirepha-rodara-śabjau bhramara-caḥravakārtbau lākṣaṇāparau. He adds that : anati-prayuktāśca na prayojyā yathā dvikah iti. Thus

Vāmana here refers to what is termed as *rūdhimūlā lakṣaṇā* later on

As already noticed by us, Vāmana does not refer to *vyāñjanā* directly But at places, he notes certain illustrations of 'punarukta' or repetition, which are actually not 'punaruktadoṣa' according to him He says that such words or such repetitions are charged with further sense This is an acceptance of the implied sense But as to how this implied sense is gathered is not made clear by Vāmana

In II ii 13 he cites certain illustrations Thus says he, "dhanurjyādhvanau dhanuḥśrutirgrūdhēh pratipatyaḥ" i e in case of dhanurjyādhvanau i e in case of a sound created by a bow-string, the idea of 'dhanuḥ' or a bow is already gathered by the term 'jyā' or bow-string So, the use of 'dhanuḥ' should be termed as redundant But says Vāmana it is not so, because the idea of, 'arohana' is not gathered in the absence of the word dhanuḥ-na hi dhanuḥ śrutimantarena dhanuḥśrutirgrūdhā jyā dhanurjyā iti sakyam pratipattum

In II ii 14 he cites further illustration to the same effect—karnāvatamśasravanakundalasirahsekhareṣu karnadinirdesaḥ sannidheh Thus, in karnāvatamśa, karna' is meant only to help the gathering of the idea of 'sannidhi' or juxtaposition In II ii 15 Vāmana says 'muktāhāras'abde muktāsabdah suddheh' i e in the word 'muktāhara', the idea of muktā or pearls is already expressed by the word 'hara' but the mentioning of muktā is not more repetition as it brings about the apprehension of purity In the same way, (II ii 16) 'puspa mala' has puspa, only to bring about the sense of 'utkarsa' or excellence He adds utkrāntānāṃ puspānam mālā iti When we come across the use of 'mālā' with reference to 'ratna' or 'śabda', as in 'ratnamālā' or 'śabdamālā' the usage is said to be a secondary one—sa tīvādupacaritasya prāyogaḥ nirupapado hi mālāsabdah pusparacanāvisesameva abhidhatte iti In the same way the word 'kari' in 'karikalabha' is not redundant as it

brings about the apprehension of 'tadrūpya' or similarity Vāmana says karikalabhasabde karīśabdah kalabhenaiva gatārthah prayujyate, tadrūpyasya pratipatyartham iti,

Thus, this type of sense is derived in certain usages. But whether it can lead us to śabdasaktimulā vyañjana or not is not made clear by Vāmana

In the third adhikaraṇa, second adhyāya, he deals with samādhiguna with reference to artha. He defines it as—arthadīptih samādhīh 2 7 Then, he classifies artha into vyakta and sūkṣma at III 2 9 artho vyaktah sūkṣmasca. In III 2 10, he says that the sūkṣma is also two-fold—bhāvya or that which can be easily grasped and vāsāniya or which can be elicited after close application (sūkṣmo bhāvyo vāsāniyasca (III 2 10), and adds—sūkṣmodvidhā bhavati bhāvyo vāsāniyasca sīghranirūpaññagamyo bhāvyah ekāgratāprakarṣagamyo vāsāniya iti. He goes on giving illustrations for the same. Now both bhāvya and vāsāniya are more subtle as compared to the vyakta or expressed. Out of these two vāsāniya is more subtle. Thus, we come across a clear recognition of the implied sense without however, any reference to any vṛtti.

III 11 15 defines kāntiguna as—dīptarasatvaṃ kāntih. The illustration he supplies is purely that of śaṅgāra rasa. But again, as to how these rasas are to be gathered, is not made clear by him. In all these cases, we may feel that Vāmana comes close to vyañjanāvyaṅgāra.

### Udbhata :

In Udbhata we come across some indirect or direct references to all the three vṛttis as below —

At v 60 Udbhata defines vyājastuti as—

śabdasaktiśvabhāvena vatra nīndevagamya te |  
vastutastu stutih śreṣṭhā vyājastutirāsau mata ||

śabdasakti here refers to abhidhāvyaṅgāra

At I 11 Udbhata defines rūpaka as—

śrutyā sambandhavirahādyaṭpadena padāntaram, |—  
gunavṛttipradhānena yujyate rūpakam tu tat ||

Thus, we come across a reference to both abhidhā and gunavṛtti, as is explained by Pratīharendurāja (approximately, — the first half of the 10th cen A D De. P 74) who says śrutiḥ niranantarānāstibālī sabdavyapārāh

tayā śrutyā anupapadyamānapadāntarasambandham sat padāntaramgunavṛttih yatrāpareṇa padena yujyate tatra rūpakata

At II 47 Udbhata defines paryāyokta wherein we come across a reference to both abhidhā and avagamana The definition runs as

paryāyoktam yadanyena prakārenabhidhiyate |  
vācyavācakavṛttibhyām sunyenāvagamātmanā ||

Vācakavṛtti is abhidhā and avagamana may be vyañjanā. The commentators viz Pratīharendurāja, the author of Laghuvṛtti and the Vivṛtikāra, identified as Rājānaka Tilaka by the editor, explain the definition of paryāyokta as follows

Pratīharendurāja explains —vācakasya abhidayakasya svabdasya vṛttih vyapāro vacyarthapratyāyanam vacyasya tvabhidheyasya vyapāro vacyantareṇa sahakaṅksāsannidhiyos mahatmyātsamsargagamanam योग्याता एवमविदhasca यो वाच्यवाचकायोरव्यपारतमानरानेपि प्रकारान्तरेणा र्थसामर्थ्यात्मानावगामास्वभावना यदावगम्यते तत् पार्यायेना स्वकांथानाभिहितमपि सान्तरेणा सद्भाव्यपारनावगम्यमानात्तत् पार्यायोकताम वास्तु

Vivṛtikāra also explains as vācakavṛttirabhidhā, vacyavṛttih akāṅsasannidhiyogyatāvasat samsargagamanam tabhyam vinā arthasamarthyātmanā avagamasvabhāvena ya pratipadyate tat paryāyanyena rūpena abhidhanam iti parāyoktam avagama-vyāpārēna kathamabhidhānamiti cet paryāyoktatvamaprastuta-prasamsavyakhyāne vaksyāmah

Thus according to the commentators, Udbhata here seems to refer to *vācakavṛtti*, i.e. *abhidhā*, *vācyavṛtti* or *tātparya* and *avagamana* i.e. possibly *vyañjana*

### Rudrata

In Rudrata, we do not come across any direct reference to *abhidhā*. However, at VI 3, he defines 'asamartha', a fault, as

“*padamīdamasamarthaṃ syādvācakamarthasya na ca vaktum |*  
*tam saknoti tiroḥitatatsamarthyam nimittena ||*

'asamartha' occurs when a particular word, which is normally expressive of a particular sense, becomes incapable of doing so on account of its power of expression being eclipsed by some other factors. Herein, we may read an indirect reference to *abhidhā*. In VI 5 and 6, in the same context, Rudrata describes another variety of *asamartha* where in a particular meaning, though normal to a particular word and yet not usually read from it, is read, e.g. *√han* in the sense of 'going'. VI 6 says that –

*śabdapravṛttibetau satyamapyasamarthameva rūḍhibalat |*  
*yaugikamarthavis'eśam padam yathā vāridhan jalabhrt ||*

i.e. 'asamartha' also happens when ordinarily a word is capable of conveying a sense on the strength of etymology but is rendered incapable to convey it on account of *rūḍhi* or usage e.g. *jalabhrt* cannot be used for *vāridhi*.

The maxim viz. *rūḍhiyogādbaliyā* seems to be known to Rudrata also and he thus knows a variety of *abhidhārtha*.

In VI.11, he defines *apratīta*, a fault, as,

*yuktyā vakti tamarthaṃ na ca rūḍhaṃ yatra*  
*yadabhidhānatayā |*  
*dvedhā tadapṛtītaṃ saṃs'ayavadasaṃs'ayaṃ ca padam ||*

Thus, Rudrata mentions *abhidhānatayā rūḍhamarthaṃ* i.e. a meaning fixed by the power of *abhidhā*. VI 12 gives an

illustration of apratīta involving doubt e.g. himahā etc VI. 13. gives an illustration of apratītadosa having no doubt asams' ayam—e.g. as'vayosinmukhārciṣmān for vadavānala Rudrata says that here this particular word is used for the normally used yaugika or rūdha words. Here again we come across a reference to yaugika and rūdha s'abdās, which may lead to abhidhā

[padamaparamapratītam yadyaugikarūdhas'abdaparyāyah  
kalpitamarthe tasmīnyathās'vayosinmukhārciṣmān || iv 13 ]

At VII 1, also Rudrata seems to refer to abhidhārtha very clearly when he says

arthah punarabhidhāvānpravartate  
yasya vācakah s'abdah |  
tasya bhavanti dravyam guṇah kṛiyā  
jāturiti bhedaḥ ||

We do not come across any reference to gunavṛtti or lakṣanā in Rudrata except at VII. 58 and here too indirectly, when he illustrates viparīta anumāna The anumāna is said to be viparīta because the sādhyā is described as following the sādha akas<sup>1</sup> The illustration cited is :

vacanamupacāragarbham dūrādudgamanamāśanam sakalāṃ  
idamadya mayi tathā te yathāsi nunāṃ priye kupitā ||

Herein 'vacana' is said to be 'upacāragarbha' Thus, there is an indirect mention of 'upacāra'

At VII 38, Rudrata defines bhāva as :

yasya vikārah prabhavānnapratibaddhena hetunā yena |  
gamayati tadabhiprāyaṃ tatpratibandham ca bhāvosau ||

The illustration is

grāmatarunam tarunyā navavañjulamañjarīsaṃsthakaram  
pas'yantiyā bhavati muhurnītarāṃ malinā mukhacchāyā ||

<sup>1</sup>Namisādhu explains that the bhāva of the lady is manifested here This is a case of an implied sense.

vyakhyātam bhāttodbhāto bābhāṣe-śabdānāmbhīdhanāma-  
bhīdhavyāpāro mukhyo guṇavṛttiṣca itī. vāmano'pī sādṛṣ'<sup>3</sup>  
yallakṣanā vakroktiḥ itī. manākṣpṛṣṭa itī. taistavad dhvani-  
digunmilitā yathālikhitapāṭhakaistu svarūpavivekam kartumas'-  
aknuvadbhīh tatsvarūpaviveko na kṛtāh, pratyutopālabyate,  
abhāgnanārikelavat yathās'ruta tadgranthodgrahanamātreṇa itī.  
(Locana)

Ruṃyaka, in the beginning of his work *alamkārasarvasva* says,

īha hī tāvad bhāmahodbbhataprabhṛtayas'cīrantanālamkāra-  
kārah pratyamānamartham vācyopaskāritayālamkārapakṣani-  
kṣiptam manyante. tathāhī paryāyoktā prastutapras'amsāsamāso-  
ktyāksepavyajastutyupameyopamānanvayādaū vastumātram  
gamyamānam vācyo paskarakatvena, "svasīdhaye parākṣep  
parārtham svasamarpanam" yathāyogam dvīvidhaya bhāngyā  
pratipāditam taih

rudratēnapi bhāvalāṅkāro dvīdhaivoktāh, rūpakadīpakā-  
pāhnutitulyayogitādāvupamālamkāro vācyopaskāritvenoktāh.  
rasavatpreyāūrjāsvīprabhṛtau tu rasabhāvādirvācyas'obhāhetut-  
venoktāh utprekṣā tu svayameva pratyamānā kathitā. taditīham  
trīvidhamapi pratyamānamalamkāratayā prakhyāpitameva.

vāmanēna tu sādṛṣ'yanībandhanayā lakṣanayā vakroktī  
alamkāratvaṃ bruvatā kas'cid dhvanībhedo'lamkāratayaivoktāh

So also, Jagannātha in his *Rasagāṅgādhara* (pp. 555) says :

īdam tu bodhyam. dhvanīkāratprācīnairbhāmahodbbhatapra-  
bhṛtūbhīh svagrāntbesu kutrāpī dhvanīgunībhūtavyāṅgyādis'abdhā  
na prayuktāh itī etāvataiva tairdhvanjādayo na svīkṛiyante  
ityādhunīkānām vācyoyuktīrayuktaiva, yatah samasoktīvyā-  
jastutyaprasutapras'amsādyālamkāranirūpane kīyānto'pī guṇī-  
bhūtavyāṅgyābbhedastairapi nīrūpitāh . aparas'ca sarvopī vyāṅ-  
gyaprapaṇcah paryāyoktākūksau nīkṣiptāh na hyanubhavasīddho-  
'rītho bālenāpyapāhnotum s'akyate dhvanyādīpadaiḥ parām  
vyavahāro na kṛtāh itēna na byctāvatanāṅgīkāro bhavati



But here, we might demur The presence of vyañjanā or suggested sense can be traced in all poetry beginning from the Rv It is, however, quite a different thing to discover in poets and critics any conscious understanding of vyañjanā So, the discussion that follows, of the alamkāras and gunas in which vyañjanā seems to be subsumed, should not be taken as proof that the idea of vyañjanā or dhvani had dawned upon the minds of Bhāmaha, Dandin etc They might or might not have had the understanding of vyañjanā as a distinct function of a word

### **Bhāmaha**

We will begin with Bhāmaha In II 85 Bhāmaha's general outlook towards all the alamkāras becomes evident when he says,

saisā sarvaiva vakroktiḥ, anayārtho vibhavyate |  
yatno 'syām kavinaḥ kāryah, ko'lamkāro'nayā vinā ||

Thus for Bhāmaha, atis'ayokti or vakrokti lies at the root of all the alamkāras, i.e. it is implied in all the alamkāras in one way or the other. At I 30 also, Bhāmaha asserts that this vakrokti should be present in all poetry, whether it be a mahākāvya or just a stanza

Says Bhāmaha

anubaddham punargathā s'loka-mātrādi tatpunah |  
yuktam vakrasvabhāvoktyā sarvamevaitadīsyate ||

Thus vakrokti is omnipresent for Bhāmaha In I 34, Bhāmaha is even prepared to reject the so called vaidarbha kāvya, if it is bereft of the element of vakrokti

I 34—apūṣṭārtham avakrokti prasannaṁ rju komalam |  
bhinnam geyamivedam tu kevalam s'rutipesalam ||

Bhāmaha very clearly affirms the use of only 'vakra' word and sense in poetry when he says at I 36 that—

na nītantadīmātreṇa jāyate cāruta gīṛam |  
vakrabhidheyas'abdoktiṣṭā vācamalamkṛtiḥ . |

Thus word and sense, charged with the element of vakratā alone make for poetry

### Parallelism between Bhamaha and Dandin

It will be interesting to note incidentally, that Dandin also, like Bhamaha, holds that *atis'ayokti* is at the root of all other figures of sense

II 214 defines *atis'ayokti* as,

vivakṣā ya viś eśasya lokasīmātivartinī |  
asāvatis ayoktiḥ syadalamkārottamā yathā ||

Thus *atis'ayokti*, the best of *alamkāras*, consists of a statement which tends to describe the matter in hand in an uncommon way II 215 cites an illustration in which ladies who are secretly going to meet their lovers, are described as non-descernible in the moon-light on account of their putting on garlands of *malikā* flowers and silk garments and having their bodies besmeared with sandal paste II 216 says that in the above illustration there is an implied hyperbolic description of the excellence of the moon-light-*candrātapasya bīhulyam uktamutkarsavattayā* In II 217, there is an element of doubt implied This doubt, however, is not genuine but *āharya*

(Dandin says II 216b

*śas'mayātiś'ayāśīṇaṁ vyaktyaḥ kīncinnidars'yate,*)

At II 219 the three worlds are described as enormously big enough to contain the glory of a king which is boundless The idea of the praise of a king is only implied

At II 220 Dandin says that this figure is the essence of all other figures of speech and that this sort of an expression is praised by all the masters of speech—says he,

*alamkārantaraṇāmapyekamābuh parayanam,  
vāgīś'amahitāmuktimitāmatis'ayābhavayāṇi ||*

Thus both Bhāmaha and Dandin seem to have an identical attitude towards alamkāras in the sense that both of them to have been struck not by the mere outward form of any alamkāra as such, but by something else that lies at the root of all the alamkāras. This element, they term as vakrokti or atis'ayukti. We will find the element of avagamana or pratyamānātā i.e. implied sense in some of the figures described by them. It may be noted here incidentally, that it is in this element of implied sense that the charm or camatkāra of the particular alamkāra lies.

### **Bhāmaha's Treatment of the Arthālamkāras**

Now, we proceed with Bhāmaha's treatment of the figures of sense.

Bhāmaha begins with rūpaka. Rūpaka occurs when in consideration of the similarity in qualities, the upameya is identified with the upamāna (II 22). Thus, it is clear that the idea of similarity is implied in rūpaka, that is to say, upamā is implied in rūpaka. At II 24 Bhāmaha describes ekadesavivartī rūpaka and it is already clear that this involves some implied element. II 25 describes Dīpaka as three-fold. The element of upamā is implied in all the varieties of dīpaka as illustrated by Bhāmaha (II, 27, 28, 29) as follows

samānavastunyāsena prativastūpamocyate |  
yathevānabhidhāne'pi guṇasām्यapratītiḥ ||

(Kavyālamkāra II 34)

Thus, there is prativastūpamā when, even in the absence of words such as yathā, vā, etc. which are directly expressive of upamā, we have the apprehension of the similarity of qualities. So, in this figure also, the idea of similarity seems to be implied only.

At II 68 ākṣepa is defined as,

-pratishedha investīasya yo vis'esābhīdhitsaya |

ākṣepa iti tāṃ santāḥ saṃsanti dvividhaṃ yathā ||

Āksepa occurs when there is an apparent denial only with a view to convey some further sense—vis'esābhidhatsayā. Thus, the additional sense is implied only

II 75 defines vyatireka as,

upamānavato'rthasya yadvis'esanīdars'anam |  
vyatirekam tamicchanti vis'esāpadanādyaṭhā ||

Thus vyatireka has also an element of similarity implied in it. In the same way in vibhāvana, kāśanāntarakalpāṇa is always implied (II 77, 78)

II 80 defines samāsokti as,

yatrokte gamyate'nyo'rthastatsamānavis'esanaṭh |  
sā samāsoktiruddistā sampkṣiptārthatayā yathā ||

Samsokti occurs when on the narration of a particular sense, another sense having similar qualities is implied. There is a clear recognition of an implied sense here.

After defining atīśyokti at II 81, Bhamaha, as noted earlier, wants it to remain present in all the alamkaras. The poets should be vigilant in bringing forth this element in kāvya as such. Anything bereft of this element of atīś'aya is only vārtā or a bare statement of fact and is no poetry. Thus Bhamaha rejects hetu, sūkṣma, and les'a as they have no element of vakrokti in them.

II 86—hetus'ca sūkṣmo les'oṭha nālamkāratayā mataḥ |  
samudāyābhīdhānasya vakroktyanābhīdhānataḥ ||

II 91 defines utprekṣā as,

'avivakṣitasāmānyā kṛñcīccopamayā saha |  
atadgunakriyāyogādutprekṣātis'ayānvitā ||

Thus utprekṣā has no sāmānyā i.e. idea of similarity as its purport, i.e. utprekṣā centres round sambhāvana or probability, and not mere similarity or sadṛś'ya. But, it has again some element of upamā, i.e. similarity is only implied. In utprekṣā the upameya is said to possess such quality or action that normally does not go with it. Thus, it has an element of atīś'aya implied in it. At II 50 also Bhamaha clearly recognises

an element of atis'aya involved in both upamā and utprekṣā. Says he—

yas'cātiś'ayavānarthah katham so'sambhavo matah |  
istam cātiś'ayārthatvam upamotpṭeksayoryathā ||

In the third chapter, Bhāmaha begins his treatment with the alamkāras such as preyas, rasavat and ūjasvī. We will discuss the case of these alamkāras when we deal with the treatment of rasa in earlier alamkārikas in a separate chapter later on.

Bhāmaha defines paryāyokta at III 8 a-as, paryāyoktam yadanyena prakārenābhūdhīyate, and illustrates it at III 9. Bhāmaha holds (III 9) that the idea of avoiding the possible intake of poison is implied in Kṛṣṇa's speech who words it differently. Thus paryāyokta has an element of implied sense. Bhāmaha does not define the figure called udātta (III. 11-12), but it follows very clearly that the idea of āsayamahattva or vibhūtimahattva is only implied.

Bhāmaha has a totally novel connotation of śleṣa (III 14) which occurs when there is realisation of identity of the upameya with the upamāna through a guṇa or quality, kṛiyā or action or, proper noun i.e. nāmā. It differs from the rūpaka in this respect that in rūpaka there is a clear mention of both the upameya and the upamāna in different terms (III 15). Thus, an element of similarity is implied in śleṣa also.

III 21 defines apahnuti as,

apahnūtīrabhūṭā ca kīncidantargatopamā |  
bhūtarthāpahnāvādasyāḥ kṛiyate cābhīdha yathā ||  
Thus it has upamā which is implied

III. 23 defines viśeṣokti as,

ekadeśasya vigame ya guṇāntarāsamsthītiḥ |  
viśeṣaprathanyāsau viś'eṣoktirmatā yathā ||

The added sense, viz. that of karanāntarakalpanā is always implied

In the same way tulyayogitā (III 27) has an element of similarity implied in it. It occurs when in order to suggest some similarity in qualities, in case of two objects, one of which is smaller in status, both are narrated as being connected through an identical action.

III 27-nyūnasyāpi vis'istena gunasāmyavivaksasya |  
tulyakāryakriyāyogāt ityuktā tulyayogitā ||

III 29 defines aprastutaprasaṃsā, wherein there is mention of a matter not in hand implying the matter in hand.

III 29-adhikārādapetasya vastuno'nyasya yā stutih |  
aprastutaprasaṃseti sā caivaṃ kathyate yathā ||

Vyājastuti (III 31) has apparent censure and implied praise. It is defined as

durādhikagunastotravyapades'ena tulyatām |  
kincidvidhimsoryā nindā vyājastutirasau yathā ||

Nidars'anā has also implied similarity, because in it, without the use of yathā, 'iva, etc, through action only, some idea is expressed. III 34 defines nidarsanā as,

-kriyayaiva vis'istasya tadarthasyopadars'anāt |  
jñeyā nidars'anā nāma yathevavatibhīrvinā ||

In upameyopamā (III 37), the idea of the elimination of any third similar object, i.e. tritīyasādṛśavyavaccheda is implied. In sabokti also (III 39) there is implied similarity. Sasamdeha is defined at III 43 as,

upamānena tattvam ca bhedaṃ ca vadataḥ punaḥ |  
sasamdehaṃ vacaḥ stutyaḥ sasamdehaṃ viduryathā ||

Thus, the idea of the praise of upameya is implied only.

III. 45 defines ananvaya

yatra tenaiva tasya syādupamānopameyatā |  
asādṛś'yavivaksātāḥ tamityāburananvayaṃ ||

Ananvaya occurs when a thing is compared with one's own self, in order to suggest that it is beyond comparison,

that is to say, it is unrivalled. The idea of *asādrś'yavivakṣā* is implied only.

III 47 defines *utprekṣāvayava* having in itself the use of double-meaning words and an element of both *utprekṣā* and *rūpaka*. The idea of similarity between *upameya* and *upamāna* is necessarily implied.

III 53-54-define *bhāvikatva* which is a *guṇa* with reference to a whole composition in which past and future events look as if they are present, and which rests on a meaning that is charming, elevated and uncommon and a narrative that is capable of being effectively staged and wherein the expression is not involved. The definition runs as -

III. 53-54-*bhāvikatvamiti prābhūḥ prabandhaviṣayam guṇam |*  
*pratyakṣā iva draśyante yatrārthā bhūtabhāvinah ||*  
*citrodattādbhūtārthatvam kathayāḥ svabhinītā ||*  
*s'abdanākulata ceti tasya hetum pracaksate ||*

Thus, *bhāvika* is by itself of the nature of implied only as it rests on a whole composition.

### Dandin

Dandin defines *madhura* *guṇa* at I 51-52 as a statement which is gifted with *rasa* or sentiment and also when there is *rasa* with reference to the object or *vastu* described. Dandin says that such a composition, *padasatīh*, as has words that look similar when heard also are capable of conveying *rasa*.

I. 51-52-*madhuram rasavadvāci vastuyayī rasasthīti |*  
*yena mādyanti dhīmanto mathuneva madhuvratah ||*  
*yayā kayāciti'srūyā yat samānamanubhūyate |*  
*tadrūpa hi padasatīh sagnuprāsa rasavah ||*

In the illustration viz. (I 53)

*eṣa rāja yadā lakṣmīm prāptvān brāhmanapriyah |*  
*tadā prabhūti dharmasya lokesminnūtsavo'bhavat ||*

It nourishes the emotion with reference to a religious king. Thus *mādhurya* has a lot of implied sense.

In I. 62, after explaining *mādhurya* *guna* in *s'abda* or word, Dandin proceeds to explain it with reference to *artha* as indicated by the words . *vastunyapi rasasthutih*. Dandin says that though all the *alampkara*s make for *rasa* in sense, it is *agrāmyatā* or the absence of vulgarity i.e. the *arthagata mādhurya*, which carries this burden to a greater extent. Dandin says (I.62):

kāmaṃ sarvopyalampkāro rasamarth enisācatī |  
tathāpyagrāmyataivainam bhāraṃ vahaṭi bhūyasā ||

Dandin further says I. 63-64 that such statements as, *kāmayamānam māṃ na tvam kāmayase katham*-are vulgar and make for the detriment of *rasa*. Says he,

iti grāmyoyamarthātma valasyāya prakalpate |  
He observes that if the same statement is modified as,  
kāmaṃ kandaṃpacandalo mayi vāmākṣi nirdayah |  
tvayi nirmatsaro distyetyagrāmyoritho rasāvah ||

It becomes charged with *rasa* and is free from vulgar sense. This *mādhurya* is full of implied sense.

Dandin defines *udāra* *guna* at I. 76. as,

utkarṣavān guṇah kas'cid yasminnukte pratiyate |  
tadudārāhvayam tena sanāthā kāvyabapdhatī ||

Thus, *udāra* *guna* consists of a statement which is expressed for the implication of some lofty quality; and poetry is highly dependent on it.

The illustration cited is, (I. 77).

arthināṃ kṛpānā dṛṣṭih tvaṃmukhe patitā sakṛt |  
tadavasthā punardeva nānyasya mukhamikṣate ||

Dandin adds (I. 78) that in the illustration cited as above, the excess of generosity is clearly indicated—*iti tyāgasya vākya-smin utkarṣah sādhu lakṣyate*.

I 79 explains another variety of *udāra* which consists of significant adjectives such as *līlāmbhuja*, *kṛidāsara*, *hemāṅgada*,



etc Here also, the idea of opulence is implied

I 79—*ślaghyairvis'esanairyuktam udāram kais'cidisyate |*  
*yathā līlāmbhujakṛdāsarohe māṅgadādayah ||*

I 85 defines *kānti* *guṇa* as,

*kāntam sarvajagatkāntam laukikārthanatīkramat |*  
*tacca vārtābhūṣaṇeṣu varnanaśvapi drś'yate ||*

*Kānta* occurs when there is an absence of hyperbole i.e. when things are described in a normally charming fashion and is seen both in conveying facts or in the description of objects, and is liked by all

Thus, *kānti* *guṇa* has a natural mode of expression and thereby implies a world of ideas as is illustrated at I 86-87 as,

*grhānti nāma tanyeva taporas'irbhavadrś'āh |*  
*sambhāvayanti yānyeva pāvanāḥ padapāmsubhīh ||*

and also

*anayoranavadyāṅgi stanayorjambhamānayoḥ |*  
*avakāś'o na paryāptah tava bāhulatāntare ||*

In the first illustration, the praise-worthiness of the house is implied and in the second, feeling or love with reference to the heroine is implied

In *samādhi* *guṇa*, according to Dandin (I 93), there is superimposition of somebody else's quality on something else This is a clear instance of *lakṣaṇā* based on similarity which is implied

I 93 says,

*anyadharmastato' nyatra lokasīmānurodhinaḥ |*  
*samyagādhiyate yatra as samādhīḥ smṛto yathā ||*

I 94 is given as an illustration in point—

*kumudānti nīlplanti kamalānyunmīlanti ca |*  
*iti netrakriyādhyasāllabdhaḥ tadvācīnti śrītiḥ ||*

Dandin then adds that words such as *nīlsthūta*, *udgīṛṇa*, *vānta* etc convey a charming sense when used metaphorically.

If they are used in the direct sense, they turn out to be vulgar. Thus even here, we have a touch of an implied sense.

I 95 says *nisthyūtdgīṇavānīdī gaunavṛttivyapās'rayam |*  
*ātisundaramanyatra grāmakaksām viṅāhate ||*

This *śamādhī* *guṇa*, says Dandin is the quint essence of poetry and is resorted to by all poets.

I 99—*tadetat kavyaśarvasvam śamādhīrnamā yo guṇah |*  
*kaviśārthah samagro pi tamenamanugacchati ||*

Thus, in his treatment of *guṇas* Dandin seems to cover implied sense. In his treatment of the figures of sense i.e. *arthālaṃkāras* also, he seems to have incorporated implied sense. We have already noted earlier his general attitude towards *ālāṃkāras*. We will not discuss all the *ālāṃkāras* such as *rupaka*, *dīpaka*, *apahnuṭi*, *vyājastuṭi*, *aprastutaprasaṃsā*, *tulyayogitā*, *paryāyoktam*, *āksepa*, etc., which have implied element as explained earlier when we dealt with Bhamaha. But, Dandin has given a good many varieties of *upamā* and almost all of them contain an implied sense.

Dandin defines *upamā* at II 14 as,

*yathakathāñcit sādṛś'yaṃ yatrodbbhūtam pratiyate |*  
*upamā nāma sā tasyāḥ prapañco yaṃ pradars'yate ||*

Thus, *upama* occurs when similarity is gathered in anyway *yathākathāñcit*—i.e. in a directly expressed fashion or an implied way. Most of the varieties of *upamā* as explained by Dandin have implied similarity. Thus, *vastūpamā* (II 16) has the common quality implied only (*pratiyamānaikadharmā*). *Viparyāsopamā* has *upamāna* in place of *upameya* and vice versa. Thus it implies the superiority of the *upameya* (II, 17). *Anyonyopamā* (II 19) is the same as *upameyopamā* having the idea of *tṛtīyasādṛśa*,—*vyāvachēda*—or elimination of a third possible similar object—as implied only. *Niyamopamā* (II 19) has the idea of restriction implied when the face is described as similar to the lotus alone.

In this ayopamā also (II 22), in the absence of any upamavācaka, the similarity is only implied II 23 gives utprekṣitopamā and has an element of utprekṣa implied in it Adbhutopamā (II 24) which is the same as what later ālamkarikas recognise as yadyarthātī ayokti has implied similarity Mohopamā (II 25) has moha or bhrānti implied Sams ayopamā (II 26) is the same as sasamdeha of the later ālamkarikas having implied similarity Nirnayopamā (II 27) is what Viśvanātha recognises as nis'cayālamkāra having implied comparison II 30 gives nindopamā which has the same quality of implied sense Similar is the case with pras am opamā (II 31), acikhyasopamā (II 32) virodhopamā (II 33) pratishedhopamā (II 34) catupamā (II 35) tattvākhyānopamā (II 36) asādharanopamā (II 37) asambhavitopamā (II 39) bahupamā (II 40), vikriyopamā (II 41) etc etc

Prativastupamā (II 46) is—vastukīñcidupanyasya nyasanat  
tatsadharmanah

samyapratītiṣṭīti prativastupamā yatha ||

There is implied comparison between the statements

Tulyayogopamā (II 48) also has the same charm of implied sense

Thus we see that in Dandin also, there is recognition of pratīyamāna or implied sense

## Vāmana

For Vāmana the position is all the more clear for he recognises upamā as the basis of all the ālamkāras and all the rest are termed by him as upamāprapañca His kāntiguna is defined as diptarasatvam—i.e. one in which rasas are aroused This clearly bears the stamp of an implied sense His samādhi is defined as arthadṛṣṭih i.e. a perception of the sense (III 27) Vāmana goes on classifying artha as vyākṛta and sukṣma (III 29) and the latter again as bhāvya or that which is elicited easily and viśantiya or that which is elicited only after concentration

(III. 2,10). The illustrations of both these varieties contain an implied sense.

### Udbhata

Udbhata in his K.S.S. practically follows the same pattern as laid down by Bhāmaha and seems to incorporate the element of implied sense in the same way as seen in Bhāmaha *Pratīhārendurāja* (first half of the 10 cen. A.D. De, P. 74, *ibid*) wants us to believe that Udbhata has knowingly incorporated *dhvani* under *alamkāras* when he says :

-kais'cit saṅgdayaṁ dhvanirnāma vyañjakatvabhedātma kāvya-  
dharmo'bhīhitah |  
sa kasmādiha nopadistah ? ucyate, eṣvevālamkāresvantarbhavāt ||

### Rudrata

Rudrata also can be safely imagined to have touched the element of implied sense with reference to all the *alamkāras* such as *rupaka*, *dīpaka*, *paryāyokta* etc. He defines and illustrates the two-fold *bhāva* also in VII. 38-41, which contains an implied sense. He has an elaborate treatment of *rāsa* but is silent about any theoretical discussion of *rāsa*-realisation.

## PART II

### CHAPTER VII

#### THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF RASA IN SANSKRIT POETICS

##### (I) Rasa in

(i) The Vedas

(ii) The Nirukta

and (iii) Bṛhaddevatā

##### 'Rasa' in the Vedas

'Rasa is a word of frequent occurrence in Vedic and classical Sanskrit literature (1). It is well-known that rasa is derived from the  $\sqrt{\text{ras}}$  which occurs in the pāṇiniya dhātupāṭha and is explained as having the senses of 'to make sound' 'to taste' and 'to be oily; (ras śabde (bhāvdi), and rasa āsvādanasnehanayoḥ (curād)).<sup>1</sup>

[The root  $\sqrt{\text{ras}}$  has thus three different meanings. In the first sense it is associated with the river rasā according to Yaska (Nirukta. 11.25-rasā nadī bhavati, rasteḥ śabda-karmanah). The word rasā is used as a name of a particular river or sometimes a river in general. One may say that here too the word may be connected to the sense of being liquid. Rasa in the sense of something liquid is associated with many things like juice or the sap of plants or the milk of the cow or the virile semen of the body etc.] In fact we find lexicons giving all these various meanings. Amara for example says :

rupam śabdo gandharasaspars'āccaviṣayaḥ amṛ. (line 291, and also śṛṅgtrāḍau viṣe virye guṇe rāge drave rasaḥ.

(line 2789)

and also the six fold tastes (line 295)

Hemacandra adds the following senses

grhe, dhātāu i.e. humours of the body, pārada i.e. mercury, premni, bhāve, ātmani, and also in the sense of sukha

Thus the word *rasa* has a very interesting semantic history. We are here interested in finding out how the physical sense of the word gets transmuted into the experience of aesthetic pleasure or the flavour of a sentiment or emotion.

[In the Vedic *samhitās*, as we shall see below, we find not only the physical sense of something liquid but also the liquid (*drava*) or the sap that is in plants, animals etc., and also the juice that can be pressed out or extracted. In the later sense of the word *kavyarasa* or *nāyārasa*, we do not find any clear reference. But in one context, we do find it associated with things literary.] Let us therefore, take a summary view of the different meanings of *rasa*, first in the Vedic *samhitās*.

In the *Rv* the word occurs for about fifty-one times. *Rasā* occurs for about eleven times. The *Yv* has nineteen and two occurrences of the words *rasa* and *rasā* respectively. The *Av* has about thirty-eight occurrences (1). In the later *samhitās* some of the mantras are repeated from the *Rv*.

*Rasa* is used for a river, at times a particular river, or a flow in general. At *Rv. VIII 49 2 Vālakhilya sukta*) we have *rasā* explained by the commentator as 'Jalāni'. Waters are termed as the *rasas* of mountains. Here, we see that the waters of the springs that flow from the mountains are regarded as the sap of the mountains which is extracted from them by Indra and becomes water. The mantra runs as

satanīkeva pra jigāti dhuṣṇuyā hanti vītrā'ni dāsuṣe |  
gīreṇiva pra rasa' pīnvire datrāni purubhojasah ||

Thus, we have the double sense of the extracted sap and water

At. Yv. 9. 3—we have apām rasah and also apām rasasya yo rasah. These are explained by both Uvata and Mahidhara as vāyu and prajāpati respectively. We may add that here the word rasa seems to carry the sense of essence of soul and consequently the presiding deity. The mantra reads as below :

apā'm rasamūdvayasam sū'rye śāntam samā'hṛtam |  
 apām rāsasya yo rasastām vo grhṇāmyuttamāmupayāma  
 grhṇōsīndrāya tvā jūstam grhṇāmyesā te yonirīndrāya tvā  
 jūstatamam ||

The same sense is repeated at Yv 19 44, 20 22 and 31.17.

Then, thirdly, we have rasa in the sense of the rasa of herbs. This may be in form of an extracted juice as in case of some, or may be just sap in the some plant

In the IX mandala of the Rv., it is mostly to be seen in these senses e g at Rv. IX 66—

tām gobhīrvr'sanam rāsam mādāya devavitaye |  
 sūtām bharāya sām sṛja || (rasa is extracted juice),

and also RV. IX. 23. 5.

-so'mo arṣati dharnasīrdadhāna indriyām rasām |  
 suvi'ro abhis'astipā'h ||

'rasa' means 'sap'.

Fourthly we have rasa in the sense of the tastes. Rv. I. 187. 4, 5 have 'rasāh' explained by Sayana as the six tastes such as, sweet, sour, etc. Rasāh i.e. tastes lateron become in the dars'anas the sense-quality of taste.

Rv. I. 187. 4 is

tāva tyē pito rāsā rājāmsyānu vi'stutah. |  
 divi' vā'ta īva s'rītā'h ||

So also Yv. 39.4 has rasa in the same sense and is explained by Mahidhara as 'svādutvam.'

Yv. 39.4—is,

R. 13.

mānasah kāmamākulīp vācaḥ satyamas iya ।  
 pas u nām rupāma nnasya ra so yāsah śrih s rayatāpma yi  
 svā'ha ॥

Fifthly, we have rasa with reference to the animals such as a cow horse etc With reference to the cow it means milk as at Rv I 37 5 which runs as--

prasāpṣā gosvaghnyam krīlāp yacchardho marutam  
 jambhe rasasya vavrdhe ।  
 rasasyagokṣīratupasya (Sayana)

At Rv VII 104 10 we have rasa with reference to food, horses cows and body Now what exactly is the meaning of rasa in all these cases is not made clear by Sayana, but it may mean essence The mantra runs as

yo no rasāp d psatī pītvo agne yo as'vānam yo gavāp  
 yastanū nām ।  
 nṛpu h stenah steyakṛ ddabhrāmetu nṛ sa hyatām tanvā  
 ta na ca ॥

Rasa of the serpents obviously means poison as at Av V 13 2 and 3

At V 13 2 is,  
 yāt te āpodakam visāp tāt te eta svagrabham ।  
 gṛhṇā mi té madhyamāmuttamam rasamutā vāmām bhīyāsā  
 nes adā du te ॥

Av IV 27 3 has rasa of the horse It is explained as speed of the horse by the commentator This also may be the sense in Rv VII 104 10 as quoted above

Sixthly, we have rasa of the human body as seen in Rv VII 104 10 above Rv I 105 2 has rasa in the sense of virile semen It runs as

ārtham, dvā u arthina n jāyā yuvate pātīm ।  
 tuñjā te vr snyam pāyah parida ya rāsam duhe vittāp me  
 asyā rodasi ॥

We also come across occurrences in which 'rasa' appears as an independent entity e g rasah, used in plural, means tastes



as explained by Sayana (Rv I 1874 and 5, see above) In the Yajurveda also, one occurrence is noteworthy Yv 189 reads as below

urk ca me sunr tā ca me páyas'ca me rásas'ca me ghr̥tam  
ca me mādhu ca me ságdhis'ca me sápit̥is'ca me k̥rs̥is ca me  
jātram ca me au dbh̥idyam ca me yajñéna kalpantam }

In the above quoted mantra, several things are asked for through sacrifice The occurrence of *rasa* between 'payas' and 'gh̥tam' may signify the juice of something edible or drinkable Here, it may be noted however, that *rasa* is mentioned by itself and not as of something It may also be noted that it figures along with *urj sunrta*, and *payas*, wherein *urja* may mean strength or vigour either of speech or body *Sunrta* may mean the sweet and true speech and *payas* may mean any fluid or juice or vital spirit, power etc In this context *rasa* may also be taken in a similar connotation as the best or finest or prime part of anything, essence, etc It might also mean taste or charm, pleasure delight

Av x 8 44 has '*rasena trptah*' This is a mystic hymn and *rasa* may mean the essence of the universe The mantra runs as—

akamo dh̥i re amr̥tah svayambhū rāsena trpto na ku tas'  
cano nah }  
tāme vāvidvā n na bibhaya m̥tyórātma nam dh̥i ramajāram  
yuvānam ||

Here it may be noted that the sense of satisfaction or fulfilment or even ecstasy is associated with *rasa* *rasa* as causing fulfilment or joy The eighth interesting use of *rasa* is seen at Rv IX 67 31 and 32 which run as below

yāh pavamanīradhyety̥ s̥ibhih s̥āmbh̥ritam rāsam }  
s̥ārvam s̥ā putāmas'natī svaditām matarīsvana ||

and also

pāvamanī ryo adhyety̥ s̥ibhih s̥āmbh̥ritam rāsam —  
tasmat sarasvatī duhe k̥srām sarpimādhudakām ||



Here we may refer to that famous verse of the Nā Śa (Ch I vs 17) whose purpose is to show relationship of the natyaveda with the other vedas and thereby give it vedic prestige. Taken in this light one may not bother oneself with finding any real basis for the statement. The verse runs as below

jagrāha pāthyam ṛgvedād  
sāmabhyo gītameva ca ।  
yajurvedādabhinayān  
rasānātharvanādapi (NS I 17)

It is however, possible to find some connection with the vedas without stretching the meaning too far e.g. the meters of the Rv are essentially pāthya i.e. recitable. This according to Abhinavaguptapāda is due to the trisvara character (i.e. udatta anudatta and svarita) of the ṛgvedic mantras. This point has been elaborated by Bharata in the chapters vāgabhīnaya (Ch XVI GOS Ed). The relation of the Yv with the sāmans of the samaveda is obvious. Yv is Abhinava says adhvaryakarmapradhāna i.e. in the Yv activities of the adhvaryu such as movement towards right etc. are predominant. Essentially the movements of different parts of the body have a particular significance to the Yv. As to the relation of the rasas with the hymns of the Av we do not find any obvious relationship. The text of the abhinavabhāratī on this point, which is quoted below is not quite clear. It runs as ātharvanavede tu sāmānādikarmasu natasyeva tasyartvijah prastudavaisunād bhavānām prajāḥ atirabhyātinavadhānagrahanadinā lohitoḥ dernepathyasya tesu tesu ca karmasu visistaprayatnapuruḥ padymāno vastambhā tmanah sattvasya sambhavāt tato tannāmagrahanam vacikastvabhīnayah purvamevoktah anyavibhavānām dhṛtipramodādīvyabhīcārinām ca paratī satām samāharanam pralldhānamiti vibhavadisāmagrīrūp makacarvaṇasambhavah itī tatastadgrahanamuktamiti (A Nā śa I 17 GOS Ed II)

The idea seems to be that priests in the various rituals of Av. such as those of *śāntikarma*, *māṇakarma* etc put on costumes consisting of red turban and such other things. Through *anubhāvas* they express certain feelings. There is a sort of mental *avaśāmbha* or resoluteness brought about by special efforts, and therefore there is the exhibition of such a *sattva* or mental disposition. According to *Abhinava*, this seems to be the connection of *rasas* with Av. One may imagine a scene in which one of such magical ritual is performed when everybody would be tense with emotion pertaining to a particular act. *Abhinava* seems to have taken some such performance of the *ātharvāna* ritual as a source of emotional ecstasy in *rasa*.

We have seen before that though the word *rasa* occurs at several places in the Av., we have no clear case of the later meaning of *nāṭyarasa* or *kāvya-rasa*. From another point of view, however, we may say that several hymns of the Av. taken by themselves are impressive love lyrics. The number of such hymns is about thirty three.

[Av. I. 34; II. 3; VI. 8; III. 25, VI. 8, 9, 82, 89, 102, 130, 131, 132, 139 VII. 36 (37), 37 (38), 38 (39) etc.]

A few lines from these may be quoted below : e.g.  
Av. VI. 8 :

yāthā vṛkśām li'buṣā samantām parisaśvajé |  
eva' pa'ri svajasva mā'm yāthā kāmī'ny'aso yāthā mānna-  
ā'pagā' āśah ||

and also,

yāthā suparnāḥ prapātan pakṣāu nibhanti bhūbhyaṃ |  
eva' nīhanmi te māno yāthā mā'm kāmī'ny'aso yāthā  
mānna'pagā āśah ||

and also

yāthāmé dyā'vāpṛthivī' sadyāḥ paryéti sū'ryah |  
eva' pā'ryemi te māno yāthā mā'm kāmī'ny'aso yāthā  
mānna'pagā āśah ||

*Origin and Development of Rasa in..*

(1) As the creeper embraces the tree on all sides, thus thou embrace me, so that thou, woman, shalt love me, so that thou shalt not be averse to me !

(2) As the eagle when he flies forth presses his wings against the earth, thus do I fasten down thy mind, so that thou, woman, shalt love me, so that thou shalt not be averse to me.

(3) As the Sun day by day goes about this heaven and earth, thus do I go about thy mind, so that thou, woman shalt love me, so that thou shalt not be averse to me. (Translation-Maurice Bloomfield-Hymns of the Av. SBE. Vol. XLII.)

Av. VI 131 is a charm to arouse the passionate love of a man e. g.

Av. VI. 131.3. is,  
yád dhā'vasi triyojanām pañcāyojana'mās' vīnam |  
tatastvām punarā'yāsi putrā'nam na asah pitā ||

"If thou dost run three leagues away (or even) five leagues, the distance coursed by a horseman, from there thou shalt again return, shall be the father of our sons !"

(Translation-Bloomfield)

The same note of a passionate woman's longing is heard also in AV. VI. 132. We quote the first mantra that runs as :  
yām devā'h smarāmāsiñcaonapsvantah s'ós'ucānam sahā'-  
dhyā' |

tām te tapāmi vārunasya dhārmanā ||

"Love's consuming longing, together with yearning, which the gods have poured into the waters, that do I kindle for thee by the law of Varuna."

(Translation-Bloomfield)

Av. VII. 36 is a love-charm spoken by a bridal couple. It runs as :

akṣyaū nau mādhusamkas'e ānikam nau samārjanan |  
antāh kṛnuṣva mā'm hṛdi' māna īnau sahā'sati ||

‘The eyes of us two shine like honey, our foreheads gleam like ointment. Place me within thy heart; may one mind be in common to us both !

(Translation-Bloomfield).

And also, AV VII. 37.

abhi’ tvā manujātena dādhami ma’ma vā’sasā ।  
yāthāso nāma ke’valo nānyā’sāp kīrtāyās’cana’ ॥

‘I envelope thee in my garment that was produced by Manu (the first man), that thou shalt be mine alone, shalt not even discourse of other women!’ (Translation-Bloomfield).

Instances can be multiplied. It should be noted that scholars are in agreement when they say that the hymns, their ritualistic application apart, should be taken as individual places viewed in this light, and away from the ritualistic background, the above quoted instances can serve as beautiful love lyrics. They become the passionate expressions of love, i.e. s’rīgārarasa primarily in its vipralambha aspect (e.g. Av. VI. 8). There are a few hymns in the Rv. such as the dialogues of Purūravas and Urvaśī, Yama and Yamī, etc. which contain such passionate expressions. But comparatively speaking the Av. has more of them. Other bhāvas or feelings such as those of bhaya, utsāha, śoka also can be found in several other hymns of the Av. One may say, therefore, that the attempt to relate the later kāvyā and nāṭya rasas to Av. is not unjustified.

#### ‘Rasa’ in the Upanisads .

We come across several occurrences of the word *rasa* or the different forms of the root  $\sqrt{\text{ras}}$  in the Upanisads. Primarily they are to be seen in two or three different senses. The meaning of a liquid seems to be common to all. In the objects of five sense-organs, that which is gathered by the tongue is called ‘*rasa*’. We come across this sense in the Prasnopanisad (4.8) which says : *rasas’ca rasayitavyam*, i.e. ‘when there is taste, it is to be tasted.’ So also in the Bṛh.

Up-sa yathā saindhavaghanānantaro'-bāhyah kṛtsno rasaghana eva. (4 5 13)- 'just as a piece of saindhava salt has nothing like the internal or the external, but the whole of it is full of taste' In the above-mentioned occurrences rasa is seen in the sense of taste In the Pras'nopanisad (1 4.) esa hi dīṣṭā. rasayitā-, the word rasayitā is in the sense of one who tastes There are many more occurrences to this effect. In the Mundaka Upanisad, -atas'ca sarva osadhayo rasas'ca (2 1 9), we have rasa in the sense of 'sap'

Then still further, rasa is seen in the sense of the juices of the trees out of which honey is formed, as in the Chāndogya Upanisad (6 9 1)

yathā somya madhu madhkṛto nististhanti |  
nānātyayānām vrkṣānām rasān samavahāramekatām  
rasam gamayati ||

[Then, we come across more and more occurrences in the sense of 'essence of things e g in the Taittirīyopanisad (1 12)]  
esa bhūtānām pṛthivī rasah, pṛthivyā āpo rasah apsāmosa-  
dhayo rasah osadhīnām puruṣo rasah puruṣasya vāgrasah  
vāca rgrasah ṛcah sāmā rasah samno udgītho rasah ||

Now, it may be noted that along with the sense of 'essence', there seems to be other subtle shades of meanings also with reference to rasa in the above quotation It should be noted that here, the number of rasas is eight This is rendered clear in the sentence that follows-sa esa rasānam rasatamah paramah parardhyo stamo yadudgīthah, i e out of these, the udgītha is the highest and the eighth rasa Thus the eighth rasa is the 'parama', the highest and is udgītha Very often 'aum' in the upanisads suggests this udgītha, the rasa of sāmā.] We may also take note of the following from the Taittirīya Upanisad

"asadva idamagra āsit tato vā sadajāyata |  
tadātmanam svayamakuruta tasmāttatsukṛtamucyate ||

iti yadvai sukr̥tam raso vai sah rasam hyevāyam labdhvā  
 "nandī bhavati (27) i.e. Verily in the beginning was this  
 asat (i.e. jagat) From It, verily was sat born. It made  
 itself the ātman So it is termed sukr̥ta Verily, it is sukr̥ta  
 Verily it is rasa On the attainment of rasa, this, verily,  
 becomes joyous'

In this quotation, sukr̥ta is rasa, and that rasa is a joy-giving factor becomes clear But with all this one cannot say that rasa occurs in the same sense in the Upanisads as in Bharata To a certain extent the use of rasa at one place in the Jaiminiya Upanisad seems to come close to the sense as seen in Bharata

We will later on observe that [rasa in Bharata has in its meaning the shades of the qualities of taste essence etc., as seen in the Upanisads.] We also see, as in the Chāndogya Upanisad that rasa is the combined taste of several ingredients like honey, which is a 'samavahara', a combination or a collection of the juices of many trees Possibly the eight rasas in the Chāndogya might have inspired the theorists to imagine eight nātyarasas also Finally, it may be observed that the above quoted utterance of the Taittiriya Upanisad, in which rasa is said to be the soul and by its attainment one is said to attain highest joy, may be taken as an original inspiration for the later theorists

### **'Rasa' in the Nirukta :—**

In the Nirukta of Yaska (circa 700-500 B.C.), we come across as many as thirteen occurrences in different forms of root √ras, or the word rasa, appearing either independently or in a compound We also come across rasa in the sense of the name of a particular river or a river in general In all the occurrences, √ras, or the word rasa seems to carry the same sense as that of 'to make sound', or 'juice' etc (2)



## 'Rasa' in the Bṛhaddevatā :

In the Bṛhaddevatā of S'aunaka we have 'rasa' occurring either independently or in a compound (3). In all the occurrences the usual senses of fluid, juice, sap or sense-quality are to be seen. Rasa occurs in the sense of a river.

## FOOT NOTES

(1) 'Rasa' occurs in the Rv. as below :

According to  
Sayana

According to  
Griffith

Rv.I. 23.23 : रसेन	जलसारेण	'essence'
37.5 : रसस्य	गोक्षीररूपस्य	rain
71.5 : रसम्	पृथिव्याः सारभूत हविः	Juice
105.2 : रसम्	पुरुषस्य सारभूत वीर्यं	bliss of love
187.4 : रसाः	पद्म रसाः स्वाद्वम्लादि	juices
187.5 : रसानाम्	स्वाद्वम्लादीनां पण्णां	savours of juices
Rv.V.43.4 : रसम्	(सोमस्य)	Juice
44.13 : रसवत्	सारवत् (पयः)	sweet-flavoured
Rv.V.44.21 : रसः	रसनीयं प्रशस्यो रसवान्	
	रसात्मको वा (इन्द्रः सोम)	Juice pleasant
	सोमरसाः	libations
63.8 : रसाः	सारम्	'essence'
Rv.VII.104.10 : रसम्	रसवत्	savoury
Rv.VIII.1.26 : रसिनः	रसवतः	savoury juice
3.1. : रसिनः	रसात्मकोऽमृतमयः	Juice
3.20 : रसः	आत्मीयं द्रव	essence
53.3 : रसम्	(सोमं)	juice
Rv.IX. 66 : रसम्	(सोमस्य)	"
16.1 : रसम्	(सोमस्य)	sap
23.5 : रसम्	(सोमरसाः)	juice
Rv.IX.39.5 : रसः		

61 17	रस	—	„
61 18	रस	—	„
62 6	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	„
63 13	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	„
64 24	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	„
65 15	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	„
67 8	रस	(सोमस्य)	„
67 15	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	„
67 31	रसम्	वेदरसभूत सार	essence
67 32	रस	सूक्तसंघ वेदसार	essence
		सूक्तसंघ	
74 9	रस	(सोमस्य)	juice
76 1	रस	(रसात्मक सोम)	juice
77 5	रस	(रसात्मक सोम)	„
79 5	रसम्	सोमम्	„
84 5	रस	रसरूप सोम	„
85 1	रसस्य	(स्वाश पीत्वा)	„
86 10	रस	रसरूप (सोम)	„
96 21	रस	(सोमस्य)	„
97 1	रसम्	आत्मीय रसम्	juice
97 12	रसेन	(आत्मीयेन)	„
97 14	रसाध्य	रसेन आस्वाद्य	abounding in sweet flavours
97 57	रसेन	—	essence
109 11	रसम्	—	juice
109 20	रसेन	(शब्देन)	„
113 3	रसम्	—	„
113 5	रसा	—	juices
113 5	रसित	रसवत	of juicy—
Rv X.9 2	रस	(स्वभूत)	sap
9 9	रसेन	(स्वरसेन)	moisture
76 5	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	sap

*The Origin and Development of Rasa in...*

'R'asa occurs in the Rv. as below :

Rv.I.112.12	रसाम्	रसा नदी भवति रसतः शद्वकर्मणः (निरु. ११-२५) इति यास्कः, नदी (रसने)	rasa wave
Rv.IV.43.6	रसया	सारभूता भूमिः	Rasa
Rv.V.41.15	रसा	नदीनामैतत्	river
53.9	रसा	जलानि	water-brooks
Rv.VIII.49.2	रसाः	रस आज पयसि	river
72.13	रसा	नदी	rasa
Rv.IX.41.6	रसा	(नदी)	rasa
Rv.X.75.6	रसया	शद्वायमानायाः अतरिक्षे	rasa
108 1	रसायाः	नद्याः-	rasa
108 2	रसायाः	नद्याः-	rasa
121.4	रसया	रसो जल, तद्वती रसा नदी-	rasa

Rasa occurs in the S'ukla yajurveda as below :

Yv. I 21 रसेन पिष्टारच्यरसेन (acc. to Uvata and Mahidhara)

II.32.	रसाय	रसभूताय, वसन्ताय
IX.3	रसः	रसः सारः
IX.3	रसम्	अपां रसम्, सारम्
XI.51	रसः	अपां सारः
XVIII.9	रसः	तत्रत्य. सारः
XIX.35	रसिन	रसवतः सोमस्य
XIX.75	रसिम्	सार
XIX.79	रसम्-	-
XIX 83	रसम्-	-
XIX 94	रसेन	(अपां) रसेन
XX.22	रससे रसेन	(अ जेन)
XX 27	रसः	(सोमरसः)

XXV 9	रसेन	वीर्षेण
XXV 12	रसया	नया
XXXI 17	रसात्	अद्भ्य समृत.-
XXXIII 21	रसा	नदी-
XXXVI 15	रस	(सोम)
XXXIX.4	रस	(अन्नस्य) रस सार -

The Sāmaveda has rasa at,

Sv. I. 239	रसिन
526	रसम्
558	रस
561	रसस्य
II. 162	रसा
240	रसा
241	रस
360	रसम्
371	रसेन
381	रस
428	रसम्
578	रस
627	रस
648	रसम्
649	रसम्
650	रस
693	रसम्
743	रसिन
749	रसम्
771	रसिन
807	रसाय्य
1188	रस

The Atharvaveda has rasa as below

		Acc. to Sayana	Acc. to Whitney
Av. I 5.2	रस	सारमूलः अरा	savour

*The Origin and Development of Rasa in...*

1.28.3	रसस्य	असृगादिरूपस्य शरीरगतस्य 'sap'	
Av. II.4.5	रसेभ्यः	औषधिसारभूतकाष्ठेभ्यः	juices
26.4	रसम्	उदकं च बलकरं रसमैव	sap
26.5	रसम्	धान्यं रसम्	sap of grain
29.1	रसैः	सारभूते-मन्योदके	sap of what is earthly
Av. III.13 5	रसः	(अपां रसः)	Whitney (pp 109) says the description in pada (almost makes us fancy some kind of mineral water to be had in view.)
28.4	रस	क्षीराज्यदिरूप.	sap
31.10	रसेन	औणधीना रसेन	sap of herbs
Av IV 2.5	रसाम्	नदी	rasa (The ocean is the atmospheric one and rasa, the heavenly river)
4.5	रस.	(अपा) अमृतात्मकः	sap
15 2	रसा.	उदकानां	Juices of the waters
17 3	रसस्य	—	sap (See Av 1 28 3)
27.2	रसम्	वृष्टायुदकं लक्षणम्	sap
27.3	रसम्	द्रव (लक्षणम्)	sap of herbs
35.3	रसेन	(स्वकीयेन) (or औरन i.e अन्न) Sap	Sap
Av. V.13 2	रसम्	(poison of the serpent) Juice	Juice
13.3	रसम्	—	juice
Av. VI.16 1	रसः	(तैलात्मकः)	essence
78.1	रसेन	दधिमधुशृतादिना	—
124.1	रसेन	उदकानः बिन्दुः स्वकीयेन रसः	sap
Av. VII.94.1	रसेन	(अपा)	taste
Av. VIII 4.10	रसम्	(शरीरसार)	—

Av IX.4 5	रस	अपा औषदीनां	sap
Av IX.8 2	रसम्	अपा औषधीनां	sap
Av X.4 18	रस	(poison)	sap
5 46	रसेन	,	,
6 2	रसेन	"	"
6 22	रसेन	"	"
8 44	रसेन	(some ystic sense)	"
Av XII 6 4	रस	—	sap
Av XIV 2 58	रस	—	sap
Av XVIII 1 48	रसवान्	(सोमं बहुरसोपेतं)	full of sap
XVIII 2 24	रसस्य	दहसन्नन्धन रसस्य, रुचिरादे	— Sap
4 23	रसवान्	—	rich in sap
4 81	रसाय	—	sap
Av XIX 31 4	रसा (Plu)	--	savours (connected with food)
31 5	रसम्	—	—
Av XX 51 2	रसा	—	sap of herbs

(2) in the Nirukta of Yāska we have,

*rasateh* -from √ras (to make sound)

at 6 21, 9 11, 11 25,

*rasadhāranam* -'holding of juices'

at 7 11,

*rasam* -juice

at 9 53, 11 29

*rasaharanāt* -from extracting juice'

at 3 16, 11 5

*rasā* names of a river

at 11 25

*rasāh* -'juices'

at 4 27, 6 19, 7 23

*rasādānam* -'drawing of juices'

at 7 11 ,

*rasān* -'Juices'

at 2.14; 4.27.; 11.23

*rasānām* :-of juices-at 10.10;

*rasāni* :-'roaring' at 11.25

*rasānudānam* :-'to release the juices; 7.10.

*rasānupradānena* :-'by giving juice' at 10.34.

'*rasena*' :-with juice. 6.15.; 12.1.

(3) in the Bṛhaddevatā we have.

*rasa* :-1.68.; 2.33.; 7.127.

*rasādāna* :-2.6.

*rasāpāranīyāsini* :-8.24.

( *rasā* is a river. )

**RASA IN PĀNINĪ (Astādhyāyī),  
PĀTAÑJALI (Mahābhāṣya), AND AŚVAGHOṢA, etc.**

‘Rasa’ in Pāṇinī [circa 3<sup>rd</sup>0 B C (Keith)] and Patanjali [circa 150 B C (Keith)]—

With Nirukta and Brhaddevatā, we end the discussion on the meanings of rasa in vedic literature. With Pāṇinī begins our discussion of the meanings of rasa in what we now call classical Sanskrit. There is one reference to rasa in Pā V 2 95—‘rasādibhyasca’. We cannot be sure as to the senses which Pāṇinī might have in mind when he used the word rasādī.

In the dhātupāṭha also, √ras is explained as having the senses of ‘(rasa) sabde’ and ‘asvādansnehanayoh’ i.e. ‘to make sound’, and ‘to taste, to liquify or to make something oily’ respectively.

In Patañjali we have several occurrences of the √ras and also the word rasa, either occurring independently or in a compound. We also come across words such as ‘rasavacitva’, ‘rasavacin’ ‘rasād’, and ‘rasika’. Excepting only one occurrence that we shall take up in detail as below, in all other cases the usual senses of ‘to make sound’, or ‘to taste’ etc and also that of a ‘sense quality’ or juice is seen (4).]

While commenting on Pā V 2 95 as quoted above, the Mahābhāṣyakāra referring to the previous sūtra i.e. Pā V 2 94 ‘tadasya’—styasmīnniti matup’—asks the question as to why this sūtra (i.e. Pā V 2 95) is added, in as much as complete sense is covered by the previous sūtra. A possible answer is that this sūtra is mentioned in order to exclude the use of other matup suffixes. But this is not accepted by the Bhāṣyakāra. According to him, there are examples of the use of other



matvarthīya suffixes in 'rasiko natah', 'urvaśi vai rūpini apsar-asam', 'spars'iko vāyuriti ~'The passage from the Mbh is quoted as follows

rasādibhyas'ca. 5 2 95

kīmarthamīdamucyate na tadasyāstyasminnityeva

matupsiddhah

rasādibhyah punarvacanamanyanivṛttiyartham ||

rasādibhyah punarvacanam kṛīyate'nyesām matvarthīyanām  
pratishedhārtam

matubena jathā tyādye'nye matvarthīyāḥ prapnuvanti te mā bhuvanniti naitadasti prayojanam, drśyante hyānye rasā-dibhyo matvarthīyāḥ rasiko natah urvaśi vai rūpinyapsar-asam spars'iko vāyuriti (Mbh on Pa V 2 95 pp 394-Edu Keilhorn) Kāśikā explains this by saying that the matup suffix is to be used in the qualities grasped by senses. But in the case of rūpini, rūpika etc the idea is to suggest not merely rūpa grasped by the eye but beauty. Similarly, in rasiko natah, the meaning is not that nata possesses juice tasted by the tongue, but he possesses an emotion or sentiment -bhāvayogah. The passage from the Kāśikā runs as follows

-rasādibhyasca pratipadikebhyo matup pratyao bhavati, tadasyāstyasminnityetasmin visaje rasavān, rūpavān kīmarthamucyate, na purvasūtrenā matupsiddhah ? rasādibhyah punarvacanamanyanivṛttiyartham anye matvarthīya mā bhuvanniti katham rūpini kanyā rūpiko dārakah ? prāyikametadvacanman, itikarano vivaksartho'nuvartate athavā gunadityatra pathyate, tena ye rasanendriyagrahya gunastesāmatra pāthah ita mā bhūt-rūpini rūpika iti sobhāyogah gamyate rasiko nata īryatra bhavayogah rasa, rūpa, gandha, sparśasabda, sneha gunāt, ekacah, gunagrahanam rasādīnām vis'esanam, rasādib

This point is made more explicit by the Tattvabodhinī on the Siddhānta kaumudī. The author, Jñānendrasarasvatī says anyamatvarthīyetyi -katham tarbi rūpini kanyā, rasiko natah iti atrābuh rasādīgane gunāt iti pathyate tena gunavācibhyā eva anyamatvarthīyasya niṣedhah rūpini nyatra tu rūpas abdena

saundaryam gṛhyate, tacca na guṇaḥ rasikam ityatra tu  
 rasasabdēna bhāvo gṛhyate na tu rasanāgrāhyo guṇa itī  
 (pp 30<sup>1</sup>-Edn. 1933 NS)

From the above discussion we cannot say whether Mahābhāṣyakāra wants to confine the use of matup suffix to the sense quality of taste only. This is however the distinction made by Kāś'ikā and later commentators. But this much is certain that the Mahābhāṣyakāra uses the word 'rasa' in 'rasiko nataḥ' in the sense of bhāva i.e. sentiment or emotion. So, we may say that it is in the Mahābhāṣya that we meet for the first time the use of word rasa in the sense of 'nāṭyarasa' also.

Other references in the Mbh. on Pā. III 1 26 show familiarity of the Mahābhāṣyakāra with dramatic performance or something akin to that. This would suggest that the word rasa in the aesthetic sense must have become current before Patañjali. How long before, we do not have at present the means to indicate.

### 'RASA' IN

- Āśvaghosa (Cir. 100 A.D.) (Keith)  
 Bhāsa (Cir. 200 A.D.) (Keith)  
 Kālidāsa (Cir. 400 A.D.) (Keith).

From our search for the use of the word rasa in the aesthetic sense, we conclude that in the early vedic literature as such, there is no clear indication of it, though there are certain usages as we noted above, which associate rasa with literary works where the meaning is of flavour as such and the joy incidental to it. But when, we come to Pāṇini and Patañjali, particularly the latter, we have a very clear use of the word rasa in the aesthetic sense. Whether this specific use of the word rasa was known to Pāṇini or not, we cannot definitely say. But if the interpretation given by Patañjali also represents the view of Pāṇini, we can say that Pāṇini

also had in his mind the aesthetic sense of *rasa* to be distinguished from the sense of 'sense quality' of *rasa*. We can, therefore, assume that this specific aesthetic sense of the word *rasa* must have become current in the literary world of Patañjali and of later times.]

### **Earlier Poets**

Let us now see from the works of earlier poets like Aśvaghoṣa, Bhāsa and Kālidāsa, whether there is any material for the formation of *rasa* theory in the famous sūtra to be found in the Nā Sā of Bharata. By our study, we mean just to indicate how works of great poets might have guided Bharata in the formation of the theory. As the data of Nā Sā, falls between second Cen A D to still later times after christ, the authors under consideration can be said to fall in a period of fluidity regarding the formation of the theory. We can not say of the authors that they follow theory in the same vein as done by Haṛya, the author of Ratnāvalī, Priyadarśikā etc. By our study we mean just to indicate how works of great poets lying before Bharata might have guided him in the formation of the theory. The works before Bharata may be necessarily those of Aśvaghoṣa, Kālidāsa etc.

It is almost accepted fact that literary theory draws upon literary practice just as grammar does upon linguistic usage. That the definitions of mahākāvya and the like as found in poeticists such as Bhāmaha, Dandin etc were formulated in view of the master-pieces of Aśvaghoṣa, Kālidāsa etc is an accepted fact. On the same analogy we may say that probably the formation of the famous *rasasūtra* in Bharata also might have been guided by the same fact as that of the careful observation and study of the actual practice of the literary giants who might have preceded him. In view of this we may try to study the works of Aśvaghoṣa, (Cir 100 A D), Bhāsa (Cir 200 A D) and Kālidāsa (Cir 400 A.D). We will try to find out if there is any mentioning or clear usage of the

so called vibhāva, anubhāva, sāttvika and vyabhicārins etc. which make for the actual rasa realisation in their particular piece and which might have thus been useful in the formation of a theory of rasa both in nāṭya and kāvya

### Asvaghosa

In the *Bu Ca* of Asvaghosa at III 7, we have the description of king S'uddhodana bidding farewell to his son Sarvārthasiddha who was starting for his first excursion. The verse reads as below

atho narendrah sutamāgatās'ruh  
s irasyupāgbrāya cīram tīrīksya |  
gacchati cāṣṭāpayati sma vācā  
snehanna cainam manasā mumoca || (Bu Ca III 7)

The *S D* has discussed *vatsala rasa sneha* or *vatsalata* is the *sibāyin putra* i.e. son and the like are the *ālāmbana* *vibhāva* the *cesta* *vidyā saurya* etc. of the son are the *uddīpanas* *ālīṅgana* (embrace) *aṅgasparśa* (touching the limbs) *sirasācumbana* (kissing the head) etc. are the *anubhāv* as *anustās aṅkā* (imagining the calamity) *harṣa* (joy) etc. are the *sāñcārins*. We have practically all this in the stanza quoted above

*Bu. Ca* III 13 22 describe the feelings of women eager to see the prince. The *vyabhicārīn* called *āvega* (impatience) is to be seen in these verses

*Bu Ca* IV 25 describes the *anubhāvas* that accompany *śṛṅgārarasa* in the following words

tā bhrūbhū prekṣitāṣṭhāvairhasasairladitairgataḥ |  
cakrurākṣepikās ceṣṭā bhūtabhūṣā ivāṅganāḥ ||

*Bu Ca* IV 54 61 describe the state of the prince who did not respond to the gestures of the beautiful ladies. We find herein the delineation of *sama* and the realisation of *śānta rasa*. The verse reads as below



Bu. Ca. VIII, 21.22 provide all the required factors that make for karunarasa.

vilambakes'yo malināmbaṅga  
nirāṇjanairbaṅgapahateksanaīrmukhīh |  
striyo na rejumṛjaya vīnākṛtā  
diviva tātā rajanīksayārunah || 21

and also, araktatāmrās'caranairanūpurāh

akundalairgrjavakaandharairmukhāh |  
svabhāvapīnairjaghanairamekhalai-  
-rahātayoktrairmusitairiva stanaīh || (22)

avega born of calamity is beautifully illustrated in Bu. Ca. VIII. 20 as below

atīpraharādatha s'okamūreccitāh  
kumārasamdars'analolalocanāh |  
grhadvīnis'cakramurās'rayā striyāh  
s'aratpayodādīva vidyutās'calāh ||

The sāttvikabhāvas such as stambha, vaivarnya etc. that go with the karuna rasa are to be seen in the following :

hatatvīso'nyāh s'thūlāmsabāhavaḥ  
striyo vīṣḍena vicetanā iva |  
na cakrasūrnāśru jābūrna śas'vasur-  
na celurāsurlīkhitā iva sthūlāh || (Bu. Ca VIII. 25)

The anubhāvas of karunarasa, such as dalvanindā (censure of fate) bhūpāta (falling on the earth), krandita (weeping) etc. are seen in yasodharāvilāpa in Bu. Ca. VIII. 31-42.

Bu. Ca. VIII. 31 is—tatastu rosapravīraktalocanā  
viśādasambandhikaṣāyagadgadam |  
uvāca nis'vāsacalatpayodhara  
vigadhas'okāśrudharā yas'odharā ||

So also, Bu. Ca. VIII. 70,—itīha devī patīs'okamūreccitā,  
rurōda dadhyau vilāpa caśakṛt |  
svabhāvadhīrāpī hī sū satī s'ucā.  
dhṛtīm na sasmāra cakāra no hrīyan ||

Falling on the earth due to grief is described in Bu Ca VIII. 73, and the wailings on the part of king Suddhodana are described in Bu Ca VIII 75-80. Jadata (Stupour), the sāttvika finds expression in Bu Ca VIII 81-

Iti tanayaviyogajataduhkhah  
 kṣītisadrś'āṃ sahaṃ vibhāya dhairyam (   
 das aratha iva ramaś'okavas yo  
 bahu vilalapa nṛpo viśamjñakalpah ||

Krodha, the sthāyibhāva of raudra and the anubhāva that accompany it are described in XIII 28-30

Bu Ca XIII 30 is,—mahābhīto dharmaparāś'ca nāgā  
 mahāmūnervighnamamṛjyamānāḥ (   
 māmam prati krodhavivṛttanetrā  
 nihsaś'vasuḥ caiva jāyāmbhīre ca ||

The material for bhīhatsarasa is supplied in the description of hell in Bu Ca XIV

Bu Ca XIV-14 says

kecittikṣṇairayodamṣṭrairbhakṣyante dārunāḥ svabhīḥ (   
 kecīd dhiṣṭairayastundairvāyasairāyasairiva ||

so also in the Vth Canto wherein the charms of ladies are described as being infective,

Bu Ca V 61-reads,

vivṛṭāsyaputā vivṛḍḍhagātrī prapatadvaktṛajalā  
 prakāśa guhyā (   
 aparā madaghūrṇiteva śīṣe na bābhāse vikṛtāṃ vapuḥ  
 poposa (|

śṛṅgāra finds beautiful expression in Sau IV 36-

athāpyanāś'yānavisesakāyāṃ mayyesyasi tvam tvaṇitam  
 tatastvām (   
 nipīdayiṣyāmi bhujadvayena nīrbhīsanenārdravilepanena ||

The vyabhicārīn called vitarka finds beautiful expression in Sau IV 42

tam gauravam būddhagatam cakarsa  
bhāryānurāgaḥ punarācakarsa |  
so'nis'cayānāpi yayau na tasthau  
turamstarangesviva rājahamsaḥ ||

The anubhāvas of karuṇa are found in Sau, VI. 4,

sā khedasamsvinnalalātakena  
nīśvāsanīṣṭitaviś'esaḥkena |  
cintācalākṣena mukhena tasthau  
bhartāramanyatra viśaṅkamānā ||

and also VI 5—tatas'cīrasthānaparīs'ramena

sthitaiva paryānkatale papata |  
tiryakca śīṣye pravīṇinabārā  
sapādukaikārdhaviḥa mabapādā ||

āvega, is seen in the verses that follow Vilāpa or wailings are seen in verses 12-19. So also the anubhāvas of kṣobha, kṛandana etc are seen in Sau. VI 24-25.

Sau VI 34 describes vividly all the anubhāvas that go with karuṇarasa as below

ruroda mamāu virurāva jaglau  
babhrāma tasthau vilalāpa dadhyan |  
cakāra roṣam vicakāra māyām  
cakarta vīkṛtaam vicakarṣa vāstram ||

Thus in Aśvaghosa we come across the actual description of different vibhāvādīs that give rise to different rasas and thus providing enough material for the theorists to draw their own conclusions.

### Bhāsa

In Bhasa's Svapnavāsavadattam, we have the vyabhicārīn called smṛti illustrated in V. 5 and 6 which read as below :

smarāmyavantyādhipateḥ sutāyaḥ  
prasthānakāle svajanam smarantyaḥ |  
bāṣpam pravṛttam nayanāntalagnam  
śneḥānomamaivorasi pātayantyāḥ (Svapna V. 5)



and also—bahus'o'pyupades'esu yayā māmiksamānayaḥ |  
hastena srastakoṇena kṛtamākāśavāditam ||

and also in the following

Rājā—śrūtisukhaninade katham nu devyāḥ  
stanajugale jaghanasthale ca suptā |  
vibhagaganarajovikṛnadandā  
pratibhayamabhusitāsyarāṇyavāsam ||

api ca, asṇigdhāsī ghoṣavati yā tapasvinyā na smarasi,  
stonisamūdvaḥanapārs'vanīpīditāni  
kheḍastanāntarasukhānyupaguhitāni |  
uddis'ya mām ca vīrahe paridevitāni  
vādyāntaresu kathitāni ca sasmitāni ||

2 (Svapna VI 1-2)

and also in Avimśaraka II 1, which runs as,

adyāpi hastīkaras'īkaras'ītalāneṣu  
bālām bhayākulavilolavīsādanetrām |  
svapneṣu nityamupalabhya punarvibodhe  
jāṭisamrah prathamajātīmiva smarāmi ||

All these instances evoke vipralambha śrīṅgāra

We may be able to read the material for karuṇa in the speech of Daśaratha in Pratīma II, for whom Rāma is lost for ever

Rājā—bhrātāḥ 'sumantra'

kvame jyeṣṭho rāmaḥ  
nabhi nabhi yuktamabhihṛitam mayā |  
kva te jyeṣṭho rāmaḥ priyasuta, sutah sū kva duhitā,  
videhānām bharturmitāṣaḥ bhaktirgurujaṇe |  
kva vā saumitṛirmām hatapitṛkāmāsannamarānam  
kīmapyāhuh kīm te sakalajanasolāṇavakaram ||

The vibhāva, anubhāva etc of hāsyā are seen in the speech of Vasantaka in svapna V, where he starts telling a story to Udayana

*Vidūṣakah* -bhodu, annam kahaissam atthi naaram bambhadattam  
nāma ihaṃ kila rāa kampillo nāma.

*Raja* -kimiti kimiti

*Vidūṣakah* -(punastadeva pathati)

*Raja* -murkha! rājā brahmadattah nagaram kampilam  
ityabhidhiyatam.

*Vidūṣakah* -kim rāa bambhadatto naa raṃ kampilam

*Raja* evametat

*Vidūṣakah* -tena hi muhuttaam padivālledu bhavam, jāva  
otibagaam karissam rāa bahamadatto naaram  
kampilam (iti bahus'astadeva pathivā) idānim  
sunodu bhavam

Raudra with krodha as its sthāyin and the enemy as  
ālambana, the activity of the enemy its uddīpana, etc is seen  
in the following passage from the Madhyama Vyāyoga

*Bhīmah* - atha ko'yaṃ bhīmo nāma viś'vakartā sivaḥ kṛṣṇah  
śakrah saktidhara yamah |  
etesu kathyatam bhadra kena te sadṛśaḥ pita ||

*Ghaṭotkacah* -sarvaḥ

*Bhīmah* -dhigantametat

*Ghaṭotkacah* -katham kathamanortamityaha kṣipasi me gurum,  
bhavatvimaṃ stbulaṃ vrksamutpātya praharāmi  
(utpātya praharati) kathamanenāpi na sakyate  
hantum kiṃ nu khalu kariṣye bhavatu, dṛṣtam  
etadgirikutamutpātya praharāmi etc etc

or as in Duṭaghaṭotkaca wherein we have,

*Ghaṭotkacah* -(sarosam) kiṃ dūta iti māṃ pradharsayasi  
mātvadbhoh na dūto haṃ.

alam vo vyavasāyena praharadhvam samābataḥ |

jyāchedāddurbalo nāhamabhimanyuriha sthitaḥ ||

mahānasa kaisorako'yaṃ me manorathah api ca,

daṣṭosto rṣustimuddiyama tiṣṭhatyesa ghaṭotacah |

uttisthatu pumān kascidgantumicchedyamālayam ||

etc etc.

*Vīrarasa*, with *garva* as its *vyabhicārin* is beautifully illustrated in *Dutavākya* I 24, wherein *Duryodhana* says,

-bho dūta na jānati bhavān rājyavyavahāram  
rājyam nāma nṛpātmajaḥ sahrdayaḥ jivā ripūn bhujyate  
talloke na tu yacyate na tu punardīnāya vā diyate |  
kāṅksā cenrpatitvamāptumacirāt kurvantu te sāhasam  
svairam vā pravisantū śāntamatibhirjustam samāyāśramam ||  
(*Dutavākya* I 24)

or in the following

*Duryodhanah*:-ā kasya vijñāpyam madvacanādevaṃ sa  
vaktavyaḥ,  
kiṃ vyartham bahu bhāṣase, na khalu te pārusya sādhyā  
rājyam,  
kopānnarhasi kīmcīdeva vacanaṃyud dham yadā dāsyasi |  
niryāmyesa nīrantaram nṛpasatacchatrāvalibhirvṛta  
stithaiṣvaṃ saha pāṇḍavaḥ pravivaco dāsyāmi te sāyakaib||  
(*Dutaghatotkaca* I 15 )

*Dharmavira* can be read in the following

*Śalyah* -bho angarāja vañcitah khalu bhavān  
*Kānah* -kena  
*Śalyah* -sakrena  
*Karṇah* -na khalu sakrah khalu mayā vañcitah  
anekayjñāhutitarpito divjaḥ  
kṛttimān dānavasamghamardanaḥ |  
suradvīpāspṛhālanakarkaśāṅgulir-  
mayā kṛtārthah khalu pākaśāśanaḥ || (*Karṇabhāra* I 23).

and also,

*Śalyah* :-āṅgarāja na dātavyam  
*Karṇah* -salyarāja alamalaṃ vārayitum, pasya,  
śikṣā ksayaṃ gacchati kālāparyayāt  
subaddhamulāḥ nīpatanti pādapāḥ |  
jalam jalāsthānagatam ca śuśyati  
butam ca dattam ca tatthaiṣa tisthati || (22)  
tasmāt grhyatām. (nikṛtya dadāti) (*Karṇabhāra* I)

Bhayānaka is illustrated in the following .

*Dāmodarah* -

etā mattacakorāsāvanayanāḥ predbhinnakamrastanāḥ  
kāntāḥ prasphuritādharaśtarucayo visrastakesasrajāḥ ।  
sambhṛāntā galitottariyavāsanāstrāsākulavyābṛtāḥ  
trastā māmannyānti pannāgapatīm dr̥ṣṭvaiva gopāṅganāḥ ॥  
(Bālacarita, IV. 1)

Bībhatsa is evoked in Ūrubhanga I 11, as below :

gbṛdhṛā madhūkamukulonnatapiṅgalākṣā  
daityendrakuṇjaranataṅkusatikṣnatundāḥ ।  
bbāntyāmbare vitatalambavikīrṇapakṣā  
māmsāḥ pravalaracitā iva tālavṛntāḥ ॥

Thus we come across illustrations in the plays of Bhāsa, that might have been a source of inspiration to the theorists

*Kālidāsa*

In Kālidāsa also we observe the same. We come across the delineation of different bhāvas, anubhāvas etc that are associated in theory with particular rasas. We find them here also in the same context. Thus, avahitthā, the vyabhicārīn of śṛṅgāra finds expression in Kum. Sa. VI 84 as,

evaṃ vādinī devatṣau pārsve pīturadhomkhi ।  
līlākamalapatrāṇi ganayāmāsa pārvatī ॥

The vyabhicārīn called mati is seen in Śakuntala I 21-  
asamṣayam ksatraparigrabhakṣamā  
yadāryamasyāmabhīlīṣi me manah ।  
satām hi sandehapadesu vastusu  
pramāṇamantahkarāṇapravṛttayah ॥

'Svapna' is the vyabhicārīn that goes with vipralambha śṛṅgāra. It finds its expression in Megha (uttara, 49)-  
māmākṣapranītibhujam nīrdayāśleṣahetoḥ  
labdhāyāste kathamapi mayā svapnasandars'aneṣu ।  
paś'yantīṅgam na khalu bahus'o na sthaliḥ devatānām  
muktāsthulāstarukisalayesvas'rules'āḥ patanti ॥

All the paraphernalia of vipralambha sṛṅgāra is supplied in Megha (uttara 47)-

tvāmālikhya pranayakupitām dhaturāgaḥ silāyāmātmānam  
te caranapatitam yavadicchāmi kartum |

asraistāvanmuhurupacitairdṛsurālupyate me krūrastasminn-  
apī na sāhate saṃgamam nau kṛtāntah ||

Herein, the heroine is the ālambanavibhāva, tatpranayakopa is the uddīpanavibhāva, the desire to fall at the feet is the anubhāva, censure of destiny is the vyabhicārīn and ratī or love is the sthāyīn

The uddīpanavibhāva for sānta is met with in Śakuntala I 7

ulvāṅ s'ukagatibhakormukhabharastāḥ etc

Unmādati's'aya, a vyabhicārīn of vipralambha is seen in Vikramo-IV in the verse viz -

sarvakṣitibhṛtam nātha etc and also in tarāṅgabhrubhaṅgā,  
etc.,

and also in-tanvī meghajālarādrapallavatayā etc Vītarka is seen in (Vikramo IV)

tissthethkopavas'at prabhāvapihita etc

Instances can be multiplied as we find the vibhavadis of karuṇa in ajavilāpa and rativilāpa, of smṛtā in Ku Sam vasantavarṇana etc Vīra finds expression at Raghu III 51,

tataḥ prahasyāpabhayāḥ purandaram  
punarbabbhāse turagasya rakṣitā |  
gṛhṇa sastram yadī sarga esa te  
na khalvanirjitya raghum kṛtī bhavān ||

or dharmavīra as in Raghu II 57,

kimapyabhiṃsyah tava cenmatōham  
yas'ahs'arīre bhava me dayāluḥ |  
ekāntavidhvamsiṣu madvidbhāṇām  
pīndēṣvanāsthā khalu bhautikeṣu ||

Thus, it is precisely such clear instances in the works of literary masters that might have been the original source of inspiration for the theorists to formulate their principles of literary criticism

We will now try to study the occurrences of the word 'rasa' in Asvaghosa, Bhāsa, and Kālidāsa and we will try to see if there is a clear reference to the aesthetic sense of rasa in any occurrence

In the Bu Ca of Aśvaghosa, we come across two occurrences of rasa and one of rasā(5) None of it carries the technical sense of nāṭyarasa or kāvyarasa

Rasā at Bu Ca V 5 means 'the earth' However, Bu Ca V 62 is noteworthy

Bu. Ca V 62, is

Iti sattvakulānurupam vividham sa pramadājanah  
s'ayānah |

sarasah sadrs'am babhara rupam  
pavanāvarjitarugnapuskārasya ||

'sarasah' obviously means 'charged with srogrārasa'

In the Sau, we have five occurrences of rasa (6) Sau V 24 has,

sraddhādhanam śreṣṭhataman dhanebhyah |  
prajñārasah tṛptikaro renebhyah ||

Rasa in prajñarasa does not carry any technical sense but rasa in 'rasebhyah' i.e. among all the rasas, may refer to the rasas such as as śrōgāra, vira, etc. or tastes in general

Sau XI. 2 has anistanaṣkramyarasah i.e. one who was not interested in inaction, and also virasah, 'without interest'

Sau IX 49 has 'rasan' in the sense of 'marking noise'. Sau XVI 93 has 'rasan' in the sense of 'taste'

Thus in Aśvaghosa, we do not come across 'rasa' in the technical sense of kāvyarasa or nāṭyarasa, excepting perhaps at Bu Ca V 62, as above

In the Trivendrum plays ascribed to Bhāsa, we have four occurrences of rasa (7) But none of it is seen in its technical sense

In Kālidāsa, we come across several references of the word rasa 8 and some of them are definitely referring to the technical sense of a nāṭyarasa or kāvyarasa

These are as below

Kum Sa VII 91 reads as below

tau sandhisu vyañjitavṛttibhedam  
rasāntaresu pratibaddharāgam |  
apasyatām apsarasām muhūrtam  
prayogamādyam lalitāṅgabāram ||  
'sandhi' refers to the pañcasandhis  
'vṛtti' refers to kais'iki, and the like  
and rasāntaresu' refers to various nāṭyarasas

Kum Sa V 82 is also noteworthy It has 'bhāvaikrasam manas' obviously in the sense of sṛṅgarārāsa

The Mālavikāgnimitram has the following occurrence of 'rasa' in its technical sense

Mā I, 4 reads as below :

devānāmīdamāmananti munayah krāntam kratum cakṣuṣam,  
rudrenedamumakṛtavyatikare svāṅge vibhaktam dvīdhā |  
traigunyodbhavamatra lokacaritam nānārasam drsyate,  
nāṭyam bhinnarcerjanasya bahudhapyekam samārāadhanam ||

Mā II 8 is,

angalrantarnihīta vacanaññi sūcitah samyagarthah,  
pādanyāso layamanugatastanmayatvam rasesu |

sākhāyonīrmrduṛabhinayastadvikalpānuvṛttau,

bhāvo bhavam nudati visayādrāgabandhah sa eva ||

Mā IV. 13—

tāmāsritya srutipathagatamṛsayabaddhamulāh  
samprāptānām nayanavīsayam rūdharāgapravālah |  
hastasparsairnukūlita iva vyaktaromodgamatvāt  
kuryātkantam manasijatarurmām rasajñam phalāśyas ||

R 15

In these occurrences 'rasa' carries the technical sense of nātyarasa.

In the Vikramorvasiṃ we have rasa in its technical sense, at,

I 8. : asyaḥ sargavidhau prajāpatirabhuccandro nu kāntipradah |  
sṃgataikarasaḥ svayaṃ nu madanaḥ māso nu

puṣṭakārḥ ||

vedābhyājadah kathāṃ nu vīśayvyāvṛttakautūhalah |  
nirmātaṃ prabhavenmanoharamimam rūpaṃ

putraṃ munih ||

III. 18. munirā bharatena yāḥ prayogaḥ  
bhavattṣvaṣṭarasaṣṭrayo niyuktah |  
lalitābhīnayam tamadya bhartā  
marutāṃ draṣṭumanāḥ salokapālāḥ ||

and, Act. III—dvitīyāḥ—tasmin punah sarasvatīkṛtakābandhe  
lakṣmīsvayamvare tesu tesu rasāntaresu tan-  
mayyāsīt |

Thus in Kālidāsa, we come across occurrences of 'rasa' in the aesthetic sense.

### Foot-Notes

All the references are to the Edn. of Dr. Keilhorn.

(1) In Patañjali we have

√ras-Pā. Sū. 2.4.85 line No. 16, 17, 17, 17, 20, pp. 500.

√ras-Pā. Sū. 1.3.10, Line 8.8, Page 268; 4/269.; 2.4.85;

17,18/19/22-499.; 5.6.7.8.9.11.18 24/500.; 2.2.3.4.5. 6.8.10/502.

rasa-1.4.110, 18/356.; 3.9/357.; 4.3.155.; 9. 15/325.

rasa-1.2.64. 5/246; 4.1.3. 7/198.

rasa-1.2.64. 3.4/246.; 4.1.3. 4.6/198.; 5.1.9. 24/366.

rasavācīva—Pā.Sū 4.4.24 line 18, page 330.

rasavācīn— 4.4.24.  $\frac{18/19}{330}$  ; 5.2.107.  $\frac{5/5/6}{397}$ .

rasādī— (ga) 5.2. 95.  $\frac{19/21}{394}$  ;

rasika 5.2.95  $\frac{21—}{394}$  ;



- (2) The Bu Ca. has,  
 'rasa' at II. 8.; III. 51.; V. 52 (sarasah)  
 and 'rasa' at V. 5,
- (3) The Sau. has rasa at  
 V. 24.—prajñārasah, rasebhyah;  
 IX. 48—'rasa'  
 XI. 2.—rasa,  
 XI. 49—rasan (=making sound)  
 XVI. 93—rasena,
- (4) The trivendrum plays ascribed to Bhāsa have,  
 rasanā-pra. yau, III, pp. 84. Edn. Prof. Déodhar)  
 bhayararasam—Avi. I. 2; (pp. 110);  
 adhikararasah—Avi. V. 4. (pp. 168)  
 guṇarasaññasya—Cā. I. 2. (pp. 197);  
 kṛdārasesu—Cā. III. 1. (pp. 223)
- (5) Kālidāsa has,  
 rasam—Raghu I. 18;  
 samarasā Raghu IV. 18;  
 rasān— „ IV. 66;  
 rasavat— „ VIII. 68;  
 rasakhandana varjitam.—Raghu. IX. 36;  
 abalāikarasāh— Raghu IX. 43;  
 rasāntarāni } „ X 17;  
 ekarasam }  
 kṛdārasam—Kum. Sa I. 29.  
 rasāt— „ „ III. 37.  
 rasātmakasya „ „ V. 22.  
 bhāvāikarasam manah— Kum. Sa. V. 82;  
 „ „ VII. 91,  
 jātaraṇarasā— „ „ VIII. 36;  
 mūlasekaśarasaññ— „ „ VIII. 38;  
 dhāturasā— „ „ VIII. 58;  
 prabhārasam— „ „ VIII. 70.

anāṅgarasaprasaṅge-	Ku. Sam. IX, 1;
rasena-	„ „ IX. 41; and XI.
rarāsa virasam-	„ „ XVI. 12;
saraṅga-	Rtu. Sc. I. 2. (grismavarnanam)-

The *S'akuntala* has,

-sadayam sundari grhyate raso'sya-III.  
 lāksārasah-Sā, IV. 4.  
 (bhavanesu) rasādhikesu-S'ā. VII, 20,

The *Vikramo* has

Śrngaraikarasah-I, 1,  
 astarasas'rayah-II, 18;  
 rasāddite- II, 22;

rasāntaresu Act III-dvītyah speaks,

*Malavikā*-has,

nānārasam-I. 4;  
 rasesu- II. 8,  
 rasajñam-IV. 1

*Megha* has,

rasābhyantarah-I. 28 (-pūrvamegha)  
 sarasakadaḥ -II, 36 (uttaramegha)

## CHAPTER VIII

### 'RASA' in Bharata ( Nā Śa Cīr 400 A.D. )

[The earliest technical discussion of rasa is to be found in the Nā Śā, attributed to, Bharata ( Cīr. 400 A.D. ) ] In fact Nā Śā is also our earliest authority on such topics of sanskrit poetics as alampkāra, guna, dosa, etc I now, therefore, present here a discussion on rasa as found in this work. The textual criticism of this work on dramaturgy is not yet fully carried out This much, however, is clear that it contains several strata belonging probably to different ages and probably also to different schools of thought The major part of this work is in verse There are, however, a few prose passages also It is likely that the prose portion containing the famous rasa-sūtra may be an early discussion on the subject However that may be, I take the whole portion, prose and verse, as one unit for the discussion here. The ānuvaṃśya āryās and s'lokas quoted in support of the main text in prose and verse, clarify what is said in the body of the text.

Having described in the first five adhyāyas of the Nā Śā, the mythical origin of the science of dramaturgy, its first production, the construction of the different types of theatre buildings, the ceremonial worship of the theatre, the different aspects of pūrvarāṅga, the difference between abhinaya, nṛtta and the different varieties of nṛtta etc, Bharata comes to some of the main themes relevant to the art of dramaturgy.\*

In the sixth adhyāya, the sages ask Bharata five questions. Of these the first and the foremost are—

—ye rasaḥ kiṃ paribhānto nṛtī-śe nṛtī-avicakṣanaḥ |

rasatvam kena vai teṣāṃ etadākhyāyumarhasi || (VI. 2 )

and,

bhāvāścaiva katham proktaḥ kiṃ vā te bhāvayantyapi |

(VI. 3a-b)

Thus, the understanding of the rasas and the bhāvas occupy prominent place in the *Nāṣā*. The eight rasas and the sthāyīn, sañcārīn and sāttvikabhāvas are enumerated in verses 16-23 of the VI the Chapter. Later on, after having enumerated abhinayas, vṛttis, pravṛttis, siddhis, four types of musical tones, four types of musical instruments, five types of singing and three types of theatre building, the author proceeds to explain the subject of rasa in prose

Here comes the famous *rasa-sūtra* viz “*vibhāvanubhāva-vyabhicārisamyogād-rasanīspattiḥ*”—.] In this sūtra, the meaning of the word ‘*nīspattiḥ*’ derived from the root *nīspad* has caused a great controversy. It may be expressed in English, following Monier Williams, as something which comes about, or arises out of, or results from something else. This sūtra is translated by Raneiro Gno: as follows—“Out of the union of determinants (*vibhāva*), the consequents (*anubhāva*), and the transitory mental states (*vyabhicārīn*), the birth of *rasa* takes place.” He translates, ‘*nīspattiḥ*’, by ‘birth’, which may be regarded as a colourless word not tending to any particular view regarding the psychological progress of this birth. This sūtra is followed by an explanation in prose supported by traditional verses

[ Here, an attempt is made to explain three points (i) How *rasa* comes about? (ii) What is *rasa*? and (iii) What feeling accompanies it? The first point is explained on the analogy of a beverage. In a beverage there is one principal ingredient which combined with other tasteful ingredients becomes in an integrated form a *rasa* like *śāḍava* and others. Similarly, when the permanent mental states like *rati* or love, *bhaya* or fear, etc., are combined with various *bhāvas*, specified in the sūtra as *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicārīn*, they become *rasas*. The second point, as to why these are called *rasas* is also explained on the same analogy viz that these also, like the material beverages, are capable of being tasted. The third point, viz

the feeling which accompanies the taste, is that of pleasure. Thus, all the three points involved in the sūtra are explained on the analogy of material rasas.]

This analogy is made clearer in the traditional verses quoted after this. Just as experts in taste, while eating the cooked things combined with many dravyas and 'vyañjanas enjoy it, similarly the wise or the connoisseurs enjoy with mind-manasā-the permanent mental states which are combined with the abhinayas of bhāvas. It is for this reason that these are called nātyarasas. In these verses, two more points are added by way of clarification. One is that it requires an expert or a connoisseur to be able to discern and enjoy the taste properly, both in matters of food and drink as well as in the enjoyment of the taste in poetry and art. The second point is that it is with the mind that taste in poetry and art is perceived and enjoyed, as distinct from the physical sense of taste in the mouth.

As to why the sthāyibhāvas alone attain the state of rasa is explained in the VII Chapter. Here also, the explanation proceeds by way of analogy. Eventhough, men have similar characteristics, have similar bodies, yat, there are some who by their noble family, character, learning, artistic proficiency, attain to the state of kinghood, while other persons of inferior talent become their followers. Similarly, vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicārin become subordinate to sthāyibhāvas. This means that in the psychological theories of the ancients, the eight or nine permanent moods, sthāyibhāvas, viz. rati or love, hasa or laughter, śoka or grief, etc, were taken to be perpetual moods of living creatures in contrast to the fleeting moods such as nirveda, glāni, etc.

Thus, from these two passages, we gather that Rasa is a matter of tasting of permanent moods with mind by men who have proficiency in such tasting. The sthāyibhāvas attain to this mental tastefulness, rasatva, not by themselves but when connected with the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and the vyabhicārin.

This connexion is of a generative nature. The knowledge of the relation of feelings emotions and sentiments with events and circumstances of life becomes so to say transformed in poetry and drama into what are called vibhāvas and anubhāvas. It is this connexion which is the stuff of what becomes rasa. ☞

Now let us see what the Na Śā means by the term 'vibhāva anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāva

The meaning of the term 'vibhāva is given as below  
 —atha vibhāva iti kasmāt ucyate vibhāvo vijñānārthah, vibhāvah  
 kāraṇam nimittam heturiti paryāyan vibhāvante nena vāgāṅga  
 sattvābhīnaya ityato vibhāvāḥ yathā vibhāvitam vijñātamity-  
 anarthaṅtaram—(Na Śā VII pp 346) (G O S Ed)

☞ Vibhava is primarily taken in the sense of knowledge (vijñāna). It is however a piece of knowledge which reveals something else also. Therefore, in relation to that something else which it reveals, it is also called kāraṇa nimitta and hetu, i.e. there are other words for vibhāva. It is by means of vibhāva that vācika, śāṅgika and sattvika abhinayas are so to say, understood or grasped specifically. Thus vibhāvitam is said to mean vijñātam. ☞ Thus rather not quite clear exposition in prose is clarified in the verse quoted as authority viz.,

bhāvo rthā vibhāvante vāgāṅgabhinayaśrayāḥ |  
 anena yasmātenāyam vibhāva itī samjñitāḥ ||

(Na Śā VII 4)

Because (many meanings coming from vācika and śāṅgika abhinayas are made clear or capable of being grasped or understood, it is called vibhāva. Thus vibhāva is really a type of knowing which is responsible for other meanings culminating in the perception of mental states.]

Anubhāva is explained as follows

—anubhāva iti kasmāt ucyate anubhāvante nena vāgāṅgasattva  
 kṛto bhīnaya itī  
 (Na Śā VII, pp 347)

↳Anubhāva is the expression of these mental states by means of vācika and āṅgika abhinayas. The anubhavas may be identified with bodily expressions, including vocal expressions which show the mental states produced by the vibhāvas. ↳The sloka is

~vāgāṅgābhinayeneha yatastvartho'nubhāvyate |  
sākṣāṅgopāṅgasamyuktastvanubhāvastataḥ smṛtāḥ  
(Nā Sā VII 5)

Vyabhicārin or transitory state is explained as,

vi abhi ityetāvupasargau cara iti gatyartho dhātuh  
vividhamabhimukhyena raseṣu carantīti vyabhicārinah vāgāṅ-  
gasattvopetāḥ prayoge rasānnayanti iti vyabhicārinah  
(Na Śa VII pp 355)

~i.e. 'vi' and 'abhi' are prefixes, and the root is 'cara' meaning 'to go', 'to move'. Here the word vyabhicārinah means, 'those mental states, which in a variety of ways move towards the principal sentiments. That is, they are the mental states which play the part of accessories which reinforce the permanent moods. ↳

The rasa theory of Bharata may be interpreted in the following way. ↳The vibhāvas are statements and presentations which give rise to emotions and sentiments. The expressions of the sentiments and emotions thus born was anubhāvas. The fleeting emotions caused and expressed in a similar way are the vyabhicārins. These unite into a unitary whole like the honey gathered from different plants. When this unitary whole becomes tasted by one who can taste it with discernment, it is the state of rasa.

It may be noted that theory of rasa is based upon the psychological analysis of the human mind in ancient times. The results have been put into a formula which has become traditional. It has eight (or nine) permanent states of mind, i.e. sthāyibhāvas, thirty-three transitory states i.e. vyabhicārins, and the eight sattvikabhāvas. This group of forty-nine

mental states is the material out of which eight or nine rasas are formed. These are, *srīgāra* (love), *hāsyā* (laughter), *karuṇā* (tragic), *vīra* (heroic), *raudra* (furious), *bhayanāka* (terrific), *bībhatsa* (odious), and *adbhuta* (marvellous), the *natyārasas*, and to which later on is added the *santa rasa* (quietistic). The *Nāṭya* being essentially a work on dramaturgy, enumerates, the different *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *sancārins* that constitute these rasas, in the sixth and seventh *adhyāyas*. All this material in the *Nāṭya* has more or less become traditional in the later works on Sanskrit dramaturgy and poetics.

It may also be noted that in the 16th *adhyāya* of the *Nāṭya*, dealing with the concepts of *lakṣaṇa*, *guṇa*, *dosa*, and *alamkāra*, it is stated (vs. 113-114) that the *guṇas* and the *alamkāras* have to be used in poetry, in consonance with the delineation of different rasas. Here, it may be noted, *rasa* is visualised in connection with poetry i.e. *kāvya* in addition to drama or *nāṭya*.



## CHAPTER IX

### 'RASA' in the earlier authors in Sanskrit Poetics

- (i) Bhāmaha
- (ii) Dandin
- (iii) Vāmana
- (iv) Udbhata
- (v) Rudrata

The comparatively simple rasa theory of the Nāṣā, becomes the subject-matter of fine analysis and recondite discussion in the later writers. The different dārsanika views have entered into this discussion and made it complicated. These different views have been given by Abhinavaguptapādācārya in his commentary on the rāsaśūtra before he gives his own subtle theory. The same subject has been touched by him in his commentary on Dhvanyāloka. Before we come to this later development, it will be appropriate to study the treatment of rasa as given by writers on poetics earlier than Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta.

In the earlier ālaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Dandin etc we do not come across any adequate discussion on rasa-realisation. It seems, these earlier writers on poetics had their own notion of kāvyā or poetry as word and sense taken together in general. All that rendered charm to poetry was termed 'ālaṃkāra' in the wider sense of the term. Bhāmaha called it 'vakrokti' in general (II 85) (1). Dandin also takes the term ālaṃkāra in a wider sense and applies it to anything that may render charm to poetry. (II 1) (2). Vāmana, at I 1 2, takes the term ālaṃkāra in a wider sense and defines it as 'saundarya' or 'charm' in general (3). Thus, whatever is a source of charm in poetry, is broadly termed ālaṃkāra by the earlier writers on poetics. These writers must not have been unaware of the theory of

characterises a muktaka, while rasa is a characteristic of a mahākāvya. Rasa as an alamkāra, as observed above, would find place even in a muktaka.

### Dandin

Dandin also, from the theoretical point of view, seems to hold an identical position with reference to the topic of rasa. He also tries to incorporate rasa, bhāva, etc., under such figures as rasavat, preyas, etc. (10).

But, as compared to Bhāmaha, Dandin seems to have given more importance to rasa. This is seen in his treatment of the figures such as rasavat, preyas, etc. (11) Dandin treats of these figures at II. 280-291. He talks of śṛṅgāra at II. 281, of raudra at II. 282, and of vīra at II. 284. karuṇa is illustrated at II. 286. Bībhatsa, adbhuta and bhayanaka are illustrated in II. 288, 289, and 291, respectively. Abhinava in his Abh. (272, Vol. I Nā Śa. G.O.S. Ed. II) while explaining the causal view of rasa held by Lollata, says that earlier writers such as Dandin also held a similar view. (12) The commentators try to read a fully worked out rasa theory in Dandin. (13) But as to the theoretic position of rasa in kāvya, Dandin says at II. 287. that thus, kārūṇya which is enhanced, is taken as alamkāra (14) Thus, even for Dandin, rasa is only an alamkāra in poetry. (15).

Preyas is defined as, 'priyatarākhyana' at II. 275 Preyas is felicitous expression and rasavat happens where rasa abounds. Ūrjasvī is where pride dominates or that which has appropriate excellence (16) From the illustrations cited by Dandin, it becomes clear that for him, preyas occurs in case of the suggestion of some bhāvas. (17). In the same way, ūrjasvī exhibits the bhāva of 'garva' or pride. Both preyas and ūrjasvī exhibit a bhāva as a 'kāvyasobhākaradharmā', i.e. alamkāra which serves to render charm to poetry. Rasavat, on the other hand, as seen above, exhibits fully developed rasas in form of an alamkāra. (18)

Dandin, like Bhāmaha, while describing the characteristics of a mahākāvya says that a mahākāvya should be full of rasa and bhāvas (rasabhāvanirantaram), and should also have well-defined sandhis. He also, like Bhāmaha, refers to other works for a description of drama.

### Vāmana

Vāmana does not treat these alaṃkāras. He, however, has tried to incorporate rasa in his own way in the arthaguna called kānti, which is defined at III. 2.15. (19). It should be noted that Vāmana seems to make an advance over his predecessors in subsuming rasa under gunas, which, for him, forms the essential of poetry-nitya dharmāḥ-as compared to alaṃkāras which are accedental or impermanent-i.e. anitya, a distinction which does not seem to have been made by Bhāmaha and Dandin.

### Udbhaṭa

Udbhaṭa treats of the topic as below. In the fourth varga of his Kavyālaṃkāra, he mentions these figures in the first kṛtikā. He defines preyasvat as, "Poetry which is composed so as to contain the indications of bhāvas like rati, by means of anubhāvas and the like, is said to contain preyās" The suggestion of these bhāvas such as rati and others, would lead us to rasavat. So, Vivṛtikara says that here, rati or love is to be taken only with reference to God, king, etc. In case of rati or love with reference to the beloved, it is rasavat. (20). Rasavat is defined at IV. 3 as "that in which the development of sentiments such as śṛṅgāra and the like, is clearly shown, and which are included (the indicators such as), a verbal statement of the sentiments, the sthāyin, the sañcārin, vibhāvas and abhinaya (21). Ūrjasvi (IV. 5) is, "the delineation of sentiments (rasas) and feeling (bhāvas), which hurt the sense of propriety in their depiction, or which are expressed in passion, anger, etc., (22). This is entirely a novel explanation of ūrjasvi, not to be seen either in Bhāmaha, or

in Dandin. Again, the use of the terms such as, 'kamakro-dhādikaranāt' probably suggests that 'rasa' according to Udbhata is caused by factors such as kama or sex desire, krodha or anger etc. Abhinava, as seen above tried to read the causal view of Lollata in Dandin.

Here also, probably we may read the same with greater confidence. Samāhita is defined at IV 7 as, "the description of the quelling of sentiments (rasa), feelings (bhava), or their semblances (abhāsas), quite unmixed with accessories (such as anubhava) (23)

Thus it appears that Udbhata treats of rasa as a part of alamkāra. But he has made a greater advance in discussing rasa eventhough as an alamkāra as can be seen in the definitions of preyasvat and the like. He mentions terms such as anubhava and refers to the 'svas'abdavācya' of rasa. Thus, probably he is the first amongst the earlier writers to have incorporated Bharata's theory. He also adds one more aspect of rasa theory viz. that whether rasa can be svas'abdavācya i.e. expressed by its own name or not. For him, rasa can be expressed by its own proper name, a position, generally controverted by authors like Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and others. Udbhata also mentions śantarasa

### Rudrata

When we come to Rudrata we find a still greater advance in the incorporation of ideas pertaining to 'rasa'. The first point to be noted is that he does not include rasavat, preyas, ūrjasvī etc. in the enumeration of alamkāras. He however, in I 4 characterises kāvyā by the word 'sarasa'. Whether this is for Rudrata a general characteristic of kāvyā or merely as in Bhāmah and Dandin a characteristic of a mahākāvya is not quite clear because the kāvyā to which he refers is one which a mahākāvī is supposed to compose. In the later adhyāyas viz. XII to XVI, we find the subject of rasa discussed

along with the discussions on the nāyakas, nāyikās etc. In fact, this section incorporates the relevant material of the Nāṣā. His justification for bringing in this topic of rasa is as follows. He says that poetry should incorporate rasas because those who have an aesthetic bent of mind are frightened by the dry teachings of the sāstras. They can learn wisdom about the four ideals of life from poetry which is full of rasas (XII 12) (24). Namisudhu says that rasas are not considered while dealing with the figures of sense, because poetry has word and sense for its body and vakrokti, vastava etc. as literary embellishments, while rasas are like beauty, the natural quality (sahajāḥ guṇāḥ), and therefore are excluded (25).

Thus as noted earlier, rasas are treated by Rudrata with reference to (kāvyāphala or) the object of poetry as derived by the connoisseurs. He then directly proceeds with the enumeration of rasas, viz śrīṅgārā vīra, karuṇa, bībhatsa, bhayānaka, adbhuta, hasya, raudra, śānta and preyaṇ (XIII 3). At XII 4, he says that rasas are so termed because they are relished as such—rasanādrasatvameśam. Namisudhu says that the ācāryas such as Bharata have called śrīṅgarādī to be rasas, because the sthāyibhāvas are so relished. Thus, it seems that Rudrata here treats of rasa-nispatti as seen in Bharata and tries to correlate it with the sahrdaya who relishes rasa as a kāvyāphala. Then he gives two varieties of śrīṅgārā viz sambhogā and vipralambhā and proceeds with the different types of nāyakas and his companions. From verses XII 6 onwards, he describes the different types of navikās. The XIIIth adhyāya is devoted to a description of śrīṅgarā and the XIVth to the vipralambhā. In the XVth adhya he describes vīra, bībhatsa, bhayānaka, adbhuta, karuṇa, raudra, śānta and preyaṇ. Then he gives a verse about the rītis that are appropriate to different rasas. The last adhya is devoted to the different types of prabandhas.

It should be noted that, as seen above in the light of the remarks of Namisādhū, Rudrata is inclined to take rasa as 'sahaja guṇa' or natural quality of kāvyā or poetry, as against alampkāra which is an external ornament. Vāmana was the first to say that guṇas are the permanent qualities of kāvyā, as against alampkāra, which is 'anitya dharma' or impermanent quality. Vāmana incorporated rasa under lāṭī guṇa which formed one of the essentials as compared to mere alampkāra, which forms the external element in kāvyā. Thus we see that the tendency to make rasa as something essential as compared to mere alampkāra (in its narrower connotation), first originated in Vāmana, and then was carried on further in Rudrata.

Moreover, Rudrata talks of preyas as a separate rasa at XV. 17. Rati or love with reference to a friend gives rise to this rasa. Thus, what in Bhaṇḍarāyaṇ, Daṇḍin and Udbhaṭa appears as alampkāra called preyas, appears in Rudrata as an independent rasa.

Rudrata, in the last chapter of his work treats of the various types of prabandhas or literary compositions. He says that the four objects of life should be treated in prabandhas mixed with rasas—(samyak tūn abhidadhyat rasas-ammis'raṇ prabandheṣu) Then he refers to the varieties of prabandhas in poetry, viz. (mahā) kāvyā, lāṭī, śukhyāyikā, etc. These are of two kinds—(i) imagined by the poet or (ii) based upon tradition. They may be (mahat) long, or short. (XVI-2). He describes the longer variety in verse 5. Those are the great poems in which all the four objects of life are depicted at length, and in which all the rasas are also depicted. While the smaller poems are those in which only one of the objects of life is depicted. As to rasas, all of them are not expected in them, while one rasa is completely depicted (XVI. 56). It may be karunārāsa or vipralambha (i.e. pravāsa ānāṣṭa) or prathamānūrāgam. (XVI. 34).

We have seen above that in the *ālaṃkārikas* earlier than *Ānandavardhana*, *rasa* is depicted as one of the *ālaṃkāras* or *gunas*, which, so to say, in their view, is a prominent characteristic of poetry. These authors, however, are not unfamiliar with the *nāṭyārāsa*s, discussed in the *Nāṭya Śāstra*. As we have seen, they bring them in while defining the *mahākāvya*s and by implication also in *kathās* and *ākhyāyikās*. Thus, it would appear that for these authors, *rasas* and *bhāvas* have their proper place in the *prabandha kāvya*s, great or small. We may note here the well-known lines about the *muktakas* of *Amaru*, wherein it is said that each verse of his is equal to a hundred *prabandhas*, implying thereby that one verse of *Amaru* has as much *rasa* as can be found in hundred *prabandhas*.

### **Ānandavardhana**

With *Ānandavardhana*, we enter into a new era of *sanskrit* poetics.

He seems to have fully realised the importance of *rasa* both in drama and poetry, and tries to give *rasa* a prominent place while incorporating it in his general scheme of *vyañjanā*. For him, the soul of poetry is *dhvani* or the suggested sense which is derived through the function of word called *vyañjanā*. This *dhvani* or the principally suggested sense, is three-fold according to *Ānanda*, viz *vastudhvani*, or the suggestion of a matter of fact or idea, *ālaṃkāradhvani*, or the suggestion of a poetic figure and *rasādhvani* or the suggestion of sentiment. This *rasādhvani* is virtually regarded as the highest type of *dhvani* by *Ānanda*. For him, *rasa* is never *svaśabdavācya* i.e. expressed through its own proper name, but is always suggested through *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicārins*. Thus *Ānanda* seems to have achieved a great point while harmonising the concepts of *rasa* as seen in *dramaturgy* and that of *vyañjanā* in poetry. *Abhinava* has elaborated the point in his *Abbh* as well as *Locana*.

Thus we<sup>1</sup> have seen that the earlier *ālaṃkārikas* such as *Bhāmaha*, *Dandin* etc do not totally ignore the fact of *rasa*. But they try to incorporate it under *ālaṃkāra*, a source of charm to poetry. *Dandin* is more elaborate in his treatment. *Udbhata* also seems to be better informed about the concept of *rasa* and its position in *kāvya*. He is probably the first to take *rasa* as *svasabda vācya* i.e. expressed by its own name. But one point is clear that for all of them the ultimate 'ālaṃkārya' is *kāvya* itself and *rasa*, *bhava*, etc., are only *ālaṃkāras*, in the wider sense of the term as 'kāvyas' *obhakarā dharma*'.

In *Vaṃsana* and *Rudrata* we noticed a new trend to incorporate *rasa*, *bhāva*, etc under *guṇa*, the essential or eternal quality of *kāvya* (*nityadharma*). *Rudrata* also speaks of several *rasas*, in fact any *bhāva* for him can be *rasa*. *Ānandavardhana* with his theory of *dhvani* and *vyanjana* gives a new orientation to the whole theme. *Abhinavagupta*, as we will see later on, elaborates the position taken by *Ānanda* and himself, in his *Locana* and *Abh*. We will consider his views on *rasa* realisation later on.

#### Foot notes

- 1 भामह II 85 सैषा सर्वेषु वक्तोक्तिरनयार्थो विभाव्यते ।  
यत्नोऽस्यां कविना कार्यं कोऽलङ्कारोऽनया विना ॥
- 2 दण्डिन् II 1 काव्यशोभाकरान् धमान् अलङ्कारान् प्रचक्षते ।
- 3 वामन I 1-2 : सौन्दर्यमलङ्कार ।
- 4 भामह III 6 रसवद्दर्शितस्पष्टशृंगारादिरस यथा ।  
देवी समागमदधर्ममस्करिष्यतिरोहित ॥

*Bhāmaha* does not choose to go into any detailed treatment of *Rasa*. At I 21 he says that the *Mahākāvya* should be युक्तं लोकस्वभावेन रसैश्च सक्तैः पृथक् । At ३, he says स्वादु काव्यं सोन्मिथ शास्त्रमप्युपयुज्यते ।



5. Bhamah III.5 : प्रेयो गृहागत कृष्णमवादीन्विदुरो यथा ।,  
अथ या मम गोविन्द जाता त्वयि गृहागते ।  
कालेनैषा भवेत्प्रोतिस्तवेवागमनात्सुनः ॥

This has been quoted by Dandin also. Appayya Dikṣita takes it as an example of *ananvaya dhvani*.

6. Bhamaha. III 7 : तर्जिषि कर्णेन यथा पार्थाय पुनरागतः ।  
न्दिः संदधाति किं कर्णः शल्येत्यहिरपाकृतः ॥

7. Bhamah, III 10. . समाहितं राजमित्रे यथा क्षत्रिययोषितां ।  
रामप्रसथै यान्तोनां पुरोऽदृश्यत नारदः ॥

8. S. D. X 86 , समाधिः सुकरे कार्ये दैवाद्वस्यन्तरागमात् ।

9. At II. 85 : Bhamaha uses the term 'vibhavyate', Abhinava tries to explain it in a technical sense of 'vibhavana'.

10 Dandin speaks of Rasa elsewhere also. He defines *mādhurya* ( I. 51) as, माधुर्यं रसवद्वाचि वस्तुन्यपि रसस्थितिः । i.e. the establishment of rasa in word and in object. 'At II.292 he explains 'mādhurya' as 'agrāmyatā' or 'absence of vulgarity'.

( II 292 is - वाक्यस्याग्राम्यतायोनेर्माधुर्यं दर्शितो रसः ।

इह त्वष्टरसायत्ता रसवत्ता स्मृता गिराम् ॥

तद्वृत्तं वाचस्पति explains as - एव शृङ्गारादिभिः अष्टभिः रसैः पूर्वदर्शितेन च अग्राम्यतोरूपेण रसेन नवधा रसत्वम् इति रसवदलङ्कारम् रूपसद्वरति वाक्यस्येति । This is not very clear. Hridayama probably explains it in a clearer way when it says माधुर्यगुणे प्रदर्शित.

शब्दार्थयोः अग्राम्यतया जातः रसः वाक्यस्य भवति ।

अलङ्कारतया निर्दिष्ट रसवत्त्वं अष्टरसायत्तमेव ।

Dandin does not seem to take rasa in any technical sense, but only in the general sense of 'kavyarasa' alone, in all those occurrences. Hemacandra says the same when he says :

श्रुतिवर्णानुप्रासाभ्यां वाग्रसं अग्राम्याभिधेयतया तु वस्तुरसः । माणिक्यचंद्र also, agrees to this He says (MS 180. आनन्दाश्रम ed.)

श्रुतिवर्णानुप्रासाभ्यां वाग्रसः अग्राम्यतया तु वस्तुरसः । इत्थं रसो द्वेषः । At, III. 149. again गिरा रसः is explained by Tarunavācaspati as

साधुत्वम् only At I 62 also 'rasa' does not carry any technical connotation I 62 reads —

काम सर्वोप्यलङ्कार रसमर्थे निधिष्यति ।

तथाप्यप्राप्त्यैवैनं भारं वहति भूयसा ॥

11 Dandin also expects like Bhamaha, the Mahākāvya to depict, without exception, rasa and bhāva (see I 81 अलङ्कृत असंक्षिप्त रसभावान्तरम् ।) तरुणवाचस्पति and हृदयगमा take 'rasa' and 'bhāva' here in their technical sense But we may take this, with Dr De in the general sense of 'kavyarasa'

12 अभिनव भा (m 272, Vol I Ns)—चिरन्तनाना वायवेव पक्ष । तथा हि दण्डिना स्वालङ्काररक्षणेऽभ्यघायि । रति शुद्धारतो गता रूपबाहुस्य योगेन । इति (काव्यादर्शे ॥ 281 ) अधिरूपररा कोनी कोपो रौद्रात्मतां गत (॥ 283) इत्यादि च ।

13 तरुण० says at II 281 तदिदं रसवत् । रूपबाहुस्ययोगेन विभावानुभाव-व्यभिचारियोगेन इत्यर्थः ।

The हृदयगमा adds —रस्याभिधान एव स्थायी भाव मृतेत्यादिना वागारम्भानुभावेन अनुमीयमानै हर्षपृथुतिस्मृतिवितर्कप्रमृतिभि व्यभिचारिभि-संयुज्यमान कथनानन्तरं शृङ्गाराख्या लभते । तेन अन्वितमेतत् रसवत् ।

रेगाचार्य रेड्डी also follows तरुण He says that herein, वासवदत्ता is the 'विभाव' her sweet words, smile etc are the anubhavas and हर्ष, विस्मय व etc are the vyabbhicāribhavas The रसायिभाव called रति is enhanced to the state of शृङ्गाररस

14 दण्डिन् II 287 इति काव्यमुद्रितमलङ्कारतया स्थितम् ।

15 Dr De observes ( pp 212 Sanskrit Poetics)—“But the Rasa in these figures is subordinate to the expressed figure itself to which it serves as a means of embellishment अलङ्कारतया स्मृतम्, in other words, the rasa is developed not for its own sake, but as increasing the beauty of expression” I fail to agree with this By 'अलङ्कारतया स्मृतम्' what Dandin means is that here karuna rasa becomes the alamkāra of kāvya The term alamkāra is to be taken, as noted above, in its wider sense of a काव्यशोभाकरधर्म. For, otherwise, we fail to

trace any other अलङ्कार in these illustrations, to which the particular rasa can be subordinated Again, Dandin calls rasavat to be that which is 'rasapesala' i.e. that which causes delight due to rasa (II 275)

16 दण्डिन् II 275 प्रेय प्रियतराख्यान रसवद्रपेशलम् ।

उर्जस्वि रुडाहकारं युक्तोत्कर्षे च तत्प्रयम् ॥

17 तरुण says देवगुरुपित्रादिविषय प्रीतिप्रकाश प्रेय ।

18 Some modern commentators such as Reddi seem to overread things when they observe that rasavat, preyas and urjasvi are grouped together because all of them form the varieties of what is called असलक्ष्यक्रमध्वनि ( प्रयाणा असलक्ष्यक्रम रूपैकधर्मत्वात् एकत्र निर्देश )

It is doubtful whether Dandin could be held to be conscious of the classification of Dhvani as above

19 वामन III ii 15 दीप्तरसद्व कान्ति ।

20 विवृतिकार-रतिरिह देवगुरुनृपादिविषया गृह्यते । कान्ताविषयाया तु रते सूचने रसदवलङ्कारो वक्ष्यते ।

21 उद्भट IV iii रसवद्दर्शितस्पर्शशृङ्गारादिरसादयम् ।

स्वशब्दस्थायिसन्धारिविभावामिनयास्पदम् ॥

22 IV 6 अनौचित्यप्रवृत्ताना कामक्रोधादिकारणात् ।

भावाना च रसाना च बन्ध उर्जस्वि कथ्यते ॥

23 उद्भट IV 7 रसभावतदाभासवृत्ते प्रथमबन्धनम् ।

अस्यानुभाषनि शून्यरूप यत्तत्समाहितम् ॥

24 मनु काव्येन क्रियते सरसानामवगमधनुर्वर्गे ।

लघु मृदु च नीरसेभ्यस्ते हि प्रत्यन्ति शास्त्रेभ्य ॥ रुद्रट XII

25 नमिसाधु 02 रुद्रट XII 2- अर्थात्बुकारमध्य एव रसा अपि हि नोक्ता उच्यते-काव्यस्य हि शब्दाद्यौ शरीरम् । तस्य च वक्रोक्तिवास्तवादय-  
कटककुण्डलय इव कृत्रिमा अलङ्कारा । रसास्तु सौन्दर्यादय इव सहजा गुणा  
इति भिन्नस्तत्प्रकरणारम्भः ।

## PART III

### CHAPTER X

#### Some Observations.

Thus far we have traced the two streams of thought, one, pertaining to *śabdavṛttis*, with particular reference to *vyāñjanā* and *dhvani*, and the other pertaining to the origin and development of the concepts of *rasa* and other cognate ideas. In *Dhvanyāloka* we find these two currents meeting and merging with each other and bringing forth an integrated theory of *rasa* and *dhvani*.

So, let us study this integrated theory of *Ānandavardhana* in detail.

We come to discuss the theory of *vyāñjanā* or *dhvani* as propounded in the *Dhvanyāloka*. As I said in the beginning, the inspiration for the investigation came from the following verse

kavyasyātmā dhvanirīti budhaiḥ yaḥ samāmnātapūrvah  
tasyābhavaṃ jagadurapare bhāktamāhustamanye |  
kecidvācām sthītamavisaye tattvamucustadiyam  
tasmādbṛmah sabdayamaṇapṛīṭaye tatsvarūpam ||

This verse makes us understand that *dhvani* was accepted as the soul of poetry by earlier teachers. It was this very *dhvani* that was called to be *bhākta* or secondary sense by other teachers. There were some who said that even though *dhvani* was experienced, it was beyond expression in words. There were some, however, who definitely negated it. It was to remove this state of doubt and negation of *dhvani* that *Ānanda* undertook to write this work.

In our search of these earlier theorists, we have not succeeded in discovering any teachers of poetics who had a clear theory of *vyāñjanā* before them. There might have been critics in old times as there are in the present days who might

have said that though they experience the soul of poetry, it was incapable of being expressed in words

As we have not been able in finding the earlier theorists of dhvani, similarly we have not found any theorists who have negatived it. We have, however, found theories about the two functions of the word, viz the primary and secondary i.e. bhākta and we have found the seeds of laksanā and vyañjanā in these

It seems that Abhinavagupta also had undertaken such an investigation and has practically come to a conclusion similar to ours. In fact he says that there have been no books in which this theory is embodied. Says he—*avicchinnena pravāhena taire-taduktam vināpi viśiṣṭapustakesu vinivēsanādityabhiprāyah* (Locana on Dhv I 1)

Considering, however, Ānanda's arguments and illustrations to prove the independent verbal function of vyañjanā, we cannot deny the possibility that there might have been a tradition amongst the teachers of poetics which embodies affirmation and denial of vyañjanā. These teachers might have been his contemporaries or near predecessors. Ānanda quotes the following verse with the introduction viz—*tathā ca anyena kṛta evātra s lokah*

—*yasminnasti na vastu kīñcana manahprahlādī sālamkṛtī  
vyutpannairacitam na caiva vacanair, vakroktisunyam*

*ca yat i*

*kāvyaṃ tad dhvaninā samanvitamiti prītya prasamsaṃjato |  
no vidmóbbhidadhātī kim sumatinā prstah svarūpam*

*dhvaneḥ ||*

Abhinavagupta explains 'anyena' by the words—*grantha-kṛtsamānakālabhāvinā manorathanḡmnā kavinaḥ*. If Abhinavagupta is right in this identification, we may conclude that amongst the contemporaries of Ānanda, the theory of dhvani must have been propounded, denied, and stoutly defended. But, as to teachers earlier than this, of dhvani, we have no independent corroborative evidence.

Let us now consider Ānanda's views

We find that Ānanda by three progressive stages comes to regard rasa as the ātman or soul of poetry. The first stage is found in the second *kārikā* of the first *udya* of the *Dhv*. Herein he says *arthah sahrdayas'laghyah kavyātmā yo vyavasthītaḥ* i.e. the meaning that is commended by the aesthetes—sahrdaya—is the soul of poetry. *Vācya* in poetry is disposed of by saying that it is explained by many poeticists in the form of various figures of speech like simile and others (*kārikā* I 3). The idea of *pratyamāna* in the poetry of great poets is explained on the analogy of beauty in the fair-sex (*Dhv* I 4), which is something over and above the beauty of several parts of the body. He seems to suggest that beauty is something which comes out of the whole. So does *pratyamānārtha* or implicit sense in a poem. This is the second stage in which the importance of the *pratyamāna* is established.

This is followed by a discussion in the *vṛtti* establishing the difference between *vācya* and *pratyamāna*. This discussion, as we note from the *vṛtti*, pertains to what is technically known as *vastuvyāṅgya*. The second variety of *vyaṅgya* that he refers to is *alampkāra-dhvanī*. The third variety of *pratyamāna* is what he calls '*rasādīlakṣanah*' i.e. *rasa*, *bhāva*, etc. About this variety it is said that it is absolutely different from the *vācya*. This third variety of *pratyamāna*, viz. *rasa* is presented as the soul of poetry in the following *kārikā*:

*kavyasyātmā sa evārthah tathā cādīkaveḥ purā |*  
*krauñcadvandvavīyogottṛaḥ sokah ślokatvamāgataḥ ||*

(*Dhv* I 5)

This is third stage. Thus in the *kārikās* 2-4 and the *vṛtti* thereon, we find the philosophy of Ānanda, regarding the soul of poetry, in a nutshell. Meaning is the soul of poetry. In the meaning it is *pratyamāna*, which is important. And in the three varieties of *pratyamāna*, *pratyamāna* *rasa* is the soul of poetry. This *rasa* is explained in the *vṛtti* thereon.

as *kavyasya sa eva arthah sarabhūtah*—, thus carrying forward the traditional meaning of *rasa* as essence in poetry.

This implicit sense is something quite different from the direct meaning of words. This point he proves by giving illustrations. If, for instance, the explicit sense is of a positive nature, the implicit sense is of a negative nature; or if the explicit sense is of a negative nature, the implicit sense is of a positive nature, or if the explicit sense is either of a positive or negative nature, the implied is neither positive nor negative in nature. In some cases the subject-matter of the implicit sense is different from the explicit with reference to different people. These are illustrated by the verses such as, '*bhama dhammā*' etc., '*attā ettha nīmajjā*', etc., '*vacca maha vviā ekke*', etc. and '*de ā parā*' etc.

## CHAPTER XI

### ‘RASA AND DHVANI AS LAID DOWN BY ĀNANDAVARDHANA

#### The Three dhvanis :

Ānanda takes up the three main types of implicit sense, viz vastudhvanī alamkāradhvanī and rasadhvanī i.e. the cases in which some bear fact or idea is implied, or alamkāra is suggested or rasa is evoked. He has illustrated vastudhvanī in the verses such as bhama dhammā etc. as discussed above (see ch. X). Here it may be noted that Ānanda clarifies the point that vastu and alamkāra can be expressed both by direct meaning i.e. vācārtha or vyāṅgyārtha i.e. suggestion. In the case of rasadhvanī however, there is a complete break with abhidhā.

#### Alamkāradhvanī

In order to explain alamkāradhvanī Ānanda introduces the idea of noticibility between the expressed sense and the implicit sense. That there is a sequence between the expressed meaning and the implicit meaning the latter following the former is not questioned. In poetry, however the fact of the degrees of noticibility is a matter of importance. Where the sequence is so quick that it does not attract the attention of the reader or hearer as in rasadhvanī it is regarded by Ānanda as the *mode of dhvanī par excellence*. There are other cases however in which the sequence between the expressed sense and the implicit sense is clearly observed as in some of the illustrations of vastudhvanī.

These are the well known divisions of saṃlakṣyakrama and asāṃlakṣyakrama of dhvanī.



It appears that the sequence or *krama* is a necessary item in *alamkāradhvani*, e.g. in the verse—

unnataḥ prolasddharah kaḷagurumalīmasaḥ |  
payodharabharastanvyāḥ kaṁ na cakare bhūḥśīnam ||

In this particular verse, the expressed meaning with reference to the monsoon season comes first. Then, on the strength of double meaning words, the implicit with reference to a young lady also shines forth. The sequence between the two senses is apparently noticable. The result is *upamādhvani*.

Ānanda explains and illustrates *alamkāradhvani* when he discusses the nature and scope of *samlakṣyakramavyāṅgya* or that in which the sequence between the expressed sense and the implicit sense is noticeable (II 20). This particular variety of *dhvani* is subdivided into that which is based on either *śabda* i.e. word (*śabdaśaktyuttha*) or an *artha* i.e. meaning (*arthasaktyuttha*). The *śabdaśaktyuttha samlakṣyakrama* is again subdivided into two viz. *vastudhvani*, as explained already, and *alamkāradhvani*.

Ānanda makes it clear at the outset that *alamkāradhvani* occurs only when an *alamkāra* is implied on the strength of the power of a word. Thus, when in a poem, *alamkāra* alone, and not *vastumātra* or idea, is implied on the strength of *śabdaśakti*, it is said to be *dhvani* based on *sabdasakti*.

(Says Ānanda II, 21 —

ākṣipta evālamkārah śabdasaktyā prakāśate |  
yasmīnnanuktaḥ śabdena śabdasaktyudbhavo hi sah ||

yasmādalamkāro, na vastumātram yasmīn kāvyē śabdasaktyā prakāśate sa śabda-saktyudbhavo dhvanirityasmākaṁ vivakṣitam.) He holds that if, an *alamkāra*, even when it is implied, becomes expressed by some other word, then also it falls out of the province of *dhvani* (sa cākṣiptā lamkāro yatra punaḥ śabdāntarenābhīhūtasvarūpaḥ tatra na śabdasaktyudbhavaṅvurananarūpavyāṅgyadhvanirvyavahārah.) This is illustrated in the verse viz. *dṛṣṭyā keśava* etc. In this particular verse,

the word 'salesam' turns the table and the verse instead of becoming an illustration of dhvani, peters out into an alamkāra called s'leṣa. But, says Ānanda, if on the strength of implication another alamkāra is suggested, it becomes an illustration of dhvani as in—

atrāntare kusumasamayayugamupasampharannajymbhata grīṃā-  
bhūddhanah phullamallikādhavalāṭṭahaso mahākalah —, or in  
the verse unnatah prolāsaddhārāh etc. or in case of dattānandāh  
prajānam etc. Ānanda says that in these illustrations, we  
have to imagine on the strength of implication, the relation  
of upamāna and upameya between the two vākyārthas and  
thus in these illustrations, upamādhvani is based on śleṣa.  
Ānanda, then proceeds to illustrate different alamkāradhvanis  
such as virodhadhvani, vyatirekadhvani etc. These are instances  
of alamkāradhvanis based on word (śabdāsaktyudbhava). At II.  
25 Ānanda points out the variety of alamkāradhvanis based  
on arthasakti. Says he,

arthasakteraalamkāro yatrāpyanyah pratiyate |  
anusvānopamavyāngyah sa prakāroparo dhvaneh ||

Thus when an implied alamkāra, which is other than the  
expressed alamkāra is suggested on the strength of meaning, it  
is termed as arthasaktyudbhava-anusvānarūpavyāngya (Vācya-  
śāmpkarav yatiriktayatranāyāśāmpkarārthasāmarthyat pratiyamāno-  
vabhasate sārthasaktyubhavo nāmānusvānarūpavyāngyōnyo  
dhvanih—on II 25) Ānanda holds that all the alamkāras such  
as rūpaka and the like that can be directly expressed, can take  
the form of the implied also (II. 26). He says that such  
implied alamkāras are exhibited variously by alamkārikas such  
as Udbhata and the like. Thus in samdeha, there is an implied  
element of upamā, rūpaka and atīśayokti. Thus, it is not difficult  
to indicate the fact that some alamkāra is implied by some  
other alamkāra

(rūpakādīralamkāravargo yo vācyatām śrītaḥ |  
sa sarvo gamyomāntvaṃ bibhrat bhumnā pradarsitaḥ ||

anyatra vācyaivenap rasddiḥ yo rūpakādirālamkārah so'nyatra pratyamānatayā bahulyena pradarśitastatrabhavabdhirbhāttod-bhātadibhiḥ, tathā ca saṁdehādīsupamārupakāṭīśayoktinaṁ prakāśamānatvaṁ pradarśitamityālamkāraṅtarasyālamkāraṅtare vyaṅgyatvaṁ na yatnapratipadyam.

But Ānanda adds (II, 27) that even when we come across some other implied *ālamkāras* as seen above, we do not call them to be *dhvani* till the expressed sense is not subordinated to the implied.

But when the expressed becomes subservient to the implied, then only it becomes the province of *dhvani*. Ānanda then goes on illustrating such cases. In *prāptaśrīresa kasmāt* etc. we have *rūpakadhvani*. So also in *lavanyakantiparipuritadivimukhe'smin smere'dhunā* etc. *upamādhvani* is seen in *virāṇa ramai* etc. or in *tan tāna* etc. *Ākṣepadhvani* is seen as in—*sa vakūmakhīlān saktō* etc. He also illustrates two cases of *arthāntaranyāsadhvani* as based on both *śabdasakti* and *arthaśakti*, *Vyāṭirekadhvani utpreksādhvani* etc. are also illustrated and explained. Ānanda, winds up the discussion with the remark that (II 28)—

evamālamkāradhvanimārgaṁ vyutpādyā tasya prayojanavattam sthāpayitumidamucyate

—śarīrikarāṇaṁ yeśāṁ vācyaive na vyavasthītam |

tēlamkārah parāṁ cobhāyāṁ yānti dhvanyāngatāṁ gataḥ ||

Thus, the *ālamkāras* that have no sound position in the body of a poem when they are only expressed, attain to beauty when implied. He also adds that these implied *ālamkāras* become *dhvani* only when purport is principally to that effect—*vyaṅgyatvāpyālamkāraṇāṁ prādhānyavivaksāyāmeva satyāṁ dhvanāvantaḥ pātaḥ*.

Ānanda, then says that these *ālamkāras* become principally implied in two ways. They become so either on the strength

Thus rasa is the subject of *vyañjanā* par excellence.

Ānandavardhana treats this third variety of *rasādihvani* under the subdivision called *asamlakṣyakramadhvani*. He holds that the *vivakṣitānyaparavācya dhvani* i.e. *abhidhāmula-dhvanī* is subdivided into two varieties such as *asamlakṣyakrama* and *samlakṣyakrama* i.e. one in which the sequence is either perceptible or not perceptible. The *asamlakṣyakrama* or that in which no sequence is perceptible includes in itself the varieties of *rasadhvani*, *bhavadhvanī*, *tadābbāsadhvanī*, *bhāva-sandhi*, *bhavodaya*, *bhavasabalatā* etc. (II 3). These are subdivided into innumerable sub-varieties. But all these are just termed as one i.e. *asamlakṣyakramadhvanī* (3). If it is principally suggested, it becomes *dhvani*. But when *rasa*, *bhāva* etc. become subservient to the expressed sense, it becomes the province of the *alamkāras* such as *rasavat* and the like (II 5) i.e. *guṇibhūtavyañgya*.

Ānanda is of the opinion that the *asamlakṣyakramadhvanī* is to be found with reference to *varṇa* i.e. syllable, *pada* i.e. word, *vākya* i.e. sentence, *saṃghatana* i.e. diction and *prabandha* i.e. the whole composition. Abhinava explains that it is to be seen with reference to a fraction of word (*padakādeśa*) or two words (*pada dvitaya*) etc. also.

The *varṇa*<sup>1</sup> or syllables also suggest *rasa* and the like. Ānanda explains this by saying that letters such as *s, g, r*, *yukta varṇas*, *t*, etc. do not promote *srāgarasasa*, while they are conducive to *bibhatsa* and the like (III 3-4). The suggestion of *rasa* through *pada* or a word is illustrated in—*utkampinī bhayapariskhalitāmsukantā* etc. Herein, the word 'te' makes for the suggestion of *karuṇa* *rasa* (iti *smṛyamānam teḍiyam saundaryamidānim sūtiyajasokāvesavibhāvatām prāptamiti* Abhinava). Suggestion through a fraction of a word is seen as in, *vṛddhyogānnatavadanayā sannidhāne* etc. 'tribhāgaḥ' in the word 'cakṛitabariniḥtrinetritribhāgaḥ' is suggestive. Suggestion based on the whole sentence is seen as in *kṛtakakupitāḥ bāṣpāmbhobhāḥ* etc.

This is an illustration of vipralambha śṛṅgāra. At times this suggested sense of the type of rasa is mixed with some alamkāra also, as in smaranavanadīpārenodbhāh punarguruse-tubhih' etc. Ānanda mentions three types of samghatanā or diction viz. *asamāsā madhyamasamāsā* and *dirghasamāsā*. He adds that this threefold samghatanā rests on gunas such as *mādhurya* and the like and suggested rasas, and the propriety of the speaker and the subject-matter is the regulating factor in its case.

(III 6-guṇānāsṛitya tisthanti mādhuryādīn vyanakti sā |  
rasān tanniyame hetuh aucityam vaktṛvācyayoh ||)

He points out further that in case of *karuṇa* and *viprayoga*, *asamāsā samghatanā* i.e. diction involving no compounds is favourable. In *raudra* however, it can be either *madhyamasamāsā* or *dirghasamāsā*. He observes that in all the types of diction the *prasādaguṇa* is, a must. *Samghatanā* may vary with reference to the form of literature such as *muktaka*, and the like.

The whole composition also becomes suggestive of rasa as illustrated by the *Rāmāyaṇa* or the *Mahābhārata*. The theme should be historical or imagined as the case may be. But it should be properly beautified with the propriety of *vibhava*, *anubhava* and *saññātī* (III 10). If the theme is historical the poet should let go situations as are not inducive to rasa and should also make innovations to evoke rasa (III 11). He should go in for *samdhis* and *samdhyāṅgas* not according to the instructions of the science of poetry or drama alone, but according to their ability to evoke rasa (III 12). The poet should delineate the different rasas at proper places in parts of the composition, in such a way as to promote the main rasa (II 13). He should use *alamkāras* aptly (II 14). These five factors govern the suggestiveness of rasa with reference to a whole composition. He duly illustrates all this.

A whole composition thus not only by itself suggests rasa, but successively by degrees also, through instances of

samlakṣyakramadhvani contained in it, (na kevalam prabandhena śakṣādvyañño raso yāvatpāramparyenāpiti darsayitumupakramate—Locana on III 15) This is illustrated as in the speech of Pāñcājanya in Madhumathanavijaya, or as in Viśamabāṇalīla when kamadeva meets his friends Abhinava explains fully how these speeches of Pāñcājanya, Yāuvana etc ultimately help the evocation of the principal rasa. It is also found illustrated in the famous grdhragomāyusaṃvāda in the Mahabharata (Abhinava says sa cābhīprayo vyākṛtaḥ santarasa eva parinīṣṭhitatam praptah Locana III 15) Ānanda says that the rasādi dhvani is also suggested by sup trā vacana, sambandha, kārarakāśakti kṛt, taddhita, and samāsa (III 16) Nipāta, upasarga kala etc also suggest it. All this is duly illustrated by him.

### Obstacles in rasavyāñjanā

Ānandavardhana then proceeds to mention certain factors that tend to obstruct the realisation of rasa. He says that a good poet should take pains to avoid such factors as may obstruct the rasa being realised in a big composition or even in a single stanza (III 17). The factors that may cause obstruction in rasa realisation are as below

(i) sketching the setting and the like of a sentiment that is of a nature quite contrary to the one in hand,

(ii) giving a very lengthy description of something even though it be connected with the main statement,

(iii) abruptly cutting off the delineation of the sentiment or its untimely evocation,

(iv) frequent delineation of a sentiment even if it is fully roused, and

(v) impropriety with reference to b-haviour

(virodhirasasambandhivibhāvādiparizrahaḥ |

vistareṇānvītyāpi vastunonyasya varṇanam ||18

Ānanda says that in the instances cited above there is a clear breach of propriety and it can not be saved by pointing out that the hero is eclipsed by ill fate !

(nacaṇḍapvidhe viṣaye daivavyāmohitatvam kathāpurusasya pariharo, yato rasabandha eva kaveḥ prādhānyena svapravṛttinibandhanam yuktaṃ || 19 Dhv)

Ānanda says that the poets should be solely devoted to the suggestion of sentiment and the like. We have taken pains for all this and not merely for the establishment of dhvani alone ! (rasādīpavyaṅgyatātparyāmevāśāṃ yuktaṃ yatinosmābhūtarabdhō na dhvanipratipādanamatrābhiniveśina)

(iv) The fourth difficulty arises when rasa that is already fully aroused is repeatedly described as such. Rasa after being fully aroused by its constituents and after being relished, tends to fade away in the fashion of a fading flower if evoked repeatedly.

(v) Vyavahatanaucitya occurs e.g. when a heroine directly mentions her desires to the hero and not indirectly through proper gestures and the like.

Or, it happens when vṛttis such e.g. karsikā and the like, as laid down in Bharata are described not with reference to their proper conditions.

Ānanda cites some parikara verses to support his statements and observes that whatever is laid down by him is in harmony with the opinion of great poets such as Vālmīki and the like.

He further elaborates the topic and gives instruction as to delineate factors as are connected with sentiments of the opposite type. He says

vivakṣite rase labdhapratisthe tu virodhinam ।

bādhyanam āṅgabhāvam va prāptirāṅguktiracchala ॥ 20

i.e. After the intended sentiment has been established on a sound footing there will be no defect in including even hindrances provided that these come either as souls (bādhyā) or ancillaries.

Ānanda is of the opinion that after the intended *rasa* is fully realised, the hindrances can be delineated in a two fold way as said above. The *bādhyatva* i.e. serving as foils of the hindrances is said to be there when they are positively overcome by the intended sentiment and not otherwise. Thus delineated they only tend to enhance the intended sentiment or, these factors cease to be hindrances when they are subordinated. They can be subordinated either in a natural way or in an imagined way. In case of natural subordination, there is no case for hindrance e.g. in the description of disease with reference to *vipralambha śṛṅgāra*. But if one describes things that are not natural ancillaries e.g. death with reference to love in separation it will create hindrance. Ānanda is of the opinion that even if a poet thinks that death can be possibly described in case of love in separation, he should not do so. For, if the substratum of the sentiment is lost, sentiment itself will be totally blasted. And you are not up to promote *karuṇā* here. If the poetry is centred round *karuṇā rasa*, such description is unobjectionable. Or, at times description of death, in case of *śṛṅgāra* is unobjectionable, if there is a chance for an immediate reunion. In case of a prolonged reunion, the evocation of proper sentiment is retarded. The poet should avoid this.

Ānanda illustrates the case of *bādhyatvena uktī* i.e. narration as foils of the hindrances in the verse *viz kvākaryam sasalakṣmanah* etc., or as in case of the advice given by the other sage, when Pundarika is lost in love for Mahāsvetā. The natural subordination is illustrated as in, *bhramam aratim alasabrdayatām* etc., superimposed subordination is seen as in, *pānduksāmam vadanam*, etc. or as in *kopāt komalalola* etc.

### **Opposite Sentiments**

Ānanda then proceeds to explain how opposite sentiments are to be delineated in a whole composition.

He is of the opinion that eventhough it is accepted that the whole work of poetic compositions should abound in



different sentiments, the poet, desirous of achieving the greatness of his works, should delineate only one sentiment as the principal one

(prasiddhepi prabandhānām nānārasanibandhane ।  
eko raso ṅgikartavyaḥ tesāmutkarsamīcatā ॥ III 21.

Ānanda is of the opinion that eventhough different rasas are fully aroused, one of them can be principal, if it is delineated right from the beginning of the work and is being referred to again and again (III 22)

(prabandhesu prathamātaram prastutaḥ can punaḥpunarānu  
sambhīyamānatvena sthāyī yo rasastasya sakalabandhavyāpīno  
ra-āntarairantarālavartibhiḥ samāveso yat sa nāneitāmupahanti)  
Dhv On III 22

Just as there can be principal action or plot of a composition even if it gets mixed with other sub-plots, in the same way there can be one principal sentiment (III 23) Ānanda is of the opinion that not only sentiments such as vīra and śṛṅgāra or śṛṅgāra and hāsyā, or raudra and śṛṅgāra, or vīra and adbhuta or śṛṅgāra and adbhuta can be correlated as principal and subordinate, but also opposite type of sentiments such as śṛṅgāra and bībhatsa, vīra and bhayānaka, śānta and raudra or śānta and śṛṅgāra also can be correlated as such, if when one sentiment is principal, the other one is not fully aroused

(avirodhī virodhī vā raso'ṅgini rasagatare ।  
pariposam na netavyastathā syādavirodhitā) ॥ III 24,

Thus, a rasa not of the opposite type as in case of śṛṅgāra and hāsyā, need not be fully aroused as compared to the main sentiment. Even if they are equally developed, there is no contradiction, e.g. in, ekato rūpa etc, or as in kantiācchittva etc

Or, the vyadhicāribhāvas with reference to a rasa opposite to the main sentiment, should not be described at length. And in case they are described at length, should there be an

immediate reversion to the vyabhicāribhāvas of the principal sentiment Or, even when a subordinate sentiment is treated fully, it should be, at all events, kept only as a subordinate by constant attention, such other escapes should also be imagined

In case, the subordinate sentiment is of the opposite type, it should be slightly less developed as compared to the main sentiment e.g. in case of *sānta* and *śṛṅgāra*

Ānanda then proceeds to lay down the specific means of overcoming opposition between two opposite sentiments He says

*viruddhaikāśrayo yastu virodhi sthāyino bhavet ।*

*sa vibhinnāśrayaḥ kāryastasya posepyadosatā ॥ (III 25)*

i.e. if an opposite sentiment is delineated with reference to the same substratum as that of the principal one, the opposite sentiment should be given a different substratum and thus even if the opposite sentiment is fully treated, there will not be any contradiction, e.g. in case of *vīra* and *bhayanaka* If *vīra* is defined with reference to the hero, *bhayanaka* should be delineated with reference to the enemy The opposition between sentiments arises in a two-fold way e.g. as already seen above, sentiments such as *vīra* and *bhayanaka* cannot reside in the same substratum The opposition between sentiments may arise when certain sentiments come side by side Now in such cases, some other sentiments should intervene in between (III 26), e.g. in *Nāgānanda* *sānta* and *śṛṅgāra* are delineated with *adbhuta* intervening between the two Thus, the contradiction between two sentiments in one and the same sentence also can be remedied (III 27), e.g. in *bhūrenudigdhān navapārijāta* etc

Ānanda says that these instructions should be carefully observed more in case of *śṛṅgāra* which is the most delicate (type-*sukumāratamo byasau* (III 28) If the poet is slightly

negligent in the delineation or rasa, it is immediately noticed and therefore he should be all attentive in this task (III 29).

### Other Topics

Having thus disposed of the main topic of rasadhvani, Ānanda has to find place for other traditional topics of poetics. This he has to do under his scheme of vyañjanā. For example, he treats the topic of vṛttis such as parusā upanāgarikā etc. as given by Udbhata, Rudrata, etc. and vṛttis such as gaudī and vaidarbhī as given by Dandin, etc. in the following way. Ānanda holds that the main task of a great poet lies in a proper marshalling of all the contents and the expressions in the direction of the sentiments and the like—

vācyaśūām vācakānām ca yadaucityena yojanam |  
rasādivisayenaitat karma mukhyam mahākaveḥ ||

(Dhv III 32)

This observation, says Ānanda is corroborated by the fact that even Bharata has laid down vṛttis with reference to artha such as kaisikī and the like and with reference to śabda such as upanāgarikā and the like, with the same purpose, that is, rasa in view. Says he

etacca rasādītatparyena kāvyānibandhanam bharatādayaḥ  
suprasiddhameveti pratipādayitumāha—

ra'ḍyanugunatvena vyavaharo'rthasabdayoh |  
aucityavān yastā etā vṛttayo dvividhaḥ sthitaḥ ||

(Dhv III 33).

Ānanda vardhana further adds that vyavaharo hi vṛttirity-ucyate—i.e. modes of employment are themselves given the designation of 'mode'. The mode of employing sense in conformity to sentiment as well as to the considerations of propriety underlies the various (dramatic) modes such as kaisikī and the like. Similarly that which relates to sounds underlies the modes such as upanāgarikā and the like.

like Thus *môdê*, properly employed with the sole intention of conveying sentiments and the like, will lend charm to dramatic as well as poetic works Sentiments and the like constitute life-essence of both these modes Plots and the like serve only as the body Says he,

-vyavahāro hi vṛturityucyate tatra rasānuguna aucityavaṇ  
vācyaśrayo, yo vyavaharastā etāh kaisikyādayah hi rasānāt-  
paryena sannivesitāh kāmapi nātyasya kāvyasya ca obhāyāmā-  
vahanī rasādayohi dvayorapi tayorjivabbutāh itivrttādi tu  
sarīrabhūtamēva

Ānanda clearly states (III 48) that once this theory of poetry is fully understood, even the so called 'modes' relating to the nature of sounds as well as to the nature of meanings will become intelligible He adds that when this theory of poetry involving a discrimination of the suggested-suggester relationship is grasped, other categories like literary modes like *kaisiky* and *upanāgarika* will become quite intelligible. Otherwise modes will remain only incredible like unseen objects, and will not come within the range of personal experience—says he,

sabdatattvāśrayah kāścīdarīthatattvayujō'parah |

vṛttayopi prakāśante jñāte'smin kāvyalakṣane || (Dhv III 48)

asmin vyangyavyaṇjakabhāvavivecanamayē kāvyalakṣane jñāte  
satī yāh kascitprasiddhā upanāgarikādyāh sabdatattvāśrayā  
vṛttayo yāścārīthatattvasambaddhāh kaisikyādayastāh samyag  
rītipadavīm avataranti anyatā tu tāsāmadrśtārīhanāmiva  
vṛttināmasraddhēyatvameva syānnanubhavasiddhatvam

Ānanda also incorporates the topic of *alampkāra*, *guṇa* and *dosa* in his scheme of *vyājanā*

In his opinion, figures like metaphor and the like, become truly significant (ie will be real ornaments) when they are employed in instances of *smṛgāra* which is the soul of suggestion, with great discrimination

two important varieties of prabandha kāvyā. But Ānanda makes the importance of rasa more comprehensive or universal in all the varieties of poetry of which prabandha is only one, as seen above. Thus we may say that as far as our knowledge goes, it is in Ānanda that we find the element of rasa becoming the soul of all poetry, a thing which was made explicit by Viśvanatha in his famous utterance viz vākyaṃ rasātmakam kāvyam.

### Classification of Poetry

Ānandavardhana, after having shown the nature and scope of vyañjanā in a comprehensive way, naturally comes to regard it as the principal element in poetry. However there are literary compositions in prose and verse, in which vyañjanā may be subordinate to the expressed sense or may not be apparent at all in conveying the charm of the literary piece. Such compositions however, cannot be altogether thrown out of realm of poetry. So, Ānanda has recourse to a sort of classification of poetry, on the principal of vyanjana. He does this in the following way

#### Dhvanīkāvyā -

The class of poetry in which the suggested element is principal and in which the expressed word subordinates its sense and the expressed sense subordinates itself and suggest the implicit sense is termed dhvani. Ānanda says,

yatrārthah sabdo vā tamarthamupasarjanīkṛtasvārthau |  
vyañktah kāvyaviśeṣah sa dhvanīriti sūribhīḥ kathitah ||

(Dhv 1 13)

He adds that the kind of poetry wherein both meaning i.e. specific meaning, and word i.e. specific word, go to suggest only the said (i.e. implicit) meaning, is signified by the name dhvani or suggestive poetry—

yatrārtho vācyaviśeṣah vācakaviśeṣah sabdo vā tamartham  
vyañktah, sa kāvyaviśeṣo dhvanīriti )

Abhinavagupta adds that the dual in 'vyāṅktaḥ' is not for nothing. It goes to imply that when it is said that a word is suggestive of a particular implicit sense, it is always a particular word accompanied by its particular sense or else any word will suggest any sense. In the same way, when a meaning suggests the implicit sense, it is not divorced from the word-element. Thus in fact both word and meaning operate simultaneously in all types of suggestion. But at times the word element is more important in bringing about the result viz. the suggestion of the implied sense, or at times the meaning aspect is more important. Thus on consideration of the greater importance of either this element or that in bringing about the required effect, it is so called that either word or meaning becomes suggestive. Thus Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka is off the mark when he criticises the dual in 'vyāṅktaḥ'—Abhinava says—

—vyāṅktaḥ iti dvivacanenedamaha—vadapyavivakṣitavācyo sabda  
eva vyāṅjakat tathāpyarthasyaṇi sabakārtita na trutvati,  
anyathā ajñātārthoṇi sabdastadvyaṅjakah syāt vivakṣitāṇya-  
paravācyo ca sabdasyaṇi bhavatyeva viśiṣṭasabdabhidheyatayā  
vina tasyārthasyāvyaṅjakatvāditi sarvatra sabdārthayorubhayor  
aṇi dhvananam vyāpārāḥ tena bhāṭṭanāyakena dvivacanam  
dūṣitam tadgajanimilikayaiva (Locana On I 13)

Ānanda illustrates avivakṣitavācyo or that with unmeant  
expressed sense, in which word element is more important  
in the suggestion of the implicit sense, in the verse

suvarnapuspāṇi pṛthivīm cinvanti puruṣāstrayah |  
sūrasca kṛtavidyasca yaśca jāṅgī sevītum ||

Abhinava says that herein word is primarily suggestive  
and meaning is but an accessory to it—sabdōṭṭa pradhānatayā  
vyaṅjakah arthastu tatsahakāritayeti catvāro vyāpārāḥ

Ordinarily, the implicit sense would be derived from the  
explicit sense of a work. There are, however, cases in which  
the explicit sense is not at all intended by the poet so that

the implicit sense cannot be derived from it e.g. in the verse *suvarnapuspām pṛthivīm* etc., the poet not intend to convey the explicit sense in such a way to make possible the derivation of the implicit sense through it. He only uses the word *suvarnapuspām pṛthivīm* etc. because by the use of these words he wants to imply the sense that it is persons who are brave, learned and who are good servants that can acquire wealth. It is to bring to relief the idea of great wealth that the poet uses the word *suvarnapuspām*. So, this is a case in which the explicit sense is not at all intended. Yet, the implicit sense is intended by the use of these usual words. It is with reference to such cases that Ānanda says that *śabda* conveys implicit sense.

*Vivakṣitānyaparavācya* or that with meant but further extending expressed sense is illustrated by the verse,

*śikharinī kva nu nama kīyacciraṃ  
kṛmabbhidhānamasāvakarottapah |  
tarunī yena tavādharapāṭalam  
daś'atī bimbaphaṣam Sukasavakah ||*

In this particular instance, the expressed sense is primarily suggestive of the implicit sense viz. the praise of the *nāyikā* and the personal feeling of the *nāyaka*. Abhinava says that here there are only three functions viz. *abhidhā*, *tātparya* and *dhvanana*, and *lakṣaṇā* is absent here. Even if somehow or other on account of the unusual question on the part of the questioner *lakṣaṇā* is admitted in this instance, the *prayojana* or intention remains only implied and rests only in the fourth stage. He holds that in the variety of *dhvani* called *asam lakṣyakramavyaṅgya* or that in which sequence is not noticeable, there is no scope for *lakṣaṇā* at all—*asamlakṣyakramavyaṅgye to lakṣaṇā samuomeṣamūtramapi nāsti*—(Locana on I 13). Thus, in it only the meaning becomes primarily suggestive.

Ānanda has subdivided the *vivakṣitābhidheya dhvani* into two viz. *asamlakṣyakrama* and *samlakṣyakrama* (Dhv II 2)

These are based on abhidhā, i.e. on the expressed sense primarily

Asamlakṣyakrama is of the type of rasādīdhvani. Samlakṣyakramadhvani is again two fold, viz (i) that which is based on word and (ii) that which is based on sense

Samlakṣya based on word is illustrated as in, *atrantare kusumasamayayugamupasamharan* etc (ii) the same based on sense is illustrated in *evam vadini devarṣau* etc. He says, "*atra hi līlakamalapatragānanamupesaṣarjanīkṛtasvarupam sabdavyāpāram vīnaivārihāntaram vyabhicāribhavalakṣaṇam prakāṣayati*

### The Guṇibhūtavyāṅgya

Another variety of poetry is seen when the artistic excellence of the expressed sense is greater than that of the suggested, though the latter is also present along with the former. This is termed as *guṇibhūtavyāṅgya* or poetry in which the suggested sense is subordinated to the expressed

(*prakāro'nyo guṇibhūtavyāṅgyah kāvyasya dṛṣyate |*

*yatra vyāṅgyānvaye vacyacārutvam syāt prakāśavat |*)

Dhv III 35

It is illustrated as in '*lavanyasindhuḥ aparā eve*', etc or as in, '*anurāgavatiḥ saṁdhyā*', etc. In the *alampkāras* such as *rasavat* and the like, the *rasa*, *bhāva* etc. are subordinated to the expressed sense as in case of a king who is subordinated to his servant when the servant is marrying—*vivahanapravṛttabhyt-yānuyāyirājavat* (III 35 Dhv). Implied *alampkāras* are subordinated as in case of *dīpaka* and the like. Ānanda is of the opinion that in all poetic compositions that look delighted by reason of their lucid and elegant words, only this variety of poetry should be recognised by the intelligent critics (III 36 Dhv), as in *lakṣmī dūhidā* etc. The whole host of figures is seen mostly to put on a new charm when brought into



touch with the implicit sense (vyangyāṁs'ānugame satī-Dhv. III 37) Ānanda supports himself by the famous quotation from Bhāmaha viz saīṣā sarvaiva vakroktiḥ etc. (II 85. Bhāmaha) All the figures such as rūpaka and the like fall under this variety

The guṇibhūtavyaṅgya may have thus implicit sense subordinated to the expressed sense, and the implicit sense itself may be of the form of alampkāra, or vastu or rasādi as the case may be (guṇibhūtavyaṅgyasya ca prakāraṇtarenāpi vyaṅgyārthānugamalakṣaṇena viśayatvamastyeva) Thus, this second variety, which is the essence of dhvani dhvaniniṣyanda rūpaḥ is to be recognised by the cultured Ānanda observes that there can be no poetry without a touch of the charm of the implicit This is the great secret of poetry and the learned should make a note of it (tadayam dhvaniniṣyandarūpo dvitīyopī mahākavi viśayo tīramanīyo lakṣaṇīyah sahrdayaḥ sarvaibū nāstyeva sahrdayaḥrdayaḥārinah kāvyaśya sa prakāro yatra na pratyamānārthasamspars'ena saubhāgyaṁ tadidaṁ kāvyarabasyam paramiti sūribhiḥ vibhāvanīyam Dhv on III 37)

Ānanda is of the opinion that even in the presence of figures and the like, it is this element viz, the shade of the implicit sense, which is a great source of charm as is bashfulness in case of women (III 38 Dhv)

The realisation of second meaning with the help of kaku or change in the accent is also to be put under this variety. (Dhv III 39)

Ānanda has already called this variety as dhvaniniṣyanda He categorically declares that this variety also can be termed as dhval, when viewed from the standpoint of the main purport of rasa-says he

prakāro'yaṁ guṇibhūtavyaṅgyo'pi dhvanirūpatam ī  
dhatte rasādītatparyasparśalocanaya punah || (Dhv III 40)

This is illustrated as in, *patyuh śirah candrakalam*, etc., or as in, *prayacchata nīcalh*, etc., or as in, *durārādhā radhā*, etc

### Citrakavya

Finally, Ānanda describes the third variety of poetry called *citra*. He holds that the two varieties mentioned above have implicit sense either as the principal sense or the subordinate one. But anything else than those two is *citra*. Thus *citra* (Dhv III 42-43) has no touch of the implied sense and is two-fold with reference to word and sense. In fact there can be no poetry without the touch of the implied. But when a poet, having no intention with reference to *rasa*, *bhāva*, etc., goes on producing figures of word and sense, then that poetry is said to be bereft of *rasādi*. Thus, in such instances, the apprehension of *rasādi* when the poet does not mean it, is very pale and therefore the poetry is said to be '*nīrasa*'-

(vivaksopārudha eva hi kāvye sabdānāmarthah vācya-sāmarthyavasena ca kavivivakṣāvirahe'pi tathāvidhe viṣaye rasādipratītirbhavanti paridurbalā bhavattīyena'pi prakārena nīrasatvam parīkalpya citravīśayo vjavasīhapyate )

It may be noted here that Ānanda does not call these varieties by the terms '*uttama*', '*madhyama*' and '*adhama*'

Ānanda in the earlier part established the full significance of *vyāñjanā* in its three-fold form viz. *vastudhvani*, *ālambkāradhvani* and *rasādhvani*. However, it is *rasādhvani* which he particularly emphasises. He asks the poets not to falter in *rasādhvani*. The touch of *rasa* so vitalises the old familiar things that they seem to have freshness of new life, just as the trees do by the touch of Spring (Dhv IV. 4). He observes that though several varieties of the *vyāñgya-vyāñjakabhāva* are possible, the poet should be intent upon one of them in particular viz that related to the delineation of sentiment and the like (Dhv IV 5). Abhinava in his *locana* also seems

to drive in the same direction when he observes that rasa-dhvanī alone is principally the soul of poetry and that vastudhvanī and alamkāradhvanī ultimately merge into it

Ānanda is of the opinion that through dhvanī and guṇibhūtavyaṅgya an infinite variety opens to the poetic genius (Dhv IV 1) The sentiments and the like, whose course is very wide, should be followed along the said instructions The limited range of poetry thus becomes boundless (Dhv IV 3)

The expressed is also of infinite variety with reference to the consideration of place, time, etc (Dhv IV 7) But it shines forth only when associated with rasa (Dhv IV, 8) Ānanda says that the theme of poetry will remain inexhaustible as nature herself, if it is charged with rasa

### Foot-notes

1. Brahmanāśramananyāya, i.e. the analogy of one who was formerly a brahmin and has now turned a śramaṇa. After turning a śramaṇa he ceases to be a brahmin and the like. But, on account of his former status, he is known as a brahmana śramaṇa. In the same way, alamkāradhvanī is so termed because it is supposed to have a former status of an expressed alamkāra

2. Abhinava says that this experience of sentiments and the like is of the nature of supreme joy. In the minds of all the individuals, there are certain permanent impressions such as rati, hasa, etc engraved and born of the experience of everyday life. When one looks at some dramatic performance, or reads a poem, one experiences the vibhāva, anubhāva, etc, and the permanent fixed emotions are roused to the status of rasa or a sentiment and the cultured man experiences supreme joy. This rasa then, is of the form of relish and is recognised as the soul of poetry. (See Locana on Dhv. I 4) -

(yastu svapne'pi na svasabdavācya na laukika vyavahārapatitah  
kintuśabdasaṃsparpyamāṇah, dayasaṃvādasundaravibhāvānubhāv-  
asaṃmucitapragvinivistatatyādivyasanānuraḡasakumārasvasaṃvidā-

nandacarvanāvyāpārarasaniyarupo rasah sa kavyavyāpārakagocaro rasadhvanirīti, sa ca dhvanireveti, sa eva mukhyatayātmeti—Locana on Dhv I 5)

3 Ānanda uses the word *dhvani* to indicate *vyañjanā* in general as well as to indicate a poem in which *vyañjanā* predominates i.e. becomes the main source of charm Abhinavagupta, and later on Mammata and others, confine the use of *dhvani* to those poems in which implicit sense predominates and do not use it for *vyañjanā* in general

The fact of the unnoticibility of the sequence of the expressed and implicit sense is interpreted in another way by saying that both are as if grasped simultaneously

## CHAPTER XII

### THE PURVAPAKṢA AGAINST VYĀṆJANĀ IN THE DHVANYALOKA

As already noted by us, the Dhvanyāloka in the very first verse of the first udyota takes note of some of the views which negativate the theory of vyāñjanā. Further on in the third udyota also, Ānanda tries to establish rasa or dhvani as the soul of poetry and rejects the suggestion of the relation of quality and qualified (i.e. guṇagunībhāva) between rasa or sentiment and itivṛtta or subject matter in a poem. The relation can only be of the type of the suggested and the suggestor i.e. vyaṅgyavyaṅjakabhāva. Ānanda goes on to prove this and distinguishes carefully between vyāñjanā and abhidhā, vyāñjanā and lakṣaṇā, vyāñjanā and tātparya and vyāñjanā and anumana or inference. To do this, he refutes the views of Mīmāṃsakas, Vaiyākranas and Naiyāyikas. Let us consider these arguments.

#### **The Abhāvavādinā**

First of all, Ānanda takes up the ālambikārikas who either deny vyāñjanā or try to subsume it under other poetic categories.

Ānanda puts the views of the pūrvapakṣa as below.

Some people are of the opinion that poetry is constituted of word and sense. Sources of charm with reference to both word and sense such as śabdālamkāras and arthālamkāras or figures of word and sense are well-known. So also are the guṇas or qualities such as mādhubhya, prasāda etc. Riti or styles like vaidarbhy gaurī, etc., vṛttis or modes like upanāṅga-rikā, parūṣā, etc., are also recognised sources of charm in poetry. So, what could this dhvani or suggestion be, which is different from the said sources of charm in poetry?

Others hold that suggestion does not exist indeed, for a species of poetry opposed to all well-known canons will necessarily cease to be poetry. Poetry can not be defined only as that which is made up of such word and sense as will delight the mind of the critic. This definition will not hold good to a procedure which deflects from all well-known canons mentioned. Thus, even if the designation of poetry were brought into currency to convey *dhvani*, it could not be universally accepted.

There are again those who hold that it is impossible to think that suggestion or *dhvani* can be something unknown before. Since it is not distinct from a source of charm, it naturally comes under the cause of charm already noted. Just by coining a novel designation for one of them only, something of note will have been declared at the most. Moreover, since the ways of speech are endless, even if there should be an insignificant element left unexplained by the earlier writers, persons should not close their eyes under self-assumed illusion of being 'cultured critics' and dance about with joy saying that they have discovered 'suggestion' therein. So many great critics have been expounding figurative elements of speech. But they see nothing in it to boast about. Suggestion can be one more *ālaṃkāra* or *guṇa*, if you like.

Ānanda here quotes a verse in support of the above view which runs as, *yasminnasti na vastu* etc. Abhinava says that it is composed by some *Manoratha Kavi*. This, we have already noted.

Some others hold that suggested sense is something only indicated i.e. *bhākta*. Still others take it as something indescribable (1).

While explaining the theory of *vyākṛāṇa* as given in *Dhv.* I, 13 (viz. *yatrārthah s'abdo vā* etc.), Ānanda refutes the opposing views.

### **Refutation of the Abhāvavāda**

Ānanda's main argument in the refutation of the *abhāvavāda* is that while the *guṇas* and *ālaṃkāras* etc. rest on the

relation of the expressed and the expressor, dhvani or suggestion is based on the relation of the suggested and the suggestor i.e. vyangyavyaṇjakabhāva. Thus, dhvani or suggestion can not be subsumed under it. He quotes a verse

vyangyavyaṇjakasambandhanibandhanataya dhvaneh |  
vācyavācakacārutvavahetvantahpātita kutah || (Dhv. I.)

Ānanda also clarifies that the alamkāras such as samā-sokti and the like do possess a touch of the implicit sense. But dhvani or suggestion cannot be subsumed under these alamkāras because in them the expressed sense is the principal source of charm and the implicit sense is only subordinate to it. Thus, in the verse-upodharāgena violatārakam etc., which is an illustration of samā-sokti the expressed sense with reference to moon and night is more charming and the implicit sense with reference to the hero and the heroine is subservient to it. So, Ānanda observes that when the suggested sense is not the principal source of charm, and when it only follows i.e. subserves the expressed sense, as in samā-sokti and the like, it is said to be the province of alamkāras and the like. Or, when the suggested is just observed and where it is not held to be principal, it is not said to be dhvani. But only when word and sense have the suggested as their purport, it is said to be the province of dhvani (2).

### Bhaktivādins refuted

Ānanda's main arguments against the bhaktivādins proceed as below :

Dhvani cannot be identical with bhakti or secondary sense on account of difference in form-rūpabhedā-, and bhakti cannot be the lakṣana or definition of dhvani as both the fallacies of too wide i.e. ativyāpti and too narrow i.e. avyāpti would result in that case. At the most it might serve as a pointer-upalakṣana to some of the species of dhvani or suggestion.

(bhaktyā bibharti naikatvaṃ rūpabhedādayaṃ dhvaniḥ |  
 ativyāpterathāvyāpterna cāsau lakṣyate tayā || (Dhv. I, 14)  
 (... kasyacid dhvanibhedasya sva tu syādupalaksanam |  
 (Dhv. I, 19. a)

The difference in nature or form between dhvani and bhakti i.e. between suggestion and indication is that while suggestion lies in the implication of a meaning other than the expressed and in a way in which the suggested sense forms the purport and is principal, bhakti is mere metaphorical expression. (3)

Bhakti or secondary sense can not be the lakṣana or definition of dhvani or suggestion on account of the faults of ativyāpti and avyāpti. The fault of ativyāpti or too wide occurs because bhakti exists even in the absence of dhvani e.g. in case of verses such as, parimlānaṃ pīna...etc. or cumbijai sa aḥuttam etc. Words such as 'lavanya' and the like do not fall in the province of dhvani. Ānanda is of the opinion that if one gives up the primary expressive power of a word and understands a sense (secondarily conveyed by it) through its indicative power, it is because of a purpose. In conveying this purpose, the word does not move falteringly at all (as it moves falteringly when indicating a meaning secondarily).

(mukhyāṃ vṛttim parityajya guṇavṛtyārthadarsanam |  
 yaduddis'ya phalaṃ, tatra śabdo naiva skhaladgaṭh) ||  
 (Dhv. I, 17)

Guṇavṛtti or indication is based on vācakatva or the primary power of expression of words. Thus, it can not be a definition of suggestion or dhvani which is solely based on suggestivity. Thus, suggestion i.e. dhvani is one thing and indication quite another—tasmādanyo dhvaniḥ -anya ca guṇavṛttih.

Avyāptidosa or the fallacy of too narrow definition also walks in if one tries to define dhvani or suggestion as



**Indication** For, indication. does not cover instances of suggestion like, 'that with meant but further extending expressed sense' i.e. *vivakṣitānyaparavācya dhvani*. Thus, Indication or *bhakti* cannot be the definition of suggestion or *dhvani*.

Ānanda is of the opinion that at the most indication or *bhakti* might serve as a pointer to some of the species of suggestion or *dhvani* i.e. it may be an *upalaksana* of *dhvani*.

Finally Ānanda makes a reply to those who took *dhvani* or suggestion as indescribable. Ānanda says that even those, who declare that the nature of suggestion is only within the experience of cultured critics and that it is inexpressible, betray only their lack of discernment. The definition of *dhvani* or suggestion has been already propounded (*Dhv* I 13) and so also the definitions of its several varieties will be set forth in the sequel. In spite of all these, if it should be thought of as inexpressible or *anirvacanya* then this would be true of every thing in the world. If, on the other hand, they are only giving expression to the all surpassing nature of suggestion or *dhvani* by means of this exaggeration, then they also might be regarded as stating the truth itself (4).

Thus, Ānanda first refutes the views of the opponents and clears the way for his theory.

### **Vyañjana as distinguished from other *sādhavrttis***

Ānandavardhana brilliantly distinguishes between the nature and scope of *vyañjana* on one hand and that of *abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇā*, *tātparya* and also *anumāna* on the other.

The objector seems to hold that there is the relation of quality and substance between *rasa* i.e. the implied sense in general and the *vācya* or the expressed sense (*gunagunivyavahāro rasādīnāmītivṛttādibhiḥ saba yukto, na tu jivas arīra-vyavahāraḥ rasādīmayam hi vācyam pratibhasate, na tu rasādibhiḥ prthagbhūtam iti*) (*Dhv* III 33). One can perceive the

expressed only as full of sentiment but never the expressed as an entity separate from sentiment

Ānanda does not seem to accept this position. In his opinion, the expressed is not full of sentiment in the same way as is the body full of whiteness and the like. Moreover, all do not seem to perceive *rasa* along with the expressed as is whiteness and the like perceived along with the body. It can not be argued that the presence of sentiment in the expressed can be discernible only to the cultured, as is the preciousness of a jewel being discernible only to some. For in that case, the sentiments would have to be discerned as something not different from the determinants i.e. *vibhāva*, consequents i.e. *anubhāvas* etc., as is preciousness in case of diamonds—(naivam, yato yathā jātyatvena pratibhasamāne ratne ratnasvarūpānātirīkṭatvameva tasya lakṣyate, tathā *rasā-dināmapi vibhāvānubhāvādīrupavācyavyatirīkṭatvameva lakṣyate*) (Dhv III 33). On the otherhand, it is well-known that *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* etc. are not identical with *rasa*. The apprehension of determinants and the like is only an invariable condition of the apprehension of sentiments and the like. Thus, as there is the possibility of cause-effect relation between the two, sequence becomes inevitable. It is however, not noticeable on account of quickness. Thus, the position stands that sentiments and the like, with unnoticeable sequence, are suggested. The objector holds that the word itself aided by context and the like, produces a simultaneous apprehension of the expressed and the suggested, and therefore the problem of sequence does not arise at all, and that the apprehension of the expressed sense is not inevitable for gathering the suggested sense, as in case of song and the like. To this, Ānanda has the following reply. That the word is suggestive of a particular sense only when aided by context and the like is acceptable to us also. But this suggestiveness is sometimes due to their specific nature itself and sometimes due to the denotative power of words—(kṛptu tadvyāñjakaivam teṣāṃ

kadācit svarūpavis'esanibandhanam kadācidvācakaśaktinibandhanam) (Dhv III 33) In instances where suggestiveness is due only to the specific nature of sounds and where apprehension of expressed meanings does not play any part at all, it would be tantamount to saying that suggestiveness is not governed by the denotative power of words at all. But if suggestiveness is to be governed at all by the expressive power of words, the conclusion becomes irresistible that the apprehension of suggested sense can only be later in time than the apprehension of the expressed sense. If that temporal sequence is so brisk as to escape notice, what is to be done? (tatra yeśāṃ vācakaśaktinibandhanam tesāṃ yadī vācyaṭpratīti-māntareṇaiva svarūpaprātītyā nispannam tadbhavenna tarhi vācakaśaktinibandhanam atha tannibandhanam tanniyamenaiva vācyaṭvācakaḥprātītyuttarakālatvaṃ vyāngyaprātīteḥ prāptameva. sa tu kramo yadī lāghavāṇna lakṣyate tatikūp kriyate (Dhv III, 33)

Ānanda further argues that if in truth, the apprehension of sentiments were possible just by words aided by context and the like, then every reader acquainted with the context, including those who are quite ignorant of the connotation of words, should have had the apprehension of sentiment by merely hearing a poem. If the apprehension of the expressed and the suggested were simultaneous, there would be no use at all of the apprehension of the expressed. On the contrary, if there should be any use for the apprehension of the expressed it is possible that the two cannot coexist—(sahabhāve ca vācyaṭpratītīranupayogaḥ) upayoge vā na sahābhāvah (Dhv. III 33)

It is true that in music, we have suggestiveness due to the perception of the specific nature of sound alone. But even there, we do have, invariably, temporal sequence between the apprehension of the nature of sounds and that of suggested sentiments. But this temporal sequence in the two functions of sounds cannot be noticed when sentiments are suggested,

because sentiments are neither opposed to the expressed sense nor appear as similar to the other sense, they are incapable of being conveyed by anything else, and all their accessories work together with lightening-quickness—(yeśāmapī svarūpavis'esapratīpattinimitam vyākṛtākatvam yatha gītādis'abdanām, teśāmapī svarūpapatitervangyapratites ca niyamabhāvi kramah tattu s'abdasya kriyapaurvāparvam ananyasādhyaatphalaghat-anāsvas'ubhāvinis'u vācyenavirodhinyabhidhayanantaravilaksane rasādau na pratiyate (Dhv III 33)

But in some contexts, the sequence is noticeable also, e.g. in case of resonance-like suggestion (anurananarūpavyāṅgyapratītiśu—Dhv III 33). In this type of suggestion, there will be apprehension of two senses viz (i) the expressed sense, and (ii) the sense suggested by the power of sense, but quite distinct from the other expressed sense. As nobody can conceal the cause effect relation between the apprehensions of the two senses, the temporal sequence between them is obvious e.g. the prakṛta gāthās such as bhama dhammā etc (atyantavilaksane ye pratīti tayorasakyanīhnavo nimittanimittibhāva itī sphuṭameva tatra paurvāparyam Dhv III 33)

In the instances such as bhama dhammā etc it is impossible to affirm that the apprehension of the one is identical with that of the other. Even in instances of resonance-like suggestion based on the power of word (i.e. śabdāśaktimulānurananarūpavyāṅgyadhvani), such as gavo vah pāvanānām etc also, wherein we have the apprehension of the two senses from the same words, similitude, between the two senses will be found suggested. Since we do not have any word openly expressing similitude, we will have to agree that it is suggested only by the power of sound. Thus it is clear that there is sequence between the apprehensions of the expressed sense and that of the suggested figure even here. Similar is the case with padaprakāśaśabdāśaktimulānurananarūpavyāṅgya i.e. in the variety of resonance-like suggestion based on the power of sound, viz that which shines out in individual words.

Ānanda holds that in suggestion based on unmeant expressed sense i.e. *avivakṣitavācya* *dhvani*—, the suggested sense comes only after the apprehension that the conventional meaning is inapplicable (in the context), and therefore, the temporal sequence is present as a rule. It is therefore clear, that even the apprehensions of the expressive word and the expressed sense involves a cause effect relation and a temporal sequence. It may be noticeable or otherwise

—(tasmādabhidhānābhīdheyapratītyoriva vācyaṅgyapratītyornimittanimittibhāvānniyamābhavī kramah sa tūktya kvacillakṣyate kvacirana laṣyate )

Ānanda after having established that the two apprehensions viz. those of the expressed and of the suggested senses as not simultaneous but as the latter following the former, now proceeds to establish the distinction [between the expressed (*vācyārtha*) and the suggested (*vyāṅgyārtha*) on different grounds

The *pūrvapakṣa* is given as below

First objection of the *pūrvapakṣa* is that *artha* or meaning can neither suggest (*vyāñjaka*) nor be suggested (*vyāṅgya*), because the existence of the suggested sense is dependent upon the existence of the suggestive word, and the existence of the suggestive word is dependent upon the existence of the suggested sense, and therefore, it is a case of arguing in circle. The answer to this would be that the suggested sense is already established earlier by independent meaning and hence this fallacy does not arise (5). This position is not accepted by the *pūrvapakṣa*. According to it there is nothing like suggested sense of a word. Whatever is expressed immediately or in sequence is really the expressed sense of the word i.e. *abhidhā*. Thus, *vyāñjana* is in no way established. Hence, it is futile to speak of a relation called '*vyāṅgyavyāñjakabhava*'. In cases where one meaning leads to another the first is only a means-upāyamātra-to the second. This, however, in no

way proves the existence of vyāṅjanā as something other than abhidhā. This happens as in case of word sense and sentence-sense (6)

The name or the school of this objector is not mentioned by Ānanda Abhinavagupta, however, says that this objection is based upon the Mīmāṃsaka and Vaiyākaraṇa theories, which he explains as follows (7)

upāyamātramityanena sādharanoktyā bhāttam prābhākaram vaiyākaraṇam ca pūrvapakṣam sūcayati bhāttamate hi,  
vākyaarthamītaye tesām pravṛttau nāntaryakam ।  
pāke jvāleva kāsibanām padārthapratipādanam etc ॥  
(Locana, on Dhv III 33)

The śloka-vārtika says the burning fuel has preparation of food as its goal, itself being only a means to this end. The fuel cannot do it in the absence of fire. Thus, fire is nāntaryaka-hetu or the immediate cause in the act of food preparation. So, fuel is the hetu or cause of fire and fire brings about pāka i.e. food preparation. Ultimately fuel has 'pāka' for its end (hetu). Similarly, the words intend to give meaning. But for that meaning sabdārtha (word-sense) becomes the nāntaryakahetu i.e. the immediate cause.

The prābhākaras have a different analogy. They cite the analogy of an arrow that, when discharged by a powerful man, cuts through the armour, pierces the vitals and takes away the breath. Thus, the arrow has 'prāṇapaharana' i.e. 'taking the life' as its object, but gātrāpaghāta i.e. cutting the vitals is the means. In the same way, in going from a pada or word to a vākya-rtha i.e. sentence sense, padārtha i.e. word-sense serves as a means only.

The Vaiyākaraṇas also share this view. The only difference is that while the prābhākaras hold sakti in the 'kāryānvita', and therefore they do not stand in need of separate tālparyavṛtti, and the intermediate padārthas are taken to be tattvika

or real, the Vaiyākaranas consider the padārtha as unreal—*atattvika*—in the sense in which the vedāntins hold *ghata*, *pata* etc to be *atattvika* i.e. unreal, due to *avidyā* or nescience. Thus, for the Vaiyākaranas, intermediate padārtas are unreal, the *Sphota* or *S'abdabrahma* is the only reality.

The arguments of the Siddhāntin are based on the assumption of the characteristics of distinctness (*bheda*) as such. Those things can be said to be distinct which are different in nature (i.e. *svarūpabheda*), and different in scope (i.e. *viśayabheda*). This dictum is applied to the expressed sense i.e. *vācārtha* and the implied sense i.e. the *vyāṅgyārtha*. If the *vyāṅgyārtha* (implicit sense) can be proved to be different from *vācārtha* (expressed sense) both in *svarūpa* and *viśaya* (i.e. nature and scope), they should be accepted as distinct from each other. This is the *siddhāntin's* argument in a nut shell. He elaborates it as follows.

In case of a word giving another meaning after conveying the primary meaning, will the objector accept any difference between these two functions or not? Does the objector recognise these two functions viz. expression of the primary meaning and implication of the suggested sense as identical? The view that these two are identical can not be accepted. There is difference in the scope as well as nature of these two (i.e. *viśayabheda* and *svarūpabheda*), e.g. the scope of the function of expression in a word is confined to the primary sense, and the scope of the function of implication involves a sense other than the primary sense. The objector can not say 'no' to the fact that the expressed sense (*vācārtha*) is 'its own' sense of the word, while the implicit sense (*vyāṅgyārtha*) is, 'one belonging to the other'. The expressed (*vācārtha*) is directly related to the word. The apprehension of the implied sense (*vyāṅgyārtha*) can be remotely related to the word through the medium of the expressed sense (*vācārtha*). If the implicit sense (*vyāṅgyārtha*) is also considered as directly related to the word, and not as indirectly related

through the medium of the expressed sense (*vacyārtha*), then, in that case, it should not be recognised as another sense at all. Thus the difference in the scope of these two functions becomes clear by itself.

The difference in nature, too, is equally obvious. The two functions can never be identical, for we find suggestiveness even in sounds of music etc. and even in gestures, which are not even sounds.

Again, the analogy of word-import and sentence-purport also does not quite apply to the expressed and the suggested senses. In the opinion of certain philosophers, the very concept of word-import is unreal. Even those who take it to be real, will have to agree that the analogy of pot and its material cause (i.e. *ghata, tadupādānakārananyāya*) will explain better the relation between sentence-purport and word-import. Just as the material causes of pot cannot be separately recognised after the pot is made, so also, word and its sense are not recognised as distinct, once the sentence-sense is gathered. But this principle does not hold good with reference to the expressed and the suggested senses. When the suggested sense is gathered, the expressed is not driven away. The apprehension of the suggested is inseparably occasioned by the gathering of the expressed sense. Thus, the analogy of the pot and lamp is more applicable. So, the remarks in the first *udyota* viz. that 'just as the purport of a sentence..... etc.' at Dhv. I. 10-alms only at pointing out that there is some similarity between the two in the fact that both are means to some other end. The analogy ends at this, and need not be pursued in greater details (10)

The objector now advances a fresh argument as below :  
 'Now, in this case there arises the contingency of there being two senses simultaneously following from one and the same sentence. In that case, it ceases to be sentence itself' To this,



Ānanda's reply is that this fault cannot be there as the two senses are related as principal and subordinate. Either of the two senses can be principal or subordinate as the case may be (11)

Ānanda observes that when the *vyāṅgyārtha* or the suggested sense is subordinate, and the *vācyārtha* is principal, according to the maxim—*yatparaḥ sabdah sa sabdārthah* i.e. a word means only that for which it is ultimately used, and it is said to be case of the *s'abda* or word being '*vācyaparaka*'. When the *vyāṅgyārtha* or the suggested sense is principal the word is said to be '*vyāṅgyaparaka*'. Now, in the first instance, when the *vyāṅgya* or, suggested sense is subordinate, the word is not '*vyāṅgyaparaka*', but the *vyāṅgyārtha* or the suggested sense is *madhyavartī* i.e. intermediary. So, it will have to be recognised as something different from *vācyārtha* or the expressed sense (12)

### **Vyāñjanā, necessity for the Mīmāṃsakas**

After having established the distinctness of *vācyārtha* or the expressed sense and *vyāṅgyārtha* or the implicit sense, i.e. of *abhidhā* and *vyāñjanā* Ānanda gives other arguments showing how it is necessary for the Mīmāṃsakas to accept *vyāñjanā*, in order to make their distinction between *laukika* and *śābdika* *vākyas* (i.e. between sentences in ordinary speech and those in the *vedas*) logical

Ānanda observes that the adherent of the Mīmāṃsā school of philosophy will have to accept perforce the conclusion that words have also incidental power of the nature of suggestiveness. For the Mīmāṃsakas, the relation between word and meaning is eternal. This is true both of the popular word and the *vedic* word. For this reason, both the popular and *vedic* word would be equally eternally correct. But this is not agreed to by the Mīmāṃsakas. For the popular speech is fallible, while the *vedic* is not. The reason lies in the fact

that the human speech is motivated by several considerations i.e. it is 'sopādhika'. Thus the Mīmāṃsakas have to accept the 'sopādhīkasambandha' i.e. the element of intention in the popular speech in addition to direct relation between word and meaning. The suggestion of this intention is vyāñjanā. So the Mīmāṃsakas cannot escape this contingency. (13)

This however does not mean that every sentence falls under the category of vyāñjanā. In cases where intention is identical with the directly expressed sense, there is no need to bring in vyāñjanā. We have to bring in vyāñjanā only when the intended sense in the form of vastu, alamkāra and rasa cannot be expressed by the direct sense. (14)

### **Lakṣaṇā-Vyāñjanā**

After having thus disposed of the question of the identity of ābhidhā and vyāñjanā, we now take up lakṣaṇā.

The pūrvapakṣa holds that vyāñjanā is not different from lakṣaṇā because both are dependent upon word and sense.

To this, Ānanda's answer is that both differ from each other on account of the difference in nature and scope i.e. because of svarūpabhedā and visayabhedā. The rūpabhedā or difference in nature or from consists in the fact that gunavṛtti or indication is reputed to be not principal (i.e. amukya), while vyāñjakatva i.e. suggestivity is principal or mukhya. (15)

There is another difference in respect of their natures. Indication (gunavṛtti) is practically ābhidhā or expression itself, with the difference that it is a subordinate verbal function; suggestion (vyāñjanā) on the other hand is something far removed from expression. (16)

Again, when another meaning is gathered through indication (gunavṛtti), the first sense merges itself with the second and becomes one with it, e.g. in 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣah' a hamlet on

the Ganges'-. But when the other sense is derived through suggestion, the first sense retains its individuality while conveying the other, in the fashion of a lamp 'Līlakamala-patrāṇi gaṇayāṃsā pārvatī-īe Pārvatī counted the petals of her play-lotus, etc -are illustrations to the point. If the name 'indication' (lakṣaṇā) were to be given to those instances also where one sense conveys another sense without losing its own importance, then it would be tantamount to saying that indication (lakṣaṇā) itself is the primary verbal function. For, usually, every sentence possesses the power to convey a purport over and above the expressed senses of individual words (17)

It may be asked by the objector, that, "when a word conveys another sense, what is the precise verbal function involved?" The Locana elaborates this argument as follows: the function of a word is two-fold, either principal or subordinate. Now, in the instances cited by the Siddhāntin, if he calls it to be principal function, it is nothing else but *abhidhā* and if he calls it a subordinate one, it is *guṇavṛtti* or secondary sense. There is no third alternative. So, when *vyāñjanā* operates, how will it be called by the Siddhāntin, *mukhya* or *amukhya*? (principal or subordinate?)

The reply is that even in case of *vyāñjanā* (suggestion) the function involved is the principal one, but owing to difference in conditions, it cannot be called *abhidhā*. *Abhidhā* depends on convention. *Vyāñjanā* depends on context and the like. Suggestion takes into consideration the importance of a particular word also, and therefore the word-element is also important (18)

Again, the difference in scope (*viśayabheda*) is also quite clear. The scope of suggestion is three-fold viz. (i) sentiments and the like, (ii) specific figures of speech, and (iii) suggested ideas. Of these three, the apprehension of sentiments and the like can never take place through *lakṣaṇā* or indication.

Same is the case with the suggested figures also. And, so far as the suggested idea is concerned, only that is suggested therein, which is intended to be conveyed by the poet by a process other than *abbhidhā* or expression. All this cannot be included in the scope of *lakṣaṇā*, since we can see several examples of *lakṣaṇā* based merely on convention or usage i.e. *rūḍhi*. If at all there is any touch of beauty instanced in *lakṣaṇā* or indication, it is entirely due to the element of suggestion or *vyākṣaṇā*, involved in it. Hence, *lakṣaṇā* (indication) and *vyākṣaṇā* (suggestion) are widely different from each other. Suggestion, in fact, is not only different from *abbhidhā* or expression and *lakṣaṇā* or indication, but it is also based upon each of them. Thus it is impossible to regard suggestiveness (*vyākṣakatva*) which is assisted by both these, to be wholly identical with either. As it derives assistance from *lakṣaṇā*, it cannot be identical with *abbhidhā* and as it gets assistance sometimes from *abbhidhā* (expression) it cannot be identical with *lakṣaṇā* (indication) alone. As it partakes the characteristics of both, it cannot be comprehended by either.

The objector may raise the following point, viz. that there may be no element of *lakṣaṇā* (indication) in suggestion with meant but further extending expressed sense. But what difference is there between suggestion with unmeant expressed sense and *lakṣaṇā*? (19). The reply is that there is no scope for any fault even here. Suggestion with unmeant expressed sense (*lakṣaṇāmulaka dhvani*) might walk in the foot-steps of *lakṣaṇā* (indication) but it does not assume the form of *lakṣaṇā* (indication) itself. It is possible to have an instance of indication (*lakṣaṇā*) which is devoid of suggestiveness. But we never come across suggestiveness devoid of the beauty of suggestion. Whenever we come across instances of indication (*lakṣaṇā*) that become a source of apprehension of the suggested content full of beauty, we find that it is all entirely due to its touch of suggestiveness in case of expression

(*abhidhā*) So, in both the divisions of suggestion with unmeant expressed sense, we see that indication (*lakṣaṇā*) is tinged with a shade of suggestiveness. This certainly will not appear identical with *lakṣaṇā* (indication), but quite separate from it and brings delight to the minds of the cultured (20)

Ānanda further tells of resources of *vyañjanā* other than words. Sounds without meaning also suggest emotions just as notes of music. Gestures without sounds, also can convey meaning and emotions.

Thus, Ānanda establishes the three-fold division of the verbal function, viz. *abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā* (21)

Ānanda in conclusion also makes a note of the fact that he has based his theory of *vyañjanā* on the authority of those who are masters of the principles of *śabdabrahma*. He refers to the *Vaiyākaranas* upon whose *Sphota* theory he draws (22)

Having shown the distinctness of the three functions of word viz. *abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā* Ānanda takes up the arguments of those who regard *vyañjanā* as inference.

### **Vyañjanā and Inference**

The logicians argue as below

In fact this suggestiveness is none other than implication, and implication is the same as the state of an inferential process. The apprehension of the suggested idea is thus identical with the inferential knowledge of the probandum (*pakṣa*). So, to put it otherwise the relation of the suggester and the suggested is none other than the relation of *lingalingi* i.e. probans-probandum. There is also another reason which substantiates this conclusion. The *Siddhāntin* has explained that words possess suggestiveness directed to the speaker's intention, and this element of the speaker's intention is only inferable (23)

~ Ānanda replies that any way, the Nāyāyika accepts the fact that over and above the meanings given by abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, there is a third process which gives its own peculiar meaning. However, this process cannot be regarded as inference, because there is no proper inference at all. An inference depends upon the relation of liṅgaṅgibhāva which is absent in this process. In a logical inference, there is no doubt about the sādhyā which is proved by means of hetu, e.g. when fire is inferred on the basis of hetu i.e. smoke, no doubt remains about the inference of the predicate i.e. sādhyā. Such a logical sādhyasādhana relation does not exist in the case of the implied sense or vyāṅgyārtha. No logical relation between sādhyā and sādhanā is meant in vyāṅgyārtha i.e. suggested sense. Hence though vyāṅgyārtha or suggested sense is grasped indirectly, the mental process is not that of logical inference. Hence vyāṅgyārtha is to be regarded as the function of word as such.

How vyākṛtā is different from liṅgatva or how vyāṅgyapratīti and liṅgapratīti are dissimilar and non-identical, is explained by Ānanda as follows. The objector has really made a clever use of the words of Siddhāntin in substantiating his position. He has remarked that the speaker's intention is certainly implied and added that such implication is the same as the state of inferential probans (i.e. liṅgatva). But in fact the true meaning of the statement is as below—The scope of words is two-fold, (i) inferable and (ii) expressive of which, the inferable is always of the nature of the speaker's intention. This intention of the speaker, once again, is two-fold—(i) desire to utter words for their own sake and (ii) desire to convey meanings through words. Between these, the first type of the speaker's intention does not play any part in verbal discourse. It only serves to distinguish an animal from a non-animal. But the second type of speaker's intention plays the part of approximate cause in verbal discourses, though it is rendered rather remote due to several other

Intervening factors between the utterance of the word and the apprehension of its meaning. Both these types of speaker's intention are inferable from words (24)

But the expressive scope of words is related to meaning itself which happens to be the aim of the speaker's intention to convey meanings. It is also two fold (i) The expressed and (ii) the suggested (25). The speaker may use words in a view to convey his meaning directly by means of them (and then we get the *vācārtha*), or he may use words which do not directly convey his meanings, with a view to achieving some purpose (and thus we get the *vyāngyārtha*). Both these aspects are far from appearing as probandum of any inference based on words. On the other hand, the relationship between word and such expressive content is something other than inference, whether it be a conventional or unconventional relationship. It is only the aspect of intention on the part of a speaker to employ words or meaningful words that is inferable and not the meaning itself conveyed by his words. If it were true that the meaning itself could form the probandum of an inference having words for its probans, there should be no scope for doubts at all, whether any meaning is right or otherwise, e.g., when the probandum viz. fire, is inferred from the probans, viz. smoke, there is indeed no room for any doubt about the existence of fire (26)

Ānanda then goes on to explain that the *vyāngyārtha* as it is conveyed by the power of the expressed itself (*vācya-sāmarthyākṣiptatayā*), it too, is related to the word, just as the expressed meaning is related to the word. Directness or indirectness is not the differentiating condition of a relationship (*sākṣādasākṣādbhavo hi sambandhasya aprayojakah*). That suggestiveness is related to expression has been already shown. The conclusion is thus indisputable that words will have the state of an inferential probans only while implying the intention of the speaker and that the meanings themselves

which are signified by the words are due to the verbal power of expression and not inference (27)

Now, we may take instances of meanings which are suggested by a word. These may be of the nature of intention and may not be as well. Can we say that all such meanings are conveyed by the power of expression alone in words? or Should we postulate some other function? It has been already shown that the power of expression alone cannot explain the suggested meaning. Hence we will have to admit another function and that function itself is called suggestiveness by us. The nature of suggestiveness is not co-extensive with the nature of an inferential probans, since the former exists in objects like light where the latter is absent (28). Just as the expressed content of words is not identical with the probandum of an inference, so also suggested content is not identical with it (29). On the contrary, that which becomes the object of an inferred probandum as shown above, does not constitute what is expressed but constitutes only an adventitious attribute of what is expressed (30). If the expressed meaning too were to be gathered by inference, there could be no scope for any difference of opinion regarding it in the world, which we do come across in our daily life.

It is true doubtless, that at times, one does not resort to inference and other instruments of knowledge while deciding the truth of even an expressed meaning. Though it falls within the scope of other instruments of knowledge, its being simultaneously an object of the verbal power of expression does not suffer in the least. The same is the case with the suggested meaning also (31). Again, as a matter of fact, the question of logical truth and falsity in regard to suggested sense in poetry, is entirely futile. Therefore, it is ridiculous to indulge in discussions regarding different instruments of knowledge applicable therein (32). So it is impossible to identify the apprehension of the suggested meaning with the apprehension of the inferred probandum in every case.



Thus Ānanda establishes the theory of vyañjana and shows how vyañjana is different from abhidhā, tatparya, lakṣaṇa and anumāna

### Foot note

(1) बुधै काव्यरसविद्धि, काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिरिति संज्ञित परम्पराया य समान्तात्पूर्वं सम्यक् वा समन्तात् म्नात् प्रकटित तस्य सहृदयजनमन-प्रकाशमानस्याप्यभावमये जगदु । तदभाववादोना चामी विकल्पा सम्भवन्ति । तत्र केचिदाचक्षरिन् । शब्दार्थशरीरे तावत्काव्यम् । तत्र च शब्दगताश्चास्त्वहेतवोऽनुप्रासादय प्रसिद्धा एव । अर्थगताश्चोपमादय । वर्णसपटनार्थाश्च ये माधुर्यादयस्तेऽपि प्रतीयन्ते । तदनतिरिक्तवृत्तयो वृत्तयोऽपि या कैश्चिदुपनागरिकाया प्रकाशिता ता अपि गता भ्रवणमोचरम् । रीतयश्च वैदर्भीप्रमृतय । तदव्यतिरिक्त कोऽय ध्वनिर्नामिति ।

अन्ये ब्रूयु - नास्त्येव ध्वनि । प्रसिद्धप्रस्थानव्यतिरेकिण काव्यप्रकारस्य काव्यत्वहाने सहृदयहृदयाह्लादि शब्दार्थमयत्वमेव काव्यलक्षणम् । न चोक्ते प्रस्थानव्यतिरेकिणो मार्गस्य तत्सम्भवति । न च उत्तममयान्त पातिन सहृदयान् काश्चित् परिकल्प्य तत् प्रसिद्ध्या ध्वनौ काव्यव्यपदेश प्रवर्तितोऽपि सकल विद्वन्मनोप्राहितामबलम्बते ।

पुनरपरे तस्याभावमन्यथा । कथयेयु - न सम्भवत्येव ध्वनिर्नामापूर्वं कश्चित् । कामनीयकमनतिवर्तमानस्य तस्योक्तेष्वेव चारुत्वहेतुष्वन्नर्भावात् । तेषामन्यतमस्येव वा अपूर्वसमाख्यामानकरणे यत्किञ्चन कथन स्यात् ।

किं च वाग्विकल्पाणामानन्त्यात् सम्भवत्यपि वा कस्मिंश्चित् काव्यलक्षण विधायिभि प्रसिद्धैरप्रदर्शिते प्रकारलेशे ध्वनिध्वनिरिति यदेतदलोकसहृदयत्वभावनामुकुलितलोचनैर्गृह्यते तत्र हेतु न विद्म । सहस्रशो हि महाममिलह्वार प्रकारा प्रकाशिता प्रकाश्यन्ते च । न च तेषामेषा दशा भ्रयते ।

तस्मात्प्रवादमान ध्वनि । न त्वस्य क्षोदक्षम तत्त्व किञ्चिदपि प्रकाशयितु शक्यम् । तथा चान्येन कृत एवात्र श्लोक ।

यस्मिन्नस्ति न वस्तु किञ्चन मन प्रह्लादि सालाण्कृतः श्युत्यन्नैरचिव न चैव वचनैर्वक्त्रोक्तिशून्य च यत् । काव्यं तद्ध्वनिना समचित्तमिति प्रीत्या प्रशस्तजगो नो विद्मोऽभिदधाति किं सुमतिना पृष्ट स्वरूप ध्वने ।

भाक्तमाहुस्तमये । अन्ये तु ध्वनिसंज्ञित काव्यात्मान गुणवृत्तिरित्याहु ।

यद्यपि ध्वनिशब्दसंकीर्तनेन काव्यलक्षणविधायिभिः गुणवृत्तिरन्यो वा न कश्चित् प्रकारः प्रकाशितः तथापि अमुस्यवृत्त्या काव्येषु व्यवहारं दर्शयता ध्वनिमार्गो मनाक्षस्पृष्टोऽपि न लक्षित इति परिकल्प्य एवमुक्तम्—भाक्तमाहुस्त-  
मन्ये इति ।

केचित्पुनर्लक्षणकरणशालीनबुद्धयो ध्वनेस्तत्त्व गिरामगोचरं सहृदयमन-  
संवेद्यमेव समारब्धातवन्तः । तेनैवविधायु विमतिषु स्थितासु सहृदयमन प्रती-  
तमेव तत्स्वरूपं ब्रूमः । /

तस्य हि ध्वने स्वरूप सकलकविकाव्योपनिषद्भूतमतिरमणीयमणीयसीभिरपि  
चिरन्तनकाव्यलक्षणविधायिनां बुद्धिभिरनुन्मीलितपूर्वम् । अथ च रामायण महा-  
भारतप्रभृतिभिः लक्ष्ये सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धव्यवहारं लक्षयता सहृदयानामानन्दो मनसि  
लभता प्रतिष्ठामिति प्रकाशयते । Dhv I ।

(2) Adhinava puts them as,

(i) तत्र समयाक्षेपणेन शब्दोऽर्थप्रतिपादक इति वृत्ता वाच्यव्यतिरिक्त-  
नास्त्येव व्यङ्ग्यम, (ii) सदपि वा तदभिधावृत्त्याक्षिप्तं शब्दागतार्थबलादाकृष्ट-  
त्वात् भाक्तम्, (iii) तदभाक्षितमपि वा न वस्तु शक्यं बुमारीधिव भवसुखम-  
तद्विस्तुति इति त्रय एवैते प्रचानविप्रतिपत्तिप्रकाराः ।

(3) लोचन on Dhv I : reads तत्राभावविकल्पस्य त्रय प्रकारा —  
शब्दार्थगुणालङ्काराणामेव शब्दार्थशोभाकारित्वालोकाश्रयातिरिक्तमुद्देशशब्दार्थरूपस्य  
काव्यस्य न शोभाहेतु कश्चिदन्योऽस्ति योऽस्वाभिर्न गणित इत्येक प्रकारः ।  
यो वा न गणित स शोभाकार्येव न भवतीति द्वितीयः । अथ शोभाकारी  
भवति तर्हिस्मदुक्त एव गुणे वाऽलङ्कारे वान्तर्भवति, नामान्तरकरणे तु कियदिद-  
पाण्डित्य, तथापि किञ्चिद्विशेषलेशमाधिक्य नामान्तरकरणमुपमाविच्छिन्तिप्रका-  
राणामसम्पत्त्वात् । तथापि गुणालङ्कारव्यतिरिक्तत्वाभाव एव । तावन्मात्रेण  
च किं कृतम् ? अन्यस्यापि वैचित्र्यस्य शक्योत्प्रेक्षत्वात् । चिरन्तनैर्हि भरत-  
मुनिप्रभृतिभिर्यमद्योमे शब्दार्थालङ्कारत्वेन इष्टे । तत्प्रत्यदिष्टप्रदर्शनं त्वन्येरात्वा  
रिके कृतम् । तद्यथा कर्मण्यणू इत्यत्र कुम्भकाराशुदाहरणं श्रुत्वा स्वयं नगर-  
कारादिशब्दा उपप्रेक्ष्यन्ते । तावता क आत्मनि बहुमानः । एव प्रकृतोऽपि इति  
तृतीयः प्रकारः । एवमेक त्रिधा विकलः, अन्ये च द्वौ इति पञ्च  
विकल्पा इति तात्पर्यार्थः ।

(4) व्यङ्ग्यस्य यथाप्राप्यान्य वाच्यमात्रानुयायिनः ।

समाप्तोक्त्यादयस्तत्र वाच्यतालङ्घनदः स्फुः । )

व्यङ्ग्यस्य प्रतिभामात्रे वाच्यार्थानुगमेऽपि वा ।

न ध्वनिर्यत्र वा तस्य प्राधान्यं न प्रतीयते ॥

तत्परावेव शङ्कार्था यत्र व्यङ्ग्यं प्रति स्थितौ ।

ध्वने स एव विषयो मन्तव्यं सङ्करोज्जितः ॥ (Dhv I)

(5) अयमुक्तप्रकारो ध्वनिर्भाषा नैकैव विभर्ति, भिन्नरूपत्वात् । वाच्य-  
व्यतिरिक्तस्यार्थस्य वाचकाभ्यां तात्पर्येण प्रकाशनं यत्र व्यङ्ग्यप्राधान्ये स  
ध्वनिः । तपवारमात्रं तु भक्तिः । (Dhv I 14)

(5) येऽपि सङ्कटदयहृदयमवेद्यमनाख्येभ्यः ध्वनेरात्मानमाप्तासिपुस्तेऽपि न  
परीक्ष्यवादिनः । यत उक्तया नीत्या वक्ष्यमाणया च ध्वने सामान्यविशेष  
रङ्गणे प्रतिपादितऽपि यद्यनाख्ये व तत् सर्वेषामेव वस्तुना तत्प्रसङ्गम् ।

यदि पुनर्ध्वनेरतिशयोक्त्यानया काव्यान्तरातिशयाय तै स्वरूपमाख्यायते  
तत्तेऽपि युक्ताभिधायिन एव । (Dhv I 19)

(6) तदेव व्यञ्जकमुखेन ध्वनिप्रकारेषु निरूपतेषु कश्चिद्वृत्तात् किमिदं  
व्यञ्जकत्वं नाम ? व्यङ्ग्यार्थप्रकाशनम् ? न हि व्यञ्जकत्वं व्यङ्ग्यत्वं चार्थस्य ।  
व्यञ्जकसिद्ध्यधीनं व्यङ्ग्यं च व्यङ्ग्यापेक्षया च व्यञ्जकवसिद्धिरित्यन्योन्यस-  
म्भवादव्यवस्थानम् । Dhv III 33

(7) तस्मात् तत्पर्यविषयो योऽर्थः स तावन्मुख्यतया वाच्यः । या  
तन्वरा तथाविधे विषये वाच्यान्तरप्रतीतिः सा तत्प्रतीतेरुपायमात्रं पदार्थप्रतीतिरिव  
वाक्यार्थप्रतीतिः । Dhv III 33

(8) ध्वन्या III 33 ननु वाच्यव्यतिरिक्तस्य व्यङ्ग्यस्य सिद्धि-  
प्रागेव प्रतिपादिता तत्सिद्ध्यधीना च व्यञ्जकसिद्धिरितिः कः पर्यनुयोगावसरः ।  
सत्यमेवैतत्, प्रागुक्तयुक्तभिर्वाच्यव्यतिरिक्तस्य वस्तुनः सिद्धिः कृता, स त्वर्यो  
व्यङ्ग्यतयैव कस्माद्व्यङ्ग्यदिश्यते ? यत्र च प्राधान्येनावस्थानं तत्र वाच्यतयैवासौ  
व्यपदेश्य युक्तः, तत्परात् वाक्यस्य । अनर्थं तत्प्रकाशिनो वाक्यस्य वाचकत्वं  
एव व्यापारः । किं तस्य व्यापारान्तरकानन्या ? तस्मात् तत्पर्यविषयो योऽर्थः  
स तावन्मुख्यतया वाच्यः । यावन्तरा तथाविधे विषये वाच्यान्तरप्रतीतिः सा  
तत्प्रतीतेरुपायमात्रम् पदार्थप्रतीतिरिव वाक्यार्थप्रतीतिः ।

On this, the Locana reads —कश्चिदिति । मीमांसकादि सात्वतिः ।  
अस्त्वसौ द्वितीयोऽर्थः तस्य यदि व्यङ्ग्य इति नाम कृतम्, वाच्य इत्यपि  
कस्मान्न क्रियते ? व्यङ्ग्य इति वाच्याभिमतस्यापि कस्मान्न क्रियते ? अवगम्य-  
मानत्वेन हि शङ्कार्थत्वं तदेव वाचकत्वम् । अभिधा हि यत्पर्यन्ता तत्रेवाभिधा

यत्त्वमुचितम्, तात्पर्यन्तता च प्रधानमूते तस्मिन्नर्थे इति मूर्धाभिधित्वं ध्वनेर्यद्गुण निरूपितं तत्रैवामिधाव्यापारेण भवितुं युक्तम् । तदाह—यत्र चेति । तत्प्रकाशिन इति । तद्व्यङ्ग्याभिमर्त प्रकाशवत्यवस्य तद् वाक्यं तस्येति ।

उपायमात्रमित्यनेन साधारणोक्तया भाट्टं प्राभाकरं वैध्याकरणं च पूर्वपक्षं सूचयति । भाट्टमते हि

वाक्यार्थमित्ये तेषां प्रवृत्तौ नान्तरोयकम् ।

पाके उवाळेव काष्ठानां पदार्थप्रतिपादनम् ॥

इति शब्दावगतैः पदार्थैः तात्पर्येण योऽर्थ उपायते स एव वाक्यार्थः । स एव वाच्य इति । प्रभाकरदर्शनेऽपि दीर्घदोषो व्यापारो निमित्तिनि वाक्यार्थे पदार्थानां तु निमित्तभावः पारमार्थिक एव । वैधाकरणानां तु सोऽपारमार्थिकः इति विशेषः । एतच्च अस्माभिः प्रयमोद्योत एव वितत्य निगीतमिति न पुनरायस्यते ग्रंथयोजनैव तु क्रियते । तदेतन्मतत्रय पूर्वपक्षे योग्यम् ।

(10) ध्वन्यालोक On III 33.

अत्रोच्यते—यत्र शब्दः स्वार्थमभिधानोऽर्थान्तरमवगमयति तत्र यत्तस्य स्वार्थाभिधायित्वं यच्च तदर्थान्तरावगमहेतुत्वं तयोरविशेषो विशेषो वा ? न तावदविशेषः यस्मात्तौ द्वौ व्यापारौ भिन्नविषयो भिन्नरूपौ च प्रतीयेते एव । तथा हि । वाचकत्वलक्षणो व्यापारः शब्दस्य स्वार्थविषयः, गमकत्वलक्षणस्वार्थान्तरविषयः । न च स्वपरव्यवहारो वाच्यव्यङ्ग्ययोरपहेतुः शक्यः । एकस्य सम्बन्धित्वेन प्रतीतेः । अपरस्य सम्बन्धिसम्बन्धित्वेन । वाच्योर्थः साक्षात् शब्दस्य सम्बन्धी, तदितरस्त्वभिधेयसामर्थ्याक्षितः सम्बन्धिसम्बन्धी । यदि च स्वसम्बन्धित्वं साक्षात्तस्य स्यात्तदर्थान्तरव्यवहार एव न स्यात् । तस्माद्विषयमेदस्तावत्तयोर्व्यापारयोः सुप्रसिद्धः ।

रूपमेदोऽपि प्रसिद्ध एव । न हि यैवाभिधानशक्तिः सैवावगमनशक्तिः । अवाचकस्यापि गीतशब्दादे रसादिलक्षणायावगमदर्शनात् । अशब्दस्यापि चेष्टादिरर्थ-विशेषप्रकाशनप्रसिद्धेः । तथा हि, कीदायोगान्नतवदनया इत्यादि श्लोके चेष्टाविशेषः सुकविनार्थप्रकाशहेतुः प्रदर्शित एव ॥

तस्माद्विन्नविषयत्वाद्भिनरूपत्वाच्च स्वार्थाभिधायित्वमर्थान्तरावगमहेतुत्वं च शब्दस्य गतयोः स्वष्टः एव नेदः । विशेषत्वेन्न तर्हीदानोमवगमनीयस्याभिधेय-सामर्थ्याक्षित्वस्यार्थान्तरस्य वाच्यत्वेन व्यपदेश्यता । शब्दव्यापारणोचरत्वं तु तस्यास्माभिरिष्यत एव; तत्तु व्यङ्ग्यत्वेनैव न वाच्यत्वेन । प्रसिद्धाभिधानान्तरसम्बन्धयोग्यत्वेन च तस्यार्थान्तरस्य प्रतीतेः शब्दान्तरेण स्वार्थाभिधायिना यद्वि-

पयोःकरणं तत्र प्रकाशनोक्तिरेव युक्ता । न च पदार्थवाक्यार्थन्यायो वाच्यव्यङ्ग्य-  
योः । यतः पदार्थप्रतीतिरसत्यैवेति कैश्चिद्विद्वद्भिः आस्यितम् । वैरप्यसत्यत्व  
मस्या नाभ्युपेयते तैः वाक्यार्थपदार्थयोर्घटतदुपादानकारणन्यायोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, यथा  
हि घटे निष्पन्ने तदुपादानकारणानां न पृथगुपलम्भस्तथैव वाक्ये तदर्थे वा प्रतीते  
पदतदार्थानाम् । तेषां विभक्ततथोपलम्भे वाक्यार्थबुद्धिरेव दूरीमवेत् । न त्वेष  
वाच्यव्यङ्ग्ययोर्न्यायः, न हि व्यङ्ग्ये प्रतीयमाने वाच्यबुद्धिः दूरीभवति, वाच्याव-  
भासापिनाभावेन तस्य प्रकाशनात् । तस्मात् घटप्रदीपन्यायस्तयोः, यथैव हि  
प्रदीपद्वारेण घटप्रतीतावुत्पन्नाया न प्रदीपप्रकाशो निवर्तते तद्वद्व्यङ्ग्यप्रतीतौ  
वाच्यावभासः । यत्तु प्रथमोद्योते यथापदार्थद्वारेण इत्याशुक्तं तदुपायमात्रात्  
साम्यविवक्षया ।

(11) ध्वन्या III 33.—नन्वेव गुणपदार्थद्वययो गेत्व वाक्यस्य प्राप्त तदभावे  
तु तस्य वाक्यतैव विघटते, तस्या एकार्थलक्षणत्वात् नैष दोषः, गुणप्रधानभावेन  
तयो व्यवस्थानात् । . तस्मात् स्थितमेतत्—व्यङ्ग्यपरत्वेऽपि काव्यस्य न  
व्यङ्ग्यस्याभिधेयत्व अपि तु व्यङ्ग्य एवेव ।

(12) ध्वन्या III 33 किं च व्यङ्ग्यस्य प्रधानेन अविवक्षाया वाच्य-  
त्व तावद् भवद्भि न अभ्युपगन्तव्यं अन्तरत्वात् शङ्क्यः । तदस्ति तावद्-  
व्यङ्ग्यं शङ्कानां कश्चिद् विषय इति । यत्रापि तस्य प्राधान्यं तत्रापि किमिति  
तस्य स्वरूपमपहन्यते ।

(13) ध्वन्या III 33 स च तथाविध औपाधिको घर्मः शृङ्गानामौ-  
त्पत्तिश्चाद्वार्थसंबन्धादिना वाक्यनिरविवक्षा पौरुषेयापौरुषेययोर्वाच्ययोर्विशेषम-  
भिधत्ता नियमेनाभ्युपगन्तव्यः, तदभ्युपगमे हि तस्य शब्दार्थसम्बन्धनित्यत्वे  
सत्यपौरुषेयपौरुषेययोर्वाच्ययोरेव प्रतिपादने निर्विशेषत्वं स्यात् । तदभ्युपगमे तु  
पौरुषेयाणां वाक्यानां पुरुषेच्छानुविधानसमारोपितौपाधिकव्यापारान्तराणां सत्यपि  
स्वाभिधेयसम्बन्धापरित्यागे मिथ्यार्थतापि भवेत् । दृश्यते हि भावानामपरित्यक्त-  
स्वभावानामपि सामान्यान्तरसम्पादितौपाधिकव्यापारान्तराणां विरुद्धकियत्वम् ।  
तथा हि—हिममयूखप्रसृतीनां निर्वापितसकलजीवलोकः शीतलत्वमुद्रहतामेव  
प्रियाविरहदहनदग्धमानमानसैर्जनैरालोक्यमानानां सता सन्तापकरित्वं प्रसिद्धमेव ।  
तस्मात् पौरुषेयाणां वाक्यानां सत्यपि नैसर्गिके अर्थसम्बन्धे मिथ्यार्थत्वं समर्थ-  
यितुमिच्छता वाचकत्वव्यतिरिक्तं किंचिद्रूपमौपाधिकं व्यक्तमेवाभिधानीयम् । तच्च  
व्यञ्जकत्वादते नान्यत् । व्यङ्ग्यप्रकाशने हि व्यञ्जकत्वम् । पौरुषेयाणि च वाक्यानि

प्राधान्येन पुरुषाभिप्रायमेव प्रकाशयन्ति । स च व्यङ्ग्य एव नत्वभिधेयः, तेन सहाभिधानस्य वाच्यवाचकत्वलक्षणसम्बन्धाभावात् ।

(14) ध्वन्या III. 33. नन्वेनेन न्यायेन सर्वेषामेव लौकिकानां वाक्यानां ध्वनिव्यवहारः प्रसक्तः । सर्वेषामप्यनेन न्यायेन व्यञ्जकत्वात् । सत्यमेतत्; किन्तु वक्षत्रमिप्रायप्रकाशनेन यद् व्यञ्जकत्वं तत् सर्वेषामेव लौकिकानां वाक्यानामविशिष्टम् । तस्तु वाचकत्वान्न भिद्यते व्यङ्ग्यं हि तत्र नान्तरीयकतया व्यवस्थितम् । न तु विवक्षितत्वेन । यत्र तु विवक्षितत्वेन व्यङ्ग्यस्य स्थितिः तत्र व्यञ्जकत्व ध्वनिव्यवहारस्य प्रयोजकम् । यत्त्वमिप्रायविशेषरूपं व्यङ्ग्यं शब्दाभ्यां प्रकाशते तदभवति विवक्षितं तात्पर्येण प्रकाशयमानं सत् । किन्तु तदेव केवलपरिमितविषयस्य ध्वनिव्यवहारस्य न प्रयोजकमन्यापकत्वात् । तथा दर्शितमेदत्रयरूपं तात्पर्येण द्योतयमानमभिप्रायरूपमभिप्रायरूपं च सर्वमेव न ध्वनिव्यवहारस्य प्रयोजक इति यथोक्तव्यञ्जकत्वविशेषे ध्वनिलक्षणे नातिव्यतिरिक्तं चाव्याप्तिः । तस्माद्वाक्यतत्त्वविदा मतेन तावद् व्यञ्जकत्वलक्षणः शाब्दो व्यापारो न विरोधी प्रत्युतानुगुण एव लक्ष्यते ।

(15) ध्वन्या III. 33 रूपमेदस्तावदयम्—यदमुख्यतया व्यापारो गुणवृत्तिः प्रसिद्धा । व्यञ्जकत्व तु मुख्यतयैव शब्दस्य व्यापारः । न हि अर्थात् व्यङ्ग्यप्रत्ययप्रतीतिर्या तस्या अमुख्यत्वं मनागपि लक्ष्यते ।

(16) ध्वन्या III 33 अयं चान्यः स्वरूपमेदः यद् गुणवृत्तिरमुख्यत्वेन व्यवस्थितं वाचकत्वमेवोच्यते । व्यञ्जकत्व तु वाचकत्वादत्यन्तं विभिन्नमेव । एतच्च प्रतिपादितम् ।

(17) ध्वन्या III 33 अयं चापरो रूपमेदो यद्गुणवृत्तौ यदार्थोऽर्थान्तर-सुरलक्षयति तदोपलक्षणीयार्थात्मना परिणत एवासौ सम्पद्यते । यथा गङ्गाया घोषः इत्यादौ । व्यञ्जकत्वमार्गे तु पदार्थः पदार्थान्तरं द्योतयति तदा स्वरूप प्रकाशयन्नेवासावान्यस्य प्रकाशकः प्रतीयते प्रदीपवत् । यथा लीलाकमलपत्राणि गणयामास पार्वती इत्यादौ । यदि च यत्र अतिरिक्तस्वप्रतीतिरर्थोऽर्थान्तरं लक्षयति तत्र लक्षणाव्यवहारः क्रियते तदेव सति लक्षणैव मुख्यः शब्दव्यापारः इति प्राप्तम् । यस्मात् प्रायेण वाक्यानां वाच्यव्यतिरिक्ततात्पर्यविषयार्थावभासित्वम् ।

(18) लोचन ०५ ध्वन्या III. 33. कीदृश इति मुख्यो वा न वा प्रकाशान्तराभावात् । मुख्यत्वे वाचकत्वमन्यथा गुणवृत्तिः, गुणो निमित्तं सादृश्यादि, तद्व्याप्तिः वृत्तिः शब्दस्य व्यापारो गुणवृत्तिरिति भावः । मुख्य एवासौ व्यापारः सामर्थ्यमेदाच्च वाचकत्वात् व्यतिरिच्यत इत्यभिप्रायेणाह—उच्यत इति ।

रूपम् । यदि हि लिङ्गितया तत्र शब्दानां व्यापारः स्यात् तच्छब्दार्थे सम्यक्-  
मिथ्यादिविवादा एव न प्रवर्तेरन्, धूमादिलिङ्गालुमिङ्गालुमेयान्तरवत् ध्वन्या III.

(27) तस्माद्वक्तृमित्रप्रारूप एव व्यङ्ग्ये लिङ्गितया शब्दानां व्यापारः ।  
तद्विषयीकृते तु प्रतिपाद्यतया । ध्वन्या III. 33.

(28) न च व्यङ्ग्यरूपे लिङ्गित्वरूपमेव, कालोकादिध्वन्यथा दृष्टवत् ।  
ध्वन्या III. 33

(29) तस्मात् प्रतिपाद्यो विषयः शब्दानां न लिङ्गित्वेन सम्बन्धो वाच्य-  
वत् । ध्वन्या III 33

(30) हि लिङ्गित्वेन तेषां सम्बन्धो दर्शितो विषयः, स न वाच्यत्वेन  
प्रतीयते, अपितुगच्छित्वेन । ध्वन्या III 33

(31) यथा च वाच्यविषये प्रमाणान्तरानुगमेन सम्यक्प्रतीतौ क्वचित् क्रिय-  
माणाया तस्य प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वे सत्यपि न शब्दव्यापारविषयताहानिस्तद्वत्  
व्यङ्ग्यस्यापि । ध्वन्या III 33

(32) काव्यविषये च व्यङ्ग्यप्रतीतिनां सत्यासम्पन्निरूपणस्य अप्रयोजनक-  
त्वमेव इति तत्र प्रमाणान्तरव्यापारपरीक्षोपहासायैव सम्यग्यते । तस्मादिलिङ्गप्रती-  
तिरेव सर्वत्र व्यङ्ग्यप्रतीतिरिति न शक्यते वक्तुम् । ध्वन्या. III 33

## CHAPTER XIII

### SOME ANTI-DHVANI THEORISTS

While starting the exposition of dhvani as expounded in Dhv we raised the question of the earlier writers, who did not accept dhvani and against whose views Ānanda was trying to establish his theory. We noted that we have not been able to discover specific works of authors who hold views opposed to the dhvani theory. Consequently, we relied upon Dhv and Locana for the opposing views (Ch 24). We do, however, find works posterior to Dhv which carry on their polemics against the dhvani theory. In order to complete the discussion on dhvani we now take up these views.

Among these works, we come across *Abhidhāvṛttimāṭṛkā* (AVM) of Mukula Bhatta (circa 9th-10th Cen A D), *Valokti-jivita* (VJ) of Kuntaka (circa middle of 10th-11th cen A D), *Das'arūpaka* (DR) of Dhanañjaya (last quarter of 10th Cen) with *Avaloka* of Dhanika, *Vyaktiviveka* of Mahimabhatta (circa 11th A D-12th A D) and *S'ṃgāraprakāśa* (S' Pra) of Bhoja-(Circa 11th A D).

Before we start with Mukula Bhatta, it should be noted that Bhatta Nāyaka's name also should be mentioned first as he is said to have composed his *Hṛdayadarpana* with an object of *dhvanīdhvaṃsa*, *Pratibhārendurāja* also mentions *Udbhata* as one who did not accept dhvani and knowingly incorporated the same under various figures of speech. One *Manoratha Kavi*, a contemporary of Ānanda, is also mentioned by *Abhinava*. He (i.e. *Manoratha*) wrote the famous verse viz. *yasminnaṣṭi na vastu* etc to ridicule dhvani.

#### Mukula Bhatta

We begin with those *ālapkṛtīkas* who seem to include the suggested sense under *lakṣaṇa*. In this context, we may mention the names of Mukula Bhatta and Kuntaka.



Mukula Bhatta, like the older grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas, satisfied himself with only two modes of expression, viz. *abhidhā* and *lakṣanā*. All implicit sense is put under *lakṣanā* by him. In his *Abhidhāvṛttimāṭṛkā* (AVM), Mukula incorporates all the examples of the implicit sense under *lakṣanā*. He discusses the nature of *abhidhā* in his AVM. He also treats of *lakṣanā* therein. *Lakṣanā* is treated only as a subdivision of *abhidhā* and virtually he believes only in one *śabdavṛtti* viz. *abhidhā* (1). He seems to incorporate the implicit sense under *lakṣanā* which is only a part of *abhidhā*.

He considers *lakṣanā* to be three-fold on the basis of *vakta* i.e. speaker, *vakya* i.e. sentence, and *vācya* i.e. the meaning or context. On the basis of these three factors, *suddha lakṣanā* and *upacāra lakṣanā* both become three-fold. Thus we arrive at six sub-divisions of *lakṣanā* (2). The illustrations cited are as below.

*Vaktrābandhana lakṣanā* is that in which the *lakṣyārtha* is gathered with reference to the type of the speaker. The illustration is *dṛṣṭim he pratīvesini* etc. The speaker is a waction woman and the *lakṣyārtha* is gathered with reference to her. Mukula holds that the future 'ratagopana' is the *lakṣyārtha* here. (For *dhvanivādin*, however, it is an example of *vyāñjanā*, based on *vaktṛvāsisṭya* or peculiarity of the speaker, and herein we derive through *vyāñjanā* some 'vastu' or idea from another 'vastu' or idea).

*Vakya-bandhana lakṣanā* is based on a particular type of a sentence. The illustration is, *prāptasṭiḥ eṣa kasmāt* etc. Here, the natural movement of the ocean is taken to be due to something else. Here the superimposition is due to a particular *vakṣyārtha* or the meaning of a sentence. Thus, the 'upacāra' is 'gauna' or subordinate. The superimposition of Viṣṇu on the king is the *lakṣyārtha* (3). (For the *dhvanivādin*, this is 'rūpakālamkāradhvanī' i.e. suggestion of the figure called *rūpaka*).

### *Some anti-dhvani Theorists*

The *vācya*bandhana *lakṣaṇā* occurs when the *lakṣyārtha* is gathered on the perusal of the *vācārtha* or the expressed sense. This is illustrated as in *durvārā madaneśavo diśi* etc. Herein the *vācārtha* or the expressed sense of the sentence is that as *agni* i.e. fire is superimposed on *vasanta* i.e. spring, *Kāmadeva* or the god of love etc., they become unbreakable. On perusal of this expressed sense, *vipralambha śrngāra* is gathered through *aksepa* or implication. Thus, it is a case of *upadanalakṣaṇā* with *Mukula* (4). Thus, *Mukula* seems to incorporate *rasadhvani* under *lakṣaṇā*. He says *lakṣaṇāmārgavagahitvam tu dhvaneḥ nūtanatayopavarṇitasya vidyata itī disarṇ unmilayitūp idamatroktam* (AVM pp 22).

#### **Kuntaka**

*Kuntaka* accepts only one mode of verbal expression viz *abhidhā*. The implied meaning which poems convey are for him so many different twists of *abhidhā*. So, he, instead of postulating the new mode of *vyañjanā*, would explain everything by *abhidhā* and the several twists to which it can be subjected. For *Kuntaka*, *dyotaka* and *vyañjaka* words, on account of their quality of the ability to give meaning (*arthapratīṭikāritva*) may be termed as *vācaka*, metaphorically. Thus the *dyotya* and *vyañjya* *arthas* i.e. suggested meaning in general, also are *vācya* or expressed on account of their quality of being gathered by us. He accepts only *abhidhā* but he does not reject either *lakṣaṇā* or *vyañjanā* as they are but the extension of *abhidhā* only (5).

*Kuntaka* tries to incorporate some of the implicit sense under *upacāravakratā*. He subsumes some other implicit sense under some other variety of *vakratā*. He does not seem to include the whole of *vyañjanā* in *lakṣaṇā*. However, *Vidyādhara*, the author of *Ekavālī* holds that *Kuntaka* incorporates all *dhvani* under *bhakti* or *lakṣaṇā* (6). Dr *Harichandra Sāstri* (*Kālidāsa et l'Art Poétique de l'Inde* pp 96-97) suggests that *bhakti* stands for *vakrokti* and that *Kuntaka* therefore, is a *bhaktivādin*. Dr *Kane* does not agree with this

vrttis of the ancients (i.e. Udbhata) are the same as varṇa-vīṇyāsavakratā. He says (V J II 5)

“varṇacchāyanusārena guṇamargānuvartini |  
vṛttivaicitryayukteti saiva proktā cīrantanaḥ ||  
yamaka is also a variety of the same

He says ‘yamakam nama kopyasyāḥ prakaraḥ paridṛśyate |

sa tu sobhantarabbhāvat ita nati pratanyate || V J II 7)

Padapurvārdhavadakratā has several varieties, such as rūdhivaicitryavakratā, paryāyavakratā, upacāravakratā, viśeṣānavakratā, samvṛttivakratā, vṛttivakratā, liṅgavaicitryavakratā, and kriyāvaicitryavakratā

Rūdhivaicitryavakratā is defined as  
(V J II 8 9)

yatra rūdherasambhāvyadharmādhyaropagarbhatā |  
sadharmāṭisāyāropagarbhatvaṃ vā pratīyate ||  
lokottaratīraskāraslaghyotkarsābbidhitasā |  
vacyasya socyate kapi rūdhivaicitryavakratā ||

There are two varieties of rūdhivaicitrya. Examples of the first variety are the word ‘kamaḥ’ in ‘tala jānti’ etc., and ‘rāmaḥ’ in ‘snigdhasyāmala’ etc. Examples of the second variety of rūdhivaicitrya (i.e. vidyamanadharmāṭisāyavācyādhya-ropagarbhatva) are, tataḥ prahasyāḥ etc. (Raghu III 51) and rāmo’sau bhuvaneṣu etc. (quoted in K. P. IV)

From the illustrations quoted as above we can see that the lakṣaṇāmūla arthāntarasamkramitavācyā variety of dhvani seems to have been covered in rūdhivaicitrya

Paryāyavakratā (V J II 11,12) is defined as

“abhidheyaṅtaratamastasyāṭisāyaposaḥ |  
ramyacchāyāntarasparśattalamkartumīśvarah ||  
svayam viśeṣānenāpi svacchāyotkarṣapeśalah” ||  
paryāyastena vaicitryam ||

An example is nābhīyoktup anṛtatvaṃ īśyaḥ etc., wherein the word ‘vajraḥ’ cannot be replaced by ‘indrasya’ without killing the charm. By this variety, paryāyadhvani or

what is technically termed as śabdaśaktimūlaka anuranana rūpavyaṅgya padadhvani seems to have been covered (130). Kuntaka himself says this very clearly.

Then follows upacāravakratā defined as : (V J.II.13-14) :  
 yatra dūrāntarenyasmāt sāmānyamupacaryate |  
 leśenāpi bhavatkāmcid vaktumudrīktavṛttitām ||  
 yanmūla sarasollekhā rūpakādiralamkrītib |  
 upacārapradhānāsau vakratā kāciducyate ||

Examples of this are, snigdhaśyāmala etc., gacchantīnām ramanavasatīm etc., and gaganam ca matlyamehaṃ etc. The first and the last are cited in the Dhv. as examples of arthāntarasamkramitavācya and atyantatīraskṛtavācya varieties of dhvani.

As already noted earlier, probably this inspires the author of Alamkārasarvasva to say that . upacāravakratādibhiḥ samasto dhvaniprapañcah svikṛtaḥ.

Viśeṣanavakratā and samvṛtīvakratā are defined as :

(V J.II.15.16)

viśeṣanasya māhātmyāt kriyāyāḥ kārakasya vā |  
 yatraollasati lāvanyam sa viśeṣanavakratā ||  
 yattu samvṛtyate vastu vaicitṛyasya vīvakṣayā |  
 sarvanāmādibhiḥ kaścitsoktā samvṛtīvakratā ||

The examples are śuciśītala etc., and nivāryatāmālī kimapyayam batuh (Kumāra. Sam. V. 83). This also partially covers what is technically termed as arthāntarasamkramitavācyadhvani.

Vṛttivaicitṛyavakratā includes vakratā with reference to kṛt, taddhita, samāsa, ekaśeṣa and sannanta. This covers all dhvani derived by kṛt, taddhita etc. (Dhv.III. 16) (14). Dhv.III. 16 also refers to dhvani based on nipāta, kāla, upasarga, līnga etc (15). This is covered by Kuntaka's other varieties of padaparārdhavakratā such as kārakavakratā, vacana, upasarga, pratyaya, nipātavakratā, puruṣavakratā, etc.

In the third unmeṣa the author comes to the discussion of vākyavaicitryavakratā. In connection with this he speaks of vastuvakratā at III 1 (16)

The vastu may be 'sahaja' or 'ābhārya' (i.e. kavīsaktivyūṭṭhāpattiparīpākapraudha). The example for both these is asyāḥ sargavidhau etc. This variety includes some vastudhvanī as the delineation is with reference to 'vastu that may be not vācya or expressed only, but also vyaṅgya i.e. suggested (17)

Kūṭaka's vākyavakratā covers alamkāradhvanī as well as the normal figures of speech. He recognises the pratiyamaṅga variety of rūpaka, vyatireka etc., where these figures are implicit. The illustration is 'lāvanyakāntiparīpūritadānāmukhe' smin etc. Rūpakadhvanī of Ānanda is also hereby covered (18)

He also gives instructions here as to how sentiment and other objects can be used in a poem to yield charming results and how to lend charm to poetry by nourishing appropriate rasas bhāvas etc. The verse 'tīkṣhet kopavaśāt' etc. is cited as an example of vipralambha and the lamentations of Vatsarāja (in Tāpasavatsarāja Act II) as examples of karuṇa

In the 4th unmeṣa he gives the treatment of prakaraṇavakratā and prabandhavakratā. Prakaraṇavakratā is illustrated by several verses from the Raghu (V), with the remark—'kuberam prati samantasambhavanayā jayadhyavasāyāḥ kāmapi sahādayā bhāḍakāritam pratipadyate'. The introduction of the curse of Duvāsā is also an instance to the point. Yet another illustration in prakaraṇavakratā is the mṛgayāprakaraṇa or the episode of hunting in Raghu (IX). The episode introduced with the words 'tataḥ pravṛtāt rajjuhastāḥ puruṣāḥ' (Mudrā rākṣasa (VI)) is also an instance to the point.

Prabandhavakratā is defined as—

itivṛttānyathāvyūttarasasampadapekṣayā ।

rasāntareṇa ramyena yatra nirvahanam bhavet ॥

kathāmarterāṃlonmīlitas'riyah ।  
vinayānandanīspatyai sā prabandhasya vakratā ॥

The Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata are the examples . Thus prabandhavakratā covers prabandhadhvani (19) Another variety of prabandhavakratā is,

“trāṣṭīkyaḥbhīnavollekhanāyakotkarsāposinā ।  
itihāsaikadesena prabandhasya samāpanam ॥  
taduttarakathāvarṭivīrasatvajhāsaya ।  
kurvīta yatra sukaviḥ sā vicitrāsya vakratā ॥

An example is Kīrātārjuniya He says that great poets show their imagination even in giving names to their works e.g. Abhijñānaśākuntala, Mudrārākṣasa, etc etc. It is genius that makes all the difference, though the plot may be the same (20) Again, at IV 26, Kuntaka reads—In all the compositions of poets, which are composed in different ways and which speak of the path of truth, there is a sort of vakratā (uncommon to others). (21) Compositions based on the same source acquire individuality due to vakratā Thus, Kuntaka covers prabandhadhvani by prabandhavakratā

Kuntaka's approach to the fact of rasa is also noteworthy. For him, rasa is the highest factor in the poetic art which is of the form of vakrokti Vakrokti is related to rasa in the same way in which it is related to dhvani Thus, just as for the dhvanivādin dhvani is the soul of kāvyā and rasadhvani is the highest form of dhvani ; in the same way, vakrokti is the soul of kāvyā and rasa is the most important aspect of vakrokti.

Kuntaka seems to pay great importance to the fact of rasa He wants poetry to be tadvidāhlāḍakārīṇī i.e. such as would delight the critic. (22) At I.5, in his VJ., while dealing with kāvyāprayojana he refers to rasa (23) Again, while talking about sukumāra mārga, he says that a sahrdaya or tadvid is 'rasādīparamārtabhājna' (rasādīparamārtabhājanamanahsaṃvāda-sundarāḥ I.26 VJ) and while dealing with saubhāgyaguna, the critics are described as 'sarasīma' i.e. 'ardracetas'. (24)

He also seems to take *rasa* as the soul of *kāvya*. He declares it categorically that *prabandhavakratā* is that highest form of *vakrokti* (25). These *prabandhas* or compositions on which the fame of great poets rests, are full of *rasa*—*'nirantararasodgāragarbhāsandarbhānirbharāḥ'* (V.J IV 11). They do not depend upon *kāthamātra* or story element or content alone (26). Thus, for Kuntaka *rasa* is the soul of a *prabandha* or a composition and is one of the aspects of *vakrokti*. Kuntaka thus seems to cover *rasadhvani* of the *asāṃplakṣya* variety.

*Rasa* for Kuntaka is not *vācya* or expressed. While dealing with the problem of the *alampkāras* such as *rasavat*, *preyas*, etc. he laughs at Udbhata's theory of *rasa* becoming *'svasabdavācya'* or being expressed by its own proper name (27).

While considering the nature of *kāvya* or poetic context, Kuntaka takes *rasa* to be very important. Thus, at V.J III.11 (vṛtti) he says that *'rasanirbharatā'* or the condition of being drenched in *rasa* is the principal aspects of poetic context. He divides *kāvya* or poetic context as two-fold, *cetana* or sentient and *jada* or insentient, and takes the first one as principal and for that *rasapariṣosa* or the enhancement of sentiment is inevitable (28). Then he gives many examples of *vipralambha* and *karuṇa* *rasas* and leaves other *rasas* to the readers (29). For him, the description of *jada* or insentient object becomes interesting on account of its ability to evoke *rasa* (30). In the same way and for the same purpose i.e. to evoke *rasa*, the description of the unimportant sentiment object such as birds and the like is also welcome (31). He adds that (V.J III 10 Vṛtti) *kāvya* or poetic context is two fold on account of its being *'svabhāvapradhāna'* or *'rasapradhāna'* and that both should be embellished on account of both of them being *'sahajasaukumāryasārāṣa'* or full of *rasa* on account of natural beauty (32).

While discussing different *mārgas* also Kuntaka refers to *rasa*. The *Sukumāra mārga* is charming (V.J I 26) on account

### *Some anti-dhvani Theorists*

of its being favourable to the mental aptitude of those who know the highest object called *rasa* (33) The *vicitramārga* is also 'sarasākuta' i.e. accomplished by *rasanirbharābhīprāya* (34) The *madhyama mārga* being a combination of these two, must be necessarily charged with *rasa*-*'rasapusta'*

Thus we see that with his theory of *vakrokti* or a striking mode of speech differing from and transcending the ordinary everyday mode of speaking about a thing, and such that charms by the skill of the poet, Kuntaka seems to cover up all the sources of charm in poetry, beginning with *alamkāra* and ending with *dhvani* and *rasa*. As already noted earlier, even *dyotaka* and *vyāñjaka* words, on account of their quality of the ability to give meaning, -*arthapratīṭikāritva*-are termed '*vācaka*' i.e. expressive of meaning, metaphorically. Thus, broadly speaking, Kuntaka may be termed as an *antar-bhāvavādin* and a *bhaktivādin* to a certain extent.

### **Dhanañjaya and Dhanika**

We will now consider the views of Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, (Circa 10th Century A.D.) the authors of *Dastupaka* and *Avaloka* on it, respectively. These are also well-known anti-dhvani theorists who try to explain the fact of suggested sense through *tatparya* or purport.

In the fourth *prakāśa* of the DR the authors touch the problem of *rasānubhūti* or the experience of sentiment in poetry. Dhanika's elaborate commentary brings out their views clearly. They accept the fact of *rasādi* but they fail to accept the proposition that *rasādis* are conveyed by *vyāñjana*. They hold that the *vyāñgya* or suggestion of the *dhvanivādin* can be explained with the help of *tatparya s'akti* or purport alone. In order to get the suggested sense through *tatparya s'akti* or purport, we will see how Dhanika expands the limits of *tatparyārtha* or purport-sense. The line of argument proceeds as below -

The *laukika vakyas* or sentences in day to day usage



such as 'gāmabhyāja', where the *kriyā* or action is clearly heard of, and sentences such as 'dvāram dvāram' in which the *kriyā* or action is not heard of, but is gathered through *prakarana* or context, only *kriyā* or action can be considered as the *vākyārtha* or the sense of a sentence. In the same way, even in *kāvya* or poetry, *rasa* which is the ultimate purpose of *kāvya* or poetry, forms the *vākyārtha*. Thus *rasa* becomes the ultimate *vākyārtha* i.e. *kāvya-vākyārtha* and therefore, is at times expressed in clear terms such as 'prītyai navodhā prīyā,' or is at times brought about by the particular *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicārins* etc. It should not be argued that as *ratyādi* and the like, is an *apadārtha* (i.e. not the direct meaning of a *pada* or word), it cannot therefore be gathered by *vākyārtha* or sentence-sense. For, ultimately, our *tātparya* *sakti* or purport rests in the final *kriyā* or action—'kāryaparyavasāyitvat tāparyas'akteh'—i.e. the action of enjoyment. Now, all sentences, *pauruseya* i.e. used in human speech and *apauruseya* i.e. divine, alike, have some action in their motive. If it is not so, any sentence would be as useless as the uttering of a mad man! With reference to the words in poetry, it can be said with the help of positive and negative concomitance, that they aim only at the generation of its own unique joy. *Kāvya* or poetry sets about to achieve this end only. There cannot be any other end in view, except this. So then, in a *kāvya*, the *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* etc. stand for the *padārthas* (i.e. word sense) and the *ratyādi* brought about by them is the *vākyārtha* (or purport). Thus, a *kāvya-vākya* is formed. It should not be argued that as in case of song and the like, there is no *vācyavācakabhāva* or the relation of expressor and the expressed here (In a song, the meaningless notes make for the experience of joy.) Because here, in the field of *kāvya*, the experience of a particular *rasa* is felt by those alone who are conversant with *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* etc. Now in the realisation of such a *rasa*, which is the *vācyārtha* of a *kāvya-vākya*, only *abhidhā* and *tātparya* *sakti* are quite sufficient and therefore, it is gratuitous to postulate the theory of *vyanjana*.

Thus, the tatparyavādin comes to the conclusion that whatever is supposed to be conveyed by vyañjanā is really conveyed by abhidhā and tatparya. Surely, in case of 'anyoktis' wherein the purport is not expressed in clear terms, dhvani cannot be resorted to.

The dhvanivādin cannot say that in case of sentences such as 'vīṣam bhuñkṣva' etc., the purport lies in the principal suggested sense, viz. 'do not take food at his place', gathered by vyañjanā, and not by tatparya. For, in this case, the vācyārtha or the expressed sense is not at all over till the last limit of the full purport is reached. If at all there is any further sense left to be gathered later on, in that case, the vācyārtha or the expressed sense is not to be taken as complete in itself. It becomes complete i.e. visrānta-only when the ultimate sense meant to be brought out by the speaker is gathered by the hearer. Thus, on the acceptance of the fact of tatparya, it is redundant to assume dhvani or vyañjanā.

A limit to the sense gathered from a sentence can not be put. A particular sentence can not be restricted to a particular sense only. Tatparya or purport rests in the ultimate action. So far as the so called desired sense is not gathered, the expressed sense or vācyārtha can not be said to be over. Tatparya is not to be measured on scales—tatparyam na tuladbhītam—so as to limit its extent, and is not to be determined as just this much and not that much !

The pūrvaśakṣa (i.e. dhvanivādin) may argue as follows. The sentences viz. bhrama dhārmika etc., gives only the sense 'bhramanakriyā'. There is no word giving the sense of prohibition and therefore, after giving the meaning in form of an injunction, the vācyārtha or the expressed sense finds its completion. Then, on account of the peculiarity of the speaker viz. the wanton girl, the sense of negation flashes forth on the mind of the cultured critic. Thus, vyañgyārtha i.e. the suggested sense, flashing forth only after the expressed sense is completely gathered—vācyavisrānti—will have to be accepted.

But, the *tātparyavādin* explains away the negative suggested sense from the positive expressed sense in *bhrama dhārmika* etc., with the help of *tātparya* alone, because the *vāc्यārtha* or the expressed sense can be said to have been completed only after the intention of the speaker is fully conveyed. If the intention of the speaker is not fully conveyed, the expressed should be taken as incomplete only. Thus, if the sense of negation is not conveyed then for the speaker, viz. the particular wanton girl the expressed sense remains incomplete.

The sentences of human speech—(*pauruseya*)—are spoken with some idea in mind, i.e. with a desire to convey something—(*vivakṣā*),—and therefore, the full meaning of the speaker, i.e. his intention should be termed as '*tātparya*' in poetry. Till this is not gathered, the sense cannot be said to be complete. If the sentence is said to convey the full sense, then in that case, how and why should it give another sense? And, in case if it goes for it, it is clear that the sentence sense is not complete.

Finally, *Dhanika* explains that the *rasādi* and the *kāvya* are related by way of '*bhāvyabhāvaka*' relation and not by '*vyāṅgyavyaṅjakabhāva*' (35)

### Mahimabhāṭṭa

*Mahimabhāṭṭa* points out the following ten blemishes in the definition of *dhvani* as given in *Dhv* I 13, which has been noticed previously. For the sake of understanding the polemic of *Mahimā*, I repeat it as under

yatrārthah sabdo vā  
tamarthamupasarjanikṛtasvārthau |  
vyanktah kāvya viśeṣah  
sa dhvanirīti sūtrīḥ kathitah || (Dhv I 13)

The blemishes as pointed out by *Mahimā* are enumerated as below

- (i) *arthasya viśiṣṭatvam*
- (ii) *sabdah*

- (iii) (Śabdah) savisesanah
- (iv) vyaktih
- (v) dhvanih
- (vi) 'vā' sabda
- (vii) 'dvivacanam' in 'vyāktah'
- (viii) tadah pūṁstvam
- (ix) the term 'kavyavisesah' and
- (x) vacanam ca kathanakartuh i.e. 'suribhih

The first fault according to Mahima is that the particular adjective viz upasarjanikṛtasva is redundant with reference to 'artha'. An adjective is one that is shown to be variable. Now, 'upasarjanikṛtasva' or 'rendering one's own self subordinate' is an adjective which does not possess variability. For the expressed sense, being an indicator of the suggested sense is necessarily and always subordinate. Says he:

uktam guṇikṛtmatvam  
yadarthasya viśesanam |  
gamakatvānna tattasya  
yuktamavyabbicaratah ||

(Vy V I 7)

The purport of Mahimā's argument seems to be as below. Adjectives are generally used to indicate a variable quality, e.g. lotuses may be white, blue or red. But that adjective which merely repeats the nature of the thing invariably connected, is logically speaking redundant. This is exactly the case in qualifying 'artha' by the adjective 'upasarjanikṛtasva', because it is always so.

It may be noted that the first fault as indicated by Mahima seems to be of the type of 'avācya vacana' or mentioning of something when it is not absolutely required.

The second blemish in the definition of dhvani as given by Ānanda consists in the mentioning of the word 'śabdah'. A word has no other function save expressing its own meaning.

Thus, it cannot suggest any other sense—śabdaḥ punaranu-  
pādeyaḥ eva tasya svābhīdhanamantarena vyāpārantarānupa-  
patterupapādayiṣyamānatvāt (Vy VI)

Thus, it seems that the second fault pertains to making śabda the conveyor of the implicit sense, because the sole function of the word is to express its own meaning. The second fault reiterates the position of Mahimā viz that the word has one continuous meaning and there is no room for anything else like vyakti.

The third fault lies in qualifying śabda by the adjective 'upasarjanīkṛtārtha'. In the opinion of Mahimā, śabda is always subservient to its meaning just as a jar is subservient to water that it is meant to contain. Śabda can be said to be principal, if at all, when there is verbatim repetition in a quotation. So it will bring in 'asambhava' if word is qualified by the adjective, 'upasarjanīkṛtāsvārtha'.

Here therefore, there is the fault of 'asambhava' because the word being always subservient to meaning, there can be no contingency in which its meaning would be subservient to it, which would happen if its meaning is to be subordinated to itself in order to convey vyāgyārtha or the suggested sense.

Even if the two faults previously shown are repudiated, Mahimā says that it would be still open to the fault of 'punarukta' or repetition—(vyabhicārāsambhavayorapi vā yat svārthayorupasarjanīkṛtatvavacanam tat punaruktam taylorarthā ntarābhivyaktyarthamupattayossāmarthyādeva tadavagateri tyuktam, (Vy VI)

It may be noted here that the blemish as pointed out here is merely of a formal nature.

Further, in continuation of the third fault discussed as above, Mahimā tries to find the fault of avyāpti in this definition, because the dhvani which is suggested in such figures as *dīpaka* would be out of the perview, in as much

as these figures are varieties of *abhidhā* and because '*abhidhā*' is not mentioned in the definition, therefore they remain left out. If it is contended that the mention of *abhidhā* is included in the mention of *śabda* and *artha*, then the mention of *śabda* also would be redundant, because it is implied by mentioning *artha*.

The fourth fault mentioned by *Mahīmā* refers to *vyakti* or *vyāñjanā* itself. He holds that it is wrong to say that word and sense 'suggest' further sense. The fourth fault thus refers to the very doctrine of *vyāñjanā*. According to him, the word has only one sense and whatever else comes out of it is a matter of inferential process. In this philosophy of word, word is a means to an end, —*sādhyaśādhanabhāva*—and the end is what the hearer is supposed to do or not to do. The understanding of this *sādhya* becomes possible through the process of inference. So, for him, whatever follows the direct meaning of the word is a matter of inference —'*saiva eva hi śābdo vyavahārah sādhyaśādhanabhāvagarbhatayā prāyeṇ anumānarūpo'bhyupagantavyah, tasya parapravṛttirvṛttir-bandhanatvāt tasyo'ca sampratyayaśampratyayatmanoranyathākartumasakyaivatatah na hi yuktimanavagacchan kaścivipaścdivacanamātrāt sampratyayabhagbhavati*' (Vy VI).

Having thus substituted inference for *vyāñjanā*, he comes upon a two-fold division of meaning viz. '*vācyārtha*' and '*anumeyārtha*'. Says he—*arthōpi diviḍho vācyānumeyasca tatra śābdavyāparaviṣayo vācyah sa eva mukhya ucyate* (Vy VI). With reference to the second, one may incidentally point out that *Mahīmā* really gives up his case by calling it '*artha*'. Says he *arthōpi diviḍhah vācyānumeyasca tatra śābdavyāparaviṣayo vācyah sa eva mukhya ucyate*. (Vy VI.) Having thus established to his satisfaction *anumeyārtha*, he explains how *vyāñgya* or suggested *vastu*, *ālmkāra* and *rasa* are cases of *anumeya vastu*, *ālmkāra* and *rasa* respectively. He adds that while the first two can be directly expressed also, the third is

only inferred—(sa ca trividhah vastumātramalamkārasādayasceh tatrādyau vācpāvapi sambhavatah anyastvanumeya eveti) (Vy VI)

Here, Maḥimā has to face a great difficulty. According to the accepted definition of valid anumāna, his inferential processes in poetry do not confirm to the cannon of (logical) inference. His opponents naturally show that what follows the direct meaning of words in a poem is not inference in any logical sense. Maḥimā's answer to this is as follows:

The meaning that comes to the mind as a sequence of direct meaning of a word is 'anumeya'. This later manifestation of meaning is supposed to be due to three causes. They may be described in the accepted dāśanika terminology as kāraṇahetu, and jñāpakahetu, under which also comes the third viz. anumāna hetu or liṅga. The illustration of the first is curds resulting from milk, the second, the appearance of a jar by a lamp in a dark room, while the third is the inference of fire on a mountain by the appearance of smoke. Now, the meaning following from the direct sense is not discovered by the first two, but by the third, and therefore, it is a process of anumāna or inference.

As to the validity in some cases of knowledge, he quotes a passage which says that even an illusory knowledge may become valid in a particular context. He quotes in his support from pramāṇa vārtika II 5 574. Says he,

śaṅkṣam-bhāntirapi sambandhataḥ pramā itī  
manipradīpaprabhayoḥ manibuddhyābhīdhavatoḥ ।  
mithyājñānāvisēṣe'pi viśeso'rthakriyām prati ॥ itī ca  
(Vy VI)

"Between two people approaching two lights, the one produced by a jewel, the other by a lamp, (without being conscious of what they really ate, but) with the idea that it is a jewel, there exists a difference in respect of casual efficiency, but not a difference of mistaken cognition' (Translation pp. 36

The esthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta—Ranciro Gnoli—SERIE ORIENTALE ROMA, XI 1956)

The purport of the verse is that the two persons see two lights of which the one is that of a lamp and the other is that of a jewel. Both of them do not know whose light it is—but they run with a belief that it is a jewel. Here the ignorance of both is equal, yet the one who gets at a jewel has his purpose fulfilled.

Thus, even though the *liṅga* may be illusory, the inference may be valid if the purpose is served.

Mahimā, however, before he goes into these arguments turns round his opponents and says that it is absurd to seek logical validity in what he calls *kāvya-numiti* and he waxes eloquent on the poetic charm of it—

tenātra gamyagamakayoh sacetasām satyāsatyatvavicāro niru-  
payogo eva kāvyaṁviseṣe ca vācyaavyaṅgyapratītiṇām satyāsastya  
tvavicāro nirupayoga eva iti tatra pramāṇāntaraparīkṣopahā-  
sāyaiva sampadyate iti (Vy V I)

In modern terminology, one might say that the inferential process in poetry is more of a psychological nature than of a logical type.

Having proved to his satisfaction that the relation between a word's immediate meaning and the meaning that follows, is not of the nature of *vyāṅgyavyaṅjaka* but of the nature of inference, he explains all the fine points worked out by Ānanda in the terminology of inference. In fact he gives the same illustrations and practically follows the same mode of argument.

The fifth fault arises as below. 'Dhvanī' is said to be there when the *vācya* or expressed sense is said to be suggestive. But in that case an inferred sense, even if it is suggested, does not become *dhvani*, for there is absence of expressed sense in it. Thus in 'dhvani' there is gathering of the implicit sense through *vācya* or expressed alone. But if this is the



connotation of dhvani, then it brings in the fault of the definition being 'too narrow' In the illustrations such as, 'evam vāḍinī' etc., there is first the suggestion of a bhāva called 'lajjā' or 'avahitthā' Through that suggested bhāva, love of Parvatī is suggested This is a case of suggestion based on suggestion Now 'dhvani' as explained earlier has its scope limited to suggestion based on expressed sense only (Mahimā shows how 'artha' can mean the expressed sense alone)

(kim ca yatra vācyaśārthasya vyañjakatvam sa ced dhvanistarhi tad anumitasya vyañjakatve dhvanitvam na syāt, tasya vācyaivābhavāt tata-ca, 'evam vāḍinī devarsau' ityadau dhvanitvamistam na syād ityavyāptirlaksanadosah) (Vy V I)

Mahimā holds that if the word 'arthah' in Dhv I 13 means both vācya and vyañgya i.e. expressed and suggested sense, then also ativyāptidosa or the fault of 'too wide' follows He holds charm only with reference to implicit sense that follows immediately without any vyavadhāna or intermediary, or a vyavadhāna i.e. intermediary only in form of a vyabhicāri-bhāva or an alamkāra. If it is else than this, it is without charm But the definition of dhvani embraces such instances also Mahimā says

"yadyartha itī vācyō rtho bhūmato'vyāptireva sām  
yenaivamvāḍinītyadavartbasyarthāntarādgatīh ||  
arthobhau tarhyatīvyāptīrdvitravastuvyavasāyini |  
prahelikadīrūpēpi kāvyē dhvanyātmata jatah ||

(Vy V I 21 22)

In this, his fifth argument, Mahimā shows two faults viz. avyāpti and ativyāpti, the first, by confining the meaning or 'artha' to vācya-rtha alone, and the second by including vyañgya-rtha also

Sixth fault lies in the mention of 'vā' Vā suggests either option (vikalpa) or collection (i.e. samuccaya) It cannot mean option, for earlier 'śabda' is explained as not to be suggestive And even if it is accepted to mean option, then it cannot be construed with the dual in form of 'vyantikah' If it means

collection then suggestivity will rest only on both sabda and artha taken together only. Thus, such cases of dhvani resting on only 'śabda' or only 'artha' will be excluded and avyāpti-doṣa will follow :

~(kimcātra vāśabdo vikalpārtho vā syāt samuccayārtho vā na tavadvikalpārbhah pakṣāntarasambhavasya vyutpāditatvāt sambhave vāśya dvivacanānupapattih, tayoh samuccayābhāvāt ... samuccayārthatve'pi yatra sabdārthayorekarkasya vyañjakatvaṃ tatra dhvanitvaṃ iṣṭam na syāt (Vy V I)

The seventh fault follows from the sixth and touches the use of dual in 'vyāntah'. Here, Mahimābhāṭṭa takes the substance of his argument from the discussion between Bhaṭṭanayaka and Abhinavagupta as given in the latter's work-'Locana'. Abhinava says that objections of Bhaṭṭanayaka are due to carelessness because in the act of suggestion the word does it as related to meaning and meaning does it as related to word, and therefore, the dual is justified. Mahimā simply rejects this defence of Abhinava (37).

Eighth fault results from the use of the pronominal stem. Here it refers to 'pratyamānam vastu' (Dhv I 5). It is used in masculine instead of neuter, which would be grammatically correct (kimca tamitā tadah pumstvena nirdeśōnupapannah - Vy V I). It may be noted that this argument is merely verbal and does not refer to the substance.

In the ninth blemish, the objection is against 'kāvyaviśeṣah'. Mahimā says that according to Dhvanikāra, a poem becomes a poem only if there is dhvani, and if there is no dhvani there is no poem. Therefore it is pointless to use the word 'kāvyaviśeṣah'. Taking this verse (i.e. Dhv I 13) in conjunction with 'kāvyasyātmā sa evārthah' etc (Dhv I 5), Mahimā argues further that where there is no rasa there is no poetry and therefore, to specify a composition as peculiar poetry is useless. Thus, it is useless to circumscribe the sphere of dhvani by qualifying the term kāvyā by 'viśeṣa', in as much

as it gives rise to the false notion that there are other specimens of *kāvya* besides what can be properly subsumed under *dhvani* –

(*api ca kāvyavisesa itī kāvyasya visistatvamanupapannam kāvyamātrasya dhvani vyapadesavisesanātvena istatvāt, tasya rasātmakatvopagamāt tadabhāve casya kāvyataiva na syāt kimuta vīśeṣaḥ itī anārambhānīyameva etat prekṣāvataṁ syāt vaiphalīyāt* (Vy VI))

There can be no varying degrees of charm in aesthetic realisation which can be made the basis of this differentiation implied by the expression-‘*kāvyaavīśeṣaḥ*’, for, in each case the final blissful experience is interminate in its character and does not admit of any determinate analysis leading to comparison *inter se* (38)

It might be argued that there are nine different sentiments (*rasa*) and, the distinction implied might have reference to any particular *rasa* amongst them. But such a course of argument would lead to the exclusion of poetic compositions from the category of *dhvanikāvya* that do not suggest that particular sentiment (39). One might however contend that there are other varieties of suggested sense besides *rasadhvani* which is raised to the status of the soul of literary art, viz *vastu-dhvanī*, and *ālamkāradhvanī*. Thus, when *rasadhvani* would be characterised by the suggested *vastu* and *ālamkāra*, severally or jointly, then and then only would it be regarded as a specimen of *dhvanikāvya*. But this defence too would be of no avail, for when a piece of poem manifests exclusively a particular emotion without suggesting either *vastu* or *ālamkāra* the designation of *dhvani* would not be applicable—a ridiculous position indeed! So, the qualifying word ‘*vīśeṣaḥ*’ is indefensible (40)

Tenth fault is *avācya vacanadosa* as seen in ‘*surībhiḥ kathitāḥ*’. The specific mention of the nominative viz *surībhiḥ*,

of the particular form 'kathitah' is needless and therefore unjustifiable.

(kṛmca 'sūribbhī kathitā'ni kathanakṛiyākṛitnirdesaḥ paksadvaye'pyavācya eva kṛtṛmātravivaksāyām kṛiyāyāḥ kṛtravjabbicārāt kṛtrviseśavivaksāyāmanantaroktakramena vyāpāravisesasambandhādeva tadviseśāvagatīśiddherityavācya-vacanāṃ doṣaḥ )

The tenth fault—avācya-avacanadosa—is mentioning something which need not be mentioned. If merely the agents of 'kathitah' are implied in general, they are already implied in the very use of the word 'kathitah'. If some particular authors are implied, these are already referred to formerly. Thus the mention of sūribbhī is redundant.

Mahimā, having thus refuted dhvani to his satisfaction, and being indisposed to bother himself with minor items, improves upon the definition of dhvani as follows:

vācyastadanumīto vā  
yatrārtho'rthāntaram prakāśayati |  
sambanbhataḥ kutascit  
sa kavyānumitirityukta || (Vy.V I 25)

And adds,

etiacca anumānasyaiva lakṣaṇam nānyasya yaduktam  
trirūpālīṅgāt parārthānumānamīti kevalam samjñābhedaḥ.  
(Vy.V I)

The ten faults shown by Mahimā are not all of equal importance. As we have noted, some of these are mere verbal and some are mere quibbles. His main argument seems to be that the word 'artha' should be limited to the first direct meaning—vācyārtha—of the word. Therefore, whatever else follows this vācyārtha in the mind of the saḥdaya should be regarded as anumeya. He has this much justification in his view that the indirect thoughts and feelings arising out of the direct meaning can be psychologically regarded as of an inferential

nature This however, is in no sense a logical anumāna or inference In fact, Mahimā, as we have noted, laughs at those who while having 'kavyānumiti' think of the 'tārikā' anumiti

He, like Ānanda tries to elaborate this point, and show how the several categories of poetics can be subsumed under this In fact in this part of the treatment of the subject, he practically takes the analogy of Ānanda's vyañjanā e g Mahimā has his asaṃpāksyakrama and saṃpāksyakrama so also vastu anumiti, alamkāra-numiti and rasādi anumiti etc The illustrations that he uses are mostly taken from Dhv Thus kavyānumiti takes the form of vyañjanā for Mahimā

### Bhoja

Now, in order to understand Bhoja's position, let us consider briefly his S K Ā, and the published fragments of Sr Pra, as well as Dr Raghavan's learned and critical thesis on Sr Pra Dr De seems to say that Bhoja does not accept the dhvani theory of Ānanda in toto, though he does quote many of the kārīkas of Dhv and appropriates some of its other matter (41)

Dr Raghavan in his Bhoja's S'r Pra tries to refute at length Dr De's views on this point We have, while tracing the earlier indications of vyañjanā pointed out that the idea of vyañjanā is to be found in some of the alamkāras discussed by Bhāmaha and Dandin (Vide Ch pp ) We can concur with the opinion that in S K Ā and Sr Pra there are alamkāras and guṇas which embody vyañjanā This however, does not necessarily make him a vyañjanāvadīn, though we may concede that as Dr Raghavan says, Bhoja may be called an antarbhāva-vadīn.

We have seen that both Dhañjaya and Dhanīka, in DR and its Avaloka, refute the theory of vyañjanā and substitute the tatparyā vṛtti in its place to do for vyañjanā Bhoja,

Muñja's successor, seems to follow the tradition of his learned assembly in not giving importance to vyañjana. In this respect we can agree with Dr. De when he says, that Bhoja's school, ".....stands in many respects apart from the kashmirian school of Ānandvardhana", but we cannot agree with him when he says...., "and appears to have been entirely untouched by the implications of the Dhvani theory". As to the use of Ānanda's *karikās* and some of its matter of Bhoja, we may point out that even the greatest opponent of Ānanda viz. Mahimabhaṭṭa also does the same. But thereby he does not become a vyañjanavādin. In contrast to this we may say that Hemacandra, the author of *Kāvyaṇuśāsana* (Crica. 11th Cen. A.D.), who lived in the time of Siddharāja and Kumārapāla accepts the views of the kashmirian authors Abhinava and Mammata, and is an ardent vyañjanavādin (see Kā. Śā 1 su. 20-25).

However, it may be added that a discordant note is struck by Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, the disciples of Hemacandra, who in their *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* (III. 109 su 163) take *rasa* to be 'spṣṭānubhavanīśevah' and add that the term 'spṣṭa' qualifying 'anubhava' means well determined. For, only the well determined object serves as a mark or *liṅgam*.—*Spṣṭāḥ iti spṣṭāḥ samyag nīṛṇīṭāḥ. asamdigdhaḥ hi liṅgam bhavati*. Thus the authors seem to lean more towards Sri. S'āṅkula.

Mammata who follows Ānanda in his theory of vyañjana, after refuting the views of anumānavādin and the like, takes up the view of advaitavādins. Advaitavādins as they are, they assume an akhandabuddhi, i.e. the sense of the whole as responsible for the elucidation of meaning. Even they, however, have to accept the division of *pada*, *padārtha* etc. And so, in the illustrations discussed in this context, they cannot escape vyañjana, if they have to arrive at the implied sense in those verses.(42)

Viśvanātha, the author of S D (circa 1300-50 A D) discusses the views of those who try to incorporate vyañjanā in the means of knowledge called 'arthāpatti'. Viśvanātha is of the opinion that as in case of anumāna, so also in case of arthāpatti the basis is vyāptijñāna or the knowledge of vyāpti. Now vyañgya or the suggested sense can not be said to rest on vyāpti. Now vyañgya or the suggested sense can not be said to rest on vyāpti on account of vyabhicāra and samdeha. So, it can not be gathered by arthāpatti (43)

Viśvanātha further adds that the suggested sense is not even 'sūcanabuddhi-grādhyā' i.e. gathered by signs and symbols (sūcana). Even this depends on an earlier popular samketa. When it is already understood between the two parties concerned that the raising of the forefinger means a particular number, then only that particular gesture suggests that number. Thus, even this sūcanabuddhi is in a way a sort of loose anumana and the suggested sense cannot be gathered by it (44)

He also adds that the vyañgyavārtha cannot be gathered by 'smṛti'. Others hold that the suggested sense can be gathered by smṛti or memory because the knowledge of rasādi is caused by saṃskāra or impressions. But in this case there will be 'atītyavyāpti' in 'pratyabhijñā' i.e. recognition also, for pratyabhijñā is also born of saṃskāras but is not of the form of smṛti (45)

The above review of the opponents of dhvani school shows that they are not opposed to pratiyamānatā or implied sense as a source of charm in poetry. The difference arises as to how this implication is grasped. Ānanda regards this as one of the functions of word but this function is not, according to him, fulfilled by either abhidhā or lakṣanā. He therefore, posits a third function of word viz vyañjanā. His opponents see no necessity of adding a third function of word because the implied sense can be grasped by inferential processes of thoughts, by meanings yielded through abhidhā and lakṣanā.

So for them, to accept vyañjana would lead to what is called gaurava dosa. Thus, the question resolves itself into the acceptance or non-acceptance of this additional function of word. Modern logicians who discuss the function of language do accept, what they call the emotive use of language in addition to its scientific function. The various emotive association a word has, become, so to say, prominent in poetic language. But if one considers the psychological processes of the emotive function, one has to agree that they are of an inferential type. In fact, as Mammata says, those who experience and enjoy rasa have to be keen in the inference of sthāyin-(loke pramadādibhiḥ sthāyīyanumāne'bhyāsapātavavātān..." etc. (K P. IV 28) Thus it is not impossible to reconcile both the opposing views

### Foot-notes

(1) इत्येतदभिधातुं दशवात्र विवेचितम् । अ. वृ. मा. का. ३२ (अभिधातुतिमातृका)

(2) वक्तुर्वाक्यस्य वाच्यस्य रूपेमेदावधारणात् ।

लक्षणा त्रिप्रकारेण विवेक्तव्या मनीषिभिः ॥ अ. वृ. मा. (का. ६)

(3) आकम्प्यमानस्यापि समुद्रस्य कम्पनार्थत्वेनाध्यवसित तत्राध्यवसान-वर्भणौपोपचारः । अ. वृ. मा. (PP 13).

(4) इत्यत्र हि रसरसरप्रभृतीनां पञ्चानामध्यारोपितवह्निभावानामसङ्ख्यं वाक्यार्थभूतम् । अतः तस्य वान्यता । तात्पर्यालोचनसामर्थ्याच्च विप्रलम्भशृङ्गारस्य आक्षेप इत्युपादानात्मिका लक्षणा ।-अ. वृ. मा. PP 14.

(5) व. जी. 1 8 (वृत्ति)-

यो वाचकः स शब्दः, यो वाच्यः च अभिधेयः सोऽर्थः इति । ननु च श्रोतव्यञ्जकावपि शब्दौ सम्भवतः । तदसंप्रधानाव्याप्तिः । यस्मादर्थप्रतीति-कारित्वसामान्यादुपचारात्तावपि वाचकावेव । एवं श्रोत्यव्यञ्ज्यमोरर्थयोः प्रत्येक्य-सामान्यादुपचाराद् वाच्यत्वमेव । तस्मात् वाच्यत्वं वाचकत्वं च शृङ्गार्थमोर्लोके सुप्रसिद्धं यद्यपि लक्षणं, तथाप्यस्मिन् अलौकिके काव्यनामे काव्यवर्त्मनि, अयमेतयोर्वैक्यमाणलक्षणः परमार्थः, किमप्यपूर्वं तत्त्वं इत्यर्थः ।



(6) एतेन यत्र कुन्तकेन मजावन्नभावि तो ध्वनिस्तदपि प्रत्याख्यातम् ।  
-एकावली, इदानीं यदप्यन्यैरस्य भक्त्यन्तर्भूतत्वमुक्तं तदपि दर्शयितुमाह  
वक्त्रोक्तीत्यादि । PP 51 (B S S Ed) See also Jayaratha (PP 8)

(7) यत्रदूरान्तरेऽन्यस्मात् सामान्यमुपचर्यते ।

लेशेनापि भवेत् काचिद्वक्तुमुद्रिक्वस्तुताम् ॥

यन्मूला सरसोल्लेखा रूपकादिरलङ्कृति ।

उपचारप्रधानासौ वक्ता काचिदुच्यते ॥ V J II ka. 13 14.

(8) यथा मूर्ते वस्तु दर्शनस्पर्शनसंवेद्यस्नेहनगुणयोगात् (स्निग्धमि)त्युच्यते  
तथैव कान्तिरमूर्ताप्युपचारात् स्निग्धेत्युक्ता । V J II 13

(9) अत एव च प्रत्ययान्तरे अस्मिन्नुपचारे न वक्ताव्यवहारः, यथा  
गौवांहीक इति । V J II 13

(10) शास्त्रादिप्रतिज्ञाद्वार्योपनिबन्धव्यतिरेकि- V J I

(11) शब्दार्थो सहितौ वक्त्रविव्यापारशालिनि ।

बन्धे व्यवस्थितौ काव्यं तद्विदाह्यादकारिणि ॥ V J I 7

(12) उमावेतावलङ्कायी<sup>१</sup> तयो पुनरलङ्कृति ।

वक्त्रोक्तिरेव वैदग्ध्यभङ्गोभणितिर्दृश्यते ॥ V. J I 10

and also उमा द्वावप्येतौ शब्दार्थौ<sup>१</sup> अलङ्कायी<sup>१</sup> अलङ्कारणीयो केनापि शोभाति-  
शयकारिणालङ्कारणेन योजनीयौ । किं तद् तयोरप्यलङ्कारणमित्यभिधीयते, तयो  
पुनरलङ्कृति । तयोर्द्वित्वसंख्या विशिष्टयोरप्यलङ्कृति पुनरेकैव, यथा द्वाव-  
प्यलङ्कियेते ।

काऽसौ वक्त्रोक्तिरेव । वक्त्राविन प्रसिद्धाभिधानव्यतिरेकिणो विचित्रे  
वाभिधा । कोऽसौ, वैदग्ध्यभङ्गोभणिति । वैदग्ध्यं विदग्धभावः, कवि  
कर्मक्षेत्रे तस्य भङ्गो विच्छिन्नः, तथा भणिति । विचित्रैवाभिधा वक्त्रोक्ति-  
रित्युच्यते ।

तदिदमत्र तात्पर्यम् । यद् शब्दार्थो केनापि व्यतिरिक्तेनालङ्कारणेन योज्यते ।  
किन्तु वक्त्रवैचित्र्ययोगितयाभिधानमेवानयोरलङ्कारः । तस्यैव शोभातिशय  
कारित्वात् । एतच्च वक्ताव्याख्यानावसर एव उदाहरिष्यते ॥ V J I 10

(13) एष एव शब्दशक्तिगूलानुरणरूपव्यङ्ग्यस्य पदध्वनेर्विषयः V J  
II 12 (वृत्ति)

(14) ध्वन्या III 16 -सुगतिवृत्तचक्रसम्बन्धैस्तथा कारकशक्तिभिः ।

कृत् तद्विषयमासेरव श्रोत्योऽलङ्कयन् कवचित् ॥

(15) ध्वन्या III. 16 -च शब्दात् निपातोपसर्गकालादिभिः प्रयुक्तेः अभिव्यञ्ज्यमानो दृश्यते ।

(16) व. जी (V. J.) III 1 -उदारस्वपरिस्पन्दसुन्दरत्वेन वर्णनम् । वस्तुनो वक्त्रशब्दैकगोचरत्वेन वक्त्रता ॥

(17) V. J. III i (वृत्ति)-

वस्तुनो वर्णनीयतया प्रस्तावितस्य पदार्थस्य यदेवविधत्वेन वर्णनं सा तस्य वक्त्रता वृत्तविविच्छित्तिः । किंचिधत्वेन इत्याह-उदारस्वपरिस्पन्दसुन्दरत्वेन । उदारः सौकर्यः सर्वातिशायी यः स्वपरिस्पन्दः स्वभावमहिमा तस्य सुन्दरस्व सौकुमार्यातिशयेन, अत्यन्तरमणोयस्वाभाविकधर्मयुक्तत्वेन, वर्णनं प्रतिपादनम् । कथम् वक्त्रशब्दैकगोचरत्वेन । वक्त्रो योऽसौ नानाविधवक्त्राविशिष्टः शब्दः कश्चिदेव वाचकविशेषे विवक्षितार्थसमर्पणसमर्थः, तस्यैकस्य केवलस्य गोचरत्वेन प्रतिपाद्यतया विषयत्वेन । वाच्यत्वेनेति नोक्तं, व्यङ्ग्यत्वेनापि प्रतिपादनसम्भवात् ॥

(18) ध्वन्या. II. 17-इत्येवविधे विषयेऽसुरणरूपरूपकाश्रयेण काव्य-चारुत्वव्यवस्थानात् रूपकध्वनिरिति व्यपदेशो न्यायः ।

(19) व जी on I. 21 -प्रबन्धे वक्त्रभावो यथा-कुत्रचिन्महाकविविरचिते रामकथोपनिबन्धे नाटकादौ पञ्चविधवक्त्रतासामग्रीसमुदायसुन्दर सहृदयहृदयहारि-महापुरुषवर्णनमुपक्रमे प्रतिभासते । परमार्थतस्तु विधिविषयात्मकधर्मोपदेशः पर्यवस्यति, रामवद्वर्तितव्यं न रावणवदिति ।

(20) कथोन्मेषसमानेऽपि ध्रुवीव निजैर्गुणैः ।

प्रबन्धा प्राणिन इव प्रभासन्ते पृथक् पृथक् ॥ इत्यन्तरालोक । (४२)  
on IV 25 व. जी.

(21) नूतनोपायनिव्यन्दनयवत्सोपदेशिनम् । महाकविप्रबन्धानां सर्वेषामस्ति वक्त्रता ॥ V. J. IV. 26.

(22) व जी. I. 10.-see foot-note No. 10.

(23) व. जी I. 5 -चतुर्वर्गफलस्वादमप्यतिश्रम्य तद्विदाम् ।

काव्यामृतरसेनान्तश्चमत्कारो वितन्यते ॥

(24) व. जी I. 6 -सर्वसत्परिस्पन्दसम्पाद्य सरसात्मनाम् ।.....  
सरसात्मनाम् आर्क्षेत्तसाम्..... ।

(25) व. जी. I. 6 अन्तर्लोकः-

प्रबन्धेषु कवीन्द्राणां कौतुकान्देषु किं पुनः ।

(26) व. जी. IV. 11-निरन्तररसोद्गारगर्भसन्दर्भनिर्भयः ।

निरं कवीनां जीवन्ति न कथमात्रमाश्रिताः ॥

(27) व जी III 1 —तदिदमुक्त भवति यत् स्वशब्दैः अभिधीयमाना ध्रुतिपथमवतरन्तेऽचोनाना चर्वणचमकारं कुर्वन्तीत्यनेन न्यायेन पृतापूपप्रमृतय पदार्था स्वशब्दैरभिधीयमाना तदास्वादसपद सम्पादयन्तीत्येव सर्वस्य कस्य चिदुपभोगसुखार्थिनस्तैरुदारचरितैरत्यन्तेनैव तदभिधानमात्रादेव त्रैलोक्यराज्य सप्तसौख्यसमृद्धि प्रतिपाद्यते इति नमस्तभ्य ।

(28) V J III 7 (वृत्ति) —मुख्य यत्प्रधान चेतनसुरासुरादिमम्बन्धी-स्वरूप तदेवविध सत्कवीना वर्णनास्पद भवति स्वव्यापारगोचरतां प्रतिपद्यते । कीदृशम्-अक्लिष्टरयादिपरिषाधमनोहरम्-अक्लिष्ट कर्तव्यनाविरहित प्रत्यप्रना मनोहरो यो रत्यादि स्थायिभाव तस्य परिपोष भ्रष्टारप्रभृतिरसत्वापादन स्था प्येव तु रसो भवेत् इति न्यायात् ।

(29) एव विप्रलम्भभ्रष्टारकरण्योः सौकुमायात् तदाहरणप्रदर्शन विहितम् । रसान्तराणामपि स्वयमुत्प्रेक्षणीयम् । V J III 7

(30) अजानामचेतनाना सलिलतरुवृक्षसुमसमयप्रमृतीनामेवविध रसोद्दीपन सामर्थ्यविनिबन्धनबन्धुरं वर्णनीयतामवगाहते । V J III 7

(31) रसोद्दीपनसामर्थ्यविनिबन्धनबन्धुरम् ।

चेतनानां अमुख्याना अजाना चापि भूयसा ॥ V J III 8.

(32) व जी III 10 (वृत्ति) —तदेवविध स्वभावप्राधान्येन रस-प्राधान्येन द्विप्रकारं सहजसौकुमार्यसरसं स्वरूपं वर्णनाविषयवस्तुनः शरीरमलङ्कार्यतामेवाहति ।

(33) रसादिपरमार्थज्ञान संवादसुन्दर । V J I 26

(34) व जी I 41 स्वभावसरसाकूतो भावानां यत्र बध्यते ।  
केनापि कमनीयेन वैचित्र्येणोपबृंहित ॥

and also

विचित्रमेव स्वरूपान्तरेण प्रतिपादयति । स्वभाव इत्यादिदो । यत् यस्मिन् भावानां स्वभावः स्वपरिस्पन्द सरसाकूत रसनिर्भराभिप्राय पदार्थाना निबध्यते निवेद्यते etc etc

(35) अवलोक of धनिक on दृश IV.

यथा लौकिकवाक्येषु ध्रुवमाणक्येषु गामम्याजेत्यादिषु अभ्रुयमाणक्येषु च द्वार द्वारमित्यादिषु स्वशब्दोपादानात् प्रचारणादिपश्चात् बुद्धिसन्निवेशिनी क्येषु

कारकोपस्थिता वाक्यार्थस्तथा काव्येष्वपि स्वशब्दोपादानात् क्वचित्, प्रीत्यै नवोढा प्रियेत्येवमवादौ, क्वचित् च प्रकरणादिवशात् (नियताविहित-NS) नियत-विहितविभावाद्यविनाभावाद् वा साक्षाद्भावकचेतसि विपरिवर्तमानो रत्यादि स्थायी स्वस्वविभावानुभावव्यभिचारिभिस्तत्तच्छब्दोऽनीति सस्कारपरंपरया (परै)-परा प्रौढोत्तमानीयमानोरत्यादिवाक्यार्थं । नचाऽऽदार्थस्य वाक्यार्थत्वं नास्तीति वाच्यम् । कार्यपर्यवसायित्वात् तात्पर्यशक्ते । तथा हि पौरुषेय अपौरुषेय वाक्य सधे कार्यपरम् । अतस्परत्वेऽनुपादेयत्वादुन्मत्तादिवाक्यवत् । काव्यशब्दानां चान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्या निरतिशयसुख स्वादव्यतिरेकेण प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकयो प्रवृत्तिविषययो प्रयोजनान्तरानुबलाद् (स्वानन्दो) स्वादोद्भूतिरेव कार्यत्वेनावधार्यते । तदुभूतिनिमित्तत्वं च विभावादिसमूहस्य स्थायिन एवावगम्यते । अनो वाक्यस्याऽभिधानशक्तिस्तेन रसेनाऽऽकृष्यमाणा तत्तत् (स्वार्था) स्वादापेक्षितावान्तरविभावादिप्रतिपादनद्वारा स्वपर्यवसायितामानीयते । तत्र विभावादय पदार्थस्थानीयास्तत् संसृष्टी रत्यादि वाक्यार्थं । तदेतत् काव्यवाक्यम् । (यदीय) यदीयो ताविमौ पदार्थवाक्ययो<sup>१</sup> । न चैव सति गीतादिवत् सुखजनकत्वेऽपि वाच्यवाचकभावानुपयोग । विशिष्टविभावादिसामग्रीविदुषमेव तथाविध रत्यादिभावनावतामेव स्वादोद्भूते । तदनेन अतिप्रसङ्गोऽपि निरस्त । ईदृशि च वाक्यार्थनिरूपणे परिकल्पिताभिधादिशक्तिवशेनैव समस्तवाक्यार्था वगते<sup>२</sup> शक्यन्तरपरिकल्पन प्रयास यथाऽव्योचाम काव्यनिर्णये ।

तात्पर्यान्तिरेकाच्च व्यञ्जकत्वस्य न ध्वनि ।

किमुक्त स्यादधुतायैतात्पर्येऽन्योक्तिरूपिणि । १॥

विष भक्षय (पूर्वो यश्चैव) वाक्ये यच्चैव परमुतादिषु ।

(प्रसङ्गते) प्रयुज्यते प्रधानत्वात् ध्वनिव केन वार्यते ॥२॥

ध्वनिश्चेत् स्वार्थविधान्त वाक्यमर्थान्तराश्रयम् ।

तत्परत्वं त्वविधान्तौ तान् न विधान्त्यसंभवात् ॥३॥

एतावत्येव विधान्तिस्तात्पर्येति किं कृतम् ।

यावत्कार्यप्रसारित्वात् तात्पर्यं न तुलायुतम् ॥४॥

अमधार्मिक विध्वंसमिति भूमिहृता (स्पदे) स्पद ।

निर्व्यावृत्ति इय वाक्य निषेधमुपसर्पति ॥५॥

प्रतिपाद्यस्य विधान्तिरपेक्षापूरणाद् यदि ।

वक्तुर्विषयित (प्रप्त) प्राप्ते अविधान्तिर्न वा इयम् ॥६॥

पौरुषेयस्य वाक्यस्य (विषया परतन्त्र) विषया परतन्त्रता ।

वक्त्रभिप्रेततात्पर्यमेव काव्यस्य युज्यते ॥७॥

इति । अतो न रसादीनां काव्येन सह व्यञ्ज्यव्यञ्जकभावः । किं तर्हि भाव्यभावकसम्बन्धः, काव्यं हि भावकम् । भाव्या रसादयः ।

The NS Ed reading are bracketted ( ) It contains numerous mistakes. A revised text, with the corrections made by MM Kuppuswami Sastri is given here as quoted by Dr Raghvan, Sr Pra (pp 181-182)

(36) अर्थस्य विशिष्टश्च शब्दः सविशेषणं तद् पुस्तकम् ।

द्विवचनवाशद् द्वौ व्यक्तिध्वनिर्नाम काव्यवैशिष्ट्यम् ॥

वचनं च कथनकर्तुं कथिता ध्वनिरुद्गमणीति दश दोषाः ।

ये त्वन्ये तदुन्नेदप्रमेदलक्षणगता न त गणिता ॥ व्य वि I

(37) अभिनव observes—

व्यक्त इति द्विवचनेनेदमाह—यदप्यविवक्षितवाच्ये शब्द एव व्यञ्जकः तथापि अर्थस्यापि सहकारिता न पुन्यति, अन्यथा अज्ञातार्थोऽपि शब्दः तद् व्यञ्जकः स्यात् । विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्ये तु शब्दस्यापि सहकारित्वं भवत्येव, विशिष्टशब्दामिधेतया विना तस्यार्थस्याव्यञ्जकत्वादिति सर्वत्र शब्दार्थयोरभयोरपि ध्वननं व्यापारः । तेन यद् भट्टनायकेन द्विवचनं दूयितं तद्गजनिमीलिकया एव । —लोचन on Dhv I 18

See also, Mahima—

अत्र केचिन्विद्वन्मानिनो द्विवचनसमर्थनामनोरथाक्षितचित्ततया वाच्यवाचकयोर्विस्मृतसुप्रसिद्धप्रतीतिरूपमभावात् तयोरेककालिकतां शब्दस्योत्पन्नयनिरस्तामपि व्यञ्जकतां पश्यत तन्निबन्धानां ध्वनिमेदयोरविवक्षितवाच्यविवक्षिताय परवाच्ययोर्ध्वननव्यापारं प्रति पर्यायेण अन्योन्यसहकारितां तदपेक्षा चानयोर्प्रधानेतरतामुपकल्प्य सहकारितया व्यक्तिक्रिया प्रयुभयोरपि कृतकर्तृत्वात् तदपेक्षो व्यक्त इति द्विवचननिर्देशः, प्राध्यायापेक्षश्च—यत्रार्थः शब्दो वेतिविकल्प इति मयमाना व्यञ्जक इति द्विवचनेनेदमाह—अर्थः शब्दो वेति विकल्पाभिधानं तु प्राधान्यमिधेत्येव इति यदाहुः, तद् अन्तिमूलं न तत्त्वमित्यलमवस्तुनिर्बन्धनेन । व्य वि I

(38) अपि च काव्यविशेष इति काव्यस्य विशिष्टत्वमनुपपन्नम् । काव्यमात्रस्य ध्वनिव्यपदेशविशेषत्वेन इष्टत्वात्, तस्य रसात्मकरथापगमात् । यतः स एवाह काव्यस्यात्मा स एवार्थः तथा आदिकवे पुरा । श्रीशङ्करवियोगोत्थ

शोक इत्येकत्वमागत ॥ न च तस्य विशेष सम्भवति निरतिशयसुखास्वाद-  
लक्षणत्वात् । यदाहु —

पाठ्यदय धृवागानां तत संपुरिते रसे ।  
तदास्वादपरैकामो हृष्यत्यन्तमुत्त. क्षणम् ॥  
ततो निर्विषयस्यास्य स्वरूपावस्थितो निज ।  
व्यज्यतेऽह्लादनिष्यन्द येन तृप्यन्ति योगिन ॥

तदभावे चास्य काव्यतैव न स्यात् । किमुत विशेष एति अनारम्भणो-  
यमेवैतत् प्रेक्षावता स्यात् वैकल्यात् । व्य वि I

(39) न च रसाना वैशिष्ट्ये तदन्तर्गते काव्यस्य विशिष्टत्वमिति युक्त  
वस्तु अव्याप्ते । एव हि प्रतिनियतरसात्मन एव तस्य ध्वनित्वं स्यात्,  
नान्यस्य अन्तरसात्मन, वैशिष्ट्याभावात् । इष्यते च तत्रापीत्यव्याप्तिर्लक्षणदोषः ।  
व्य वि I

(40) न च रसात्मन काव्यस्य वस्तुमात्रादिभिः विशेष शक्य भाषातुम्,  
तेषा विभवादिस्वरूपा रसाभिव्यक्तिहेतुत्वोपगमात् । न च व्यञ्जकाना वैचित्र्ये  
व्यङ्ग्यस्य विशेषोऽभ्युपगन्तुं युक्तः शावडेयादिनामिव गोत्वस्य । ततोऽस्य  
विशिष्टत्वोपगमे वा यत्र तयो उभयोरेकैकस्य वा व्यङ्ग्यता तत्रैव ध्वनि-व्यपदेश  
स्यात् न तु केवलरसात्मनि काव्ये वैशिष्ट्याभावात् । (व्य वि I)

(41) Dr De (Sanskrit Poetics II, pp, 229) says

‘It will be convenient in this connection to take up the  
school of opinion represented by the writer on poetics in  
the Agnipurāṇa and by Bhoja, which stands in many respects  
apart from kashmirian school of Ānandavardhana and which  
appears to have been entirely untouched by the implications  
of the Dhvani theory’

on pp 261 he says ‘He i.e (Bhoja) even appropriates  
karikas from the Dhvanyāloka, although he does not accept  
the theory”

(42) अविशिष्टमपर्यायानेकसाद्व्यतिष्ठितम् ।

एक वेदान्तनिष्णानास्तमखण्ड प्रपेदिरे ॥ K P II बालबोधिनी

also बादरायण,

अनवयवमेव वाच्यमनाद्यविद्योद्दिशितालोक्यदवर्णविभागमस्या निमित्तम् ।

and also —अखण्डबुद्धिनिर्माणो वाक्यार्थ एव वाच्य वाक्यमेव

च वाचकम् इति येऽप्याहु तैरप्यविद्यापयपतितै पदपदार्थकल्पना कर्तव्यैवेति तत्प्रक्षे अप्यवश्यमुक्तोदाहरणादौ विख्यादि व्यङ्ग्य एव । K P V,

see also --परिनिश्चितनिरूपभ्रंशशब्दमङ्गला विपश्चिता मतमाश्रित्यैव प्रवृत्तोऽयं ध्वनिव्यवहार इति तै सह किं विरोधाविरोधौ चित्येत । ध्वन्या III  
see also Adhinava on this quoted earlier,

(43) एतेनार्थापत्तिवेद्यत्वमपि व्यङ्ग्यानामपास्तम् अर्थापत्तेरपि पूर्वसिद्ध व्याप्तिच्छाया उपजीव्यैव प्रवृत्ते यथा यो जीवति स कुत्राप्यवतिष्ठते जीवति चात्र गोष्ठ्यामविद्यमानश्चैव इत्यादौ । S D. V.

(44) किं च, वस्त्रविक्रयादौ तर्जनीतोल्मेन दशसंख्यादिवत् सूचन-  
बुद्धिवेशोऽप्ययं न भवति । सूचनबुद्धेरपि संकेतादिलौकिकप्रमाणमापेक्षवानुमान  
प्रकारताङ्गीकारात् । S D V

(45) यच्च सस्कारजन्यत्वात् रसादिबुद्धिः स्मृति इति केचित् ।  
तत्रापि प्रत्यभिज्ञाया अनैकान्वितया हेतोरामासना । S D V.

## CHAPTER XIV

### DHVANI IN ABHINAVAGUPTA

Abhinavagupta follows the Dhvanyāloka in his theories on dhvani and rasa. His two important works on this subject are a commentary on Dhv known as Locana and a commentary on the Nā Sā of Bharata, known as Nātyavedavivṛti or Abhinavabharatī (A bh). The merit of his work lies in clear elaboration and at times subtle explanation and original insights to a certain extent. He was a great philosopher of pratyabhijñā school, and has implicitly taken certain ideas peculiar to that school for granted in his discussions. So his works on the pratyabhijñā school of thought, viz Tantrāloka, and Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivarṇinī incidentally throw some light on some aspects of his theory of poetry.

As the Locana and the A bh are commentaries, much of their content is naturally the same as that of Dhv and Nā Sā. For these reasons, much of their treatment is bound to be piece-meal. In the discussion of the contents of Dhv and Nā Sā, I have, as far as possible, confined myself to the works themselves. Here while considering Abhinava's comms, I will note the points which have been clarified, elaborated and sometimes improved upon by him. In the treatment of these points some repetition would be unavoidable though I have tried to avoid it as far as possible. As noted just now, the treatment of various topics in these comms, particularly in Locana, is piecemeal, and so, in order to give a coherent account, I have brought together the pieces bearing on the same topic and tried to give a connected account. Let us now first consider the Locana.



## The Tradition (Āmnayā) of Dhvani

Abhinava holds that the theory of dhvani was laid down by so many intelligent people. He, however, fails to mention any concrete name of an ālankārika who must have called dhvani to be the soul of poetry. He records an unwritten tradition of the dhvanivādins in the words —*avicchinnena prava-hena tairretaduktam vinā'pi vistsapustakesu vinivesanādity-śabhiprāyah* (Locana on Dhv I 1). Thus, it seems that Abhinava seems to have failed in discovering the names and the works of the original propounders of dhvanivāda.

## Definitions of Dhvani

Abhinava accepts the definition of dhvani as given in the Dhv I 13. He tries to explain the duel in 'vyāṅktaḥ'. By this, according to him, what is meant is that in both the varieties of *śabdasaṅkīrṇa* and *arthasaṅkīrṇa* of dhvani, both word and meaning (*śabda* and *artha*), have a role to perform. Thus, Bhaṭṭanāyaka was wrong in criticising the duel ending in 'vyāṅktaḥ'.

Says he *vyāṅktaḥ iti dvivacanenedamśha-yadapyavivakṣitavācye śabda eva vyāṅjakah tathāpyarthasyāpi saha-karita na trūyati, anyathā ajñātārtho pi śabdastadvyāṅjakah syāt vivakṣitānyaparavācye ca śabdasya'pi bhavatyeva vistsa abdaḥidheyataya vinā tasyarthasyāvyanjakatvāditi sarvatra śabdārthayorubhayorāpi dhvananam vyāpārah tena bhāṭṭa nāyakena dvivacanam duṣitam tadgajanīmīlkayaiva arthah śabdo vā iti vikalpābhīdhānam pradhānyābhiprāyena* (Locana on Dhv I 13).

## Two meanings of the term dhvani and its five-fold application

Abhinava derives the word *dhvani* in two different ways giving two different meanings. One is *dhvanatīti dhvaniḥ* i.e. that which sounds, reverberates or implies is *dhvani*, the

second is—dhvanyate in dhvanih—i.e. that which is sounded, reverberated, or implied is dhvani. The first refers to sabda which implies some meaning, and also to meaning (vācyārtha) which implies further meaning and also to the process i.e. sabdana or dhvanana of a word which implies something. The second derivation explains dhvani as something which is implied. This, we might say, is dhvani proper.

In addition, a poem, which consists of all these four, is also known as dhvani. Thus he explains dhvani in such a way as to cover all the five accepts. Says he

sa iti artho vā sabdo va vyāpāro vā artho'pi vācyo vā  
dhvanatīti, sabdo-pyevam vyangyo va dhvanyate iti vyāpāro vā  
sabdarthayordhvananamīti karikayā tu prādhānyena samudāya  
eva kāvyarūpo mukhyatayā dhvanīrīti pratipādīam

Further on, he explains this point in greater detail. He elaborately discusses the Sphotavāda of the varyākaranas and tries to correlate it with the theory of dhvani. He says  
asmābhirapi prasiddhebhyaḥ sabdavyāpārebhya'bhīdhatāt-  
paryalakṣaṇārūpebhya'ūtrikto vyāpārah dhvanīrītyuktah evaṃ  
catuskamapi dhvaniḥ tadyogācca samastamapi kāvyam dhvaniḥ  
(Locana on I 13 Dhv). He adds —tena vācyopi dhvaniḥ,  
vācakopi sabdo dhvaniḥ, dvayorapi vyanjakatvam dhvanatīti  
kṛtvā sammisṛyate vibhāvānubhāvasamvalanayeti sabdanam  
sabdah sabdavyāpārah, na cāsavabīdhādīrupah, apītvātmabhūtah,  
so'pi dhvananam dhvaniḥ kāvyamīti vyapadesyasca yo'rthah  
so'pīdhvaniḥ, uktaprakāradhvanīcatustayamayatvāt ata eva  
sādhāranahetumāha—vyanjakatvasāmyādīti vyaṅgyavyāñjaka-  
bhāvah sarvesu pakṣeṣu sādhāraṇa ityarthah

This double derivation of dhvani makes it necessary to keep the two meanings apart to avoid confusion. The one suggests an agent or the process of suggestion, the other, what is suggested. There are three main types of dhvanis accepted by both Ānanda and Abhinava, viz. vastudhvanī, ālampāra-dhvanī and rasadhvanī. All the three must come under

'dhvanyate' derivation. The other derivation viz 'dhvani' (and dhvanana) appear to have been given in conformity of the vāyākaraṇas for whom sabda or word is 'dhvani' which reverberates Sphota

### The three types of Dhvani

Abhinava accepts the general three fold classification of dhvani as given by Ānanda. However, he adds some further explanation. For him, the pratiyamāna or implied sense is described as two-fold, (i) laukika or the one that is met with also in ordinary discourse and (ii) kāvyaavyāpāraikagocara or one which is met with only in poetry. This means that the first is possible in poetry as well as ordinary discourse, while the second is possible only in poetry.

The first viz laukika dhvani in poetry is of two types, (i) that which suggests vastu or some matter—i.e. vastudhvani and, (ii) which suggests a figure of speech i.e. alamkāradhvani. This laukika dhvani in its two varieties can equally be expressed directly by its own words as one might ask the mendicant not to go to the place of rendezvous because the dog is killed by a lion. Alamkāradhvani is so termed on the analogy of brāhmaṇa śramaṇa.

The variety of dhvani which is possible in poetry is rasadhvani. Only this rasadhvani is dhvani in the opinion of Abhinava. This alone it being pre dominant, is the soul of poetry. Rasadhvani, says Abhinava can never be expressed by its own name. He holds that this alone is primarily the soul of poetry, and that both vastudhvani and alamkāradhvani finally terminate into rasadhvani. Says he sa ca dhvanireveti, sa eva mukhyataya atmeti vastvalamkāradhvanyo rasadhvani paryantatvameveti vayameva vakṣyāmasatatra tatte tyastāṃ tavat (Locana on Dhv. I. 4)


Says he pratiyamānamātre'pi prakrānte tṛtīya eva rasadhvanirīti mantavyam itihāsabalāt prakrāntavyāttigraha

balācca tena rasa eva vastuta ātma, vastvalaṃkāradhvanī tu sarvathā rasam prati paryavasyete iti vācyādutkṛṣṭau tavitayabhl-prāyena dhvanīḥ kāvyasyātmētisāmānyenokītaḥ

**Experience of Rasa** Abhinava has elaborately discussed the nature of the experience of rasa in his *Abh*. Here, however, he gives a brief account of it. Rasa is recognised to be of the form of *svasamvīd*. Abhinava holds that the experience of sentiments and emotions etc. is of the nature of Supreme Joy. In the minds of all the individuals, there are certain permanent impressions such as *rati*, *bāsa*, etc. engrained and born of the experience of everyday life. When one looks at some dramatic performance, or reads a poem, one experiences the *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* etc. and the permanent fixed emotions are roused to the status of *rasa* and the cultured man experiences supreme joy. This *rasa*, then, is of the form of relish and is recognised as the soul of poetry. We will deal with Abhinava's views on *rasa*-realisation in greater details later on. We, may, however, note his words: *yastu svapne'pi na sva-sabdavācya na laukika-vyavahārapatitaḥ kintu sabdasamarpyam-ānahrdayasamvādasundaravibhāvasamucitaprāgviniṣṭa-vyāpār-araṇīyārūpo rasah sa kāvyavyāpārikagocarō rasadhvanirīti*, (Locana on *Dhv* I 4)

### **The possible varieties of dhvani**

Abhinava has also tried to give the possible varieties of *dhvani* under *Dhv* II 31, and *Dhv* III 43 in a mathematical way on the basis of varieties given in *Dhv*. At *Dhv* II, 31 he gives thirty-five basic varieties of *dhvani*. It can be explained as below



All these when multiplied by the subvarieties of guṇibhuta-  
vyangya, alampkāra and dhvani through the relation of  
saṁstṭi and saṁkara, tend to be 7420. Abhinava tries to  
illustrate some of them. It has been pointed out by modern  
writers that Abhinava's calculation of the number of dhvanis  
is not correct. It should be 9940 and not 7420.

### **The abhāvavādins or the opponents of dhvani**

Abhinava also treats the views of some dhvaniabhāvavādins i.e. those who do not accept vyañjanā and dhvani. He tries to classify them, and then in his own way tries to refute the views of the advocates of abhīhātānvayavāda, anvitābhīdhanavāda, etc.

In this matter also, Abhinava has given us more detailed and elaborate discussion. He says that the abhāvavādins are virtually of five classes though apparently Ānanda has counted only three. The first variety of abhāvavādins are subdivided into three as below—*tatrābhāvavikalpasya trayah prakārah—sabdārthaguṇālamkāraṇāmeva sabdarthasobhakārīṇv ilokaśāstrā-tīrtikasundarasabdartharupasya kāvyasya na sobhāhetuḥ kaś cidanyo'sti yo'smābhīna ganita ityekaḥ prakārah* *yo vā na ganitaḥ so śobhakāryeva na bhavatyī dvitīyah* *atha sobhakārī bhavatyī tārhyasmadukta eva gūṇe vā'lamkāre vāntarbhavatyī namāntarakarane tu kīyadīdam paṇḍītyam* *athapyuktesu guṇālamkāresu vā nāntarbhāvah, tathāpi kīncidviseśalesamasrītya namāntarakaranamupamāvicchittiprakāraṇāmasamkhyatvāt tathāpi guṇālamkāravatīrtikatvābbhāvah eva tāvanmātreṇa ca kim kṛtam?* *anyasyāpi vacitrasya sakyotprekṣyatvāt cīrantanairbhi bharatamuniprabhṛtibhīryamakopame eva śabdārthālamkāratveneste* *tatprapañcadīkpradarsanaṃ tvanyairālamkāra kārīḥ kṛtam tadyathā 'karmānvan' ityatra kumbhakārādīudāharānam* *śrūtva svayam negarakārādī sabdā utprekṣyante tāvat ka ātmanī bahumānah* *evam prakṛteṣu tītyah prakārah evamekaśtrīdhā vikalpah, anyau ca dvāvīti pañca vikalpah* *iti tatparyārthah* (Locana on Dhv. I i)

Thus Abhinava classifies these opponents of dhvani as below (a) those who hold that dhvani does not exist at all or *nāstyeva dhvaniḥ*, (b) those who say that dhvani is only *bhakti* or secondary sense—i.e. *bhaktireva dhvaniḥ* and (c) those who maintain that dhvani is undecscribable i.e. *anirvācyo dhvaniḥ*. The first variety is subdivided into three types. Thus in all we have five varieties of abhāvavādins.

Abhinava then points out that the theory of the absence of dhvani is a matter of past, while the bhaktavāda is a continuous tradition - bhāktavādastvavicchinnaḥ pustakesvitya-bhīprāyena bhāktamahurīti nityapravartamānapeksayābhīdhānam He does not mention any specific name of those abhāvavādins. However, as noted earlier he mentions one Manorathakavī who ridicules dhvani.

Abhinava tries to correlate bhāktavāda with the earlier poeticists such as Bhāmaha, Udbhata, Vāmana, etc. He says - darsayati-bhāttodbhata-vāmanādinaḥ (Locana on Dhv. I. 1)

He goes on to establish vyanjanā and dhvani and tries to silence the abhīhitānvayavāda, anvītabhīdhānavāda, etc. in the following way :

#### Abhīhitānvayavāda refuted

The argument of the abhīhitānvayavāda proceeds as below : The tatparyavṛtti, in case of bhama dhammā etc has not ended in form of the intended sense. The words such as dṛpta, dhārmika, tad, etc cannot be correlated and therefore there is mukhyārthabādha or contradiction in the primary sense. Thus, there is scope for viparīta lakṣanā having virodha or contradiction for its 'nimitta'. This viparīta lakṣanā makes for the sense of negation in this particular illustration viz bhama dhammā etc. This sense of negation is derived thus only on the strength of word (śabdaśaktimula eva) and therefore, there can not be any sense other than the expressed

(nanu tatparyasaktiraparyavasitā vivaksyaḥ dṛptadhārmika-tadadīpadārthanānvayarūpamukhyārthabādhabalena virodhanimittayā viparītalakṣanayā ca vāk्यārthibhūtanīṣedhapratītimabhīhitānvayadrīḥ karoti śabdaśaktimula eva sorthaḥ, evamanekāmiti hi vyavahāraḥ tanna vācyaḥ kurīto'nyorītha it (Locana, Dhv I. 4)

Abhinava, in the refutation of the above view explains the nature and scope of abhīdhā, tatparya and lakṣanā. He holds that in the particular illustration viz bhama dhammā

etc as there is no mukhyārthabādhā or contradiction in the primary sense, correlation is not impossible. So there is no scope for lakṣaṇā at all (ata eva mukhyārthabādhō nātra saṅkya itī na viparītalakṣaṇāyā avasarah)

Abhinava considers the point whether the suggested sense can be gathered in the third stage, viz lakṣaṇā. For him suggestion comes at the fourth stage. He holds that in instances such as gaṅgāyām ghosah or simho batuh, the sense of coolness, purity etc. with reference to the hamlet, or the sense of the heroic quality of the batu, is gathered by vāñjanā, the fourth power and can not be gathered by anumāna or inference on account of the faults of anaiḥāntikatva and the like, or by remembrance, as it is only with reference to experienced objects, or by abhidhā in the absence of convention or by tātparya as it is over with correlation only, or by lakṣaṇā in the absence of 'skhaladgatitva' or faulting movement of words, or lakṣitalakṣaṇā which involves the contingencies of ānantya i.e. endlessness and vyabhicāra i.e. discrepancy. Thus, the suggested sense is gathered only by suggestion, the fourth power of word.

(yattvīdam ghosasyātipavitratatvasītalatvasavyatvādīkaṃ prajojanamāśabdāntaravācyaṃ pramāṇāntarapratipannam batorva parākramāntisayaśālitvaṃ tatra śabdasya na tāvanna vyāpārah, tathā hi-tatasāṃipyāttaddharmatvanumānamanaikāntikam, Simhasabdavācyaṭvaṃ ca batorasiddham atha yatra yatrai vamaśbdaprayogastatra tatra taddharmayoga ityanumānam, tasyāpi vyūptigrahakāle maulikam pramāṇāntarain vācyaṃ, na c'asti na ca smṛitiriyam, ananubhūte tadayogāt, niyamapratipattirvaktveta dvīvalakṣitamityadhyavasāyabdhāva prasthānecca ityasti tāvadatva śabdasyaiva vyāpārah vyāpārasca nābhīdhattma samayābhāvat na tātparyātma tasyānavajapratītiḥeva parikīṛtyat, na lakṣaṇātmat ukṛādeva hetoh skhaladgatitvābhāvat tatrāpi hi skhaladgatitve punarmukhyārthabādhā nīitam prajojanamitjanavasthā syāt ata eva yat kenacīllakṣitalakṣaṇeti nāma



kṛtam tadvyasanamātram tasmādabhidhātatparyalakṣaṇavya-  
tīrktascatuṛtho'sau vyāpāro dhvananadyotanavyaṇjanapratyāy-  
anāvagamanādisodaravyapadesaṁrūpito'bhyupagantavyaḥ -  
Locana on Dhv I 4 )

Abhinava is of the opinion that difference in the functions of word is gathered on the strength of the difference in the accessories. Abhidhā rests on convention, tātparya on correlation, lakṣaṇā on the contradiction of the primary sense-mukhyārthabādhā, and the like. Vyāṇjanā or suggestion is different from these, as it rests on the meaning gathered through these and also on the intelligence of the hearer. It subordinates the first three and is termed as the soul of poetry (tena samayāpekṣā vācyaṭvagamanaśaktirabhidhāśaktiḥ tadanyathānupapattisahayavabodhanasaktistatparyasaktiḥ mukhyārthabādhādisaḥ akāryapekṣārthapratibhāsanasaktirlakṣaṇā śaktiḥ tacchaktitrayo pajanūtārthāvagamamulajātataṭpratibhāsapavitṛtapratipatīḥ pratibhāsaḥyārthadyotanasaktirdbhvananavyāpārah, sa ca prāveṣṭitam vyāpāratrayaṁ nyahkurvan pradhānabhūtaḥ kāvyatmetyasayena niśedhapramukhatayā ca prayojanavisayopī nisedhavisaya ityuktam (Locana-Dhv I 4)

### Anvītabhidhānavāda refuted

Abhinava also silences the anvītabhidhānavāda. He argues in the following way. The upholder of anvītabhidhānavāda, on the strength of the maxim viz yatparaḥ śabdah sa śabdārthah, believes in abhidhā alone which operates like an arrow shot by a great hero, and gets at the suggested idea also. Abhinava holds that when the objector expects abhidhā to go further and further, he cannot take the whole process as one and identical, on account of the difference in subject-matter. If the subject-matter is not one but many, then on account of the difference in accessories it is bound to be non-identical. For when the subject-matter is identical, with reference to word, buddhi i.e. understanding and karma or action, the fact of intermittent operation is discarded. If the subject-matter is different, our position viz that the functions are different, stands.

(yópyanvitābhidhānavādi 'yatparah śabdah sa śabdarthah' iti hrdaye grhītvā śaravadabhīdhavyāpārameva dīrghadīrgham-  
cchatī, tasya yadī dīrgho vyāpārastadekosāvīti kutah ? bhinna-  
viśayatvāt athānekosau tadviśayasabakāribhedādasajātya eva  
yuktah. sajātye ca kārye viramyā vyāpārah śabdakarmabu-  
dhyādīnāṃ padārthavīdibhiḥ nīśiddhah. asajātye cāsmannaya  
eva) (Locana on Dhv. I. 4)

### Sphotavāda silenced

Abhinava also tries to meet with the upholders of Sphota. He holds that those who accept the non-divisible Sphota, or non divisible sentence, also have got to accept, on empirical ground, the existence of individual words i.e. padas and the like. Thus, even for them vyañjana should be acceptable on empirical ground. When one crosses the bounds of empirical ground, one may accept the maxim-sarve sarvārthavācakaḥ, and may do away with the difference of abhidhā, lakṣaṇa etc. And this position at transcendental level is not unknown to our author i.e. Ānandavardhana who also composed Tattvāloka, a work on philosophy.

(yepyavibhaktam Sphotam vīkyam tadartham cāhuḥ,  
tairapyavidyāpadapatitaiḥ sarveyamanusarantiyā prakṛtiyā,  
tadutīrnatve tu sarvaṃ paramesvarādvyayaṃ brahmetyasma-  
cchāstrakārena na na vidītam tattvālokaṃ grāntam viracayate-  
tyastam) (Locana Dhv. I. 4)

### Rasādi Dhvani

Now we will consider the topic of rasādi dhvani as treated in the Locana (on Dhv. II 1-4). In the udyota II, kārīkās 1-4, the subjects of rasa, bhāva, rasābhāva, bhāvābhāsa, bhāvasānti etc., is treated. Abhinava, in Locana on these kārīkās elaborately explains and illustrates these topics. He says a poem lives by its rasa. Even then, some particular element of it happens to charm more and therefore gets projected in some poems. These give rise to bhāvadhvani, bhāvodaya, bhāvasānti, etc.—(yadapi ca rasenaiva

Abhinava then says that thus these bhāvadhvaniś are just the drippings (nisyanda) of rasādhvani and on account of the special source of charm they are separately cognised. (evam rasādhvanerevāṃś bhāvadhvaniprabhṛtayo nisyandā āsvāde pradhānam prayojakamevāṃśam vibhajya pṛthagvyavasthāpyate (Locana on Dhv. II 3)

### Rasādhvani

Rasādhvani occurs there only when for the connoisseur, tasting is brought about by the relish of sthāyin combined with vibhāva, anubhava and vyabhicārin—rasādhvanistu sa eva yo'tra mukhyataya vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāriśāmyojanodita-sthāyipratipattikasya pratipattuh sthāyīyāmśacarvanāprayuktah evāsvādaprakarṣah—Locana on Dhv II 3) This is illustrated as in kṛcchrenoruyugam vyatītya etc Abhinava holds that when this rasa is principally suggested, it becomes the province of āśāṃlakṣyakramādhvani. When rasādi is suggested in a subservient way, it is rasādi ālakṣkāra. Says he tatrabhī vyaktiḥ pradhānatayā bhavatyanyatbhāvā pradhānatve dhvaniḥ, anyatbhā rasādyālakṣkārah (Locana on Dhv II 4)

Like Ānanda, he also maintains that the ālakṣkāras such as upamā, utprekṣā etc indirectly, through the body in form of word and sense, embellish rasa, the soul. Rasa is the ultimate ālakṣkārya. Just as a dead body cannot be decorated, in the same way, poetry without rasa cannot be embellished.

etaduktam bhavati—upamayā yadyapi vācyārtho'lakṣkriyate tathāpi tasya tadēvālakṣkaranam yadvyāngyārthābhivyañjanasāmarthvādhānamiti vastuto dhvanyātmaivālakṣkāryah katakake-yurādibhirapi śarīrasamavālyibhīscetana ātmaiva tattaccittavṛttiviśeṣaucityasūcanātmatayālakṣkriyate—(Locana on Dhv II 5)

Here, it may be pointed out that the later writers like Mammata, Hemacandra etc absorb all these ideas regarding bhāvadhvani, rasābhāsa etc in their works. We may say that the ideas of Dhv regarding vyañjana and rasa are, to say,

given completeness by Locana and the *Abh* on the *rasasūtra* of the *Nā Śā*. The later writers draw upon all the three as one source.

### The *Sahrdaya*

This *rasa*-realisation is experienced only by '*sahrdaya*' and not by all ordinary people. He explains the term '*sahrdaya*' as follows: *yesām kavyānusūtanābhyāsavasādvīsadibhūte manomukure varnanīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā te svahrdaya-samvādadbhājah sahrdayāḥ*-(Locana, on *Dhv* I 1), *yathoktam*-(*Nā Śā*) (VII 10):-

*yo'rtho hṛdayasamvādī  
tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ ।  
sarīram vyāpyate tena  
suskam kāsthamivāṇinā ॥*

i.e.-The faculty of self-identification with the events represented (the determinants, consequents, etc.) demands that the mirror of the mind should be made completely clear, by means of repeated acquaintance with the practice of poetry. The possessed of heart, those who possess the consent of their own hearts, are those who have this faculty. For it has been said "the tasting of that which finds the consent of the heart arouses the *rasa*. The body is pervaded by it, as dry wood by fire". The mind and the heart must be mirror-like (*vīsada-vimala*), ready to receive all the images which are reflected in them. *vimalamukurakalpībhutanījabhrdayāḥ* (*Abh* p. 37). In the *Tantrāloka* III 200, Abhinava says

*tathā hi madhure gite sparse vā candanādike ।  
mādhyaस्थ्यavigame yāsau hṛdaye spandamānatā ॥  
ānandasaktiḥ saivoktā yataḥ sahrdayo janāḥ ।*

"When the ears are filled with the sound of sweet song or the nostrils with the scent of sandal wood, etc. the state of indifference (non-participation, impersonality, etc.), disappears

and the heart is invaded by a state of vibration (spanda mānata) Such a state is precisely the so-called beatitude, thanks to which man is, 'gifted with heart' According to the Saiva philosophy of Kashmir, heart is consciousness itself, thought, beatitude, etc (Gnolly)

In his A bh (p 280) he defines the 'adbhikara 'as-adbhikarī cātra vimalapratibhānasalibrdayah'-ie The qualified person is in this case any person whose heart possesses a mirror-like power of intuition (pratibhāna) Elsewhere (A bh Vol II p 339) Abhinava says that poetic sensibility is the faculty of entering into identity with the heart of the poet (kavibrdava tadātmyapathiyogitā)

Abhinava has tried to record his views on rasa realisation in the locana on Dhv II. 4 He has also recorded and refuted the views of Lollata, Saṅkuka etc However, we will discuss this in the following chapters wherein we will consider the relevant portion of his Abb on the rasa-sūtra of Bharata in Na.Śā VI Ch

It may be noted in the end that like Ānanda, Abhinava also holds that rasa, bhava, etc are always suggested and can never be directly expressed Says he rasabhāvatadabbasatā-prasamāḥ punarṇa kadacidabhidhīyante, aṭha cāsvādyamānatā-prānatayā bhānti tatra dhvananavyāparādṛte nāsti lalpana-taram Locana on (Dhv I 4)

## CHAPTER XV

### THE NATURE OF RASA-EXPERIENCE AS EXPLAINED BY

- (i) **Bhaṭṭa Lollata**—Cir 815 A D De Sk Poetics P 36, Edn. '60—  
Second and third quarter of the ninth cen  
A D —Pandey—Abhinavagupta p 128, 3rd  
Edn (1935) 750-800 A D Kane, History  
of Sk Poetics
- (ii) **Śrī Śaṅkuka**—9th A D , De Sk. Poetics p. 36, ed. '850  
A D —Pandey, Abhinavagupta, p 128, Ed.  
'35 840 A D identified with poet Śaṅkuka—  
Kane
- (iii) **Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka**—End of 9th and beginning of 10th Cen  
A D De —p 41, 883-902 A D —Pandey  
p 130 900-925 A D Kane, p 43
- (iv) **Abhinavagupta**—1015 A D De, 950-'60 to 1015 A D K C  
Pandey (Abh p 8), 980-1030 A D Kane,  
p 43

We noted in the earlier chapter the *rasasūtra* and its prose explanations given in the *Nāṣā*. This forms the first stage in the development of rasa theory. The second stage is found in the relation established between *vyañjanā* and *rasa* as in the *Dhv*. The third stage can be seen in the relevant portion of *Locana* and the *Abh* of Abhinavagupta. We now study this third stage.

We may start the discussion by stating again the *rasa-sūtra* of the *Nāṣā* viz 'vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisamyoga-drasanīpattih'. It appears from the works of Abhinava that this *sūtra* was much discussed and debated upon and was variously explained e g by Lollata, śrī Śaṅkuka, etc. [The

names of the other commentators are Udbhata and Kirtidhara, see Saṅgitaranākara of Saṅgadeva (I P. 19) Unfortunately, the works of those authors are not yet discovered. We have, therefore, to rely upon references in Abhinavagupta's works for their views. Eventhough, Abhinava has tried to be as objective as possible in presenting their views, we cannot say that these are given in their completeness. Much therefore in their views remains obscure. With this proviso in mind, we will now take up the views of these writers in the order as given by Abhinava.

For the sake of classification, we may note that the main points of controversy refer to, (i) the absence of the mention of 'sthāyibhāva' in the sūtra, (ii) the meaning of the term 'samyoga', and (iii) the meaning of the term 'nispattih', and the psychological and epistemological problems arising out of these.

Abhinava has adopted the method in vogue amongst the later darsanikas. It is to present the views which are farthest from the opinion of the author and get them refuted by the later critic. This in turn is refuted by another one, and so on till we reach the last but one view which is refuted by Abhinavagupta himself before stating his own position (1).

We will now first take up Bhaṭṭa Lollata (2)

Bhaṭṭa Lollata adds the term 'sthāyin' in the sūtra to make the meaning clear. He explains the sūtra to mean that the relation of sthāyin or the permanent mental state with vibhavadis i.e. determinants consequents, etc., causes rasa. Lollata accepts the normal happening in ordinary life. As in ordinary life the permanent mental states such as delight or rati and the like are caused due to some factors, and this delight which is caused is expressed through its own actions or effects and is nourished by some accompanying factors, in the same way it so happens in poetry also. Abhinava says

that this view of Lollata seems also to be the view of Dandin who says, 'kopo raudrātmatām gatah', or 'ratih' śṛṅgārātām gata', etc i.e 'anger when heightened becomes the furious', or 'delight becomes love' etc Thus, for Lollata, as in normal life a particular feeling caused by certain factors, expressed through certain effects and enriched through ancillary factors reaches its own height, in the same way, in poetry or drama rasa is the product of this union. More precisely, the determinants are the cause of the birth of the mental state (cittavṛtti) that is the permanent mental state (sthāyibhāva). In using the term consequents Bharata does not mean the consequents arising from the rasa (since these obviously cannot be considered as causes of the rasa) but only the consequents arising from the mental states. Even though the transitory mental states, in so far as they are mental movements, cannot accompany simultaneously the permanent mental state, Bharata in this sutra means that the permanent mental state remains nevertheless in a state of latent disposition (vāsana). Rasa, therefore, according to Lollata is simply permanent mental state intensified (upacita) by the determinants, the consequents, etc. The permanent mental state by itself is in a dormant state anupacitaḥ.]

Thus according to Lollata, the śṛṅgāraraśa, for example is the one between the original Rāma and Sītā. The actor, and we may add, the poet, by what Lollata calls 'anusandhāna' are able to present this rasa. Dr Pandey interprets this word 'anusandhāna' in the technical sense of 'yojana' current in the Śaiva Āgama(3) (Indian Aesthetics p 39-40 Ed. '59). With this interpretation of anusandhāna Dr Pandey puts a new view about Bhatta Lollata's theory. For him, rasa is concerned with the artist and is an object itself. According to Dr. Pandey, Bhatta Lollata does not have the spectator or the reader in his mind (Indian Aesthetics p 40-Ed '59 see foot-note no 3). But Mammata, Hemacandra and later writers and commentators take pratīti



also to be a part of the view of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and thus take cognisance of the spectator also in rasa experience. Dr Pandey, however, says that Mammaṭa has amended the text of Abhinavagupta slightly by adding the word 'pratyamāno' (see p 40-ibid). But, if we however presume that Lollaṭa's view is not fully quoted by Abhinava, and also assume that Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, etc. probably had the original text of Lollaṭa's commentary on the Nāṣā before them, it may not be necessary to regard the pratyamānaṭa as an amendment on the part of Mammata. Whatever it may be, the utpatti and the pratīti view of Lollaṭa has been traditionally accepted. So, Lollaṭa with his theory of utpatti-pratīpustī-pratīti, just transforms the fact of ordinary life to the realm of poetry. He may, therefore, be called in modern terminology, a realist (4).

### Śrī Śaṅkuka

Śrī Śaṅkuka opposes this view of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa on several grounds. His first argument pertains to the text of the sūtra itself. Śaṅkuka holds that if the sthāyins generated by the vibhāvas, suggested by the anubhāvas and nourished by vyabhicārins become rasa, then Bharata should have first mentioned and defined the sthāyins. But this he has not done. On the contrary he first mentions and defines rasa in the sixth chapter of the Nāṣā, and then deals with the bhāvas in the seventh adhyāya. Moreover, if rasa is just the nourished or intensified (upacita) stage of the permanent mental state, it would be useless, after having given the cause of the generation of the sthāyibhāva, to give again, in a separate sūtra, the cause of rasa, which is merely an intensified sthāyin. This would make the sūtra redundant (5).

Śaṅkuka next takes up another aspect of Lollaṭa's theory for refutation. Lollaṭa said that rasa is an intensified form of the sthāyibhāva. Śaṅkuka argues. If the different stages

of the permanent mental state were to be taken into consideration, such stages would be innumerable and therefore we would have to recognise infinite stages of rasa. This would contradict the text of Bharata which recognises the six varieties of *hasya* and the ten stages of *srngāra*. But his most important argument against Lollata's *upacativāda* is that sentiments such as sorrow, anger, etc. are intense to start with and gradually they tend to be less and less. Thus the *upacativāda* contradicts this fact of experience.

So, Sankuka interprets the *sūtra* thus—

*tasmāt hetubhir vibhāvākhyaiḥ, kāryaiscānubhāvātmaḥ  
sahacārīrūpaisca vyabhicaraiḥ prayatnārjitatayā kṛtrimaivapi  
tathānabhimanyamānairanukartīsthātvena līngabalataḥ pratiya  
mānaḥ sthāyī bhavo mukhyarāmādigatasṭhāyanukaraṇarūpaḥ  
anukarānarūpatvādeva ca nāmāntareṇa vyapadyto rasah*  
—(A bb p 272 Na Sa Vol I Ed 1956) (6)

We may analyse *Sri Sankuka's* above interpretation as follows. <sup>1</sup>The *kāraṇa* (cause), *kārya* (effect) and the *sahacāris* (accompanying mental states) of the real world become in poetry, drama, etc. *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicārībhava* respectively. In his seventh *adhyāya* Bharata explains *vibhāva* as '*viśṛṅkhānarthah*' (p 346 *ibid*), i.e. that which brings about knowledge. *Anubhāva* is that which enables one to experience, i.e. the four fold *abhinaya* (p 367—*ibid*). The *vyabhicārīns* are the fleeting emotions(7) which accompany the main permanent mental state. These three are achieved by the artist through effort and therefore they are artificial. In actual life these are natural. But even though they are achieved by effect and are artificial, yet by the art of the imitator or the poet, they are not taken as such by the spectator or reader. It is of course the imitator(8) who exhibits these three. For the spectator they become the *līnga* i.e. the characteristic mark which enables him to apprehend inferentially the permanent mental state as being inherent in the imitator. The *sthāyī bhāva* here is understood in the form of imitation of the

permanent mental state of the original Rāma and the like. Such a perception of *sthāyibhāva* is called *rasa* for the only reason that it is in form of imitation (9). This theory of Saṅkuka is known to tradition as *anukṛti-anumitivāda*.

The *vibhāvas* are ascertained by the power of poetic speech. The significance of *anubhāva* is grasped through training. The *vyabhicāriṇs* are grasped through the artificial evocation of one's own experience. But the *sthāyīn* cannot be ascertained even by poetic speech. The words such as *rati*, *hāsa*, etc., merely name these *sthāyīns*. These words i.e. *rati*, *hāsa* etc. do not evoke in the mind the sentiments as would be done by the verbal representation i.e. *vācika abhinaya* (9). Verbal representation—*vācika abhinaya*—is not merely speech, but something artistically accomplished by it. What is obtained in the mind by *vācika abhinaya* i.e. known or grasped, is called 'avagamana'—communication by Śrī Saṅkuka. This power of *avagamana* or communication and evocation, is other than mere verbal function. It is something achieved by the actor's art. Precisely for this reason, Bharata does not mention the term *sthāyīn*, not even in a different grammatical case (A bh p 275, *ibid*). It would serve no purpose.

Thus, the natural *sthāyīn* is not *rasa*. So, concludes Śaṅkuka, that the *rati* or delight imitated by the actor is *śṛṅgāra*, the sentiment of love. It is quite proper to say that *śṛṅgāra* is of the nature of imitated *rati* and is born of it. Here, a question would arise—how an unreal knowledge can achieve the purpose of the real knowledge? i.e. how the knowledge of the imitated feeling that is unreal, can give rise to the experience of a real feeling? In answer to this question, reference is made to *maṇipradīpaprabhāṅyāya*. (A bh p 275, *ibid*) (10)

Śrī Saṅkuka also raises the question as to the nature of this *rasa* experience. He has before him the following categories, valid knowledge, the invalid knowledge, doubt and

similarity. None of these holds good when one witnesses a play. What actually one sees on the stage is that the actor is happy. This is valid knowledge. But one does not see it in this way. The actor who is personifying Rāma is not Rāma. Thus what appears is false. But one does not see in it this way. Similarly, one does not doubt whether the actor is or is not Rāma. Nor one has the knowledge of the actor's similarity with Rāma. So, none of the logical modes of knowledge holds good of this experience and yet there is a real experience (*sphurannanubhavaḥ*). So, in what way this throbbing experience be understood? Here, Śrī Saṅkuka adds a new mode of cognition which he calls '*citraturaganyāya*' or the mode of perceiving the painted horse. Just as one reacts to a painted horse not in any one of the recognised logical categories, so does one in a drama, or a piece of poetry. In modern terminology, we would say this the creation of imagination. But the point to be noted here is that in the opinion of Saṅkuka, the experience of the creation of imagination is real in its own right even though, it may not fall under any recognised logical category. In other words, the reality of aesthetic experience is established by Śrī Saṅkuka.

Śrī Saṅkuka's interpretation of the *rasa-sūtra* may be put in the following way. [Bharata has intentionally omitted the mention of *sthāyin* in the *rasa-sūtra*. The mere mention of it would have served no purpose. *Rasa* is the imitation of *sthāyins* as portrayed in the art of the actor. The psychological process in the mind of the spectator who experiences *rasa* resembles the inferential mode. Then Śrī Saṅkuka raises the important question as to the nature of this *rasa* experience. It does not fall under any of the recognised logical categories and yet is it as real as anyone of these modes of cognition. To explain this, he introduces the '*citraturaganyāya*'. One reacts to the presentation on the stage as one reacts to the painted horse. Just as we call the painted horse to be a horse, in the same way the character of Rāma in poetry of

drama is called Rāma. Thus Śrī Śaṅkuka tries to explain poetic experience with the help of imitation and inference. The vibhāvādīs for him are not the *kāraṇahetus* but the *jāpakahetus* (11)

Lollata took both the experiences of day-to-day life and the world of poetry as belonging to the same plane. Śaṅkuka puts both of them on a different plane. ]

Abhinavagupta gives the refutation of the views of Śrī Śaṅkuka through his teacher Bhaṭṭa Tota (12)

The first point that is taken up for refutation is the *anukṛti* or imitation part of Śaṅkuka's theory. When art is regarded as imitation, logically the question of its origin arises.

Bhaṭṭa Tota takes up the *preposition-ratyanukarāḥ sṛṅgārāḥ* for refutation. He puts forth four alternatives. for whom *rasa* is imitation?—(i) It is for the spectator? Does the spectator apprehend *rasa* as imitation of something? Or, (ii) It is for the actor? Does the actor imitate somebody? or (iii) Is it merely the opinion of the critics and commentators? or (iv) has Bharatamuni said that *rasa* is an imitation?

Bhaṭṭa Tota bases his argument on the assumption that there must be something similar between the original and the imitation. He shows that there is absolutely no similarity between the mental state of *rati* and what one sees in the actor. These two are totally different. To show their extreme difference Bhaṭṭa Tota uses the philosophical arguments of what constitutes difference. These are, (i) *svatūpabheda* or the difference in nature, (ii) perception by different senses and (iii) difference of substrata. These are applied as below.

(i) The body of the actor, the costumes, his horripilation, his faltering words, the raising of his arms, the waving of them, etc. his frowns, his expressive glances, etc. are physical, *rati*, *krodha*, etc. are mental. Thus they differ in nature. (ii) The body of the actor, his costumes, etc. are seen by the physical sense of the eye, while *rati*, *krodha*, etc. are perceived

by the internal sense-*antahkarana*. Thus, these are perceived by different senses (iii) The substratum of the body, costume, etc and the substratum of *rati*, *krodha*, etc are different. Thus they differ in substrata also. Thus there is total difference between the original and its supposed imitation.

The purport of Bhatta Tota's argument seems to be this. What the imitator shows—his body, his costumes and his gestures, are physical. These cannot imitate *rati* or delight which is purely a mental state. So, it would be absurd to say that *srīgāra* is the imitation of *rati*.

In the above argument of Bhatta Tota, the body, costumes, etc are taken as *srīgāra* and then the absurdity of these as imitation of the mental state of *rati* is shown. The protagonist of Śrī Śaṅkuka corrects this misunderstanding or misstatement. His contention is that it is the mental state of the actor made known by the above items as the imitation of *rati*, which is called *srīgāra*. To this, the answer of Bhatta Tota is that what is thus apprehended is the mental state of the actor, i.e. the *rati* of the actor, and it is not apprehended as an imitation.

Now, it is not his natural mental state that the actor represents by gestures etc, but that of the original persons. That is why the *vibhāvādis* are called artificial (*kytrima*)—This is the next position which Bhatta Tota attacks. If these *vibhāvādis* are understood as artificial by the spectator, how would they make the spectator comprehend it as *rati*? To this the answer would be that what the spectator comprehends is '*ratyanukāra*'. This is done through an inferential process. So Bhatta Tota now argues to show the absurdity of inferring the imitation of *rati*. One can infer *rati* from these causes. But one cannot infer something which is not the effect of these causes viz '*ratyanukāra*'. Similarly here it would not do. One cannot infer from mist which resembles smoke, a japa-flower which resembles fire.

Further, the theory of imitation (*anukāra*) cannot be supported on the observation of similitude. The actor who is not really angry appears to be so. This is in a way true. But in fact the actor appears similar to one who is angry by raising his eye-brows and the like. But this much similarity does not constitute imitation of the original. Even if for the sake of argument we take this to be *anukāra* or imitation, it goes against what the spectator perceives. Bhaṭṭa Tota says as such. He says that the impression of the spectator is not that of similarity. Such a preception would be without any emotion (*bhāvasūnya*—p. 275 *ibid*). While the spectator feels emotion when he sees the performance of the actor.

Next to this, Bhaṭṭa Tota tries to refute the opinion of Śrī Saṅkuka that in the cognition of *rasa*, there is neither valid knowledge, nor invalid knowledge, etc. When the spectator perceives Rāma in the actor how can it be said that it is not valid knowledge? Similarly, after the show is over and one knows the actor in his proper person, one's previous knowledge that the actor was Rāma proves false. So it would be *viparyaya* i.e. invalid also.

Then, to say that through the power of poetry *vibhavadis* are ascertained, is absurd. No actor who speaks—*seyam mamaṅgesu* etc.—ever feels that Sita is his somebody. If it is meant for the spectators, it would be easier for them to connect it with the original *sthāyin*. Thus Tota refutes the view that *rasa*, for the spectator, is an imitation of *sthāyin*.

After this, he takes up the second alternative viz. imitation in the case of the actor or *nata*. No actor when he acts, does it with consciousness that, 'I am imitating Rāma or his mental state'. Even then, if *anukāra* or imitation is insisted upon, the following difficulties would arise. Here the most obvious argument is that whom does the actor imitate? The original Rāma can not serve as his model because

'anukarana' There is another meaning also of 'anukarna', and that is doing something after it has been done by somebody else (pascatkaranam) This would hold good in the case of everybody in life It is not something special for the actor or nāta Thus anukarana or imitation in any of the two senses, is not possible for the actor

The followers of imitation theory would not accept this interpretation of their view They would rather say that while depicting Rāma they are imitating the sorrow of some excellent person But here, the old difficulty would arise With what would they imitate the sorrow of that excellent character? The actor has not before him the mental state of sorrow of the excellent character If he imitates his sorrow by imitating the anubhāvas such as tears and the like, of the excellent person, then the old difficulty of 'vailakṣanya' or total difference between the physical anubhava and the mental state of sorrow would arise

If in answer to this, it is said that the actor imitates only the anubhāvas of the excellent character, then that excellent character will have to be particularised Without such particularisation, one cannot understand whose anubhāvas are imitated If to defend their position it is said that the actor imitates a person who weeps as he weeps, then the personality of the actor enters into it and then it will not be imitation but his own sthāyin

Having thus refuted the theory of anukārya-anukartr bhāva (p. 275, *ibid*), Bhatt Tota has to explain anukāra in as much as nātya has been defined as bhāvānukīrtana (Na sa I 107), and lokaṣṭtānukarana-(I 112), by Bharata in the first adhyāya Abhinavagupta has discussed this point (p 35-37 *ibid*), quoting the authority of the Kāvya-kautuka of his Upadhyāya Bhatta Tota who interpreted anukīrtana as meaning 'anuvyavasāya' i.e. re-orientation Reference to this is made here also (p 276, *ibid*). What the actor does is explained in the following way. The



Bhatta Nāyaka says that the same objections would apply if we accept the theory that *rasa* is simply generated. Thus he makes short-shift of *utpattivāda*

He also briefly refers to the *abhivyativāda*. *Abhivyakti* means manifesting something which exists potentially. Here, the manifestation would naturally depend upon the means of manifestation. Now if we assume that *rasa* exists potentially and is later manifested by means of *vibhāvādīs*, this would result in many degrees of *rasa*-manifestation. And this is surely not what happens in *rasa*-experience. This general argument can be applied both with reference to oneself and to someone else, as before. Thus Bhatta Nāyaka rejects *abhivyaktivāda* also (p 276, *ibid*)

Now before we consider the views of Bhatta Nāyaka we may refer to the brief presentation of *rasa* theory from the Sāṃkhya point of view, Sāṃkhyadṛṣā, p 276 (*ibid*). According to this view, the nature of *rasa* consists of happiness (*sukha*) and misery (*duḥkha*). We may say, this has reference to the *sattvaguna* and the *rajo-guna*. The aggregate of objects which have potentiality of creating happiness and misery is external. And, in this aggregate, the *vibhavas* perform the role of *dala* i.e. *upādāna*-or material substratum, while the *anubhavas* and *vyabhi-cārins* are refining agents. The *sthāyins* or the permanent mental states caused by the appropriate aggregates are internal and have the nature of happiness and misery. Abhinava does not take the trouble to refute these views but simply says that those who say that such propositions of Bharata viz. as '*sthāyivibhāvan rasatvaṃ upaneṣyāmah*' are to be taken metaphorically (*upacāra*), and not literally, knowingly contradict the text. Arguments of 'such people need not be taken seriously. This is rather laconic and we cannot clearly understand why the *sāṃkhya* views are not properly considered

In the views of Bhatta Nāyaka, we have some terms which remind us of the *sāṃkhya* terminology and some *sāṃkhya*

theory also Whether he has something to do with the above sāmkyha views, we cannot say Let us now consider Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka's theory.

His explanation of rasa is given in the A bh. as below (p. 278, *ibid*) "bhāṭṭanāyakaśvāha raso na pratiyate, notpadyate, nābhivyaajyate svagataiva na hi pratītau karuṇe duḥkṛitvam syāt, na ca sā pratītir yuktā sitāderavibhāvāt, svakāntāsmṛtya-samvedanāt, devatādau sādharanīkarnayogyatvāt, samudrollaṅghanāder asādharanyāt na ca tadvato rāmasya smṛti ranupalābhatvāt tasmāt kāvyē doṣābhāvagunālamkāramayatvalalakṣaṇena, nātye caturvidhābhīnayarupenā nīvidanīyamohasamkātatanīvāranakārīnā vibhāvādisādharanīkarnātmanābhīdhātō dvītyenāṁsena bhāvakatvavyāpārena bhāvya māno rasōnubhavasamṛtyādivilakṣanena rajastamōnuvedhavaicitryabalād dṛitvistaravikasātmanā sattvodore kaprakāśānanda mayanīyasamvidvisrāntilakṣanena parabrahmāsvādasavidhena bhogena parambhujyate iti etc. (16)

In the sāmkyha view the buddhi or the citta consists of three qualities sattva, rajas and tamas This tamas in relation to buddhi is also called moha or stupour As long as this stupour predominates, one is unable to perceive fineness, nor one can have a clear understanding of anything The function of art is to narrow down or remove the narrowness caused by this quality of tamas A poem does this by its characteristic viz. the absence of defects (doṣa) and the presence of guṇa and alamkāra (i.e. excellence and figures of speech) Drama does this by its four fold abhinaya i.e. representation When this thick veil on the mind is thus removed, the power of revelation bhāvakatva which is the next step after the first denotative power abhidhā of the word, operates This operation consists of generalising the vibhāvādis of the poem or the drama It is this power which makes one aware of rasa The rasa is enjoyed by what is technically known as bhoga-enjoyment This 'bhoga' is technically understod in the Sāmkyha philosophy as arising out of the Union of puruṣa and prakṛti, in buddhi, the finest

evolute of prakṛti, the former as being reflected in the latter. Here, it would mean that the puruṣa reflected in buddhi enjoys the rasa-buddhi. This bhoga is regarded as different from direct experience (anubhava), memory (smṛti), etc. On account of the persistence of rajas and tamas in buddhi, it assumes variety. This variety gives it the characteristic of dṛti, vistara and vikāsa (i.e. fluidity, dilatation, and expansion respectively). This bhoga reposes (visrānti) in one's own sāmvit-consciousness, which becomes pervaded by enlightenment-prakāśa and joy-i.e. ānanda on account of the predominance of sattva. On this account it becomes like the enjoyment or taste of parabrahma.

The purpose of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka seems to be this—Words in poetry do not rest with merely giving the denotation. They have the capacity to give a generalised sense i.e. they generalise the vibhāvādis. This means that rasa which is the resultant of vibhāvādis is also grasped the by generalised way. To put it in another way, the sthāyibhavas aroused with reference to an imaginary particular person, time, place, etc., become generalised by the generalisation of the vibhavas so that their limitation disappears and so the percipient can become aware of them as a part of his own consciousness. Because the consciousness is fully awakened by the power of poetic speech rasa is enjoyed. Thus one may say that the function of the poetic speech reaches the last stage of bhoga also.

We will see later on that many of these ideas are appropriated in Abhinava's philosophy of rasa also. But for the present, we are concerned with what Abhinava refutes in Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory. His main objection is against introducing the new term of bhoga in rasa philosophy as against pratīti or apprehension and such other forms of knowledge. If Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka means rasana i.e. tasting by bhoga, it is also a form of knowledge—pratīti. Because of its meaning being different, a separate name may be given to it, as in case of drasana or perception, anumati or inference, śruti or

verbal knowledge, upamiti or knowledge through similitude, and pratibhāna or intuition etc, etc

Abhinavagupta's second objection is against the rejection of both utpatti and abhivyakti with reference to rasa. It is said that rasa, which is a fact of experience, is not caused or brought into being, then it must be existing for ever. And, if its manifestation is also rejected, then it will have to be accepted that rasa does not exist for there is no third alternative. A thing which is not apprehended in any way, cannot be the subject of discourse, i.e., it cannot be asserted that rasa exists.

The third point of attack is the recognition of the three mental states of druti fluidity, vistara or dilatation and vikāsa or expansion. Abhinava holds that if it is asserted by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka that by 'pratīti' or apprehension is meant the power of generating enjoyment and that it consists of the nature of druti i.e., fluidity, vistara i.e. dilatation, etc we accept it. But then, why only three states as mentioned above ? There will be as many pratītis or apprehensions of the nature of tasting as there are rasas. And they will be all generating bhoga. In fact there will be infinite permutations and combinations of the three guṇas viz sattva, rajas and tamas, on the principal of predominance and subordination, then why accept only three ?

Abhinavagupta would accept 'bhāvanā', if it is understood in the following sense, viz to make anything the subject-matter of cognition in the form of tasting, consisting of chewing caused by vibhāvādis.

Abhinava accepts the opinion of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka expressed in the verse.

bhāvasaṃyojanāvyaṅgyaparasaṃvittigocarah |  
asvādanātmanubhavo rasah kāvyārtha ucyate ||

because it makes the meaning of a poem rasa, which is manifested by vibhāvādis

Here ends the refutation of the views of Bhatta Lollata, Śrī Saṅkuka and Bhatta Nāyaka in *Abhidavabbhāratī*. In it, the theory of Lollata, that *rasa* is caused by the *vibhāvādīs* and that it is only an intensified state of *sthāyin* has been refuted through the mouth of Śrī Saṅkuka. Śrī Saṅkuka's view that *rasa* is an imitation of *sthāyin* is rejected through Bhatta Tota. His inference theory is ridiculed by comparing it with the type of pseudo-inference in which one might infer from mist resembling smoke, a red *japā* flower resembling fire. His analogy of *citraturaga* is also discarded. The main point of objection in Bhatta Nāyaka's theory is his bringing in *bhoga*, a category different from all kinds of *pratītis* or apprehensions.

All these thinkers, however, have something important to contribute to the development of the theory of *rasa*. The relation of the poet's world with reality enables one to grasp the inherent emotion in the person's event and things of the world. This may be said to be Lollata's contribution. The semblance of the poet's world with reality and the inferential process psychologically involved in the deducing of emotions from the imitated world are elements in aesthetic perception, emphasised by Śrī Saṅkuka. Bhatta Nāyaka contributes the important element of '*sādhāranīkarana*' which is an inevitable precondition in all aesthetic experience. His three forms of *rasa*-*pratītis* viz *drutī*, *vistara*, etc. are important to understand the states of mind behind specific *rasa*-experience. We shall see that Abhinavagupta has drawn upon some of these ideas in the formation of his *rasa* theory.

**RASA EXPERIENCE ACCORDING TO ABHINAVAGUPTA** (1015-A D De, 950-60 A D -1015 A D. K C. Pandey; Abb. p. 8, 980-1030 A D -Kane P. 43)

In this chapter, we will now try to understand and discuss Abhinavagupta's ideas which go to form his theory of *rasa*. The first thing that he asserts is *kāvyaṛtho rasah*

(p 278. A bh - Nā S'a second Ed G O S ), and quotes as his authority *kāvyaārthan bhāvayanti* (Nā S'a VII p 342 *ibid*) In the A bh on this in *adhyāya* seven, it is explained that *artha* here does not mean the direct sense (*na tvārthasabdo'bhīdhe-yavāci*), but what is principally sought after And what is principally sought after is *rasa*

### Rasa as Kāvyaārtha

He says that in a poem the meaning of a word and that of a sentence ultimately ends in *rasas*. Therefore, on account of their uncommonness and predominance the meaning of poem is *rasas-kāvyaārthah rasah* (p 343, *ibid*) (17) This emphasis on *rasa* as the meaning of a poem is to keep out such terms as *bhoga* and the like

### Sādhāranīkarana

[Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka had shown that the *sādhāranīkaranavyāpāra* i.e. the process of generalising or universalising is an important function of poetic speech Abhinava finds an analogy for this process in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā*. He gives two illustrations from *śruti* to show this *rātrimāsata*, they lay by night, and *tāmag nau prādāt* —he gave it to fire.]

In these two sentences, the meaning is limited by person, number and tense. Now when someone with a purpose and qualifications to understand and interested in doing something related to this hears these sentences, he derives another meaning which removes the limitations of person, number and tense and has the general idea of sitting by night or offering something to the fire. And because he is interested in doing some such thing, he will understand the meaning such as 'I will sit for the night', 'I will sacrifice this for the fire' etc. Now this process consisting in transference of meaning is called by different *darsanas* by different names such as *pratibha* or intuition, *bhāvana* or propulsion, *vidhi* or command, *niyoga*

or order etc. The same sort of transference of meaning takes place in a qualified person from the poetic speech. This is the basis of *sādhāranīkarana*.] The idea seems to be that in a person with a pragmatic outlook, hearing, and we may add, seeing something in which he is interested, becomes generalised i.e. the original limitations of time, person, etc. are eliminated. This may be applied to a person who is interested in poetry, and has the capacity to understand and appreciate poetry. When such a person reads a poem, the person, the number and the tense etc. in the poetic speech become, so to say, eliminated for him, after the first stage of understanding it in a direct way is over. The object presents itself to a *sahṛdaya* in unlimited form.

### The Sahṛdaya

[This means that the *sādhāranīkarana vyāpāra* is possible for a *sahṛdaya* alone. So, the first prerequisite to appreciate poetry or to enjoy the joy of aesthetic feeling is *sahṛdayatā*. Consequently, it is but natural that Abhinava should lay so much emphasis on *sahṛdaya*. He defines the *adbakārin* or the qualified person as follows: *adbakāri cātra vimalapratibhāns'ā-līhṛdayah* (A bh p 280 *ibid*) i.e. the qualified person here, is one whose heart possesses a mirror-like power of intuition. All do not have this intrinsic capacity to taste a poem. Individuals possessed of aesthetic sensibility are called possessed of heart. They are those who have the concord of heart (*sahṛdaya*, *hṛdayasaṃvādabdhak*).] He defines the *sahṛdaya* in the *Locana* as follows: *yesāṃ kāvyānusīlanābhyāsavasat viśadībhūte manomukure varṇanīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā te svahṛdayasaṃvādabdhajāḥ sahṛdayāḥ, yathoktam* (Nā Śā VII 10)–

yōrtho hṛdayasaṃvādi tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ |  
śarīraṃ vyāpyate tena śūkaṃ kāśthamivāgninā ||

### The nature of Rasa

[Abhinava starts his discussion on *rasa* by describing how the process of *sādhāranīkarana* takes place and how *rasa*–

experience arises in a *sabrdaya* by taking three illustrations from *Kalidāsa*,—one from *Śāṅkuntala*—viz. *grivābhaṅgābhīramam muhuh* etc. (I.7) and the other two from *Kumāra Sam.* viz. *umāpī*, etc. (III. 62), and *harastu kiñcit ...* etc. III 67.

The first is an illustration of *bhayanaka rasa*, and the other two of *śṅgāra*. This is how the process takes place. First, one becomes aware of the usual sense of the sentence viz. *grivābhaṅgābhīramam* etc. After this, another apprehension takes place. This is of the nature of mental visualisation. In this second stage of mental visualisation, the tense, person, etc. become eliminated. The young-one of the deer which is visualised in this apprehension loses its particularity and therefore, the idea that some particular deer is frightened becomes unreal. Consequently, fear as such, unlimited, freed from time and space, appears, so to say, before mind. Thus far, we may add, that the poetic speech is in the analogy of the illustrations quoted before. But from here it goes a step further. The fear, untouched by time and space, is a fear which does not frighten the first person of observer (*bhītoham*), nor does it refer to a third person, nor has it a reference to an enemy, friend or a neutral person. This means that the fear has reference to no person as such. And because no one is involved, there is neither the sense of unhappiness nor happiness, and consequently, there is no reaction to avoid or take it (*hānopādāna*). These latter, as we shall see, are the *vighnas* or obstacles which come in the way of aesthetic experience. So, this experience is different from experiences in which these reactions take place in ordinary life. Therefore, here, the sentiment of fear is grasped by an apprehension, free from such obstacles. Consequently, as it were, this sentiment of fear itself enters the heart (*sūkṣādīva*) and revolves before our eyes. This is *bhayanaka rasa*. We may add that the same procedure will apply to the experience of *śṅgāra* from the other two illustrations.

In such an experience of *rasa*, one's own self is not very much suppressed, nor it is allowed particularly to emerge. This



holds good about any other person, who witnesses the soka, and we may add, reads a poem. Therefore, the cognition of *sādhāranya* or the generality is not limited to any person, It is extended (*vitata*) like the cognition of *vyapti* i.e. universal pervasion, acquired by competent person, from the relation of smoke and fire, or like the knowledge of the relation between trembling and fear.

After thus describing the process of generalisation and pointing to the universally cognisable nature of this generality, Abhinava tells us that it is the assemblage of actor and such other things that help the process of visualisation. In this assemblage, the generality becomes very much nourished, because the limiting factor of time, space, knower, etc. and those given by the poem totally disappear on account of mutual elimination. Therefore, all the competent persons in an audience are capable of apprehending it in one compactness (*ekaghanatā*), and this helps in the nourishment of *rasa*. This happens because there is concord of *vāsanā* i.e. latent dispositions amongst persons whose minds are full of varied *vasanās* i.e. innate dispositions (p. 279 *ibid*). The *avighnāsamvit* or unimpeded consciousness, brought about in this way is *camatkāra*. These are the technical terms of the *pratyabhijñā* philosophy, which we shall try to understand later.

It may be regarded as cognitive determination (*adhyavasāya*) or the mental power of putting ideas together and forming whole,—this latter may be translated as imagination (*samkalpa*). This visualisation may be regarded as remembrance (*smṛti*) also but it is not to be taken in the sense in which the dilecticians take it. The sense is similar to '*accetasā smarati nūnamabodhapūrvam*' etc. (*Abhi. Sā. V. 2*). This memory is not dependent on any previous experience. So, whatever term one might apply, this is apprehension (*prāpti*) of the nature of testing in which *rati* or delight, particularly the erotic delight as such, appears. This apprehension

of delight is not conditioned by any other particularity. For this reason, it is not the experience of common place delight (*laukikā ratih*). But for that, it is not false (*mithyā*); nor it is indescribable (*anirvācya*). It is also not similar to the common place apprehension of delight (*laukika tulya*), nor is it of the nature of superimposition of the popular experience (*tadāropādītulya*). However, from another point of view, this apprehension of *rati* or delight as such, may be regarded as a state of intensification of *sthayibhāva* or the permanent mental state (*upacayavasthā'stu*) (18), because there is no restriction of time, space and person. It may be regarded as imitation (*anukāra*), because it is done following the original state of mind. And, if we follow the *viśānavāda* in which all percepts are mental, we may regard this experience as a collection of mental elements, which are of course the *vibhāvādīs*. Here we see how Abhinava interprets and appropriates the theories of former *ācāryas*. Taken as one may, from all points of view, it is the mental state (*bhāva*) which, grasped by the apprehension from which all obstacles have been eliminated, and of the nature of tasting is *rasa*. (P. 280 *ibid*) Such a consciousness, *samvitti*, freed from obstacles, is called among people as *camatkāra*, *nirves'a* (immersion), *rasanā* (tasting), *āsvādana* (sampling), *bhoga* (enjoyment), *samāpatti* (accomplishment), *laya* (lysis), *visrānti* (rest), etc (19) Abhinava says *loke sakalaviḡhavinirmuktā samvittireva camatkāranirveśarasanāsvādanabhogasamāpattilayavistrāntyādiabdhairabhidhīyate*. (*ibid* P. 280)

We might say, the above in a way gives a complete view of Abhinava's theory of *rasa*. In this the principle of *sādhāranīkārṇa* or generalisation is taken from *Bhauia Nāyaka* as far as we know though, of course, Abhinava tries to see its root in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*. Abhinava's own contribution may be said to lie in his concept of *rasa* as an entity grasped by *nirviḡhṛā samvit* or unimpeded consciousness. Naturally therefore, he devotes good space to the discussion of these

This discussion, over and above giving us the knowledge of the mental stuff which is to be tasted as *rasa*, has another significance. The *sthāyins* or the permanent mental states being *vāsanās* or latent dispositions are to be found in all beings. For this reason, when an aesthete or *sahṛdaya* witnesses a play or reads a poem, he finds his own mental disposition coming into his consciousness. As Abhinava says later on, this is the reason why an aesthete even though he is not concerned in a worldly sense with what he reads and witnesses, finds himself a part of the total experience (p. 285 *ibid* *yasyām svātma'pi tadvāsanāvattvādanupravistah*)

### The Vighnas

Abhinava says, — (*tathāhi-laukikenānumānena samskṛtāḥ pramāṇādinaḥ (dina) tāstasthyena pratipadyate. api tu hrdaya-samvādātmakasaḥṛdayatvabalātpūrnabhaviṣyadrasāsvadānkuribhāvena-mṛtyādisopānamanāruhyaiva taumayibhāvocitacarvṇā-prānatayā na ca 'ā carvṇā prāh mānāntarāḍ yenādhunāsmṛtiḥ syāt na cātra laukikapratyaksādi pramānavyāpārah. kiṁvalaukikavibhavadisamyogabalopanataiveyam carvṇā sā ca pratyakṣānumānāgamopamāṇādilaukikapramānajanitaratyādyavabodhataḥ tathā yogipratyaksajanitatatasthaparasamvittipānātsakalaviṣayikoparāgasunya suddhaparayogigatasvātmaṇḍandakaghaṇanubhavaḥca viśiṣyate eteṣāṃ yathāyogamarjanādivighnāntarodayāttatsthyena sphuṭataviṣayāvesavaivasyakṛta saundaryavirahāt atra tu svātmaikagatatvaniyamāsambhāvāt (na viśayāvesavaivasyam) svānupravesātparagatatvaniyamābbhāvāt (na tāstasthyāsphutatvam) tadvibhāvādisādhārāṇyavaśasamprabuddhociṭtanijaratyādivāsanāvesavasācca na vighnāntarāḍinaṃ sambhava ityavocāma bahusah (Abh. Vol. I p. 284-285)*

We might say in a general way, that those things which come in the way of the cognitive chewing of the permanent and transitory mental states are the *vighnas* or obstacles. Abhinava mentions seven such obstacles (21)

The first is called sambhavanāvīraharūpa pratipattāvayogyatā the second, svagataparagatatvanīyamena desakālādiviśeṣāvesah, the third, nījasukhādivivasiḥbhāvah, the fourth, pratītyupāyavat-kalyam, the fifth, sphutatvābhāvah, the sixth, apradhanata, and the seventh, saṁsayayogah

The first may be called improbability. When the matter of a poem or a drama or a piece of art appears improbable, one's mind cannot rest on it and consequently, we may add, one is unable to reach the state of rasa-experience. For this reason, the subject matter of a poem or a drama must appear as probable. The second may be called the intrusion of the space-time particularly. This would arise when a reader or a spectator takes the subject-matter as either referring to himself or to someone else. Such personal factors would bring in the obstruction of the particularity of space and time. This, we may add, results in obstructing sādharāṇikarāṇa or generalisation. The third may be called helplessness, due to arising of personal considerations of happiness and the like. This also would be due to the bringing in of the element of personality. This would cloud the samvit-or consciousness and make the grasping of sādharāṇikarāṇa or generalisation impossible. The fourth may be called the lack of means of apprehension. A work of art which is defective in its presentation cannot create apprehension of its meaning in the mind of the reader and the spectator. We may explain this as below. A poem, which does not use correct language, would not be properly understood or a singer who does not indicate the vādī and samvādī etc would not be properly understood. The fifth may be called lack of clarity (sphutatva). A poem may use correct language and yet it would lack clarity. In a poem or drama, or a work of art, one expects one's apprehension to be like visualisation (parīyakṣocitapratīyayasākāṅkṣatva). Abhinava quoted the authority of Nyāyabhāṣya and says that all cognition has for its end direct perception or visualisation. This applies to the aesthetic cognition also. Abhinava says that, this is why abhinaya or

representation and the like, are required for a play. In short, each art has its own technique of making its contents as if visualised. The sixth obstacle may be called the lack of emphasis on the principal element. In the *rasanīṣpatti*, for the experience of *rasa*, these agents viz. *vibhāvādīs* are mentioned. But none of these by themselves, can be the principal object of delineation. The *uddāna vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* are insentient and therefore, they cannot be principal. The *vyabhičārins* or the transitory mental states, even though of the nature of consciousness, are always dependent. So, they also cannot be principal. For these reasons, *sthāyins* alone can be the principal. In a poem or a drama, in which the delineation lacks this quality of making the *sthāyins* or permanent mental states a principal matter of delineation, would create an obstacle in the experience of *rasa*. We have seen before, why the *sthāyins* or the permanent mental states are the universal dispositions of living creatures and why the *vyabhičārins* are only the transitory mental states. Even amongst the *sthāyins*, Abhinava would choose four, viz. *rati* or delight, *krodha* or anger, *utsāha* or heroism and *nirveda*, born out of philosophical knowledge. Even these would be subservient to one another. According to the variety of the drama one of these would be principal and the rest subservient.

We may here point out a very important element in Abhinava's theory of art. *Rasa* being the final aim of a poem or any other piece of art, one cannot have a proper aesthetic experience if the principal *rasa* is not brought into relief by making others subservient. Therefore, this is a *vighna*. The seventh may be called the obstacle of doubt.

A poet who does not provide a proper combination of *vibhāvādīs* would create doubt into the mind of the reader as to which *rasa* is conveyed. The *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhičārins* or the determinants, consequents and the transitory states respectively, by themselves cannot lead to a

to remove these obstacles—*tatra vighnāpasāraḥ vibhāvaprabhy-  
tayah* (p. 280. *ibid*) This may be interpreted in a simple way.  
A poem, or a drama, or any other work of art, consists of  
the *vibhāvadis*. So, if the creation of a poem or a play or  
any other art is done in a proper way, these obstacles would  
not arise and it would lead to the aesthetic experience.

### Abhinava's interpretation of *rasa-sūtra*

Abhinava says (*tatra lokvyavahāre kāryakāraṇasahacarat-  
makalīṅgadarsanesthāyīyatmaparacittavṛtītyanumānābhyāsapāiv-  
ādadhunā tatre vodyanakaśāṭṣavīkṣanādibhīrlaukikīm kāraṇatvā-  
dibhuvamatīkrāntairvibhāvanubhāvasamuprajakatvamātraprān-  
aiḥ, ata evālaukikavibhāvādivyapades'abhaḥbhūḥ pratyakāra-  
nādīrupasamśkaropajīvanakhyāpanāya vibhāvādīnāmādheya-  
vyapadesyairbhāvādhyāyepī vaksyamānasvarūpabhedalrguna-  
pradhānatatparyeṇa samajīkadhyī samīgyogam sambandha-  
malkāgrjamaśāditavadbhīrlaukikanīrvighnasamvedanātmakaca-  
rvanāgocaratām nīto'rthasārvvyamānataikāśāro na tu siddhasva-  
bhāvah tatkālika eva na tu carvanāturīktakālavalambī sthāyīvīla-  
(yūla)ksana eva rasah* (A. bh. Vol. I, p. 284)

This may be elaborated as below

[After all this preliminary discussion, Abhinava comes to  
the interpretation of the *rasa-sūtra*. First he explains the  
particular significance of *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicāri-  
bhāva*. One may say, these are cognitive elements. In the  
common place experience, one is able to infer a permanent  
mental state of any other person by the observation of the  
concomitant relation between the permanent mental states and  
the collocation of its cause, effect and accessories. The quickness  
of inference which comes out of practice goes beyond the  
necessity of the causal stage (*atīkrānta*), in enabling to perceive  
the *sthāyins* or the permanent mental states, by the presentation  
of a garden or the casting of glances and the like, in poetry  
or drama. These cognitive processes are no longer causative  
elements of the *sthāyins* or the permanent mental states. For

this reason, the *kāraṇa* (cause), the *kārya* (effect) and *sahakāri* (the accessory), are termed as *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāris* respectively. These three, in order of principal and subordinate, have to reach a proper union (*samyag yoga*), or relation (*sambandha*), or one-pointedness (*aikāgya*), in the mind of the audience. This is, what is called, "*vibhāvanubhāvavyabhicārisamyoga*". From such a *samyoga* of these, comes a meaning which is the subject of the cognitive chewing (*samvedana*), from which the obstacles have been removed and which makes this cognitive-chewing an extra ordinary experience. The meaning thus grasped is *rasa*. It is of the essence of cognitive chewing, and not something whose existence has been accomplished before (*siddhasvabhāva*). It is immediate (*tatkālika eva*), and not something which exists in time other than the cognitive chewing. Thus *rasa* is something different from natural *sthāyin* or the permanent mental state. ]

Srī Sāṅkuka said that because *rasa* is the imitation of *sthāyins* or the permanent mental state, the word *sthāyin* was not mentioned in the *sūtra*. But it is the *sthāyin* or the permanent mental state, known by the *vibhāvadīs*, which is *rasa*, because it is so tasted. To this, Abhinava replies that in that case even such a popular experience would be *rasa*, because when one tastes a mental state which really does not exist in the actor, why one should not taste it when it is actually there. Therefore, inferential cognition of *sthāyin* or permanent mental state is not *rasa*. If *sthāyin* were mentioned in the *sūtra* as inferred from the *vibhāvadīs* such a contingency would arise. For this reason the word *sthāyin* is not mentioned in the *sūtra*. However, we find such references in the *Nāṭya Śāstra* as '*sthāyī rasābhūtā*,' etc. Abhinava would say that there is a propriety in this, because the '*sthāyī*' material which was known in the world by the causes etc., is now useful for cognitive chewing by recourse to *vibhāvadīs*.

Abhinava also objects to the inference theory by saying that there would be no taste (*rasa*) in the inference of

common place mental states. Therefore, the taste of *rasa*, whose nature is that of extraordinary *camatkāra* is different from common place cognitions like memory and inference.

### Rasa Experience by the Aesthete

After thus explaining the *rasasūtra* in an abstract way, Abhinava describes how an aesthete experiences *rasa*. His mind is cultivated in the process of common place (*laukika*) inference. This means that a mental state would immediately arise in his mind with its corresponding affection. So, he does not, therefore, perceive a handsome young lady in a poem or on the stage with indifference (*ātasthyena*), but he does it with the sprouting of the taste of *rasa* which is going to be fuller later on. He is able to do this by the force of his *sahridayatva* which is of the nature of concord of the heart (*hrdayasaṃvāda*). He has this experience, without climbing (22) the steps of inference, memory, and the like, because the essence of such an experience is cognitive chewing and this cognitive chewing corresponds to the sense of identification with what is perceived (P 284, *ibid*). What is meant is that the spectator's mind becomes identified with what he perceives and this gives rise to the appropriate *carvanā* or cognitive chewing.

In Abhinavagupta's theory, this *carvanā* or cognitive chewing is a condition precedent to *rasa* experience, and because it is of the nature of cognition, he has to distinguish this *carvanā* or cognitive chewing from other forms of cognition.

### The epistemological nature of *rasa*-experience

This *carvanā* or cognitive chewing cannot be of the nature of remembrance, because it was not known before through some other *pramāṇas* or means of knowledge. It cannot be identified with the other *laukika* or common place means of knowledge such as sense-perception (*pratyakṣa*) and the like. This *carvanā* is brought about by the force of collocation of



extra-ordinary vibhāvas or determinants and the like. Therefore, this carvanā is to be distinguished from the knowledge of rati or delight and the like, born from ordinary worldly pramānas or means of knowledge like direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), scriptural authority (āgama), analogy (upamāna) etc. It is also to be distinguished from the indifferent consciousness generated by the extra-sensory perception of a yogin, and also from the experience of the uniform compact joy of the ātman of the higher yogin, because it is void of the colouring of the sense object.

The reason of this distinction in each case is given thus. In the case of the knowledge of rati or delight, and the like acquired through worldly means of knowledge, there is always the contingency of personally acquiring or abandoning the thing (hānopādāna). And this is an obstacle in rasa experience. In the case of an ordinary yogin, on account of indifference (tatasthya), there is haziness of experience, while in carvanā or cognitive chewing, there is clear visualisation (asphuṭatvena). In the experience of the higher yogin, there is lack of beauty (saundaryaviraha), because all the colouring of the sense objects is absent. In the case of cognitive chewing or carvanā, there is no vaivasya or helplessness before the objects of sense, because the cognition is not necessarily taken in relation to one self. There is no indifference because in a way, one's self is there in the experience, and there is no necessary reference to somebody else. And therefore, there is no consequent jealousy. In carvanā or cognitive chewing there is vāsanā or latent disposition of one's own rati or delight and the like, awakened by the force of the generalised determinants and the like. So, there is no rise of obstacles in rasa-experience.

For this reason, the vibhāvādīs or the determinants and the like, are not the efficient causes of rasa, because in that case, even when they are not there, there will be the existence of rasa, just as a jar might exist even though the potter and the like do not exist. They are not also the causes

of cognition, and therefore, do not come under the category of means of knowledge i.e. *pramāṇas*. The *pramāṇas* or the means of knowledge enlighten only what exists previously. But *rasa* does not exist previous to the *vibhāvādīs* and therefore, is not a *prameya* i.e. something to be known. Naturally then, the question arises,—what are these *vibhāvādīs*? This usage of the *vibhāvādīs* is useful for the understanding of *carvanā*—the cognitive chewing—, and for this very reason, it is an unusual usage—*alaukika vyavahāra*. If it is asked, “where do you find such a thing at any other place in the world?”, we may say that it is a tribute to our proving that it is extraordinary as far as the worldly matters go. But if an analogous example is required, we would say that we do not find the taste of a drink in its ingredients taken separately.

Here, we may point out that when the *rasa* experience is called something other than *laukika* i.e. common place in the world, it is here opposed to the experience in poetry, drama, in short, in art. *Abhinava* has been trying all along that aesthetic experience cannot be compared or evaluated with the other experiences of worldly matter.

But when *rasa* is lifted out of the usual categories of knowledge, logic would say that it is an unknowable (*aprameya*) entity. *Abhinava* would accept this position, because for him the very life of *rasa* lies in its *rasyatā* i.e. in its being tasted and this experience is not of the nature of *prameya* (i.e. a knowable entity) and the like. This would contradict the thesis of the *sūtra* which says that *rasa* is a ‘*nīṣpatti*’, which is neither generation nor knowledge. Here, *Abhinava* makes a fine distinction. The reference of ‘*nīṣpatti*’ in the *sūtra* is not to *rasa* as such but to ‘*rasanā*’ or the process of cognitive chewing or tasting whose object is *rasa*. In this way, the life of *rasa* is solely dependent upon *rasanā*. And therefore, on account of the ‘*nīṣpatti*’ of *rasanā* or cognitive chewing, *rasa* may also be called as caused. This *rasanā* or cognitive chewing is neither due to the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*—

vyāpāra), nor to causal process (kāraṇa vyāpāra) But then, this does not make it a false experience (apramāṇikā), because it is proved by its very consciousness (svasaṃvedana-siddhatvāt) Therefore, rasa-experience is sui generis

Abhinava, after having distinguished rasana or cognitive chewing from other forms of cognition, does not deny to it knowableness as such In fact he says that rasana is of the nature of knowledge (bodha) It is only different from other forms of knowledge usually recognised The difference lies in its means, viz. the vibhavadis, being different from other means of knowledge in common practice (laukika-vailaksanyāt)

So, the purport of the sūtra, according to Abhinava is that rasa is an extra-ordinary entity which is the object of rasana or cognitive chewing, and that this rasana is born of the collocation of vibhavadis

Abhinava summarises (P 285 *ibid*) this lengthy discussion thus — The make-up of the actor hides the identity of the actor We also do not think that he is Rāma, eventhough that thought is forcibly brought before us by the poem The reason for this is the intense previous impressions which do not allow us to think of him to be Rāma The result of this state of mind is that the spectator gives up the time and the space both of the actor and of Rāma We see on the stage horripilation and the like These make us cognise rati or delight as such But this cognition is freed from the restraint of time and space. In this cognition, one's self also enters because one possesses the latent dispositions (vāsana) of rati or delight, and the like. And so, one's cognition of rasa is not of an indifferent person But one does not cognise rati or delight as an effect of a determinate cause—niyata-kāraṇatayā—for oneself Therefore, there is no possibility of one's becoming attached (abhisvāṅga) or making an effort to obtain One does not cognise rati or delight as of somebody else benefiting from it as a result of definite cause And so, one does

not feel any pain or enmity etc (duḥkhadvesādyudaya) So, the generalised rati or delight, when it is cognised in one movement of consciousness or its chain (saṃtānavṛtti) is srñēgta Abhinava again repeats that the idea of generality is due to vibhāvādīś We may say this is Abhinava's attempt to explain the participation of one's self in an aesthetic experience

### **All rasas-of the nature of joy**

An important point in Abhinava's theory remains to be discussed [He accepts the theory of 'ānandarūpata sarva rasānām (p 282 ibid) This point he has discussed while discussing the sixth vighna or obstacle All the sthayins or permanent mental states by themselves in worldly experience are not of the nature of happiness In rasa-experience, they give joy because they become the matter of cognitive chewing in one's own consciousness freed from obstacles Such a consciousness is of the nature of one uniform compact light and its essence is joy or ananda Therefore, even sorrow or anger and the like when they become the part of such a consciousness give joy The theory that nirvighna samvit as such is accompanied by joy or has joy as its constituent is a tenet of the pratyabhijñā school.]

### **Different philosophical schools represented by different acaryas**

The fact of rasa is particularly accepted by almost all the writers on saṃskṛit poetics Here its development has taken a psychological and epistemological direction The explanation given in the Nāṣā of the rārasūtra was enough for the actor and his director, the natyācārya

When however the interpretation of the rārasūtra was taken up by the pundits well versed in the śāstras it became more and more sophisticated

We have seen above that in the interpretation of rasa doctrine there is an attempt to explain the psychological

**mīmāṃsaka** It is however doubtful, whether we can, on this evidence, take him to be a **mīmāṃsaka** It is well-known that the **mīmāṃsā** rules of interpretation are used by the followers of different schools

In the **utpattivāda** and the **pratitivāda** of Lollata, if both **utpatti** and **pratiti** refer to the spectator as **Mammata** and others have assumed, we can find in it the **mīmāṃsā** view of **svatahpramāṇyavāda**, wherein the occurrence of knowledge is accompanied by its varacity That is, the occurrence of the knowledge of **Rāma** is accompanied by the knowledge that this is **Rāma**

Dr Pandey and Gnoli have shown that Lollata commented upon the **Spanda Kārikā**, and therefore was presumably a follower of the **Kashmir Saivism** According to Dr Pandey, Lollata uses the term **anusandhāna** in the **Saiva** sense of **yojana** In fact, one reference in the **Abh** which says that **parispanda** is not the only **vyāpāra** of **ātman**, according to Lollata, suggests that it is at least one **vyāpāra** of **ātman** This would make him the follower of the **pratyabhijñā** school of **Kashmir Saivism**

In the presentation of **Saṅkuka's** views in the **Abh**, we find him emphasizing the imitation theory of **rasa** and assuming a sort of inferential process in its cognition, Dr Pandey thinks that he adopts the technique of **prācya nyāya** (P 50 **Indian Aesthetics**) Is this however, sufficient to call him a **Naiyāyika**? There is nothing in the **Nyāya** philosophy to suggest the imitation view And, no **Naiyāyika** worth his salt would call the psychological process of indirect knowledge a real inference So his views should be taken as his reflections on the nature and mode of **rasa**

In the theory of **Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka**, there are no doubt some **sāṃkhya** concepts such as those of the three **guṇas**, and that of **bhoga** But he also refers to the '**ānandamaya nija saṃvit**', and '**paramabrahmāsvāda**' (P 277 *ibid*) However in **Abh**

(P. 5) Bhatta Nāyaka's views would make him a māyavādi vedāntin. (see also Dr. Pandey who supports this. P. 72-73 Indian Aesthetics). It would seem however, that here too, we have not enough references to identify his schools of philosophy.

As to Abhinavagupta, we know that he was a follower of the pratyabhijñā darsana. Fortunately, some of the important works on Pratyabhijñā darsana are discovered and edited in Kashmir series of texts and studies. In these philosophical works, we find some basic concepts of the school which also hold good for his theory of rasa. As we noted above, terms like 'saṃvit', 'nirvighnā saṃvit', 'camatkāra' and 'ānanda' have a peculiar significance, which we can clearly understand only in the light of their meanings in the discussion of Pratyabhijñā philosophy. Eventhough, we cannot go here into the details of this philosophy, a very brief account would be necessary for a proper understanding of these terms (24). The pratyabhijñā school is monist in its metaphysics. The one single substance which manifests itself as the cosmos of living and non-living objects is 'citi' 'or' 'caitanya'. It can therefore be called spiritual monism. The ultimate 'citi' or 'caitanya' is called in this school as 'Śiva'. All the phenomena of the universe are the self-manifestation or self-reflection of Śiva. This school differs from other schools of vedānta, particularly from that of Saṅkara, in regarding this power of self-manifestation of Siva as real. This Śiva caitanya is conceived not as something static, but fraught with dynamic energy.

This view of ultimate reality is explained through several concepts, and some of these are 'spanda', 'phurattā', 'vimarsa', 'camtkāra', 'icchā' etc. Abhinava himself has explained briefly but lucidly these terms in his work named *Tantrasāra*. We cannot do better than summarise what he has said in the upodghāta or introduction of this work.

He says that nature of all existants is light-prakāsa. This prakāsa is one and universal. It is not divided by time and

space (*deśa*, *kāla*), because time and space themselves are of the nature of *prakāśa*. This *prakāśa* is then identified with *saṃvit* – *sa eva ca saṃvit* (p 2) *Samvit* is explained as – *arthapra-kāśarupā* ( *arthapra-kāśarupā hī saṃvit* ) This means that the nature of *saṃvit* is to enlighten objects ( *artha* ) But this *prakāśa* is also, enlightenment itself It is not dependent upon anything else ( *pāratantryam* ), for its enlightenment Thus, this *prakāśa* is one and *svatantra*, i.e. self-dependent, and because it is not limited by space, time and form it is all pervading ( *vyāpaka* ), eternal ( *nitya* ), and formless, even though it has all the forms in it potentially

Thus this monism of *prakāśa* and *saṃvit* is monism of consciousness

After this are mentioned the various *śaktis* or powers of this *saṃvit* Its dependence ( *svatantryam* ) is its power of *ānanda* ( *ānanda śaktiḥ* ) Its *camatkāra* is its power of will ( *icchāśaktiḥ* ) Its nature of enlightenment is its power of cognition ( *jñānaśaktiḥ* ) Its capacity to assume all forms is its power of acting ( *kriyāśaktiḥ* ) Even though, it can be described as joined with these powers, in reality, it is *Siva* containing within Himself, *icchā*, *jñāna*, and *kriyā*, i.e. will, knowledge and activity It is light and it reposes in its own joy (p 5-6, *Tantrasāra* – Kashmir Series of Texts and studies, – No XVII Ed 1918 )

Then, *Abhinava* describes how this *Siva* in its full independence shows itself as *anu* (25)

From this brief account, we find that *saṃvit* whose nature is to enlighten or present objects is the ultimate reality When it is completely independent, it is joy itself ( *ānanda* ) As desire it is *camatkāra*. Thus the three are identical To be reposing in this is to be *Siva*, or *ānanda* i.e. joy

In this school, everything that is or exists is *Siva* in reality And therefore, wherever the mind goes, there is the state of *Śiva* –

“yatra yatra mano yati bahye vā bhyantare’pi vā |  
tatra tatra śivāvasthā vyāpakatvāt kva yāsyati ||

Vijñanabhairava V 116, p 99—Kashmir Sanskrit Granthāvalī Vol 6, Ed 1918

The essential thing is that one's *samvitti* or consciousness must repose unobstructedly in its true nature i.e. in *Siva*. This is joy itself. In this school the possibility of *samvit* knowing itself or reposing in itself is the source of all joy,—sensual, artistic or spiritual. The following verse from *Vijñanabhairava* is taken as authority by *Abhinava* and other writers of this school for this view.

“ jagdhipānaktollasarasānandavijrmbhanat |  
bhāvayedbharitāvasthām mahānandastato bhavet ||  
(Sloka 72, P 60)

*Abhinava* has explained this view in detail in his *Īśvara-pratyabhijñānavivartimarsinī* (P 117–179, Vol II Ed, 1941, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies). *Camatkṛti* is explained as *camatkṛtiḥ bhuñjānasya yā kriyā* i.e. The mental activity of one who enjoys i.e. the mental activity of enjoying is *camatkṛti*. It is also ‘*bhogasamāpattimaya ānandaḥ*’. This is joy, *ānanda*, which consists in being identical with enjoyment. This is further clarified thus — the enlightenment of one's own complete nature assumes the form of *parāmarśa* i.e. thought or consciousness. It is called *ānanda*. *Svarūpaśya svātmanah paripurnanījasvarūpaprakāśanam eva paramarśamayātām dadhad ānanda itī ucyate* p 177 (ibid). This view is applied to the mundane experiences of men. It is also shown how and when one has joy and when one has not. The illustration of a hungry man is cited. Because he is empty, he is in need of something else. His mind has become *vivāṣa* (helpless) by the desire of food which is something different from himself. In this condition there is no one solid consciousness of one's self (*ekagha navṛtti*) and therefore, he is as if without joy. We have seen that *vivāṣatā* or helplessness is a sort of *vighna* or obstacle.



When, however, his belly is full, his incompleteness in the form of his emptiness is destroyed. And so, in that condition of satisfaction, he has joy which lies in the cognition of oneself. But this joy is incomplete, because hunger exists in potential form—*samskārarūpatayā*—and therefore, he has still to desire the objects of the satisfaction of his appetite. Abhinava says that all the worldly joy is of this nature. When one gets something desired, one is afraid of its future loss and so one always remains disturbed and therefore incomplete. But even in this mundane existence, whatever little joy is there, is the result of experiencing one's own-self i.e. having a momentary touch or contact with Siva. Abhinava supports his view by a quotation from Śrī Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa who says that whatever joy is seen in this universe is a drop of the Ocean of joy which is Divinity itself.

Abhinava, by fine analysis isolates the aesthetic element of joy even in matters of food and drink. He says that while drinking sweet juice, there is a cognitive element viz. 'idam-ittham'—'It is like this'—, which is distinct from gluttonous elements. And in this way, one reposes in oneself as a knower and while doing so, one thinks principally of the knower element i.e. *pramātrbhaga*. Thus, a person distinguishing in thought the knower-element of consciousness is called *bhūñjana* i.e. one who enjoys in proper sense. What Abhinava emphasises is the aesthetic element in the experience of such gross things as eating and drinking. This aesthetic element, according to his philosophy, is the repose in oneself as cogniser. We may put this in a simpler way and say that the thought viz. 'I enjoy' is the source of aesthetic joy.

Having thus made distinct the aesthetic element even in gross matters, he shows the aesthetic elements in poetry and drama (P. 178-9 *ibid*). Rasas like *śṛṅgāra* which are subject-matters of drama and poetry are, he says, distinct from sensual joys. Here, by the removal of obstacles like, earning and abandoning—*hanopādāna*—one tastes happiness by

completely overcoming the sense of otherness (*anyathābhāvam*) i.e. when one enjoys the sentiments depicted in poetry and drama, one does not think of anything else. This is in a way a precondition of aesthetic enjoyment. This experience because it is free from all obstacles—*nirvighnatvāt*—is *rasanā* (or tasting), *carvanā* (sampling), *nirvṛti* (bliss), *pratīti* (apprehension), and *pramāṭṛtvavis'rānti* or repose in the state of being a knower. In this experience, there is another part of enlightenment or knowledge which reposes in the objects of knowledge. But one has to be oblivious of this part and concentrate on the knower-element in order to enjoy *rasa*. Such a capacity makes one a *sahṛdaya*. For further discussion he here refers to his *Abh.*

This makes it clear that the element of joy in experiences of gross things and of art has the same source. When this element becomes supreme, and when the mind is freed from all other desires of objects, it is said to be enjoying the supreme divine bliss. This divine experience is—"I am *S'iva*".

Abhinava, at the end of this discussion shows the difference between the enjoyment of gross elements and aesthetic elements as follows *madhurādi rasāsvāde tu viśayaspars'-avyavadhānam* (p. 179) i.e. in the enjoyment of sweet drinks there is the obstruction in form of the contact with an outside object, i.e. here one can get joy only through an external object. This is its limitation. In the enjoyment of poetry and drama, one's experience is freed from such obstacles. But the potentiality of such obstacles remains latent and capable of getting into consciousness—*tato'pi kāvyānātyādau tadvyavadhānas'ūnyatā tadvyavadhānasamskāranuvedhastu.*—But in poetry and drama, those who are careful of obviating the part of obstacles in experience can have the highest bliss, i.e. those who are real *sahṛdayas* can get the highest bliss—*tatrāpi tu tathoditavyavadhānāms'atiraskriyāśvavadhāna-hṛdayaḥ labhanta eva paramānandam.* Thus Abhinava, like a true

aesthete, sees the possibility of the experience of highest joy in poetry and art

In this philosophy, highest joy (paramānanda), nirvṛti (bliss), and camatkāra are of the nature of parāmars'a i.e. thought or consciousness. But this parāmars'a has to be completely free and independent of anything other than itself, and it must have one compact cognitive chewing. This parāmars'a becomes paramānanda on account of its solid state of cognitive chewing anupacaritasya samvedanarūpatā nantariyatvena avasthitasya svatantrasya rasanaikaghanatayā parāmars'ah paramānanda nirvṛtiḥ camatkāra ucyate

The above discussion taken from the I P V.V. gives a sort of philosophical background to the aesthetics of Abhinavagupta (26). It is something which is not divorced from our empirical experience of joy. Both the aesthetic joy and the spiritual joy are cognate of this joy, or, we may put it as some writers of this school do, that whatever little joy we have in our mundane experience is cognate of this Divine joy. The degrees in these experiences of joy are caused by the degrees of the soul's dependence on something other than itself. When the soul is completely independent and does not rely upon or repose in anything else, it is the highest joy.

In the view of this philosophy, everything is S'iva. The limited individual human soul is S'iva itself. As long as the individual human soul (anu) does not recognise itself (pratyabhijñā) as Siva it is limited and consequently unhappy. So, one may say, that the moments of such recognition in the life of a soul are the moments of joy. Poetry and drama and art, everything that is beautiful and sublime in nature and anything which makes one sensitive of the inner vibration (spanda) or the inner throbbing sphurattā afford a peep into this world of Bliss and Joy.

### Foot-notes

(1) See as an example the *Tattabodhavidhāyini* of Abhayadevasūri on the *Sanmatitarka* of Siddhasenadivākara-Ed Pundit Sukhlalji and Pundit Bechardas, Gujarat Vidya-peeth, Ahmedabad

(2) We are here particularly concerned with the *A bh.* on *Nā Sā* (VI, VII) The portion of the comm dealing with the *rasasutra* was very corrupt and therefore obscure in the first edition (G O S) Luckily this portion has been almost quoted verbatim in the *viveka* on *Kā Śā* of Hemacandra With the help of this *viveka* as critically edited by Prof R C Parikh, Gnoli has tried to give a satisfactory text of this portion of *A bh* The second edition of the G O S has much improved upon the text of the first edition There are, however, many obscure places in all these texts including *Viveka* We here also draw upon the second edition of the *Kā Sā* (Prof Parikh) for *Viveka*

In this chapter, I have tried to translate the technical terms and the relevant portions from the *A bh*, with the help of Gnoli's invaluable work

(3) He says we have stated above that Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa was both a literary man and a philosopher He knew Saiva philosophy It is therefore, reasonable to support that the word 'anusandhāna', which he uses here, has the only meaning that was recognised in the contemporary philosophical circle That the word 'anusandhāna' was synonymous with "yojana" and not "abhimāna" as 'āropa' is evident from the following verses of Utpalācārya in the *Īsvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā* and Abhinava's commentary on it

kadācūkāvabhāse yāp ūrvābhāsadīyojanā |  
saṃskarat kalpanā proktā sa'pi bhinnāvabhāsinī ||

I P V Vol 1-256

-kādācītkah kadacīdbbhavah ajñātaśakalakārah avabhāse  
yasya dehādch svalaksanarūpasya, tatra yā pūrvābhāsenā bala-  
disarīrābhāsenā yojanā yoham bālah sa evādyā yuvā ityanu-  
sandhanam

(4) 'Bhatta Lollata flourished in Kashmir in the IXth or Xth century. He wrote a commentary, now lost, on the Nāṭya-sāstra of Bharata. Ksemaraja (spandanirṇaya, p. 34) and A G (Abhinavagupta) (M V V, V 778) quote a Bhatta Lollata who wrote commentary (vṛtti) to the Spandakārikā of Vasugupta. In my opinion, it seems probable that these two Bhatta Lollatas are one and the same person, Bhatta Lollata, would, in this case, have lived in the reign of Avantivarman (856-83 A D, Vasugupta lived under Avantivarman) or in the reign of his successor, Saṅkaravarman. This change also involves a change in the dates of Saṅkuka (CS Infra p 32, n 4), who could then be identified no longer with the poet Saṅkuka, who was a contemporary of Ajitapida (early IXth century)'—R Gnoli p 30

See also K C Pandey—Comparative Aesthetics Vol I  
Indian Aesthetics (Ed 1959), p 38-39-40 says

—“we have discussed the date of Bhatta Lollata in an earlier work (Abb. 126-9). He was a contemporary of Bhatta Kallata, the author or publisher of the Spanda Kārikā. He commented not only on Bharata's Nāṭya Sāstra but also on the Spanda Kārikā. He therefore, inherited both the drama turgic and the philosophical traditions from his predecessors. In interpreting him we have to keep this fact in mind and also “Thus, we find that Bhatta Lollata was not concerned with the Spectator's point of view of rasa. In his commentary, as we learn it from Abhinava's presentation of his view, there was no reference to the spectator. The word ‘pratyamāṇah’, implying the spectator, has been introduced by Mammata, with very slight amendment of the text of Abhinava, which we have already given above. Mammata's amendment runs as follows :

"mukhyaya vṛtya rāmadāvanukārye,  
tadrūpatānusandhānāt  
nartakepi pratiyamāno rasah" K P IV

For Lollata's view, see also Locana

"tathāhi pūrvāvasthāyām ya sthāyi sa eva vyabhicārisampā-  
tadinā prāptapatiposo'nukāryagata eva rasah nātye tu prayujya-  
mānatvāt nātya rasa iti kecit' (Locana on II 4 Dhv)

See also Mammata's presentation of Lollata's view

"vibhavaīrtalanodyanādibhirālambanoddīpanakāranaih rat  
yadiko bhāvo janitah anubhāvaih katāksabhujaksepaprabhrti-  
bhūh kāryaih pratītyogyah kṛtah, vyabhicāribhūrnirvedadibhūh  
sahakaribhūrupacito mukhyaya vṛtya rāmadāvanukārye,  
tadrūpatānusandhānānnartake pi pratiyamāno rasa iti bhāta-  
lollataprabhrtayah (K P IV)

(5) This portion of the A bh is rather laconic. But fortunately this has been given a more amplified form in the Viveka of Hemacandra. I have followed it here.

(6) This portion consisting of the above quotation and what follows in the A bh on the next page (p 273 G O S Ed '56) is given in a more logical form in the viveka of Hemacandra. The same trend of argument is found in the K P, of Mammata in a concise form.

(7) See Ch VIII of the thesis.

(8) Compare with Aristotle's mimesis.

(9) How does the spectator who witnesses the sentiments of the actor feel those sentiments himself? The Viveka gives the following explanation vastusaundaryabalaḥ kasayaphala carvanāparapurusaḥ sa nāprabhava mukhāprasekakalana kalpayā . etc (p 91-92, Ed 64 Prof R C Parikh)

The first explanation is that it is beauty of what is presented—vastusaundaryabalaḥ that evokes rasa in the spectator. The second is an analogy. When one perceives some

other person chewing a fruit with astringent flavour, saliva is produced in one's mouth. This physiological action has its counterpart in the nature of emotion also. Eventhough one may have no cause of laughter or sorrow if one sees someone laughing or weeping, one automatically feels like laughing or weeping. These two viz 'vastusaundaryabala' and *kaśāya-phalacarvanā* are not found in the text of Abh. Whether they are later additions or they formed part of the original text of Sankuka, we cannot say.

(10) Abhinaya is the art which uses natural modes of speech, movements of body, etc for the effective communication of ideas, feelings, emotions, sentiments, etc. In fact its success lies in endowing these with the semblance of reality which the mere speech or movement of the body fail to do. So here, what cannot be communicated by mere words is communicated or evoked by uttering words in an artistic appropriate way.

(11) See above.

(12) "Sankuka flourished in Kashmir after Bhatta Lollata. It is doubtful whether he should be identified with the poet Sankuka, author of a poem called *Bhavanābhyudaya*, who, accordingly to Kalhana (R.T. IV, 705) lived under the reign of Ajitapāda (about 830 A.D.) In this case, his predecessor, Bhatta Lollata can no longer be identified with the commentator, of the same name, on the *Spandakārikā*, and so his period should be put back to the end of the 8th century and the beginning of the 9th. Sankuka wrote a commentary to Bharata, now lost, which is frequently quoted by A.G. On Śankuka see De, S.P., I p 38, Pandey, A.G. p 128 -Gnoli, p 32.

K. C. Pandey-Abhinavagupta p 128 Ed 1935-says "From frequent references to and criticism of S'rī Sankuka's interpretation of the Bharata Sutra by Abhinava in his commentary (pp. 67,75,104) as also from the fact that he points out

differences between his original of the Bharata Sūtra and that of Śrī Saṅkuka, (A bh 216 217) it is apparent that the latter also commented upon Bhārata Sūtra That he belonged to Kashmir and was a contemporary of King Ajitapīḍa (850), we have already stated in the foregoing pages

It may be noted that this theory of imitation reminds one of the "mimesis" i.e. 'imitation' of Aristotle.

As for Saṅkuka's views as noted in the Locana, read following "anye tu-anukartari yah sthāyavabhāśobhāmayādisāmagryādikṛto bhūtviva haritālgdinaśvāvabhāśah, sa eva lokatītatayāsvādaparasaṃjñayā pratītyā rasyamāno rasa itī nātyādrasā nātyarasaḥ" (Locana on Dhv II 4)

See also Mammaṭa (K P IV)

kāvyaṅgusamdhānabalācchikṣābhyāsanīrvartitasvakāryapra-  
kātanaena ca nātenaiva prakāśitaiḥ kārānakāryasahakāribhīḥ  
kṛtrimaīrapī tathā nabhimanyamānairvibhāvādisabdavyapades-  
yath 'samyogāt' gamyagamakabhāvarūpāt, anumīyamānōpi  
vastusaundaryabalādrasānīyatvenānyānumīyamānavilaksanah  
sthāyīvena sambhāvyamāno ratyādirbhāve rasa itī śrī  
śaṅkukah

Gnoli remarks (pp 39)—Śaṅkuka's mistake consists in asserting that aesthetic experience is an experience of a discursive kind (savikalpa, it is an imitation), and at the same time saying that it differs from every other kind of discursive cognition The doctrine which he professes is thus vitiated by an intrinsic contradiction The whole of Bhaṭṭa Tota's confutation, reproduced by Abhinava, reduces in the last analysis to a close and often scholastic examination of this contradiction

{13} Hemacandra explains - ayaṃ bhāvaḥ prasiddhāt  
ratīlaksanāt kārānād ratyanukaranam nāma kārāntaram  
tatprabhavasced anubhāvah syuh tathāiva ca viśeṣavidā yadī  
jñāyeran tadā ratyanukaranalaksanasya vastvantarasyaṅmānam  
samānjasaṃ syāt na caivam, tat katham iva ratyanukarana-



pratītiḥ avīśesavīdā ca tathāvidhānubhāvadarśane ratirevānumi-  
yate tac ca mithyājñānam eveti

As for Bhatta Tauta or Tota see

"The expression 'my masters' observes H C (Hemacandra) alludes to Bhatta Tota (or Tauta), who was the direct master of A G and, therefore, lived in Kashmir during the second half of the 10th Century Bhatta Tota wrote a work of poetry, the Kāvya-kautuka, on which A G wrote a commentary (vivarana) which has not yet been found The confutation of saṅkuka, given in the following pages, goes back therefore, to Bhatta Tota"-(Gnoli p 38)

(14) See also Locana on Dhv II 4

kavyepi ca tasmāt sthītametat abhivyajyante rasāḥ  
pratītyaiva ca rasyanta iti

See also Mammata (K P IV)

na tatasthyena nātmagatatvena rasah pratīyate, notpadyate  
nābhivyajyate api tu kāvyē natyē cābhīdhātō dvītyena  
vibhāvādisādhāranīkaranātmanā bhāvakatvavyāpāreṇa bhāvya-  
mānah sthāyī, sattvodrekaprakāśānandamayasaṁvidvisrāntīsa-  
tattvena bhogena bhujyate

The expression sattvodreka is reproduced almost verbatim by Mammata It has been commented upon in several ways Vidyācakra-vartī (K P Trivendrum Sanskrit Series) explains as below sattvodrekād yau prakāśānandau tanmayyāṁ sām-  
vidī samādhivṛttirūpāyāṁ yā yogināṁ visrāntir vigahitasaklas-  
raṁ nistarāṅgenāvasthītiḥ tatsadṛśena

Māṇikyacandra (p 74) comments on sattvodrekena  
prakāśah prakato yā ānandas tanmayī yā sāmvit tasyāṁ  
visrāntī, sā satattvaṁ paramārtho yasya sa tathā

Abhinava says in the Locana (p 183)

rajastamovaicitryānuviddhasattvamayanijacītsvabhāvanirv-  
tīvisrāntīlākṣaṇaḥ Viśvanātha says :

sattvodrekād akhandasvaparakāśānandaśīmanmayah |  
vedyāntarasparśasūnyo brahmāsvādasahodarah ||  
lokottaracamatkārasprāṇah kascit pramāṭṛbhīh |  
svākaravad abhinnatveneyam āsvādyate rasah ||

"Rasa is tasted by the qualified persons (i.e. qui rationem artis intelligunt) It is tasted by virtue of the emergence of sattva. It is made up of a full Intelligence, Beatitude and self-luminosity. It is void of contact with any other knowable thing, twin brother to the tasting of brahman. It is animated by a *camatkāra* of a non-ordinary nature. It is tasted as if it were our very being, in indivisibility" (Trans. Gnoli pp 55)-Gnoli further adds" cf. the translation of A. K. Coomaraswamy *The Transformation of Nature in Art*, Harvard, 1934, pp 48. Coomaraswamy translated *camatkāra* with 'lighting-flash'. According to Visvanātha, *sattva* is nothing but the mind or inner sense (*manah*) devoid of any contact with *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ* (pp 55).

Gnoli writes (p 50)-Bhatta Nāyaka flourished in Kashmir after Ānandavardhana (who was a contemporary of King Avantivarman, 856-883 A.D.), the author of the *Dhvanyāloka*. Bhatta Nāyaka is, therefore, to be placed round about 900 A.D. It is not, probably, mistaken to identify him with brahmana Nāyaka, who lived during the reign of Śaṅkaravarman (883-902 A.D.), and who is mentioned by Kāhāna (R.T.V. 159). In the I.P.V.V., III, p 96, A.G. quotes a stanza of Śaiva inspiration, which he attributes to Bhatta Nāyaka, to which he gives the title of *mīmāṃsākāgrāhī* (the same title is given by A.G., elsewhere, to Kumārila, *mīmāṃsākāpravaṇa*). Another stanza of Bhatta Nāyaka (taken from a *stotra*) is quoted by Kṣemarāja (*Spandanirṇaya* p 18). I am inclined to think that these two Bhatta Nāyakas were one and the same person. The poetic work of Bhatta Nāyaka is the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa*, which has not yet come to light. The opening stanza of this work, which contains an invocation to Śiva, has been preserved in the *Abh.*, I p 5. The stanzas from Bhatta Nāyaka, which recur a few lines later, are taken, without any doubt, from this work. The fragments of the poetic work of Bhatta Nāyaka have been collected by T. P. Chintamani, J.O.R.M., Vol I, pp 267-276.

On the poetic doctrine of Bhatta Nāyaka and the confutation of dhvani, of T. R. Chintamani, J.B.U., Vol 17, part 2, pp. 267-276 Bhatta Nāyaka's theory is also stated with few variations in the Dhv. Ā. L. pp. 180 ff. On Bhatta Nāyaka in general, see Kane, S D.V. pp. 212-215, Pandey, A. G., pp 128-130.

On Bhatta Nāyaka, Pandey writes (Indian Aesthetics Ed. '59 p 72)—Intellectual Background of Bhatta Nāyaka—

Bhatta Nāyaka was an immediate predecessor, or an older contemporary, of Abhinava : for, he was king Śāṅkuka Varman's contemporary (883-902 A D). He therefore, lived in the same literary atmosphere as that in which Abhinava lived. By his time the two important factors in the evolution of the form, which the aesthetic theory assumed in the hands of Abhinava, had come into being (1) Ānanda Vardhana had propounded the theory of Dhvani, the power of language to convey the spiritual meaning (Dhvanī) and (2) Śaiva metaphysics also had been well systematised by Utpalā in his detailed commentary, the vivṛti, on his own Īsvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā. But Bhatta Nāyaka did not come under the influence of either. He was an avowed opponent of the spiritual meaning theory and wrote a work, the Hṛdayadarpaṇa, with the expressed object of demolishing it. And he seems to have simply ignored the Saiva philosophy. He followed the vedānta school and based his theory upon the same school of philosophy.

...He had vedantic tendencies. For, in the course of his commentary on the very first verse of Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra, he refers to the vedantic conception of the phenomenal world. He points out its similarity with the dramatic presentation. According to him, the activities of Rāma, Rāvaṇa, etc. (in stage presentation) shine wonderfully, though they are actually non-existent. They are mere creations of imagination and therefore are without any fixed form and are capable of millions of imaginative additions. They are different from

objects of dream, illusion, etc., and therefore, are capable of fully captivating the heart. They are products of actors, who in the course of production do not abandon their essential nature, exactly as Brahman does not give up his essential nature when he creates the phenomenal world. But in spite of all this they are capable of giving rise to aesthetic experience and thus serve a human purpose. Just so this phenomenal world, which is nothing but mere name and form, which really do not exist, serves the highest human purpose, through reflection and contemplation.

He also makes use of the vedantic conception of Ānanda, as predominance of pure Sattva, free from all admixture of Rajas and Tamas. He represents the aesthetic experience to be kin to the mystic realisation of Brahman. He however, does not thoroughly stick to vedantic technique in his exposition of the aesthetic theory. We shall briefly give an account of vedantic and allied conceptions, utilised by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in proper context.

The passage from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, suggesting his vedantic leaning may be quoted as below (A bh Vol I p 5)

bhaṭṭanāyakaḥ brahmanā paramātmā yadudabṛīṇa  
vidyāviracitanīssārābhedaagrahe yadudaharanīkṛtā yannātyam  
tad vaksyāmi, yathābhi kalpana mātrasāram tata evānavasthī  
taikarupam kṣānena kalpanāsaharasarasabam svapnādivilaks  
anamapī susthutarām brdayargrahanīdānamatyaktasvalambana  
brahmakalpanātoparacitām rāmarāvanadicesuam kuto'pyabhū  
tadbhūtaṇṇīyā bhāṭi, tathā bhāṣamanamapī ca pumarthopaya  
tāmeti tatbā tadṛgeva viśvamīdamasatyanāmarupaprapancāt  
makamata ca stavanāmananādivasena paramapumaratha  
prāpakamitī

(15) *Viveka* (p 96, Ed '64, Prof Parikh) has the following additional proposition 'paragatatvena tu pratītau tāstasthya meva bhavet'.—If the apprehension of rasa is taken with reference to someone other than himself, one would be indifferent to it. This proposition might have formed part

## CHAPTER XVI

### SOME OTHER WRITERS ON RASA

(1) Dhanañjaya and Dhanika (C. 10th A D )

(11) Bhoja (11th A D ) and others

#### Dhanañjaya and Dhanika

Dhanañjaya and Dhanika the authors of DR with its Avaloka occupy an important place in the history of Sanskrit poetics and dramaturgy, Chronologically they come after Ānanda and are almost contemporaries of Abhinava. As against the Kashmirian writers on poetics Dhanañjaya and Dhanika along with Bhoja, the successor of Muñja represent the Malva school of writers. We must therefore consider in what aspects these authors differ from Ānanda and Abhinava. As to the views of the latter they may or may not have been known to these writers.

Dhanañjaya defines rasa as follows

vibhavaīraṇubhāvasca sattvikairvyabhīcaribhiḥ |

āṇīyamāṇaī svādyatvam sthāyībhavo rasah smṛtaḥ ||

(DR IV 1)

This definition is in a way explanatory of the famous sutra of the Nā Sā which is taken as authority for all the discussions on the subject. We saw while discussing the views of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Śrī Saṅkuka and others that the absence of mention of sthāyībhava in the rasa sutra is one of the main topics of discussion. We also saw that in the opinions of Śrī Saṅkuka and Abhinava, the mention of sthāyībhava is not only unnecessary but would have also ruined the definition because in their view sthāyībhāvas as such never becomes the objects of rasa.

Dhanañjaya however is definite in his view that it is the sthāyībhava which becomes the object of rasa. This is an important difference.

A minor difference is to be found in the addition of *sāttvikabhāvas* as one of the agents bringing about *rasa*. This is in fact an addition in the *rasa-sūtra* itself. Though the *sāttvika* can be taken as implied in *anubhāvas*, its separate mention is justified by *Dhananjaya* and *Dhanika* in the following way. Even though the *sāttvika bhāvas* are also *anubhāvas*, yet they are different from them as they originate from *sattva* i.e. mind alone. Says *Dhananjaya* (DR IV 4 b 5a.)—

prthagbhāvā bhavantyanye 'nubhāvātve' pi sāttvikāḥ |—4b  
sattvadeva samutpattestacca tadbhāvabhāvanam ||—5a

*Dhanika* says

paragatadubhaharjādibhāvanāyāmatyantānukulāntahkar—  
anātvaṃ sattvaṃ yadaha  
sattvaṃ nama manah prabhavaṃ tacca  
samāhitamanastvādutpadyate

Another important point of difference lies in the *modus operandi* of *rasa* experience. We have already seen that *Dhananjaya* and *Dhanika* do not accept the *vyāgya-vyājakabhāva* but are satisfied with *bhavya-bhāvaka* relation. This, we have already noted, is the view propounded by *Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka* also, who mentions *bhāvakatva* and *bhōjakatva vyāparas* (Na Sā Vol III GOS Edn P 276-7)

Yet another important topic to be found in *Dhananjaya* is that of the four *cittabhūmis* or four states of mind from which arise the different *rasas*. These are as follows

svādah kavyarthasambhedatmānandasamudbhavaḥ |  
vikāsavistaraksobhaviksepaḥ sa caturvidhaḥ || DR IV 43

*Dhanika* explains it elaborately as below. He says that the *sthāyibhāva* correlated with *vibhāvādīs* is *kāvyaṛtha*. On the strength of this the heart of *sāmājika* is harmonised with that of *Rāma*, and the like. The ego centered limited cognition of I is obliterated. The joy caused due to this is the *kāvyananda*. This joy is basically the same with reference to all the *rasas* but different *rasas* come into force by different

vibhavadis On account of this difference In vibhavadis, the mental states—cittabhumis—are also divided into vikāsa, vistara, kṣobha and vikṣepa Rasas are also classified on the basis of these cittabhumis Says he

kavyārthena vibhāvādisamsṛtasthagyaātmakena bhāvakacetasaḥ sambhede' nyonyasamvalane pratyastamitasvaparavibhāge satī prabālatarasvānandodbhūtiḥ svādah tasya ca sāmānyātmanaika tvēpi pratīnyatavibhāvādikaranajanjena sambhedabhedena caturdha cittabhumayo bhavanti — (Avaloka on D R IV 44)

Vikāsa is with reference to srāgāra and hāsyā, vistara with vīra and adbhuta, kṣobha with bībhatsa and bhayānaka and vikṣepa with raudra and karuṇa Says Dhanañjaya,

srāgaravīrabībhatsaraudresu manasaḥ kramāt |

hāsyadbhutaḥbhayotkarsakarunaṇaṁ ta eva hi ||

(DR IV 44)

We have already seen that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka mentions three cittabhumis If Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka can be accepted as a predecessor of Dhanañjaya, we may say that he follows Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in this respect

There is another important point in which Dhanañjaya differs, viz the number of rasas In the Nā Sa itself we find, 'astau nātye ṛasaḥ smṛtaḥ—(Nā Sā VI 15) Later on we find santarasa also as the ninth rasa This portion dealing with the topic of śantarasa is, in view of modern critics, an interpolation though we find that Abhinava, Mammata, Hema-candra etc all accept nine rasas Dhanañjaya and Dhanika however, forcibly controvert this latter view Their arguments as to why śantarasa cannot be a nātyarasa are interesting, They are as below

Dhanañjaya enumerates sthāyibhāvas in DR IV 35, as, 'ratyūtsahajupsāḥ krodho hasaḥ smayo bhayaṁ sokah | samamapi ketiprāṇaḥ puṣṭirnāstyeṣu naitasya ||

Dhanika adds that as sama is of the form of cessation of all activity it cannot be represented on the stage Thus śanta

has no place in a dramatic representation. In Nāgānanda love for Malayavati is described throughout and the attainment of the state of vidyādhara is narrated in the end. If śama is the sthāyibhāva in Nāgānanda it will not be in harmony with the above. The same anukārya cannot be the substance of two opposite types of things viz. anurāga and virāga. Thus in Nāgānanda śama is not the sthāyin but uśāha is the sthāyin that goes with dayāvira Dayāvira is not opposed to śrīgāra which is subservient to it or phala in form of sovereignty (cakravarittva) Thus there only eight rasas in nāṭya. Says Dhanika .. sarvathā nāṭakādāvabhīnayaścātmehi sthāyitvamasmābhīśāmasya nīśidhyate...etc ..atōstāveva sthāyinaḥ . Avaloka on DR IV.35.)

Dhananjaya further adds that nirveda has its nature not identical with that of the sthāyin So how can it be relished ? Its enhancement will only make for lack of relish So there are only eight sthāyins in drama Says he,

nirvedādiratādrūpyādashāyī svadate katham |  
vairasyāyaiva tatposah tenāstau sthāyino matāḥ|| (DR IV 36)

As to the nature of rasa experience and as to the seat of rasa in the connoisseur they do agree with Ānanda and Abhinava The concomittant of rasa experience is joy In fact Dhanika says

vaksyamānasuabhāvairvibhāvanubhāvavyabhicārisattvikaiḥ  
kāvyopattairabhinayopadar sitairvā srotipreksakānāmantarvipari-  
vartamāno ratyādirvaksyamānalakṣanah sthāyī svādagocaratām  
nirbharānandasamvidātmatāmānīyamāno rasaḥ

(DR. Avaloka IV. 1.)

As rasa is connected with cognition and joy, it rests only in the rasika or the connoisseur. Says Dhanika .

tena rasikah sāmājīkah kāvyam tu tatbhavidānandasamvi-  
dunmilanahetubhāvena rasavadāyurghṛtamityādivyapadeśavat.

(Avaloka on DR. I. i.)



## Bhoja

Bhoja succeeded Muñja whose court pundits were Dhanañjaya and Dhanika. S.K. Ā and Sr Pra are the two works on poetics attributed to Bhoja. S.K. Ā is published. Sr Pra, is published in parts only. But we get a critical evaluation of the contents of this work in the learned thesis of Dr V. Raghavan.

## The Rasa-Theory of Bhoja

Bhoja has dealt with the topics of rasa in his two voluminous works the S.K. Ā and the Sr Pra. The former has been published several times and the publication of the latter is undertaken by H.O.S. though it is not yet out. Dr V. Raghavan has, however, published an exhaustive treatise on Sr Pra. He has also given at the end of chapters full quotations of the relevant portions of the text. Here, I draw upon NS Ed. of the S.K. Ā and for Sr Pra I rely upon the passages quoted by Dr V. Raghavan.

Bhoja's theory of rasa appears in some aspect to be peculiar to himself, or we may say to the literary men of his court. I will here mainly discuss his views as far as they bear upon the interpretation of the rasa-sutra of the Na S'ā.

Dr Raghavan has exhaustively and very ably analysed the different shreds of the complicated fabric of discussion on rasa.

Bhoja seems to have recognised three stages or kotis of rasa viz. the parā, madhyamā and the uttarā koti. He seems to have derived a plea for this arrangement from Dandin. For Bhoja, as for Dandin, rasa is also an alamkāra in the wide sense of kāvyasobhākara dharma. Bhoja includes rasas under alamkāras and cites Dandin who says

preyaḥ priyatarākhyāṇaṁ rasavadrasapesalam |  
urjasvi rūdhāhamkāraṁ yuktoṭkarsam ca tat trayam ||

'Yuktoikarṣam' is taken by Bhoja in an unusual sense and he bases his three kotis of rasa on this. Says he  
 tatra 'ūrjasvi rudbhāhampkaram' ityanena atmavis'ṣanisthasya  
 utkrstādṛṣṭajanmanah anekajanmanubhavasampskārasādītadra-  
 ḍhimnah samagrātmasampadudayātis'ayahetoh alam (sbam)-  
 kāravisesasya upasamgrahādahampkār (da) bhīmānasrṅgīrā  
 dyaparanāmao rasasya mānasmayavikīrārūpena abhimanināp  
 manasi jagratah pūrvām kotim upavarṇayati 'rasavad  
 rasapes'alam' ityanena vibhāvanubhāvavyabhicārisamyoḡadrasa  
 nispatirīti ratyādīrūpena anekadhāvirbhāvatah abhivardhamā-  
 nasya paraprakarsagāmīnah sṅgārasya madhyamāvasthāmava-  
 sthāpayati 'preyah priyatarākhyānam ityanena samastabhāva-  
 mūrdhabhīṣiktāyā rāteḥ paraprakarsādhigamāt bhāvanāpathatik-  
 rame bhāvarūpatīmullāṅghya premarūpena parinatāyā up-  
 dānt bhāvantarānāmapi paraprakarsādhigame rasarūpena  
 parinatirīti jāpāyan ahaṃkārasya uttarām kotim upalaksayati  
 (Śr Pra Vol II. p 365-70 Ch XI)

For Bhoja, the rasas and the rasa theory dealt with by other ālambikārikas fall under the madhyamāvasthā. It should be noted, however, that for him rasas in the madhyamāvasthā are really bhāvas only but are secondarily called rasas. As noted earlier, he has derived his clue from Dandin's dictum as quoted above viz preyah priyatarākhyānam etc. For him, the process which would result in rasa is the process of development and intensification of sentiments and emotions. So, for Bhoja, rasa is the utkarṣa or prakarṣa of emotion. This is similar to the upacaya theory of Lollata. For the explanation of rasa-sūtra given by Bhoja, we have to rely on the passage in the Śr Pra (See Dr Raghavan's Śr Pra. p 516) (Śr Pra p 381-388). He explains the rasa sūtra with reference to what he calls the madhyamāvasthā, in the following way

Bhoja first explains the term 'vibhāva' in its two aspects viz ālambana and uddīpana. He says katham pūnāḥ vibhāvā  
 R S 27

nubhāvavyabhicārisamyogāt rasanīspatuh ? ucyate-yathā indu-sannidheh gāṇḍakāḥ syandate, yathārkasannidheh suryakānto jvalati, yathā karpurasannidheh sphatiko viliyate, tathā tebhya-stebhvaḥ ālambanavibhāvebhyah tadākaraparīnatendriyabuddh-yupādhiyogīno bhīmānimanasaḥ te te ratikrodhas'okādayo bhavaḥ samutpadyante - "There is abhīmāna in the mind, when objects confront it, the abhīmāna takes the shapes of objects and according as the objects are pleasant or otherwise, the bhavas, rati, krodha, soka, etc are born. The process is respectively similar to the candrakānta stone flowing out in the presence of the moon (rati), the sūryakānta blazing forth on the sight of the Sun (krodha), and the sphatika melting in the proximity of karpura (s'oka)-This explains ālambana-vibhāva' (Trans Raghavan p 487)

Then, he explains the uddīpana vibhāva as follows atha indudaye yathā samudraḥ ksubhyati, yathā apathyasevayā vyadhurabhivardhate, yathānāryasannidheh sādhuradhikam duḥkhaḥ karoti, tathā tebhya-stebhvyah uddīpanavibhāvebhyah tattadanubhavasamākārayogīnaḥ manasā tattadbhāva (a) bhivṛddhaye te te vikāra upajāyante

"Just as the sea becomes boisterous at moon-rise, just as disease increases by bad diet, just as a rogue creates more mischief when he gets to his aid one more of his own class, so also uddīpana-vibhāvas create trouble first (ksobha), then increase the suffering more and more. The uddīpanas are thus kṣobhakas, abhivardhakas and pratikulas, agitating, inflaming and adverse. This explains uddīpana-vibhāva - (Raghavan p 487-8)

From these sthāyībhāvas thus created and kindled respectively from rasa by ālambana and uddīpana vibhāvas, arise anubhāvas and vyabhicāriṇs. They are essentially of the form of bhāvas, though differing in name and form. They are abhyantara or internal and bāhya or external.

How are these vibhāvādīs correlated and act upon the sthāyīṇs to produce rasa ? Bhoja explains this in the words.

atha yathā iksubhyo rasah, sarsapebhyastailam, dhātubhyo hīranyām, asmabhyo loham, dadhno navanītam, kāsthato' gñih, tebhyastebhyah yantrāgnimanthasamyogebhyah nispatanti, tathā evebhyah vibhavanubhāvavyabhicārisamyogebhyah ratikrodhasokāḍibhyah, te te rasāḥ nispadyante

i.e. As juice is created from sugarcane, oil is pressed out of sarsapa, gold from metal, iron from stone butter from curds, fire from faggots, by the instrumentality of machines, fire or churning, similarly, from rati, krodha, etc., with the help of particular vibhavadis, are produced particular rasas. So, rasas are intensified sthayins through the contact of the sthayins with vibhavadis. This upacaya takes place in the following way

yathā lavana (rasa) āmlādayah svasamyogināḥ mrdvikā dīnāpi ātmarupatām nayantah upacīyante, tathā ratyadīni vibhavadīnapyātmarupatām nayanti upacayante

(S r Pra Vol II p 385)

These three viz. vibhava, anubhāvā and vyabhicārinś differ in nature but they become identical and get merged in the one flood of rasa-rasatā, rasenaiva sāmānyam bhavati ibid p 385

So, it seems, Bhoja also, like Dandin and Lollata, adopts the causal view. But here an important point is to be borne in mind. The causal theory adopted by Bhoja is sāmkhya theory of satkāryavāda, according to which, effects pre-exist in an unmanifest form in the cause. The activity is concerned only with making manifest what was unmanifest. Similarly, according to this theory, rasas pre-exist in vibhavadis and their combination with sthayins bring them out, makes them manifest. Bhoja's prakarsa is similar to Lollata's upacaya.

Many such rasas combine to produce rasa-samkara, even as many tastes go to make up drinks. Says Bhoja atha yathā oṣādhirasebhyah madhunīṣpattih, yathā madhurāḍibhyah sadavot-pattih, gudāḍibhyah āsavotpattih, tathā tabhyah tebhyah rasa-sāmānyebhyah rasavisesābhiniṣṛtīḥ

Then he talks of the jātibhedas of rasas such as bhava, rasa, tadābhāsa etc., and also of the stages or avasthas such as utpāda i.e. birth, abhivṛddhi i.e. nourishment and sthairyā i.e. firmness. Says he :

atha yathā ekasyāpyagneh bhaumadivyaudaryādayo jātibhedāḥ dāhālokapākādayo arthakriyāḥ sandriyante, tathākas-yapī rasasya bhāvarasatadābhāsādayo jātibhedāḥ utkanthābhisānganirvṛtyādayaḥ arthakriyāḥ utpādābhivṛddhisthairyādayo avasthāḥ, samupalabhyante ।

Another novel feature of this theory is that Bhoja tries to obliterate the distinction between sthāyibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicārins. For Bhoja, all the 49 bhavas can become rasa on attaining prakarsa by vibhāvādīs :— ratyādīnāmekonapañcāśato'pī vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisamyogāt paraprakarsādhi-game rasavyapadeśārhatā । (Śr. Pra. Vol. II. p 381)

These are called rasas only secondarily i.e. through upacāra. They are of three forms, prakṛsta, bhāvarūpa and ābhāsa : sa śrīgārah, so 'bhīmānah sa rasah, tathā etc. ratyādayo jāyante ..... tadupādhiścāyamupajāyamāno rasah tridhā vikhyāyate prakṛsto bhāvarūpah, ābhāsataśca । (ibid p. 356)

Now we come to the other kotis viz. parā and the uttarā. These seem to be his own original thinking on the matter, though they are not so original as they appear at the first sight. Says Bhoja : etena rūdhāhamkāratā rasasya pūrva kotih. ratyādīnāmekonapañcāśato'pī vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisamyogāt paraprakarsādhi-game rasavyapadeśārhatā rasasyaiva madhyamā-vasthā. preyaḥ priyatarākhyānamiti upalaksanena yathā rateḥ premarūpena parinatih tathā bhāvāntarānāmapi paramaparipāke premarūpena parinatau rasaikāyanamiti rasasya paramā kṛstha iti pratisthitam bhavati. P. 351, Śr. Pra. Vol. II.

In the very first kārīkā of the fifth ch. of his S. K. Ā. Bhoja puts forth his new theory of rasa in the words -  
raso 'bhīmāno' hankārah śrīgāra iti gīyate ।  
yo'rthāḥ tasyānvayat kāvyam kamanīyatvamaśnute ॥

In the Śr Pra (Vol I P 1-3 Mas Ed) he says,  
 atmasthitam guṇavisesamahamkṛtasya  
 smgāramāhurīha jīvitamātmayoneh |  
 tasyātmaśaktirasanyatayā rasatvam  
 yuktasya yena rasiko' yamiti pravādaḥ ||

In a person, says Bhoja, in whose consciousness Ego has become manifest, there is a particular quality of such Ego-consciousness. This is the very life of Eros who takes birth from such a self. This quality of Eros is known as smgāra. This quality i.e., smgāra is tasted in the self by the self. This tasting is rasa sui generis. A person in whom this self-tasting has become manifest or developed is called rasika. Thus, by this verse, Bhoja explains the meaning of the word ahamkara used in the first kārīkā of his S K Ā V.

Let us try to understand the implications of this statement. We take as our basis the samkhya psychology, which Bhoja seems to follow or have in mind and which teaches that the man in the world is a particular correlation of puruṣa and prakṛti. According to its another dogma puruṣa is merely the subject of knowledge. It is completely unchanging and inactive. Puruṣa can not be said to do anything. It is consciousness itself and so to say enlightens the transformation that takes place in prakṛti. In such a relation, therefore, what we ordinarily call mental transformations are to be understood as the transformation of prakṛti which is material in nature but which is continuously being illumined by the caitanya of the puruṣa.

In the evolution of prakṛti from its state of equilibrium of sattva, rajas and tamas, the first evolute is known as mahat. This seems to indicate the vastness of reality as such. From this evolves what is known as buddhi which should be understood as cognition as such. This is to say that the vastness of reality first evolves the specific quality of cognition. Buddhi gives birth to ahaṃkāra which we may interpret as Ego or individuality. This evolute of individuality further evolves

into what are known as pañca tanmātrās i.e. the subtle elements which become gross in different kinds of matter and the motor organ and the sensoria organs and in inner organ called antahkarana or manas, which seems to be the active agent between the buddhi and the remaining fifteen elements. We need not go in the study of the further evolutes of prakṛti. What we are concerned with here is the fact of individualised buddhi and Ego which is called 'abhimānohamkārah' by Īś'varakṛṣṇa (Sā Kā 24)

It is the self-enjoyment of this Ego which in the opinion of Bhoja is rasa or taste par excellence. In other words, when such a state of consciousness is reached it is called rasa. Bhoja seems to take this as his basic principle in the discussion of rasa. With this fact he joins up another fact and that is the nature of Eros or kama as such. This is supposed to be self-originating (ātmayoni, compare Amarakosa, ātmabhūh). This is the fundamental fact of love or rati, which is usually identified with the sex-passion. Sex-passion is something which joins the two opposites. The relation of puruṣa and prakṛti, in a way, is visualised in a similar union, though not identical. Eros seems to become manifest in this way. Because the manifestation of Eros is known by the term *śṛṅgāra*, Bhoja is tempted to equate the three *abhimāna*, *ahamkāra* and *śṛṅgāra* as indicating the consciousness of taste or enjoyment.

How far Bhoja is justified in equating the three is another matter. If we here can take the tāntrika or the Śākta view of ultimate union of prakṛti and puruṣa<sup>1</sup> or śiva and śakti, we can find justification for Bhoja's view of defining rasa as *śṛṅgāra*, *abhimāna* and *ahamkāra*.

He, however, to be consistent with his *utkarṣa* theory, interprets *śṛṅgāra* as *śṛṅgam riyate*-etc. This view of Bhoja is, in a way, a substitute for the *nirvighnā samvit* of the Kashmirian śākta *ālaṃkārikas*. In the discussion of Abhinavagupta, however, we find *nirvighnā samvit* coming as a final

state in rasa-consciousness Bhoja starts with abhīmāna, ahaṃkāra and śṛṅgāra as the prime condition of rasa. Thus for Bhoja, a person whose Ego has developed to the capacity of this tasting-rasa—is rasika proper. It is only such a person for whom rasa has meaning.

S K Ā. and Śr. Pra. however, do not in a systematic way develop these ideas. So many different items have been brought in, so that it is very difficult to discover a consistent theory, as for example we do in case of Dhv. Bhoja's attempt to derive all the eight or nine rasas from this basic śṛṅgāra has led to much confusion. Śṛṅgāra is by tradition the principal rasa amongst eight or nine other rasas. Its preponderance in literature is immense. It, therefore, in a popular way can be called rasa par excellence. But this is not the sense in which Bhoja uses the word śṛṅgāra in his S. K. Ā. V. 1, and its further explanation in the Śr. Pra. Here śṛṅgāra is the primary fact of the Ego experiencing itself. Even when we identify Ego and Eros, Śṛṅgāra in the usual sense cannot be identified with it. It is as much a derivative as the other rasas like vīra, adbhuta, karuṇa, etc. Bhoja seems to have been misled into confusing these positions, unless we take the old platonic idea of Eros or the Modern Freudian idea of Libido as the source of all emotions. Anyway, Bhoja has the unique distinction of putting a new dynamic idea into the dialectics of rasa.

As Dr. Raghvan has pointed out, Bhoja bases his speculations on rasa on his concept of rasika. He tries to explain the current usage of the term 'rasika' as follows: *rasaḥ asya astīti rasikah*. Rasa is thus a quality of an individual which makes a man rasika. Rasika, for Bhoja, is not merely the connoisseur or the enjoyer of poetry alone. It means the cultured man in general. He has in him the excellent quality of rasa and this distinguishes him from the other viz. the nirasa. This quality of rasa is identical with all rasikas. Bhoja says that this rasa of the rasika is nothing else but the Ego-Ahaṃkāra tatva.



itself This rasa abhāṅkāra is in the poet, character, actor and spectator It is endowed in a person on account of meritorious deeds in past life Says he ātmasthitam guṇavisesam etc (see above)

Rasa is cīttasamvāda But all men do not have cīttasamvāda in all rasas So, Bharata and following him Abhinava classify characters into *uttama madhyama* and *adhama dhīrodatta, dhīroddhata, dhīralahita* and *dhīrasanta* etc Bhoja also therefore, tries to find out one characterising rasa for each of the four types of heroes such as *dhīrodatta, dhīroddhata* etc This classification becomes intelligible only when we accept a scheme of four different rasas as dominating the characters as their distinguishing marks and as their permanent moods So, Bhoja speaks of *udatta uddhata preyas* and *santa* as the rasas of the four types of heroes

Bhoja has also criticised Bharata's scheme of four prakṛti rasas producing the other four rasas This scheme, Bhoja himself accepts with modifications But Bhoja unnecessarily criticises Bharata by confusing his idea of *abhimana-sṛṅgāra* with Bharata's idea of the usual *sṛṅgāra*

Bhoja's new *sṛṅgāra* is not the old *sṛṅgāra* or *rati prakarsa* This he makes amply clear by his classification of *sṛṅgāra* into *dharma-sṛṅgāra, artha sṛṅgāra, kāma sṛṅgāra* and *moksa-sṛṅgāra*, and by this he means the activities or *purusārtha* of men in these directions Here, by *kāma sṛṅgāra* is meant the usual *sṛṅgāra* of *rati-prakarsa* Says he

vibhavanubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogāt (vi) prakarṣamāpadya  
mānaḥ pradhānaḥ (bhā) vo ratiṃ nama kamaśṛṅgārakhyāṃ  
labhate P 733 Vol IV Ch 32 Śr Pra

This *kāma-sṛṅgāra* also is subdivided by Bhoja into *dharma, artha, kāma* and *mokṣa* (1) It should be noted, however, that for Bhoja activity towards *mokṣa* is *mokṣa-sṛṅgāra* in which Bhoja treats the pure type of *jñānamṛga* of the *sanyāsin* or that

of a karmayogin or he also speaks of grhastha-mumukṣu and his activities. The last is the dhīra-prasānta and his wife married according to vedic rites is the heroine in this case.

In his *uttarā kotī* he talks of all rasas merging into one rasa—the preman rasa—

rasam tvīha premānamevāmananti, sarveśāmeva hi ratyādī  
prakarsānām ratipriyo ranapriyo'marsapriyah parihāsapriyah  
premnyeva paryavasānat, (Sr Pra Vol II P 352-7 ch XI)

The bhūmā of ratī, hāsa, etc is not rasa, but sṛṅgāra alone is rasa. Says he – tatkāthamucyate, 'ratyādibhūmāni punarvitatbā rasoktiḥ' iti? ucyate-na ratyādibhūmā rasah, kim tarhi? sṛṅgarh, sṛṅgāro hi nāma viśīṣṭestadrśīceṣṭābhivyānjā-kāṇām ātmagūṇasampadām utkarṣābjām buddhisukhecchādvē-ṣāprayatnasamskāradyatīś'ayaḥetuh ātmanōhankāravīśeśah saccetasā rasyamāno rasa ityucyate, yadastitve rasiko'nyathabhave nīrasa iti, (Sr Pra, Vol II) 352-7 Ch XI)

In this last part we see that rasa, far from remaining merely a matter of poetic taste, becomes a sort of the realisation of the essence of the self in form of preman.

Here I may incidentally point out that in the later works of vaiṣṇavite writers such as Ujjvalanīlamani sṛṅgāra rasa does not remain merely a matter of human love but rises to the status of Divine love, the love of the Gopī's for ŚrīKṛṣṇa. We also find a similar but curious treatment of the subject in the work called Hamsavilasa of Mithu Kavi of Gujarat.

### The Rasa theory of Ramachandra and Gunachandra

The influence of DR, and that of SK Ā and Sr Pra the works of Malva, is evident in Hemacandra and his disciples *Ramcandra and Gunacandra in Gujarat*. Hemacandra is cognised of the new ideas put forth by Bhoja and his works. But he prefers to follow the tradition of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta and subsumes some of the items under old terms. Thus sneha-rasa with āṇḍratā as its sthāyin is subsumed under ratī,

The love for a friend is *rati*, love for a brother as in case of Lakṣmaṇas love for Rāma is *dharmavīra*, that of children for their parents is *bhaya*. In the same way, says Hemacandra that *laulyarasa* with *gardha* as its *sthāyin* can be subsumed under either *hāsa* or *rati*. Similar is the case with *bhakti*.

As the ND is more independent in holding certain views, we will take it up first. Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, the pupils of Hemacandra, however, are more independent of tradition of their guru in this respect. They seem to follow Bhoja in recognising some of the *sañcārins* as *sthāyins* developing into independent *rasas*. They hold that over and above the nine *rasas* there can be many more such as *laulya* *rasa* with *gardha* as its *sthāyin*, *sneha* with *ārdratā* as its *sthāyin*, *vyasanarasa* with *āsakti* with its *sthāyin* etc. They also recognise additional *vyabhicārins* such as *ksut*, *ṛṣṇā*, *maitri*, *muditā*, *śraddhā*, *dayā*, *upeksā*, *rati*, *santosa*, *ksamā*, *mārdava*, *ārjava*, *dakṣiṇya*, etc. They also hold that even the *sthāyins* and *anubhavas* become *vyabhicārins*. This is seen in Bhoja also who says—*nanu astau sthāyinaḥ astau sāttvikāḥ, trayastriṃśad vyabhicārīnaḥ iti bruvate na tat sādhu, yatōmīśamanyatamasya etaireva parasparam nirvartiyamānatvāt kascit kadācit sthāyī, kadācittu vyabhicāri ato'vasthāvasāt sarve'pyamī vyabhicārīnaḥ, sarve'pi ca sthāyīnaḥ sāttvikāḥ api sarva eva, manahprabhavatvāt, anupahataṃ hi manah sāttvamityucyate* (Śr Pra Vol II p 352-7. Ch XI)

Bhoja also speaks of many other *rasas* such as *ānandarasa* with *praharsa* as its *sthāyin* and also *vīra*, *auddhatya*, *svāntāntya*, *sādhvasa*, *vilāsa*, *anurāga* and *saṅgama* *rasas*. He also speaks of twenty more *rasas* such as *rati*, *utkarsa*, *dbṛtī*, *utkāntā*, *vismaya*, *matī*, *vitarka*, *cintā*, *capalatā*, *hāsa*, *utsāha*, *stambha*, *gadgada*, *unmāda*, *vṛdā*, *avahitthā*, *bhaya* and *saṅka* etc (Śr Pra P 400). It should be noted that the inclusion of *vīra* in the list given as above is something curious, for *vīra* *rasa* is recognised by all the *ṭīlankārikas* and there is nothing new in it.

The tendency to recognise nine traditional *rasas* is not altogether new. Even Abhinava quotes the views of others who accepted *rasas* such as *sneha*, *lauhya*, etc. with *ārdratā* and *gardha* etc. as their *sthāyins* respectively.

Let us examine the definition of *rasa* as given in the ND. The ND says

*sthāyibhāvah sṛtotkarsah vibhavavyabhicārinibhīḥ  
spastānubhāvaniscayah sukhaduhkhātmako rasah ||*

The first thing that we note is the mention, in this definition, of the term *sthāyibhāvah*. This is in accordance with the practice of Dhananjaya and Bhoja.

The second point to be noted is that in the *rasa-sūtra* of Bharata, all the three i.e. *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicārin*, combine to give *rasa*, while here, a little different analysis is given. The effect of *rasa* is brought about by *vibhavas* and the *vyabhicārins* i.e. these are taken as the causes of *rasa*. But the determination of *rasa* is explained as due to clear and distinct *anubhāvas*. This determination or *niscaya* comes about in an inferential process dependent upon concomitants. This reminds us of the *Naiyāyika* view of Śrī Sankuka (*anumiti-anukṛti*).

The third important point of difference lies in recognising the dual nature of *rasa*, i.e. causing *sukha* or *duḥkha*. The meaning is that some *rasas* give pleasure while others give pain. In all these matters Hemacandra follows the traditional view of Ānanda and Abhinava.

The ideas underlying this definition are explained by the authors in their commentary. They take up the position of realists like Bhoja. For them, as noted in the *kārikā* itself, *sthāyibhāva*, when intensified, is itself *rasa*. This really happens with the original persons. The love for *Sitā* can only reside in *Rāma*, and vice-versa. They enjoy the sentiment of mutual *rati* in reality. Their love cannot be experienced by anyone else.

Then how are we to explain the rasa in the readers and the spectators ? The authors say that it is a well-known fact that people do recognise other peoples' sentiments. This cognition is not of course, direct, because sentiments of others are beyond direct perception. They are, therefore, only inferred. This inferential cognition is dependent upon concomitance. But how in a poem or a stage-play can we bring the original characters whose feelings we can infer ? The actor gives a semblance of the vibhāvas etc. of the original characters, while during this act, even though the actor has not the original feeling in him, yet by his anubhāvas he creates the possibility of the inference of feelings in the minds of the spectators. It is for this reason that the authors say that rasa is determined by spastānubhāva i.e. clear gestures etc.

The idea seems to be something like this. The actor with the help of the vibhāvas and vyabhicārins, is enabled to work out the proper anubhāvas which give rasa to his spectators.

The authors make this point clear in the part of the vṛtti which discusses the rasa sūtra : yadapyucyate vibhāvānuubhāvarvyabhicārisamyogādrasanispattirīti tatpāpyanubhāva vyabhicārīnaśca śṛyādīvarnaniyānukāryāpekṣayaiva dṛṣṭayāḥ etc. (p. 143 G O S Ed). The terms anubhāvas and vyabhicārins in the sūtra, according to their interpretation, refer to the described or represented women etc. From these comes rasa by direct perception of one's own experience and by indirect inference of other's experience. This is in conformity with the other exponents of the sūtra who naturally take the anubhāvas and vyabhicārins as those of described or represented characters. The difference lies in taking vibhāvas as belonging to the original person. Probably here they follow Bhoja. The authors say that rasa in its distinctness can only reside in the original characters, because vibhāvādis are real only to them and for this reason, the vyabhicārins and anubhāvas born out of rasa are distinct only in their case. But for others i.e. spectators etc., the vibhāvādis are not real (kevalam mukhya-

dayanti sumanasah puruṣāḥ harsādīms'cādhigacchanti tathā  
 naābhāvabhīnayaavyanjulān vāgāṅgasattvopetān sthāyibhāvanā-  
 svādayanti sumanasah preksakāḥ ca harṣādīmscādhigacchanti  
 tasmanñātyarasā ityabhivyaḅhyātāḥ (G O S Ed Nā S'ā VI),  
 Thus, according to this view, it is held that the rasas, presu-  
 mably all, are pleasant. But those, however, who think that  
 all the rasas are not pleasant, interpret the passage differently.  
 Abhinavagupta says anye tvādis'abjēna s'okādīnāmātra  
 samgrahaḥ (Abh on Nā S'ā G O S Ed p 290). Abhinava's  
 own view is as said above, that all rasas are pleasant. He  
 rejects the other opinion by saying -sa ca na yuktāḥ sāmāji-  
 kām harsaikaphalam nātyam, na s'okādīphalam. He says  
 with emphasis -asmanmate tu samvedanamevanandaghanamās-  
 vādyaṭe tatra kṛā dukkhas'anā kevalam tasyaiva citratākarane  
 ratis'okadivāsanavyāpārastadudbodhane cābhīnayādīvyāparāḥ  
 (p 293 ibid). Dr Raghavan notes the sukha-dukkhātma-katā  
 view of one Rudrabhaṭṭa given in his Rasakalika. He also  
 refers to Haripāla's view regarding the painful nature of  
 vipralambha. (J O R Madras Vol XI P 113-14, 107)

Thus we see that Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra do not  
 follow tradition of their guru in many respects.

We will now take up some other authors, such as—

- (i) Mammata (11th-12th A D)
- (ii) Hemacandra (1088 A D—1172 A D)
- (iii) Viśvanatha (1300-1350 A D)
- (iv) Jagannatha (1620-1660 A D) and others

Mammata, the great syncretist of Sanskrit Poetics has tried  
 to synthesise most of the views of earlier ācāryas. In his  
 mañcalā, he characterises the poetic creation as pleasant on  
 account of nine rasas. But in the definition of poetry, he  
 does not mention rasa as such. This, however, is implied  
 in s'abdārthau, because in the three varieties of artha, the  
 vyāṅgyārtha for him is the meaning of poetry par excellence.  
 In the varieties of vyāṅgyārtha it is rasavyāṅgya which is the  
 most important. He summarises the discussions of Abb. in

one elaborate sentence. In this matter, Mammata implicitly follows Ānanda and Abhinava.

So does Hemacandra in his *Kāvyaṇus'āsana*. In fact he has quoted the whole passage bearing on *rasa* from Abh. At the end of this he says that he also follows Abhinava in this matter—*etanmatameva ca smābhirupajvitatam* (Viveka p. 103). Viśvanātha similarly follows Ānanda and Abhinava in this matter. But he gives prominence to *rasa* in his definition of *kavya* viz *vākyam rasātmakam kavyam* (SD I). He has, however, clarified one point as to how *rasa* becomes *abhi-vyakta*. He says *vyakto dadhyādinyāyena rupantaraparīnato vyaktikṛta eva rasah na tu dīpena ghata iva purvasiddho vyajyata taduktam locanakāraih—'rasah pratyanta iti tvodanam pacatītivad vyavaharah iti'* (SD III 1).

Pundit Jagannātha in his *R G* has discussed many of the problems of Sanskrit Poetics in an independent way. The sum and substance of his ideas on *rasa*, however, are not different from those of Ānanda, Abhinava and Mammata. He, however, like the earlier theorists of *rasa* such as Bhaṭṭa Lollata, Śrī Saṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nayaka, etc., who give the explanation of *rasa*-experience according to their philosophical dogma, gives his vedantic twist to the explanation of *rasa*-experience. According to vedantic view, the nature of the *ātman* is 'sat', 'cit' and 'ānanda'. This 'cit' in our ordinary life is darkened by a cloud (*āvaraṇa*), may be of *māyā*. The poet's speech through its *vibhāvādisāmagrī* breaks up this covering-*āvaraṇa*—and when this happens, the essential constituent of the soul, viz *ānanda*, becomes self-revealed. This is the reason according to him why all *rasa* experiences have as their condition *ānanda*-bliss. And it is for this reason that, according to Jagannātha, *rasānanda* is regarded as similar to *brahmānanda*, of course, it is not *brahmānanda* as such. We may say following Jagannātha that poetry by temporarily removing the coverage of the consciousness gives for the time being a glimpse of the bliss of the soul.

### Resume'

It is my purpose here to put together the main ideas arising out of the discussions in the different chapters of this thesis. I have tried to trace the semantic history of *dhvani*, *vyanjana* and *rasa*.

As to *dhvani* we saw that the meaning that is attached to it in works of poetics is not found, as far as my inquiry goes, in either early vedic literature or later. It is found in its usual sense of sound or making sound. In this sense it is used as a synonym for *śabda* in the works of the *vaiyākaraṇas*, particularly in connection with *Sphota*. This usage of the grammarians seems to have been taken up by the poeticians in their works. But as *dhvani* suggests *Sphota*, similarly in a poem word and its meaning suggest something else and are on that analogy called *dhvani*. When and by whom such a usage was made current is not known. Anyway, by the time of Ānandavardhana it seems to have been an established usage because his work is called *Dhvanyāloka* which, as we have seen, is devoted to the discussion of *dhvani* and *vyañjanā*. It may be noted here that in some of the modern regional languages such as Gujarati, the word *dhvani* is used in the sense of purport or suggestion.

Coming to *vyanjana* or *vyañjanā* we find that we do not find these verbal nouns used in the vedas. But  $\sqrt{\text{añj}}$  and  $\text{vi}+\sqrt{\text{anj}}$  are frequently used.

The meaning that we gather from this is interesting.  $\sqrt{\text{Anj}}$  has the sense of anointing. The survey of the occurrences of  $\text{vi}+\sqrt{\text{añj}}$  in the vedas shows two connected meanings viz., to bring out something hidden by applying some other thing, to brighten, to adorn, to decorate, to embellish, to manifest. In this sense *vyanjana* becomes something like *alamkāra*. It has the sense almost of adding beauty or exhibiting it.

The *Nighantu* and the *Nirukta*, as in case of the vedas, do not have any word like *vyañjanā*. The *Nighantu* has not



even  $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$  or  $v_1 + \sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$  in any form. The *Nirukta* contains occurrences of  $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$  in the sense of 'to anoint'. In *Nirukta* we come across 'vyañjana' in the sense of 'indicator'. In Ch I, Yāska cites the opinion of Gārgya who holds that *upasargas*, though not meaningful by themselves, are yet suggestive of (*dyotakāh*) the relation of *nāma* and *ākhyāta*. Yāska does not mention 'dyotana' by name, but he seems to come very close to 'dyotana' here, which, however, is equivalent to 'vyanjana' of the later *ālamkārikas*.

In the *Rk-pratīśākhya* we come across 'vyanjana' only in the technical sense of a consonant. As to why consonants are called *vyañjana* is not explained. But we may presume that they are so called because the consonants are indicated or made manifest by their relevant sound units.

In Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, we find 'vyanjana' used in a special sense in addition to the technical sense of a consonant. In Pa II 1.34, we have, 'vyanjanairupasikṭe', wherein 'vyañjana' is something which serves to enhance the relish of the main item of food. This usage extends the meaning of the word *vyañjana* to ingredients which add to the flavour of the original substance or bring out its original taste to a greater advantage. When Bharata (Na Sṛ VI) while describing the nature of *rasa* gave the analogy of *śālavādīrasa* and show the importance of *vyañjana*, he might have had in his mind this idea viz. that of ingredients enhancing or exhibiting the taste of the original substance. This has an important bearing on the relation of *vyanjanā* and *rasa*. For Bharata *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicārin* are ingredients which enhance or make manifest the taste of the *sthāyins*.

How far this analogical application of *vyañjana* to *rasa* is responsible for the later relation of *vyanjanā* and *rasa* is difficult to say. In the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, we come across many occurrences of  $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$  and  $v_1 + \sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$  and also words such as

vyañjana We find  $vi+√añj$  in the sense of suggestion as in Mbh Pā VIII 1 70 line 15/page 381 (Mbh Ed Keilhorn)—  $ihāpi mandrasādhanaṁ kṛyāṅgaṁ vyañjate$  At Mbh Pā VIII 2 48 line 23 23/page 408 (Mbh Ed Keilhorn) we have vyanjana in the sense of 'prakāśana

Thus we learn from the earlier literature that vyañjana has the sense of decoration, decorator, indication indicator, consonant sounds suggesting or giving the inner meaning and ingredients enhancing or exhibiting to advantage the original taste of substance

From the study of the works of classical writers prior to Bhāṣa and Dandin such as Bhaṣa, Aśvaghoṣa and Kālidāsa, we find that the meanings of the earlier literature continue But in these works we also find the later sense of suggested meaning or suggestion or something other than directly expressed or clearly grasped e.g. Bu Ca IV 84 has 'upapannam idam vakyam sauhardavyaṅjakam tvayī, wherein a vākya is said to be suggestive of sauharḍa or the feeling of friendship, or Megha (pūrva) 29 has—saubhāgyam te subhaga virahāvasthaya vyañjayanti, wherein Nīrvindhya suggests, by her state, the good luck of the cloud

In Saundarananda XVIII 11—we have vyanjana in the sense of alamkāra We know that in Vāmana the word alamkāra has two senses viz that of saundarya and a figure of speech It is not unlikely that the word vyañjana also had a sense similar to alamkāra i.e. beauty or beautifying agent and also the sense of suggestion The first sense of alamkāra seems to have gone out of usage but the second sense seems to have prevailed in saṁskṛta poetics Thus vyanjana in the sense used in saṁskṛta poetics seems to be current in the work of early classical writers

Thus with the earlier poets vyañjana seems to have been accepted as suggestion in poetry This naturally makes for the recognition of vyañjana as one of the functions of a word The

topic of the functions of words has to be studied through the discussions in the works of grammarians and other philosophical schools. From these discussions the following points emerge. Firstly as regards the relation between *Sphota* and *dhvani*, we can make the following, observations

(1) In the view of grammarians *dhvani* is explained as '*dhvanatīti dhvaniḥ*'. *Dhvani* is so termed because it sounds, or rings or reverberates *Sphota*. The word *ghata*, for example, is used for the object *ghata* which is seen, touched, etc. while the utterance of *ghata* is sound by itself. This means that what is touched and seen is expressed through sound which is the function of hearing. Thus *dhvani* came to have the meaning of suggesting one thing by another. This import of *dhvani* was taken up in poetics as suggestion-*vyāñjanā* in all its varied forms. All the different items that had the capacity to suggest something were regarded as *vyāñjakas* e.g. *śabda*, *artha*, *pada*, *padāṃśa*, *varṇa* and also *guṇa*, *ālaṃkāra*, *riti*, *vṛtti*, *vākya-racana*, *prabandha* as a whole etc.

(2) In the philosophy of the grammarians the sound '*ghata*' for example, does not give the meaning directly. It does so through *Sphota* which in its turn is suggested by the sound *ghata*. Thus what we ordinarily call meaning is arrived at by an indirect process. For the *ālaṃkārikas* also, the process of *vyāṅgyārthagrahaṇa* is not direct but indirect. We arrive at the suggested sense either through *abhidhā* or through *lakṣaṇā*.

(3) The grammarians believe in *vākya-sphota*. They do not accept the separate existence of *padas* i.e. individual words, and much less of letters or *varṇas*. But common experience of ordinary people misleads many to believe that the meaning is derived from individual words or *padas* and thus through letters or *varṇas*. The *Mīmāṃsakas* accept this position. It seems, however, that here ordinary people, and so also the *Mīmāṃsakas*, do not seem to pierce the veil of delusion and they mistake the nature of condition for the nature of the

contents The nature of the condition is the multiplicity of letters, the nature of contents is the unity of word—the vākyasphota

Similar is the case with some ālamkārikas Abhidhā and laksanā form the nature of condition and vyañjanā or dhvani is the nature of the contents Those who fail to distinguish between ends and means, seem to confuse abhidhā and laksanā with vyañjanā

(4) To put it otherwise, for the grammarians, the letters may be taken just as what we may call the object of knowledge i.e. jñānasya viśayaḥ while the word-whole is jñānasya phalam—the result or the fruit of knowledge For the ālamkārikas also, abhidhā and laksanā are jñānasya viśayaḥ, while vyañjanā may be taken as jñānasya phalam These two are not to be confused

(5) The grammarians believe in vākyasphota So they avoid the contingency faced by the padavādīn viz that of recognising parts even of letters or varṇas Similarly those ālamkārikas who want to arrive at the vyaṅgyārtha with the help of laksanā, will have to go for a second laksanā, and a third and a fourth laksanā ad infinitum, involving further prayojanas

(6) Sphota is a distinct entity by itself, not to be identified with dhvani i.e. sound of a word The 'vyangya' is also a separate entity, not to be confused with abhidheyārtha or lakṣyārtha

(7) For the grammarians, there is a krama or sequence in the process of gathering meaning from a word From word to Sphota and from Sphota to meaning—this is the sequence In the same way with the ālamkārikas also, there is a sequence perceptible or imperceptible, between vācyārtha and vyaṅgyārtha

Ānandavardhana, Abhinavaguptapāda and Mammata etc., while discussing this topic refer to the budhas, the wise men

who have taught this doctrine. These budhas are Vaiyākaranas. And they are, as we have seen, justified in making this remark.

The second line of inquiry leads us into the consideration of sabdārvāṇavṛttis in other schools of thought such as those represented by the Vaiyākaranas, Mīmāṃsakas, etc. The points that emerge are as follows. The vaiyākaraṇa view, particularly as represented by Patañjali and Bhartṛhari is as follows. In Patañjali, we find the discussion of mukhyārtha and gaunārtha. But we do not come across any definition as such of abhidhā, gaunī, lakṣanā or vyañjanā. While discussing the gaunārtha or secondary sense, he mentions four different circumstances in which secondary function takes place. Tāsthyā or the relation of location, tāddharmya, or the relation of substance and quality, or function, sāmīpya or the relation of proximity and sāhacarya or being together are mentioned under Pa. IV. 1.48. We come across the term abhidhāṇa paving way for abhidhā vṛtti. In tāddharmya relation as mentioned above, we find the material for gaunī vṛtti and for lakṣanā we find material in other relations as mentioned above. No strict line of demarcation is laid between gaunī and lakṣanā. When we come to Bhartṛhari, we find material which is the source of vyañjanā in the later ālaṃkārikas. In the Mbh. nothing more definite for vyañjanā is noticed than already noted by us earlier.

Bhartṛhari not only mentions gauna and mukhya artha but also discusses the problem of determination of the sense of a given word which has convention (saṅketa) with reference to more than one senses, i.e. a word having multiple senses. In his view, the particular meaning out of several is determined by factors such as context, time, place, etc. (V P II 317-318). It is important to note that later ālaṃkārikas like Abhinava, Mammata, etc. quote these very verses while explaining the abhidhāṇa śābdī vyañjana. Now, the particular sense being fixed, others come to our mind,

according to the *ālamkārikas* with the help of *vyāñjan* Bhartṛhari does not concern himself with the gathering of the extra sense. He only discusses how a particular word, out of the many conventional senses, is limited to convey only one sense at a time. But it is exactly here that the *ālamkārikas* begin where the grammarian has ended. Thus the origin of inspiration for *vyāñjana* is supplied by the grammarian.

Among the later grammarians, Nagasa was the first to recommend the case of *vyāñjanā* clearly.

As for the *Mīmāṃsakas*, we find in Jaimini and Sabara clear references to *abhidhā* and *lakṣanā*. We also come across some varieties of *lakṣana* and *dharma lakṣanā* is also termed *guṇavāda* (Mī. Su. 1.2.10). *Guṇavāda* is also found to be used in a wider connotation of *upacāra* or secondary application in general. Later *Mīmāṃsakas* such as Kumarila and others mention the *tātparya* *vyūti* also. But, there seems to be no reference to *vyāñjanā* as such.

As for the *Naiyāyikas* the acceptance of *abhidhā* by Gotama and others is clearly indicated in the discussion of *śamketagrahana* (Nyā. Su. II.2.65). We also come across reference to the nature of secondary usage or *upacāra* in Nyā. Su. II.2.64. The *Vatsyāyanabhāṣya* illustrates different varieties and also refers elsewhere to *bhakti* and *bhākta artha*. But we do not come across any reference to *vyāñjanā* as such.

Later *Naiyāyikas* such as Gaṇādihara and Jaṇadīśa are not inclined favourably towards *vyāñjanā* which is just a mental cognition or *mānasa bodha* for them. They accept words to be *rūdhā lakṣaka*, *yogarūdhā* and *yaugika* (Sa. Sa. Pra. 16).

The relevance of noting different views on *śabdārthavyūti* in different schools of thought is that our earliest writers o

Bhāmaha seems to be quite familiar with *abhidhā*. But as to his familiarity with functions of word other than the direct one, particularly *vyanjana*, we may say that *vyañjanā* does not find the same place as *abhidhā* in his mind i.e. he does not seem to have recognised *vyanjana* as a separate *vṛtti*. He, however, uses *vi+√an* with the later meaning of *vyanjana* at different places. Similar is the case with Dandin who also mentions *gaunavṛtti* in clear terms. Vamana refers to *lakṣanā* but we miss any clear reference to *vyanjanā* in his writing. It is in Udbhata that we come across a clear mention of 'avagamana' *vṛtti* as distinct from *vācyavacakavṛtti* (IV 47) when he defines *pariyōkta*. This *avagamana vṛtti* cal. *vyanjanā*. In Rudrata, we come across only an indirect recognition of *vyanjanā* when he defines and illustrates *bhāvalamkāra* (VIII, 38-39)

Thus, it seems that the import of *vyañjana* was not unknown to the early poeticists, though they had not clearly recognised it.

Ānandavardhana, Abhinava, Ruṣyaka and Jagannātha observe that the fact of *dhvani*, though not clearly so named, was not unknown to the early poeticists such as Bhāmaha, Dandin, etc who tried to subsume it under different categories. But I have tried to show that we do find an element of implicit sense in the treatment of various topics such as *guṇa*, *alamkāra*, etc by these authors, but it does not go to prove that they knew *dhvani* theory clearly and subsumed it knowingly under various heads.

This may be the basis for the belief of Ānanda, Abhinava etc who observe that Bhāmaha, Dandin etc knew *dhvani* and subsumed it under different poetic categories. The extent works of Bhāmaha, Dandin, etc however do not give proof of the fact that they recognised consciously and subsumed *dhvani* under various heads.

Thus it is only in the *Dhvanyaloka* that we find the first sāstric discussion of *śabdārthavṛttis* giving a definite

status to vyanjana as one of the three sabdarthavṛttis. In the discussion of the varieties of dhvani, Ānandavardhana gives mainly three viz vastudhvanī, alamkāra dhvanī and rasadhvanī. In poetry, however, vastu and alamkāra can be also conveyed by abhidhā and laksanā. It is only rasa which is exclusively conveyed by vyanjana. It therefore seems that the clear recognition of rasa as the very essence of poetry necessitated the discussion as to how rasa, which is not conveyed directly, is conveyed. The process of vyanjanā appeared to be the most satisfying process for the suggestion of rasa. Thus the fact of rasa and the function of vyanjanā become interrelated, and hence the theory of vyanjanā and rasa has to be viewed as one. For the proper understanding of this inter relation, an inquiry into the origin and development of the concept of rasa becomes desirable (3).

In the vedas we find rasa not only in the physical sense of something liquid, but also in the sense of sap in the plants, animals, etc., and also the juice that can be pressed out or extracted, taste etc. In one context, Rv IX 67 31 and 32 we may be able to find some reference to a meaning similar to kavyarasa. There are the pavmānī sūktas to be studied by the ṛsis. Feeling of ecstasy or fulfilment is attached to rasa at Av X 8 44. Qualities as those of exhilaration, joy-giving, taste, flavour etc. are also associated with rasa which thus becomes an object of relish, a joy-giving essence. These meanings make it very easy for the connoisseurs to utilise the word for the aesthetic flavour of sentiments and emotions as found in literature.

In the Nāṣa (I, 17) rasa is associated with Av. Rasa occurs very often in the AV but there is no clear case of later meaning of kavyarasa or nṛtyarasa in it. Abhinava tries to explain this connection in his own way. But I have suggested that probably a better link can be sought in the love-charms, which are as many as 33, and which can be safely taken as beautiful love lyrics, their ritualistic application notwithstanding.



The *Taittirīya Up.* contains the famous utterance in which *rasa* is said to be the soul of the universe and which, on attainment, results in highest joy. This also can be taken as an original inspiration for later theorists

In the *Nighantu*, *Nirukta*, and *Bṛhaddevatā*, we have nothing new to take a note of with reference to *rasa*. Pāṇini's use (V. 295) of *rasa* is not very clear. But the *Mbh* supplies some interesting data. On Pā V 295, Patañjali has the following discussion. He tries to justify this sūtra when preceding sūtra to the same effect is already there. A possible answer suggested is that this sūtra is mentioned in order to exclude the use of other *matup* suffixes. Patañjali illustrates other *matvarthīya* suffixes as in 'rasiko natah', 'urvast vai rūpini apsarasām' etc. *Kāśikā* and *Tattvabodhinī* on the *Siddhāntakaumudī* make it clear that here 'rasa' in 'rasiko natah' and 'rūpa' in 'rūpini' do not stand for sense qualities to be perceived by the corresponding sense of taste and sight, but for aesthetic taste and beauty respectively. Thus it is in the *Mbh* of Patañjali that we first find a clear mention of *rasa* in 'rasiko natah' in the later sense of the *Nā Śā*. Naturally the usage must have been much older for Patañjali to give it as an illustration.

'Rasa' in the early classical poets such as Bhaṣa, Aśvaghoṣa and Kālidāsa, has the sense of taste. The authors lived before 500 A D and the *Nā Śā*, of Bharata which is placed between 300-500 A D may be regarded as familiar with these poets or with such other works. Whatever it may be, in the *Nā Śā* we find the theory of *rasa* crystallised into a sūtra. This naturally presupposes previous discussions on the subject. Whether the discussion on the nature of *rasa* started in the schools of dramaturgy or in earlier *nāṭyasūtras* mentioned by Pāṇini, we have no means of giving a definite opinion. As in case of *vyañjanā*, the earlier poeticists such as Bhaṁaḥa, Dandin, etc seem to be aware of *rasa* and bring it under *alamkāra* *guṇa* and. It is

only in Dhv. that like *vyāñjanā* rasa gets full recognition and is taken as the very essence or soul of poetry

Thus in Dhv. we find a full exposition of the theory of *rasa*, particularly the nature of conveying *rasa*. We saw that according to Ānanda, *rasa* can be conveyed only through *vyāñjanā*. In the *Nāṭyavedavivṛiti* and the *Locana* by Abhinavaguptapadācārya, we find other theories of the process of *rasa* realisation such as those represented by Bhaṭṭa Lollata, Śrī, Saṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, etc. It seems that Ānanda had all these theories before him in their embryonic form and he tried to establish that it is only *vyāñjanā* that can convey *rasa*. Abhinava elaborated this point by giving in the *pūrva-pakṣa* the views of different thinkers and refuting them and finally establishing the *vyāñjana* process as the exclusive process for *rasa* realisation.

However, there were still others who tried to disagree from Ānanda. Dhanañjaya, like Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka seems to maintain *bhavyabbhāvaka* relation with reference to *rasa* and *kāvya*, while Kuntaka has *vicitrā abhidhā*, *rasa* being a form of *vakrokti* in the wider sense of the term and Mahimā tries to revive the *anumitivāda*. In Bhoja we find a different trend. He has a novel approach and tries to correlate *rasa-abhināna-ahamkāra-sṃgāra*, with the *sāṃkhya* trend of thought in its background (see also Bhojavṛtti on *Patañjala sūtra* I 6 P 6, and II 6 P 18- ed. Ānandāsrama series). Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra also strike a different note though the traditional views of Ānanda and Abhinava ultimately gain ground and are firmly reestablished in the hands of Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha.

The mental process which enables one to experience *rasa* can not be really separated from the experience itself as said above. It may be analytically separated for the purpose of discussion. But in fact it is one unitary whole. It is for this reason that we have to consider the theory of the process of *rasa* and the experience of *rasa* as one. It is for this very

reason that the view that one holds about the process of *rasa* affects the theory regarding the nature of the experience of *rasa* and vice-versa. The consideration of this aspect is essential for the understanding of the nature of *rasa*. We have therefore to consider the different views on *rasa* experience from this point of view also. (As noted earlier in the earlier vedic literature *rasa* is something liquid. It is flavour in the mouth, sense of taste etc. On the other side, it is the juicy extract of something, the essence of a thing. In the *Taittiriya Upanisad* we find that the *ātman* which is the supreme reality of the universe is also the essence of the universe—*raso vai sah*—) In sanskrit literature on one side we find the different meanings of *rasa* given in *Amarakośa* and other lexicons continue. On the other side, however we find that right from the time of *Patanjali* and probably even earlier, the term *rasa* is in use for non-material flavour or taste i.e. in its aesthetic sense. In '*rasiko natah*' as noted earlier, we find the word *rasa* used in this sense. When the word *rasa* is used in early poetry, it appears in this sense of literary or artistic flavour.

In the period of the *Nāṣā* and even in earlier ages the nature of *rasa* seems to have been a subject of great and varied discussion. The *Nāṣā* has crystallised it in form of *sūtra* viz. "*vibhāvanubhāvavyabhicārisamyoḡādrasanispattiḥ*" (*Nāṣā* Ch. 6). The explanation given in the *Nāṣā* shows that *rasa* is a resultant of many things, technically of *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicāribhāva*. It is explained on the analogy of *sadavādirasa*. It is accompanied by a feeling of joy. But any resultant of various ingredients is not *rasa* in the *Nāṣā*. The sentiments and the emotions, the *sthāyibhāvas* and the *vyabhicāris*, *sāttvikabhāvas* and their expressions *anubhāvas* that are part and parcel of the human mind are experienced as *rasa*.

To put it in another way, one may say that *rasa* is a taste of sentiments and emotions as they ooze out from the cognitive

he belonged to the school of Kashmir Śaivism. We have tried to suggest that excepting the case of Abhinavagupta who was a philosopher of the Pratyabhijñā School of Kashmir Śaivism, nothing definite can be said of other ācāryas. As nirvighnā samvit and camatkāra play the central role in Abhinava's philosophy of rasa, their technical meanings have to be understood from a consideration of them in the pratyabhijñā school.

Abhinavagupta has said in the verses preceding his discussion that his is an attempt not to find fault with the teaching of the previous ācāryas but to put them in clearer and purer form. This is not merely an expression of modesty on his part. If we analyse the different threads in the web of Abhinava's final statement, we will see in them the opinion of the previous ācāryas put in a more acceptable position. The sahādaya who only has the capacity to perceive rasa is well informed about the relation of things and events, and the sentiments, emotions and feeling that they arouse in life. This ingredient in rasa perception comes from, we may say, Lolāta. The element in rasa perception of the swiftness with which a sahādaya, witnessing a drama or reading a poem, infers from the spectacle, the appropriate emotions, comes from Śrī Saṅkuka. Śrī Saṅkuka also by invoking the citraturaganyāya frees the presentation in a poem of drama from the limitations of reality which would necessitate the judgement about the truth or falsehood or the doubtfulness or similarity of the poetic fact with life. In other words, Śrī Saṅkuka takes poetic creation out of the field of gross reality.

The universality in the perception of rasa comes from the sūdhāraṇīkāraṇa of Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka. In rasa perception one is not troubled by the intrusion of the egoistic impulses of myness, thyness or hisness. This makes it possible for the sahādaya to see a sthāyibhāva in its universality, free from these obstructions. This makes for the heightening of pure consciousness sattvotreka—which is joy itself.

Abhinava weaves in his theory all these ideas freeing them from logical blemishes. Abhinava accepts from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka his *sādhāranīkarana vyāpāra*, but not his idea of *bhoga*. In his view *vibhāvādīs* are adequate for the manifestation-*vyakti*-of *rasa*. The contemplation of the *vibhāvādīs* is compared to chewing. Thus contemplative chewing yields *rasa*. But the activity of chewing and the experience of *rasa* are, so to say, *pari passu*.

Jagannātha accepts this view but substitutes vedantic terminology. He calls it '*bhagnāvaranā cit*' and equates *rasa* with the experience of the highest reality, quoting '*raso, vai sah*'.

We have already seen that though Dhanañjaya and Dhanika do not accept the theory of *vyañjanā*, yet they regard the experience of all *rasas* as joyful. Bhoja also regards the experience of all the *rasas* as joyful. But Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, and later on Siddhicandra in his commentary on K. P. called *Kāvyaaprakāśakhaṇḍana*, follow a different tradition. They take the realistic view that the sentiments, emotions and feelings, not pleasant in life, cannot be pleasant, because they are conveyed through poetry. We do not know whether Lollata who is a realist held this view. But it is quite consistent for those who do not distinguish between the nature of the experience, in ordinary life, of sentiments, emotions and feelings from their cognition in poetry and art, to hold such a view.

Most of the theorists in Sanskrit poetics have adopted the view of *lokottaratā* in poetic experience. In fact it is by the suppression of the conative side of the ego that the *rasa* experience becomes possible. Bhoja however regards *ahamkāra* and *abhimāna* as central to *rasa*. As already noted in his view a *nāyaka*, according to the type of his *abhimāna* or *ahamkāra*, is able to experience the relevant *rasa*, e.g. *dhyaralita* enjoys *kāma śṛṅgāra*, *dhiroddhata* enjoys *artha śṛṅgāra*, *dharma śṛṅgāra*

is enjoyed by a grhastha with his wedded wife, etc (Śr Pra, Chs 18, 19, 20)

In Bhoja's philosophy there are three stages of rasa viz parā, or (पूरा), madhyamā and uttarā. For him the traditional understanding of rasas comes in the madhyamā kotī. His highest stage of uttarā kotī is the experience of preman rasa.

We have seen that Bharata regards eight only as the nāṭya-rasas. But we find the ninth rasa viz sānta, even in the Nāṭya Śāstra, whether as a later addition or the view of a different school we are unable to say. In any case, the experience of sānta rasa carries a man beyond the aesthetic stage as such. In it he comes back to life, where however, the ego and its passion are calmed down. This is the life of an unworldly man. If the suppression of egoistic passions is the condition of rasa, sānta is also rasa. But because it is a part of his life, it does not reach the aesthetic or imaginative stage. The rasika of Bhoja who has the highest preman-rasa is in a way similar to this but different in as much as his view goes beyond the aesthetic sānta rasa to the state of preman—great love. This imperceptibly carries us in to Bhakti rasa. It is both imaginative and aesthetic in its nature as well as real for the Bhakta. There is so much genuine poetry in the songs of the Bhakta which is a reality as far as Bhaktas are concerned.

The work of Rūpagoṣvāmī viz Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu and Ujvalaṅkaramaṇi illustrate this development. Haṁsavilāsa, the Sanskrit work of the Gujarati poet Mittu (18th Cen) also illustrates this development in a new way.

We thus find in the rasa theorists an attempt to grapple with the type of experience which in poetry and art, using the material of life, yet takes them beyond life's egoistic limitations and in certain cases makes their very life free from such limitations. Thus rasa is a spiritual experience and we find it illustrated in the history of Indian culture, wherein poetry, art and religion move together.

**Foot-notes**

- (1) Editions (1) A Barooah, Calcutta 1884 (2) by Vireśvara, Sastri, Benaras 1888 (chs iv and v) (3) by Jivanand Vidhyasagar with Com. of Ratnesvara (on chs i-iii), Calcutta 1894, (4) by Kedarnath Durgaprasad and Vasudev L Pansikar, Nirṇaya Sagar Press, with Comm of Ratnesvara (on chs i-iii), and of Jagaddhara (on iv), Bombay 1925, 1934 Our references are to this
- (2) This classification seems to be based upon the different types of marriage
- (3) It may be noted here that Gñoli in his learned introduction mentions only *rasa* as *dhvani* proper

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## ABBREVIATIONS

- Abhi Sā -Abhiyāna Sāṅkuntala  
A bh -Abhinavabharatī  
A V M -Abhidhāvṛttimātrkā  
Av -Atharvaveda  
B O R I Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute  
Bu Ca -Buddha Carita  
Dhv Dhvanyāloka  
D R Dāśarupaka of Dhanañjaya  
G O S Gackwad's Oriental Series  
K P -Kavyaprakāśa of Maṇmata  
Kumara-Sam -Kumārasambhava  
Mālavikā -Mālavikāgnimitram  
Mbh-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali  
Megha Meghadūta  
Mī Sū Mīmāṃsā Sūtras  
Nā Śa-Nāṭyasāstra  
Pa Panini  
Pā Sū Panini Sūtra  
Pratijñā -Pratijñāyagandharāyana  
Pratima Pratimanātaka  
Rv -Rgveda  
Rk-Prā Rkprāśikhya  
Raghu -Raghuvamśa  
Sau -Saundarananda  
Sā -Sāyana  
S B -Sābarabhāṣya on Mīmāṃsā Sūtras  
S K A -Sarasvatī Kāṇḍābharaṇa of Bhoja  
Śr Pra -Śraṅgāra Prakāśa of Bhoja  
Svapna -Svapnavāśavadattam  
Sv -Samaveda  
Vikramo -Vikramorvashya  
V P -Vākyapadīya

V J -Vakrokti-jivita of Kuntaka.

Vy V Vyaktiviveka of Mahima.

Yv -Yajurveda

वे सू वेदान्तसूत्र

न्या सू.-न्यायसूत्र

मी सू मीमांसा सूत्र

सा द-साहित्यदर्पण of विश्वनाथ

दुर्ग-दुर्गाचार्य on निरुक्त

श श प्र-शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका

वै सू-वैशेषिक सूत्र

शाबर मा-शाबरभाष्य

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